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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the problems met by the antitrust authority of the 
Antimonopoly Law (the AML 2008) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during 
its merger control assessment. It provides solutions to some of these problems with 
reference to EU competition law. Although the thesis cannot solve all the problems 
once for all, it does provide effective solutions to the two following important 
issues: Firstly, how to make the horizontal merger analysis in China better predicts 
the effects of merger on the competitive process? Secondly, how to improve the 
public transparency of antitrust merger assessment in China? 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law’s horizontal merger assessment is still immature and 
experiencing further challenges for development. In order to establish a more 
appropriate and transparent merger control regime, the thesis chooses EU 
competition law to compare. Not only because it is more advanced, but also, 
because the AML 2008 is heavily influenced by the regime. However, it is 
noteworthy that the experience from EU cannot solve all problems met by Chinese 
antitrust authority; especially those are caused by Chinese political and economic 
structure which EU did not have. Nevertheless, by solving the problems met in the 
above two aspects, the thesis has contributed to a more effective and transparent 
horizontal merger control regime for Chinese Antimonopoly Law. Translations of 
titles, authors, and publishers from Chinese works are unofficial, and the laws in 
this thesis are up to date at 30 June 2013. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
A Critical Evaluation of the Analysis of Horizontal 
Mergers under the Anti-Monopoly Law in China—
What Can we Learn From the EU?  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1 Research Questions  
This thesis examines antitrust merger analysis in the People's Republic of China.1 
Two questions are addressed. Firstly, comparing the EU and China, in which 
jurisdiction the horizontal merger analysis better predicts the effects of merger on 
the competitive process. If the EU has more advantages, what can China learn in 
order to improve its method of merger analysis? Secondly, which jurisdiction shows 
greater public transparency of merger assessment? If the EU, what can China learn 
in order to improve such transparency? The following are reasons for choosing 
these two research questions. 
1.1 Aims of Antitrust Merger Control in China 
Merger control can take various forms. In general terms a basic distinction is to be 
drawn between forms of control that are concerned essentially with the processes 
by which mergers and take-overs occur and those forms that are concerned with 
the significance of merger itself.2 In China the former form of merger control is set 
out in its Company Law.3 It is formulated to regulate the organisation and 
                                         
1
 The People's Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949, commonly known as China, has control          
over mainland China and the largely self-governing territories of Hong Kong (since 1997) and Macau 
(since 1999). China in the thesis only means the mainland China. 
2
 M Dabbah and P Lasok QC, Merger control worldwide, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
3
 See Chapter 9 in the Company Law of China which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress on December 29, 1993. The law was revised three times on 25
th
 
December 1999, 28
th
 August 2004 and 27
th
 October 2005. An unofficial English translation of revision 
2005 is available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/17/content_569258_15.htm 
(Viewed on 1
st
 October 2013). There was no official English translation available at the time of writing 
in thesis. 
2 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
behaviour of companies, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of 
companies, shareholders and creditors.4 This is excluded from study in this thesis. 
In this thesis, merger control only concerns the effect of merger itself. In China 
this form of merger control is set out in Chapter4 of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
(hereafter ‘AML2008’). Under the AML 2008, merger control aims to prevent and 
restrain monopolistic conduct, protect fair competition, enhance economic 
efficiency, safeguard the interests of consumers and social public interest and 
promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy.5  
Compared with the ultimate aim in the EU which is to protect consumer welfare, 
the purpose in China is conflicting. It is threefold. The first aim is protecting 
consumer welfare. Chinese law, however, does not explicitly confine its 
assessment to the consumer interest exclusively. Competitors’ interests related to 
a concentration are also considered. As reported by the press, the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) may adopt complaints from 
domestic companies who claimed that their enterprises would not be able to 
survive if a particular merger were allowed to go through.6 Thirdly, there are some 
public interests quite independent of competition, such as establishing national 
monopolists7 or environmental legislation.8 MOFCOM does not provide a hierarchy 
                                         
4
 See Article 1, Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter AML 2008). The law 
was adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress 
of the People's Republic of China on 30
th
 August 2007 and entered into force since 1
st
 August 2008. 
An unofficial English translation about the legislation is available in appendix. There is no official 
English translation during thesis study. 
5
 Article1, the AML 2008. The AML 2008 did not define any specific purpose of merger control. 
Therefore the aim of merger control should be consistent with the general purpose of the AML 2008.  
6
 In Coca Cola/Huiyuan, the MOFCOM concerned the merger would reduce the business 
opportunities for domestic middle and small enterprises producing fruit juice, and restrain domestic 
enterprises in their participation in competition and innovation.  In light of this, merger would adversely 
affect the structure of the relevant market and its effective competition, and also harm the healthy 
development of the relevant market in China. Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22, Coca 
cola/Huiyuan, point3 in section 4, In Inbev/AB, the MOFCOM cleared the transaction on the condition 
that the merged entity should not seek to hold or increase equity interests in the other four domestic 
enterprises. See Announcement of MOFCOM [2008] No.95, Inbev / Anheuser-Busch.  
7
 The Chinese government has a mission to encourage and support the concentration between 
domestic enterprises. In the state’s ‘Tenth Five Planning’, governments are required to promote the 
establishment of a series of giant enterprises and enterprise groups with well-known trademarks, 
independent Intellectual Property and extinguish technology. In 2001 six departments under the State 
Council issued a ‘Guidance on the Development of Internationally Competitive Enterprise Groups’ 
which states that according to the State's 'Tenth Five Planning", governments should give priority to 
developing a series of enterprise groups with the advantage of capital and technology to make them 
leading powers and improve the whole industry and structure in the market. In 2004 eight 
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or balancing mechanism for these competing goals. Thus it is hard to get a final 
decision if consumer welfare is increased, whereas the other two points are 
reduced by a concentration or vice versa.9  
In this thesis, merger assessment focuses only on one definite goal of antitrust 
merger control in China, namely consumer welfare. 
1.2 The Effects of Mergers on Consumer Welfare 
An historical view has been that there is  one-way causation from the structure of 
the market (the number of producers active in the market, barriers to entry, cost 
structures, product differentiation, etc.) to the conduct of producers in that 
market (in terms of pricing and output decision, advertising and product 
differentiation, research and development, collusion etc.) to consumer welfare 
(price of goods or service, the quality of the goods, consumer choice and 
                                                                                                                               
departments under the State Council including the enforcement authority of merger control, proposed 
again to ‘promote the establishment of 15 to 20 large circulation enterprises in 5 to 8 years’ in the 
‘Opinions on the Promotion of Establishment of Large Enterprises or Groups in the Area of Physical 
Distribution’. Faced with the promotion by the government, antitrust merger control might be swayed 
or compromised in the name of increasing public interest or the efficiency of merging parties.  
8
 ‘Public interest’ has not been clarified in related antitrust legislation. Scholars in China take Article 22 
of the Interim Regulation on Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors in 
2006 (hereafter the ‘Foreign M&A Regulations 2006) as  explanation on its notion. The article 
provides that the public interest includes: technical and economic progress, acquisition of failing firms, 
an enterprise's international competitiveness, and environmental factors. The Interim Regulation on 
Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors was promulgated by the 
MOFCOM on 2
nd
 January 2003 and took into effect on the12
th
 April 2003.The amendment of 2006 
(hereafter the ‘Foreign M&A Regulations2006’)  was issued on 8 August 2006 and took effect on the 
8
th
 September 2006. It changed from ‘interim provision’ to ‘The Provisions for the Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors’ on 22
nd
 June 2009. This thesis discusses amendment 
2006, an unofficial English translation is available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-
04/17/content_569271.htm (Viewed on the 24
th
 September 2010). To date, no mention of ‘public 
interest’ has appeared in any published merger decisions.  
9
 The consequences of a horizontal merger are various. After merger the relevant market has one firm 
fewer than before. However, in most instances, merger will neither significantly impede competition in 
the relevant market nor impair consumer welfare. On the other hand, the cost saving resulting from 
the merger to society in general can outweigh the detrimental effect of the merger on consumer 
welfare. According to the consumer welfare standard, a merger should be prohibited if consumer 
welfare is impaired substantially. However, when considering the total welfare of society the merger 
should be cleared as welfare post-merger is increased. The goal of protecting consumers also easily 
conflicts with the goal of protecting the public interest. For example, consumer welfare is increased if 
greater choices are available. However, article 5 of the AML 2008 encourages transactions in order to 
‘expand the business scale’. In this case choices of products may be reduced for consumers. The 
conflicting goals of the AML 2008 are also discussed in, X Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-
monopoly Law, (2008) Volume 75, No. 1, Antitrust Law Journal, pp.142-144. 
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innovation of new products ).10 Merger may change the structure of the market and 
result in conduct by producers in the market which may harm the interests of 
consumers.11 Conducts can also influence the structure of the market. Competitors 
in a market can be eliminated through predatory pricing or tying, or by reducing or 
eliminating the scope for new entry by investing heavily in advertising, excess 
capacity or research and development. Consumer welfare may be affected because 
of the change in market structure. Therefore, merger should be investigated when 
the merged entity is predicted to harm consumer welfare through changing 
competitive process, namely changing market structure or adopting specific 
conducts.  
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of horizontal merger control, criteria of 
Types I and II errors are introduced. Type I error is said to occur if a merger with 
significant anti-competitive effects is wrongly allowed (‘false positive’),  type II 
occurs if a merger is wrongly prohibited or cleared with restrictive conditions 
which would not impede market competition substantially (‘false negative’).12 
1.3 Transparency of Merger Analysis 
‘Transparency’ means the ability of the public to see and understand the workings 
of the merger review process. It requires fair and responsive explanation of the 
                                         
10
 The concept of consumer welfare has four components. Consumer welfare is enhanced if the price 
of goods or services is reduced; or the quality of those goods is increased while the price is not 
changed; or consumer choice is wider, or consumers benefit through technical innovation. The four 
components are recognised in paragraph 8 of the Commission Notice on the appraisal of horizontal 
merger under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. In the 
foreword to the XXXIst Report on Competition Policy, 2001, Marios Monti,  the then Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, stated: ‘our objective is to ensure that competition is undistorted, so as to permit 
wider consumer choice, technological innovation and price competition’. Similarly, in Procter & 
Gamble/VP Schickedanz (II), the Commission found that the proposed merger was likely to harm 
consumers in relation to price, quality, innovation and choice. See case IV/M.430 Procter & 
Gamble/VP Schickedanz (II) [1994]O.J.L354/32, paragraph 182, 
11
 On this one-way causation see, W M Landes and R Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 
(1981) Volume 94 Number 5, Harvard Law Review,pp.937-996; For a sceptical view of the effects of 
antitrust policy on consumer welfare see R W Crandall and C Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve 
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, (2003) Volume17 Number 4, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, pp.3-26. Effects of horizontal merger on market competition and the interest of 
consumers will be discussed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
12
 On Type I and Type II error refer to M.B. Shermer, the Skeptic Encyclopaedia of Pseudoscience, 
(ABC-CLIO, 2002), 455. See also L Roller and M Mano, the Impact of the New Substantive Test in 
European Merger Control,  (2006) Volume 2 No.1, European Competition Journal, pp. 9-28. 
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anti-trust enforcers' action and inaction.13 Transparency of merger analysis 
enhances knowledge and compliance with the law and limits political interference 
and arbitrary activity in competition matters.14 Transparency of the reasons for a 
merger decision to the persons concerned also enables them to defend their rights 
and the Courts to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction.15 Although precise 
measurement of merger effect is rare16, authorities should aim to improve 
transparency to the public through legislation, guidelines and case decision. 
1.4 Adoption of Merger Analysis in the EU as Reference 
1.4.1 The Similarities between the EU and China 
i. The same objectives of merger control between the EU and China 
Both merger control in the EU and China protect competition in the market and 
consumer welfare.17 During the last decade there has been considerable discussion 
                                         
13
 R Pitofsky, Comments on Warren Grimes: Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, (2003) 
Volume 51, Buffalo Law Review, 995, available at: 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1341&context=facpub  (accessed 
on the 8
th
 May 2012);   
14
 See C Ş Rusu,  A Few Considerations regarding Transparency and Legal Certainty in European 
Merger Control, (2007) Issue 2, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Jurisprudentia, pp.180-196; 
Business & Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD & International Chamber of Commerce, 
Recommended Framework for Best Practices in International Merger Control Procedures, (4
th
 
October 2001), available at: http://www.biac.org/statements/comp/BIAC-ICCMergerPaper.pdf  
(accessed on the 3
rd
 March 2012); R Carlton et al., Confidentiality and Disclosure in European 
Commission Antitrust Proceedings—the Case for Clarity, (2008) Volume 4, Number 2, European 
Competition Journal, pp.401-414. 
15
 Meaning of transparency in the EU can see in See Case T-199/99 Sgaravatti Mediterranea Srl v 
Commission [2002] E.C.R. II-2289, paragraph 100. 
16
 There may be two reasons for the rarity of precise measurement. Firstly, all merger control is to a 
greater or lesser extent forward-looking or prophylactic. The enforcement authority has to make 
predictions about the likely effect of the merger on competition in the market. Prediction may be 
speculative and uncertain. In addition, securing access to sufficient data to evaluate precisely the 
market power and efficiency effects is extremely difficult. The question of whether the merged group 
will enjoy market power is uncertain, taking account a whole range of factors such as concentration 
levels, barriers to entry and buyer power. While some of these are capable of objective measurement, 
many are not and analysis of the relevant factors taken together is necessarily complex, and 
subjective. Therefore the enforcement authority of merger control embraces discretion to balance 
various considerations in merger review. See K Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the 
Globalization of Antitrust, (2005) Volume 72 Issue 2, Antitrust Law Journal, pp.375-422. 
17
See Recital 2 of EUMR and Article 1 of the AML 2008. See also the discussion of the substantive 
test of merger control in ‘4.2.1Rewording the Substantive Test’ in Chapter 3. 
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of the goals governing the application of merger control in various jurisdictions, 
particularly the US and the EU.18 The debate in the late 1980s among enforcers and 
academics has finally led to the view that competition law should primarily aim at 
an efficient working of the market, in order to maximise consumer welfare as the 
standard for the evaluation of practices under competition policy.19 In the EU this 
approach was confirmed several times by the former Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, Mario Monti.20 Further, the Notice on Horizontal Mergers states 
that the goal of the Regulations is exclusively to protect consumer welfare: 
Effective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as low prices, high 
quality products, a wide selection of goods and services, and innovation. 
Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents those that would be 
likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the 
market power of firms.21 
Although there are others who do not regard consumer welfare as the sole 
objective of merger control, the working assumption of merger analysis in the EU 
is the promotion of consumer welfare.22According to article 1 of the AML 2008, 
                                         
18
About the debate see, CD Ehlermann and LL Laudati, The objectives of competition policy 
European competition, in European Competition Law Annual, (Hart Publishing, 1998), 1; K Miert, 
European competition policy: a retrospective and prospects for the future, in Annual Proceedings of 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Juris Publishing, 2000), pp. 
1-12; Mario Monti, Speech at the UCLA Law First Annual Institute on US and EU Antitrust Aspects of 
Mergers and Acquisitions of February 28, 2004, Convergence in EU-US antitrust policy regarding 
mergers and acquisitions: an EU perspective, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/449&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed on the 23
rd
 April 2012). 
19
 A Pera and V Auricchio, Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and the Objectives of Competition 
Policy, (2005) Volume1 Number 1, European Competition Journal, pp.153-177. 
20
 Mario Monti stated that ‘We both agree that the ultimate purpose of our respective intervention in 
the market-place should be to ensure that consumer welfare is not harmed.’ See also comments of 
Mario Monti in response to a speech by Hew Pate in Brussels on 7
th
June 2004, emphasising that 
consumer welfare is the ultimate objective of both US and EU competition policy, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004_005_en.pdf; (accessed on the 15
th
 September 
2013). For more speeches of Mario Monti on the objective of EU merger control see A Lindsay, the 
EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, Second Edition,(Sweet & Maxwell,2006), pp.37-39. 
21
 Paragraph 8, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter ‘Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers’), 
[2004] O.J. C31/5.  
22
There are three kinds of criteria for assessing competition law: consumer welfare considers whether 
the market delivers benefits to consumers; total welfare takes account of the interests of producers as 
well as consumers; and efficiency focuses on the way the market operates. For an introduction of 
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merger control in China also aims to prevent and restrain monopolistic conduct and 
safeguard the interests of consumers.23 In published case decisions, the MOFCOM 
has blocked a merger or imposed commitments on notified concentrations because 
the mergers would impede effective competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of consumer welfare.24 
ii. The Role of Enforcement Authorities in Merger Control 
Recital 8 of the preamble to the EUMR makes clear that the Commission is the only 
body that can take decisions concerning concentrations with an EU dimension.25The 
European Commission has comprehensive authority to engage in investigation, 
decision making and imposing sanctions in relation to mergers with an EU 
dimension. In addition, it is responsible for issuing competition related guidelines 
to address the problems identified by the Commission.26 The European Court of 
Justice and the General Court are only responsible for hearing appeals in relation 
to decisions taken (or not taken) by the Commission.27 They do not have the 
authority to make antitrust merger decisions or impose sanctions directly. The 
position in similar in China: the MOFCOM is the only administrative authority in 
China which is in charge of legislation, reviewing and making final decisions in 
                                                                                                                               
these three criteria see A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 20, 
pp.1-25. 
23
Article 1 and Article 28, the AML 2008. 
24
For example, in Coca cola/Huiyuan, transaction was blocked because ‘it will result in elimination and 
restraint of competition with existing fruit juice drinks enterprises and further damage the lawful 
interests and rights of the consumers’. In Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, notified transaction was cleared 
with restrictive conditions because ‘it will have negative impact on effective competition in China’s 
MMA market’. See section 4-1, Coca cola/Huiyuan, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22; 
paragraph 1, section 5, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28. 
25
See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (hereinafter ‘EUMR’), [2004] O.J. L24. 
26
 See W.P.J. Wile, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the 
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, World 
Competition: Law and Economics Review, (2004) Volume 27 No.2 pp.202-224.  
27
 The general right to appeal against actions of the Commission is set out in Article 230 of the EU 
Treaty. Article 21(1) ECMR also provides ‘subject to review by the [ECJ] the Commission shall have 
sole jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for in this regulation’. Appeals of merger case decision 
are discussed in M Furse, Competition law of the EC and UK, Sixth Edition, (Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp.189-201. 
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merger control.28 The relevant court becomes involved only when any party 
concerned is dissatisfied with the decisions and appeals.29 
iii. Mission of integrating markets 
The EU is an economic and political union of 28 member states. Each member 
state may compose an exclusive relevant market. The Commission aims to break 
down barriers to cross-border trade within the EU and to establish a single market 
in the EU within which there is free movement of goods, services, capital and 
workers.30The operation of administrative monopoly in China results in barriers to 
regional markets.31The AML 2008 also aims to overcome administrative monopoly 
and reorganise local markets into a single national one.32 
In conclusion, these similarities lead to the adoption of the EU model as a 
reference for comparison, especially as the EU has a longer period of development 
of its merger control regime than China. In the process of development the regime 
became more transparent and complete. This experience can guide the newly born 
merger control processes in Chinese law. The history of merger control in the EU 
may for convenience be divided into three phases. The first is the period from the 
initial lacuna in the Treaty of Rome to the drive for merger control at the EU 
level.33 In 1973 the Commission adopted its first legislative proposal for a merger 
control regulation. However, there was no consensus on the necessity for merger 
                                         
28
See ‘4.2.2.1The Role of MOFCOM in China’s Merger Control System’ in Chapter 1. 
29
Article 53, the AML 2008. 
30
 This is a feature unique to EU competition law. see J Goyder and A. A.Llorens, EC competition law, 
Fifth Edition, (Oxford European Union Law Library, 2009),11 
31
See ‘4.2.1.1 Barriers to Accessing Some Administrative Zones’ in Chapter 1.Xinzhu Zhang and 
Vanessa Yanhua Zhang thought the geographic market in case Inbev/Anheuser-Busch was narrower 
than that of China. More detail regarding the notified transaction is available at ‘3.2Factors 
Considered in Defining the Relevant Geographic Market’ in Chapter 2. See X Zhang and V Zhang, 
Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, (2010) Volume 6 Issue 2, E.C.L.R., pp. 482-486. 
32
 Abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition is regulated under Chapter 5 of 
the AML 2008. In general, any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or an 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs is not allowed to abuse its administrative power to 
block free circulation of commodities between regions. See Articles 32 to 37, the AML 2008. 
33
 The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (hereafter ECSC treaty) contained provisions for 
controlling mergers, but it was not adopted in the EEC Treaty. For the climate of merger control in the 
EU before the adoption of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89  see T A Downes and J Ellison, the 
Legal Control of Mergers in the European Communities, (Blackstone Press Limited, 1991), pp.1-33. 
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control among Member States.  The second phase is the period of application of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (currently Articles 101 and 102 of The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union).Prior to the adoption of the European 
Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) the Commission relied, where possible, on 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in prohibiting some mergers. Nevertheless, the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 has its own problems; the process of review is 
long and uncertain and the scope of merger review is undetermined.34 The third 
phase of merger control in the EU is characterised by the issue of EC Merger 
Control Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 (ECMR).35  Subsequent amendments were 
proposed in the implementation of ECMR 4064/89. In response to the 1996 Green 
Paper reviewing the ECMR Regulation 1310/97 introduced some amendments to the 
ECMR.36 After that the 2001 Green paper mooted jurisdictional, substantive and 
procedural matters set out in the ECMR.37  As the outcome of the negotiation and 
discussion of the 2001 Green paper, the EU Merger Regulation was adopted and 
published in the Official Journal on 20 January 2004.38 The regulation is 
supplemented by an implementing Regulation and a series of Commission Notices 
which provide guidance to the interpretation of various provisions of the Merger 
Regulation.   
1.4.2 Differences in Context between the EU and China 
There are differences in the context between the EU and China for assessing 
horizontal mergers reduce the significance of comparison, and which are 
acknowledged throughout this thesis. 
                                         
34
 See D Neven and L Röller, Discrepancies between Markets and Regulators: an Analysis of the First 
Ten Years of EU Merger Control, (August 2002), HEI Working Paper No: 10/2002, available at: 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_economics/shared/international_
economics/publications/working%20papers/2002/HEIWP10-2002.pdf (accessed on the 30
th
 
September 2013);N Levy, EC Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence, (2003) Volume 26 Issue 2, 
World Competition, pp.195-218. 
35
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, (1989) O.J. L 395/1. 
36
Community Merger Control Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, COM (96) 19, 
January 1996; Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (1997) O.J.L180/1. 
37
Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, COM (2001) 745, December 
2001. 
38
See supra note 25. 
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i. The impact of non-competitive considerations on merger assessment 
In addition to protecting market competition and consumer welfare, antitrust 
merger assessment in China also has another purpose. According to Article 1 of the 
AML, merger assessments may take into account issues such as ‘enhancing 
economic efficiency’, ‘safeguarding the interests of social public interest’ and 
‘promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy’. There is no 
further legislation or guidelines which clarify these concepts. These concepts have 
not been applied in the published case decisions. Therefore, it is too early to 
evaluate the MOFCOM’s assessment of these factors in merger control, or compare 
their enforcement with the EU.   
ii. Judicial review of merger decisions 
In the EU the General Court will annul the Commission’s decision when there are 
‘manifest errors’.39 Generally, the contribution of judicial review on merger 
assessment can be analysed from three aspects, namely interpretation of the EU 
Merger Regulation,40review of the substantive issues of merger assessment41 and 
reviews of the procedures applied.42However, as judicial review in China is not 
independent and is in fact ineffective, its contribution on correcting mistakes in 
the MOFCOM’s merger assessment is limited.43 
                                         
39
See case T-5/02,Tetra Laval v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-4381;Cases T-342/99, Airtours v. 
Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-2585; 
40
In particular the court emphasises on constructing the meaning of the provisions of the EUMR. The 
General Court have interpreted the ‘dominant’ test, under the 1989 ECMR, that it applied to cases of 
collective as well as individual dominance. See case T-102/96 Gencor v. European Commission 
[1999] E.C.R. II-753; a situation of collective dominance could be based on three cumulative factors. 
See case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] E.C.R II-02585, paragraph 62. 
41
The General Court reviews the evidence to verify if the factual findings are based on ‘cogent and 
consistent evidence’. See Case C-12/03Commission v Tetra Laval [2010] E.C.R. I-00067, paragraph 
27; In addition, it checks whether the reasons for conclusions are consistent with those factual 
findings and confirms whether or not the Commission has made any ‘manifest errors’. See Case T-
5/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4381, paragraph 132. See also M Clough, the Role of 
Judicial Review in Merger Control, (2003-2004) Volume 24, Northwestern Journal of International Law 
& Business, 733. 
42
In Schneider, the General Court defined the relationship between the Commission’s Statement of 
Objections (SO) and the final decision. See Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] 
E.C.R. II-4071, points 445. 
43
See ‘4.2.3 Ineffectiveness of Judicial Review’ in Chapter 1. 
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iii. Imbalance of information for comparison between the EU and China 
Compared with the extensive regulations, case decisions and articles regarding 
merger control in the EU, there are only 13 (short) relevant guidelines and 19 
published merger case decisions in China as of30 June 2013. A number of factors 
which are listed in the AML2008 or guidelines are of limited value. There is no 
further explanation or discussion on how those factors are considered, nor 
evidence published concerning how these factors have influenced the MOFCOM in 
any particular case.44This limits the conclusions which may be drawn at present in 
relation to the practice of the MOFCOM in some areas. 
2 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters, including an Introduction and conclusion. It 
criticises the approach of appraising a proposed concentration under the AML2008 
in China. It questions whether merger analysis by MOFCOM is able to predict the 
effect of any given concentration on the competitive process. It also questions 
whether the process of merger analysis as reflected in merger decisions is 
transparent.  As currently practised, merger review consists of three fundamental 
steps: 1) the delineation of relevant markets; 2) examination of specific market 
factors to determine the extent to which the proposed merger would increase 
market power and thus harm the market competition; and 3) assessment of 
rebutting factors that could offset any harms due to increased market power.45 In 
Chapter 2 the approach of defining the relevant market in China is compared with 
the comparative approach in the EU. Market definition is a necessary pre-condition 
for assessment of a concentration; it is a starting point for a competitive analysis 
and not an end. Two goods or services are in the same relevant market if and only 
if customers view them as sufficiently close substitutes. In this chapter the 
questions that need to be answered are: what does ‘sufficiently close’ substitution 
                                         
44
Factors leaving for research in future include ‘efficiency created by the merger’, ‘failing firm defence’, 
‘the effects of merger on national economic development and on public interest’. This standpoint is 
also expressed in note 2 of Chapter 5, 168. 
45
 Steps of merger review is confirmed in M K Katz and H A Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the 
Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, (September, 2006), UC Berkeley Public Law 
Research Paper No.821234, 538. 
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mean? What approach is adopted in analysing the substitute relationship between 
products? Is the process of defining ‘relevant market’ clarified in MOFCOM’s case 
decision, comparing with the merger decisions in the EU is transparent. 
Chapters 3 and 4 review anti-competitive concerns in horizontal mergers.46 
Horizontal mergers produce two consequences that do not arise in either vertical 
or conglomerate mergers. A horizontal merger may remove important competitive 
constraints in a concentrated market and, consequently, the market power of the 
merged entity might be increased. The reduction in these competitive constraints 
could lead to significant price increases in the relevant market.47 Generally, such 
price increases can occur through two channels. Unilateral effects mean a merger 
would create or strengthen the dominant position of the merging firm and, 
consequently, it will be able to raise its price without losing sales. Co-ordinated 
effects means a merger would create or strengthen a collective dominant position. 
Therefore it increases the likelihood that firms are able to coordinate their 
behaviour in this way and raise prices, even without entering into an agreement or 
resorting to a concerted practice.48 Chapter 3 focuses on the approach of 
evaluating unilateral effects in China. Assessment of co-ordinated effects will be 
conducted in Chapter 4. Through comparison each chapter intends to explore the 
question whether competitive analysis is explained clearly in law and case decision 
in China and whether the result of competitive assessment is able to reflect the 
effect of merger on the competitive process properly.    
Chapter 5 evaluates the countervailing factors to anti-competitive issues. Even 
though a merger is predicted to cause competitive harm to consumers, there are 
still countervailing factors which are likely to ensure that consumers are not 
harmed by the merger. In the Interim Rules factors which can counter the anti-
                                         
46
 A horizontal merger is one which occurs between firms operating in the same market. See H 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, Third Edition, 
(Thomson West, 2005), 500. 
47
 Apart from price increase the merged group is also able profitably to reduce quality, choice or 
innovation as the reduction of its competitive constraint. See paragraph 24, Guidelines on Horizontal 
Mergers. 
48
 Paragraph 39, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. See also Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission, 
[1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 277; Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission, [2002] ECR II-2585, 
paragraph 61. 
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competitive effect on consumers are listed.49 In addition to economic efficiency, 
MOFCOM also considers the countervailing new entry; whether buyers can exert an 
offsetting power over the concentration’s anti-competitive effect (buyer power) 
and whether the merging parties are ‘on the verge of bankruptcy’ (i.e. failing firm 
defence). If the business operators concerned can prove that the concentration 
gives rise to countervailing benefits which ‘obviously’ outweigh its negative impact, 
or it is in accord with the public interest, MOFCOM may decide not to prohibit the 
concentration.50 The Interim Rules does not provide any details on how to calculate 
or measure these factors. To date factors of countervailing market entry and buyer 
power have been considered in published cases.51 Their method of analysis and 
transparency in case decisions will be compared with their counterparts in the EU. 
Other potential defences, namely efficiency and failing firm factors, cannot 
restrain the market power of the merged entity. They are taken as exemptions of 
prohibition or raising sharp commitments when anti-competitive effect of merging 
parties has already existed. Accordingly these two factors are not discussed further 
in this thesis. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis is presented in chapter 6. It 
contains two aspects. First, whether the merger analysis in China can predict the 
effects of concentration on market competition? Second, to what extent does the 
legislation and case decisions make transparent to the public how MOFCOM weighs 
all the variables in their enforcement decisions? Both of these two questions are 
analysed with reference to merger review in the EU. 
3  Methods of Research 
The comparative method is essential in this thesis. The MOFCOM is often criticised 
for its lack of experience of merger examination.52 Some may then question 
                                         
49
 Articles 7 to 13, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement No. 55 of 
29
th
 August 2011, Interim Rules on Evaluating Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business 
Operators (hereinafter ‘Interim Rules’). 
50
 Article 28, the AML2008. 
51
 See the discussion in chapter 5. 
52
 See Y Huang, Pursuing the second best: the history, momentum, and remaining issues of China’s 
anti-monopoly law, (2008) Volume 75 Issue1 Antitrust law Journal, pp. 231-265; X Wang, Comment 
on Operators Concentration in Anti-Monopoly Law of people’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国反垄
断法中经营者集中制度的评析, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanlongduanfa zhong jingyingzhejizhong 
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whether the authorities in China can adopt and apply various competition law 
techniques from large, developed bodies such as the EU.53 If it can, how much can 
it modify particular legal techniques, considering its own economic, political, and 
social consequences? In general it legitimately can be assumed that competition 
authorities with a short history should adopt legal and economic structures from 
advanced competition regimes, regardless of their different economic and social 
structures. In particular, this assumption seems plausible when competition 
authorities rely heavily on the universalism of economic theories.54 This 
comparative analysis can offer a larger variety of solutions than could be made in a 
system within one country. The MOFCOM can learn from other regimes’ legal 
practices, which may give guidance on better paths of development, and modify 
them to fit their own economy and market. 
In addition, historical analysis will also be applied. In the introduction, the 
development of merger control in China requires a historical investigation. Through 
the historical review, the disparities of market situation and legal circumstance 
between China and EU can be found out. These differences will be considered 
when learning the experience from the EU.  
                                                                                                                               
zhidu de pingxi], (2008) Volume1 Law Journal [法学杂志,faxue zazhi], pp. 2-7; J Shi, Thinking about 
complement of the system of defense against the substantial test of merger control [完善我国经营者
集中实质审查抗辩制度的思考, Wanshan Woguo Jingyingzhe Jizhong ShizhiShencha KangbianZhidu 
de Sikao], (2009)Volume 12,The Law[法學,Fa Xue],pp.102-109. 
53
 In this thesis reference is set as the merger control regime in the EU. The comparison of merger 
control of China and other regimes can be conducted in future research.  
54
 The economic basis of merger control is available at Part III—Measurement in S Bishop and M 
Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, Second 
Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pp.317-456.  
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4 Historical Development of the Chinese Economy 
and Competition Law 
4.1 No Tradition of Anti-monopoly Analysis of 
Concentrations 
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee the Communist 
party of China made a decision which redirected the focus of its work from ‘class 
struggle’ to construction of the economy. 55 Since this policy change in 1978, 
economic reform in China has been an ongoing project. In this process China has 
experienced the transition from a social planned economy to a socialist market 
economy.56 A planned or command economy is an economic system in which the 
central government makes all decisions on the production and consumption of 
goods and services.57 In order to construct the socialist market economic system, 
market forces rather than central government should play the basic role in 
allocating resources.58 During the transition the purpose of merger control was 
changed. The following section will review the development of merger control in 
China. The tradition and features of merger control in history may have some 
influence on the development, expression, and application of merger control in 
the present. 
                                         
55
 The announcement of  the Third Plenary Session of The Eleventh Central Committee, People's 
Daily, (Beijing, 24
th
 December 1978), 1, available at: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/1975390.htm?fr=ala0 (accessed on the 7
th
 December 2009). 
56
 In 1993, the second constitutional amendment was passed in the Eighth National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China. According to article7 of this amendment, the state 
changed from implement of planned economy to socialist marketing economy. For an unofficial 
translation of this amendment can refer to: http://portal.gov.mo/web/guest/info_detail?infoid=103 
(viewed on the 23 September 2010). 
57
 The Editorial office, Encyclopaedia of China, Second Edition, (Press of Encyclopaedia of China, 
2009). 
58
 The Decision on Solving Some Problems in Establishment of Socialist Market Economy System 
was promulgated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1993. The Official 
Chinese Version is available at http://www.cass.net.cn/zhuanti/2008ggkf/show_News.asp?id=228951 
(viewed on the 24
th
 September 2010). No English translation was available at the time of writing this 
thesis. 
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4.1.1 Encouraging Mergers between the SOEs between 1978 and 
1993 
As a tool to realise the industrial policy of the planned economy, regulations on 
merger control were promulgated by state authorities. In 1986 Regulations to 
Further Push the Development of Horizontal Alliance in [the] Economy were passed 
by the State Council. 59 In 1987 the former State Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System and the former State Economic and Trade Commission together 
published Suggestions on Construction and Development of Business 
Conglomerates.60 In 1989 four authorities jointly published The Provisional 
regulations on merger.61 
These regulations encouraged horizontal mergers and the formation of group 
enterprises among State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The purpose was to reduce the 
losses of SOEs.62 It planted a seed for the establishment of SOEs’ dominant 
positions in the market. Anti-monopoly was only proposed as a principle of 
regulation existing alongside other principles.63 There was no threshold on the 
                                         
59
 Regulations for Further Pushing the Development of Horizontal Alliance in Economy,[国务院关于进
一步推动横向经济联合若干问题的规定 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Tuidong Hengxiang Lianhe 
Ruogan Wenti De Guiding], which was promulgated by the State Council of China on 23
rd
 March 1986. 
It was repealed in 2000. The official Chinese version is available at: 
http://law.baidu.com/pages/chinalawinfo/0/27/859f16fa6c4ee582e2e3dd6b59cbd137_0.html (viewed 
on the 23
rd
 September 2013). There is no English translation during thesis. 
60
 Suggestions on Construction and Development of Business Conglomerate [国家体改委、国家经委
关于组建和发展企业集团的几点意见 Guojia Tigaiwei,Guojia jingwei guanyu Zujian he Fazhan 
Qiyejituan de Jidian Yijian] was promulgated by the State Commission for Restructuring the  
Economic System and State Economic Commission on 16
th
 December1987. It has been ceased. The 
official Chinese version is available  at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/gwyfg/1987/232101198707.html (Viewed on the 7
th
 September 
2013).  As above. 
61
 The Interim Regulation on Merger [国家体改委、国家计委、财政部、国家国有资产管理局关于企业
兼并的暂行办法 Guojia Tigaiwei, Guojia jiwei, Caizhengbu, Guojia guoyouzichan Guanliju Guanyu 
Qiyejianbing de Zanxing banfa] was jointly released by the former State Commission for Restructuring 
the Economic System, the State Development Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, the 
National State-Owned Assets Administration on 19
th
 February 1989. It was repealed in 2000. The 
official Chinese version is available at: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=5554 (Viewed on 
the 7th September 2013). As above. 
62
 Article2, Suggestions on construction and development of business conglomerate, supra note 44. 
63
 For example, in the Interim Regulation on Merger, anti-monopoly is one of six principles that 
concentrations should follow. In addition to the aim of anti-monopoly, mergers should also accord with 
the strategy of economic development and industry policy; optimise the industrial structure, product 
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concentrations which might be reviewed under an anti-monopoly process, nor were 
there measures set out in relation to concentrations which might have the effect 
of lessening competition in the market.64 
4.1.2 Driving for Regulating Mergers between Enterprises with 
Foreign Investments between 1993 and 2003 
In light of the development of market structures, legislation concerning 
competition was speeded up in this period. Based on the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law, 65 a number of regulations concerning competition were passed.66 The 
Provision on the Merger and Division of Enterprises with Foreign Investment in this 
period was applied in relation to the regulation of mergers and the division of 
enterprises, and protecting the interests of enterprises and individuals concerned 
in merger and division.67  
                                                                                                                               
structure and organisational structure of the enterprises; and promote scale economy etc. The Interim 
Regulation on Merger, supra note 46. 
64
 M Du and H Li, Merger control in the state of economic transformation which is based on Anti-
monopoly: the Example of China  [经济转轨国家中企业并购的反垄断法规制：对中国的个案研究 Jingji 
Zhuangui Guojizhong Qiye Binggou de Fanlongduanfa Guizhi] in D W Cheng and J F Li , An 
Exploration of China’s Legislation on Competition[中国竞争法立法探要,zhongguo jingzhengfa lifa 
tanyao], (Social Sciences Academic Press,2006), 83. 
65
 Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China [中国人民共和国反不正当竞争法, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanbuzhengdang Jingzhengfa] was promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress and effective on the 9th February 1993. For an official 
English translation see:  http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306 (viewed on the 24
th
 
September 2013). 
66
 Such as Price Law of People’s Republic of China [中华人们共和国价格法, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jiagefa], adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People's Congress on the 29
th
 December 1997, entered into force on the 1
st
 May 1998. An English 
translation  can be seen at: http://www.82invest.com/UploadFile/price%20law.pdf  (viewed on the 24
th
 
September 2010); and Law of the  People’s Republic of China on Bid Invitation and Bidding Law [中华
人民共和国招标投标法, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhaobiao Toubiaofa] was adopted at the 11th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on the 30
th
 August 1999, 
promulgated on the 30
th
August, and entering into force on the 1
st
 January 2000. An English version 
can be seen at: http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/biabl226/ (viewed on the 24
th
 September 
2013) 
67
 Provision on the Merger and Division of Enterprises with Foreign Investment [关于外商投资企业合
并与分立的规定, Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye Hebing yu Fenli de Guiding] were promulgated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce on the 23
rd
 September 1999. This amendment was issued on the 22
nd
 November 2010. 
The analysis in this thesis is based on the amendment of 2010. An unofficial translation can be found 
at: http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/yingyu_246912.html (Viewed on the 24
th
 September 
2013).According to Article1 the provision its purpose is to standardise acts involving merger or 
18 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
These Provisions were only applicable to mergers or division between 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures, Chinese-foreign cooperative joint ventures 
with legal personality status, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and 
companies limited by shares with foreign investment, which had been 
established in China pursuant to China's laws. 68  
In accordance with Article 26 of this Provision the administrative department for 
reviewing and approving mergers was the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (hereafter MOFTEC)69. When MOFTEC found that a merger could lead 
to monopoly in a relevant market and impede free competition it would hold a 
hearing with other departments, investigate and collect evidence from the parties 
to the merger and analyse the condition of the relevant market. The regulation did 
not set out what the MOFTEC would do after any investigation and hearing. In the 
process of investigation and hearing the parties which would be involved were not 
clearly specified. This opaque approach rendered the enforcement of merger 
control based on anti-monopoly ineffective. Nor was there any threshold for 
MOFTEC to decide whether a concentration should be subject to an anti-monopoly 
review. There was no definition of ‘monopoly’ provided in the regulation. The 
discretion left to MOFTEC ensured that the merger parties could not predict the 
result of any merger review.  
In conclusion, regulations in this period showed that the government realised the 
possibility that mergers could lead to monopolies in markets, and that it had the 
intention to control this trend to monopoly through concentration. Nevertheless, 
the incomplete legislation made this intention hard to implement. 
                                                                                                                               
division of foreign investment enterprises and to protect the lawful rights and interests of investors and 
creditors of enterprises.  
68
 Article 2, ibid. 
69
 In March 2003 The MOFCOM was established. It undertakes some functions of the MOFTEC, the 
National Development and Reform Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission. The 
MOFCOM is one of administrative departments composing the State Council. 
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4.1.3 Control of Concentrations Relating Foreign Investors during 
the Period 2003-2008 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the 11th December 2001.70 
Foreign-related acquisitions were stepped up and began to threaten the WTO 
liberalised sectors. The government was pushed into the creation of merger 
control regulations, particularly mergers involving foreign investors.71 The Interim 
Provisions on mergers and acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors 
was promulgated in 2003.72 It was the first legislation in China which established a 
review system applying anti-monopoly principles to concentrations. It established a 
framework for an effective merger control system. The threshold of merger control, 
analytical considerations, exemptions from prohibition, enforcement and 
procedure of merger control were all dealt with in these provisions. However, 
there were a number of omissions. 
The Interim Provisions was only applicable to the acquisition of domestic 
enterprises by foreign investors.73 That is to say only mergers concerning existing 
foreign-funded enterprises would fall to be considered in review. Mergers between 
domestic enterprises only or involving a foreign investor who had not yet invested 
in China were outside the scope of the merger and acquisition system. This created 
differential treatment of concentrations determined purely by ownership type, 
without consideration of economic effects.  
A threshold for review was established in these regulations.74 Market revenue and 
market share were set as two factors of threshold. However, the regulations lack 
further explanation as to how to assess market revenues and market shares. This 
                                         
70
 The Chinese government accepted the Protocol on the Accession of the WTO on the 11
th 
November 2001. For the text of the Protocol on the Accession of WTO can see World Trade 
Organization, Protocol on the Agreement of the People’s Republic of China to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
71
 M Williams, Competition policy and law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 198. 
72
 For an introduction to the Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors (hereinafter ‘the Foreign M&A Regulations 2006’) see supra note 8. 
73
 Article 2, ibid. 
74
 Article 51 and article 53, ibid. 
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lacuna meant that the results of any analysis would be unpredictable. The 
threshold also contains the number of enterprises in the relevant domestic market 
which are taken over by the same foreign investor within one year.75 This may 
prevent a company from assuming a dominant or monopoly position through a 
chain of ‘small’ acquisitions. Nevertheless, it did not introduce a standard by 
which to assess the accumulated market power acquired.76 If all the acquired 
companies had low market power, such a process of merger might not seriously 
harm competition.  
In addition, ‘in the event that an acquisition does not meet the threshold of 
merger control, the MOFCOM or the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC)  still had the power to open a case when they considered, upon 
request by a domestic enterprise in a competitive relationship to the merging 
parties, or a relevant functional department or industrial association, that the 
acquisition by the foreign investor involved a substantial market share, or there 
were other major factors which materially impacted market competition’.77 In such 
a situation the foreign investor could be required to make a report to the MOFCOM 
or the SAIC, which could take further action. However, the lack of any definition 
of the term ‘other major factors’ resulted in the threshold of merger control’s 
being opaque, and an inability of merging parties to anticipate the demands of a 
merger review process. 
The regulations provide that in merger and acquisition of domestic enterprises 
foreign investors should not create excessive concentration in the domestic market, 
eliminate or hinder domestic competition, disturb the social economic order or 
harm the societal public interest.78 These elements were considerations in the 
examination of mergers. However, there was no definition of ‘excessive 
concentration’, ‘social economic order’ or ‘societal public interests’. 
                                         
75
 Article 51 (2) and article 53 (5), ibid. 
76
 M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp.177-191. 
77
 Article 51, the Foreign M&A Regulations 2006, supra note 8.  
78
 Article 3, ibid. 
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When the MOFCOM and the General State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (GSAIC) considered that the merger could cause excessive market 
centralization, hinder fair competition or damage consumers' benefits, they had 
the power, within 90 days of the receipt of all the documents, either solely 
through negotiation or jointly, to convene the relevant departments, institutions, 
enterprises and other interested parties and hold a hearing, and could decide 
whether to grant approval in accordance with the law.79 However, there were no 
guidelines on the conditions of solely or jointly reviewing merger, or in relation to 
the relative powers of each administrative department involved in the review. 
To sum up, first of all in China there was no tradition of anti-monopoly analysis in 
merger control. The purpose of merger control was mixed with competition goals 
and non-competition goals. In the past merger control was used as a tool to solve 
specific problems under various market conditions. It existed to reduce the losses 
in SOEs80 or to deal with a threat from foreign investors.81 Competition policy 
targeting anti-monopoly was weak. 
Secondly, merger control under an anti-monopoly standard did not exist as an 
independent process. It was mixed in with the content of control which was to 
protect the shareholders of merger parties as well as the orderly framework of 
merger transaction, for instance in the Foreign M&A Regulations 2006. 
Thirdly, a majority of provisions on merger control were scattered in many 
‘interim administrative rules’.82 The legal authority of administrative rules in 
China’s legal system is relatively low. According to the Legislation Law of The 
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 Article 52, ibid 
80
 See 4.1.1 Encouragement of merger between 1978 and 1993. 
81
 See 4.1.3 Formulation of merger control on anti-monopoly to foreign investors during the period 
2003-2008. 
82
 Pursuant to article 71 of The Legislation Law of The People’s Republic of China, ‘The various 
ministries, commissions, the People's Bank of China, the Auditing Agency, and a body directly under 
the State Council exercising regulatory function, may enact administrative rules within the scope of its 
authority in accordance with national law, administrative regulations, as well as decisions and orders 
of the State Council’. The law was adopted at the third Session of the Ninth National People's 
Congress on March the 15
th
 2000 and was enacted on the 1
st
 July 2000. The official translation can 
be found at: http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm (Viewed on the 17
th
 September 
2013). 
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People’s Republic of China, legislation in China can be divided into various levels:83 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China has the highest legal authority;84 
National law lies on the second level; 85 Administrative regulations lie on the third 
level; 86 the fourth level of legal authority is local decrees and administrative 
rules.87 They are implemented within their respective scope of authority; a local 
decree has higher legal authority than local rules issued by governments at the 
same and lower level.  
Fourthly, the conduct of enforcement authorities and their powers were opaque. 
As in the Foreign M&A Regulations 2006, the enforcers of merger control on anti-
monopoly were the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
(MOFCOM) and the General State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(GSAIC).88 However, there was no guideline on the conditions of solely or jointly 
reviewing mergers, nor any interpretation of the boundary of power for each 
administrative department in reviewing merger as well. This could have resulted in 
conflict of jurisdiction between these two authorities and opportunity for them to 
abuse their powers in investigation. 
4.1.4 Independence of Merger Control under an Anti-monopoly 
Standard 
As China’s first comprehensive competition law, the AML 2008 unites the loose 
legislation on competition that existed in China before its enactment. Merger 
                                         
83
 For legally binding force of various statutes see articles 78 to 82 of The Legislation Law.  
84
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the 5th National People's 
Congress on the 4
th
December 1982 with further revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. The official 
English translation can be found at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm 
(viewed on the 24
th
 September 2013). 
85
 The National People's Congress and Standing Committee thereof shall exercise state legislative 
power. The National People's Congress enacts and amends Criminal, Civil, and State organic law and 
other basic law. The Standing Committee of National People's Congress enacts and amends laws 
other than those to be enacted by the National People's Congress; See Article 7 of the Legislation 
Law, supra note 65. 
86
 Administrative regulation was enacted by the State Council. See Article 63, the Legislation Law. 
87
 Pursuant to Article 63 of the Legislation Law, the People's Congress of a province, autonomous 
region and municipality directly under the central government and the Standing Committee thereof 
may enact local decrees.  
88
 Article 52, the Foreign M&A Regulations 2006, see supra note 8. 
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control on an anti-monopoly standard is at last separated from Foreign M&A 
Regulations 200989. Drafting of the AML 2008 China started in 1994,90 but it was not 
enacted until August 2007. A series of drafts were proposed in the process.91  
In order to interpret the provisions of the AML 2008 on merger control, twelve 
guidelines had been promulgated by the central government by June 2013. The 
AML 2008 and the twelve guidelines constitute the Chinese merger control regime 
at present. By June 2013 nineteen merger decisions had been published under the 
AML 2008.92 Eleven of these nineteen concentrations have an EU dimension 
pursuant to Article 1(2) of the EUMR and have been assessed by the European 
Commission as well. 
4.2 Market Situation for the Implementation of Merger 
Control in China  
The situation of politics, economy and culture is the background for the 
formulation and enforcement of merger control. It may influence the 
implementation of the purpose of merger control. Some features of the market 
situation in China will be introduced as background to merger control. Their 
differences from the conditions in the EU will be considered and compared in the 
relevant chapters.93 
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 According to article 51 of the provisions of Foreign M&A Regulations 2009, where mergers and 
acquisitions of a domestic enterprise by a foreign investor meet the thresholds of antitrust merger 
control, the foreign investor shall make a declaration with the MOFCOM and shall not carry out the 
deal without such declaration. An unofficial English translation of the Foreign M&A Regulations 2009 
is available at: http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2009-08/17/content_212277.htm (viewed on 
the 24
th
 September 2013). 
90
 B M Owen et al., China’s Competition policy reforms: the anti-monopoly Law and beyond, (2008) 
Volume 75 No.1, Antitrust Law Journal, 236. 
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 The first draft was promulgated in 1999. This draft provided an initial framework for merger control. 
Modifications based on version 1999 were issued nearly every year. The 2001 draft has not been 
officially published in Chinese or in English. In 2005 there were three draft versions.  
92
 No official English translation of these decisions was available during this study.  
93
 The market situation in China can be seen in Y Jung and Q Hao, the New Economic Consititution in 
China: A Third Way for Competition Regime? (2003) Volume 24 Issue 1, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business, pp.107-172; A Emch, The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and Its 
Structure Shortcomings, (August, 2008) Global Competition Policy Magazine, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1221922 (accessed on the 13
th
 May 2012). Y Huang, Pursuing The Second 
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4.2.1 The Role of Government in Merger Control 
Market economy is the foundation for implementing anti-monopoly law.94 The 
social economy market was adopted in China in 1993. Even now the role of 
government in China still has features of the planned economy. Its influence also 
seeps into the process of merger control. 
4.2.1.1 Barriers to Accessing Some Administrative Zones  
In China the barriers to accessing some regional markets are high. The situation 
should be considered in defining the scope of relevant geographic market in 
merger assessment.  
Local government at several levels uses its administrative power to establish 
barriers to fair competition between local and non-local enterprises. 95 Through 
formulation of local rules local government can grant privileges to local enterprises. 
They may provide credit aid, tax and land preference, and will favour local 
corporations in government procurement. Non-local enterprises will come across 
restriction from local government in sales quantity, price, tax policy and so on. 
                                                                                                                               
Best: The history, Momentum and Remaining Issues of China’s Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 36, 
pp.117-131; X Wen, Market Dominance by China’s Public Utility Enterprises, (2008) Volume 75 No.1, 
Antitrust Law Journal, pp.151-171; E M Fox, An Anti-monopoly Law for China-Scaling the Walls of 
Government Restraints, (2008) Volume 75 No.1, Antitrust Law Journal, pp.173-104; R H Pate, What I 
Heard in The Great Hall of the People—Realistic expectations of Chinese Antitrust, (2008) Volume 75 
No.1, Antitrust Law Journal, pp.195-211; D J Gerber, Constructing Competition Law in China: The 
Potential Value of European and U.S. Experience, (2004) Volume 3 Issue 2, Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review, pp.315-331; Z Huo, A Tiger Without Teeth: The Antitrust Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, (2008) Volume 10 Issue 1, Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, pp.32-61; 
C Wu and Z Liu, A Tiger without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly under China’s Anti-
Monopoly, (2012) Volume 41 Issue 1-2, Review of Industrial Organization, pp.133-155; D J Gerber, 
Constructing Competition Law in China: The Potential Value of European and U.S. Experience, (2004) 
Volume 3 Issue 2, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, pp.315-331. 
94
 J Sun, The Implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law: A Case Study of Coca- Cola's Abortive 
Acquisition of Huiyuan Juice, (2009) Volume 6 Issue 1, Frontiers of Law in China, 117. 
95
 According to Article 95 of the Constitution 1982, People's congresses and people's governments in 
China are established in provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, 
cities, municipal districts, townships, nationality townships and towns. The legislator and enforcer of 
unfair local rules are people’s governments at various levels. 
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They have to face high barriers from both local government and local enterprises 
with market power.96 
Given the existence of high barriers in various local markets it is difficult to form a 
high level of state-wide concentration. However, each local enterprise may have a 
large market share in its own district. This thesis does not analyse the reasons for 
such barriers. It is a fact of the market situation in China which should be 
considered in merger control, especially in defining a local rather than nation-wide 
geographic market.  
4.2.1.2 Barriers to Accessing Specific Industries 
According to Article 7 of the AML 2008,  
With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned economy and 
concerning the lifeline of national economy and national security or the 
industries lawfully enjoying exclusive production and sales, the state shall 
protect these lawful business operations conducted by the business 
operators therein. 
This article provides that the state accepts and protects the monopoly of SOEs in 
particular industries. Except the SOEs other types of enterprise might find it hard 
                                         
96
 The issue of regional protectionism in China is discussed by C Bai et al., Local protectionism and 
regional specialization:evidence from China’s industries, (2004) Volume 63, Journal of International 
Economics, pp. 397 – 417; X Li,  The effect of market disseverance because of regional protectionism 
to the market structure [源于地方保护的市场分割对市场结构的影响 Yuanyu Difangbaohu de Shichang 
Fenge dui Shichang Jiegou de Yingxiang], (2010) volume 7, Special Zone Economy [特区经济 Tequ 
Jingji], pp.289-291; D Zhang and J Wang, The issues and solutions on regional administrative 
monopoly, [论区域性行政垄断的问题与应对 Lun Quyuxing Xingzheng Longduan de Wenti yu Yingdui], 
(2010) volume12 No. 3, Journal of Liaoning University of Technology (Social Science Edition)[ 辽宁工
业大学学报(社会科学版) Liaoning Gongye Daxue (Shehui Kexueban)], pp.5-8; Q Ding, Analysing the 
issues of administrative protection in some industries of China and the government regulation [论政府
规制与中国的行业性行政垄断 Lun Zhengfu Guizhi yu Zhongguo de Hangyexing Xingzheng Longduan], 
(2010) Volume8 No.4, Journal of Hubei University of Economics)[湖北经济学院学报，Hubei Jingji 
Xueyuan Xuebao], pp.88-93.  
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to access these sectors which are not open to market competition. The SOEs’ 
dominant position in these sectors is prevented from scrutiny by the AML2008.97  
4.2.1.3 The Owner of State Assets 
As players in the market State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are under the control of 
another department composing the State Council. The State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (hereafter ‘SASAC’) has responsibilities 
to guide and push forward the reform and reconstruction of state-owned 
enterprises, supervise the preservation and increase the value of state-owned 
assets in the supervised enterprises, appoint and remove the top executives of the 
supervised enterprises, and grant rewards or inflict punishments on them pursuant 
to evaluating their performances with legal procedures.98 Merger can be a method 
by which SOEs increase the value of their assets.99   
MOFCOM under the control of the State Council plays the roles of legislator and 
enforcer of merger control. It may grant privileges to the merger of SOEs in order 
to realise the aim of industrial policy. Looking through the history of China, the 
unfair treatment of SOEs and other kinds of enterprise was a hidden problem for 
merger control in China.100 
                                         
97
 Names of the 113 SOEs are available at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html 
(accessed on the 23
rd
 July 2013). These SOEs are scattered in many industries, including energy 
sources, electric power, transport, mobile communication, aviation, metallurgic and chemical 
industries and so on. The related antitrust legislation has not confined the scope of industries which 
enjoy exclusive production and sales. This article blurs the lines of the AML 2008’s overview. See 
also J R Samuels, Tain't What You Do: Effect of China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State 
Owned Enterprises, Penn State International Law Review, (2007-2008) Volume 26 Issue1, pp.169-
202; 
98
 The function of SASAC can be seen at: 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html (viewed on the 22
nd
 September 2010).  
99
 See ‘4.1.1 Encouraging Mergers between SOEs between 1978 and 1993’ in this chapter. 
100
 The links between SOEs and the government also result in the goals’ of merger control combining 
both competition and non-competition factors. See ‘1.1 Aims of Antitrust Merger Control in China’ in 
this chapter. There are suggestions on solving unfairness between SOEs and other kinds of 
enterprise, except political revolution. See: B M. Owen et al., China’s Competition policy reforms: the 
anti-monopoly Law and beyond, (2008) volume 75, Antitrust law Journal, pp.231-265; J Mitnich and C 
Yang, A Emch: The Dragon Rises: China’s Merger Control Regime One Year On, (2009) Volume 23, 
Antitrust, pp. 53-59. 
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4.2.2  Enforcement Authority of China’s Merger Control 
4.2.2.1 The Role of MOFCOM in China’s Merger Control System 
In China’s merger control system MOFCOM is in charge of legislation, review and 
making final decisions.101 Of the twelve guidelines on antitrust merger control, 
eight have been issued by MOFCOM. In addition the State Council of China102 and 
other administrative departments under the State Council103 all joined in the 
legislation of guidelines. These guidelines all belong to administrative rules.104 
In addition the Anti-monopoly Bureau under MOFCOM is in charge of reviewing 
mergers, accepting notification and negotiation of concentrations, hearing 
witnesses, investigating and examining.105 It makes the final decision based on 
investigation. 
                                         
101
 In the MOFCOM the Anti-monopoly Bureau (AMB) is responsible for enforcing concrete works of 
the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council. In 2008 the State Council approved the new three 
fixed program of the MOFCOM (fixing function, fixing formation, fixing jobs).  The Bureau is founded 
through this program. The Program can be seen at: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20080914/06085304283.shtml (Viewed on the 5
th
 September 2013). 
102
 According to article 85 of The Constitution1982, the State Council is the Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China, the executive body of the highest organ of state power; 
and the highest organ of state administration. 
103
 The provision of calculation method on application of concentration in financial operators was 
issued jointly by the MOFCOM, People's bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Assurance Regulatory Commission on 22July 2009, 
which came into force on the 15
th
 August 2009.  
104
 The concept of administrative rule can be seen supra note 65. 
105
 There are nine important functions of Anti-monopoly Bureau under MOFCOM: a. to draft the 
related regulation on merger control and formulate administrative rules and documents of 
administrative norms on interpretation of regulation; b. to examine mergers based on anti-monopoly 
law, accept notification, carry out the work of hearing, investigation and merger review; c. to accept 
and investigate concentrations which are notified to antitrust enforcement authority, and punish illegal 
activities; d. to investigate monopoly behaviour in external trade, and take measures to eliminate its 
issues; e. to guide the responding of internal enterprises on anti-monopoly in foreign countries; f. to 
initiate and organise negotiation and discussion of  competition articles in bilateral or multilateral 
agreements; g. to organise international communication and cooperation on bilateral or multilateral 
competitive policies; h. to be responsible for specific assignments by the Anti-monopoly Committee of 
the State Council; i. to fulfil other assignments specified by the leaders in MOFCOM. See the official 
site of Anti-monopoly Bureau at : 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200809/20080905756026.html?1992812441=705144026 
(viewed on the 22
nd
 September 2013).  
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4.2.2.2 Mission of Implementing Non-competitive Considerations 
MOFCOM is one of the ministries under the State Council of China.106 It has to 
accomplish the assignments entrusted by the State Council.107 Similarly, the Anti-
monopoly Bureau has to accomplish the assignments which are entrusted by the 
MOFCOM. The truth is that industrial policy which conflicts with the protection of 
competition has been approved by the State Council. For example, on the 5th 
December 2006 the State Council transmitted the guidance stipulated by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Hereafter SASAC). The 
Guidance concerns the adjustment of state-owned assets and reconstruction of 
SOEs.108 It requires the state-owned asset to concentrate in vital industries and key 
areas to protect their oligopoly of State Assets. Encouragement of oligopoly 
contradicts the goal of maintaining competition. Such industrial policies may 
influence the impartial implementation of competition policy by the Anti-
monopoly Bureau.  
4.2.3 Ineffectiveness of Judicial Review 
Pursuant to article 53 of the AML 2008, where any party concerned is dissatisfied 
with merger decisions, it may first apply for administrative reconsideration; if the 
party is still dissatisfied with the reconsideration decision, it may lodge an 
administrative lawsuit according to law. That is to say administrative 
reconsideration and lawsuit together undertake the responsibility of annulling or 
correcting faulty merger decisions under the AML 2008. 
                                         
106
 Ministries and Commissions under the State Council can be seen at: http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/05/content_20741.htm (Viewed on the 5
th
 February 2011).  
107
 The missions of the MOFCOM are available to see at: 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml (accessed on the 17
th
 September 2013). 
108
 The State Council Document (2006) No.97. The document is available to see in Chinese at: 
http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/200803/t20080328_32542.html (accessed on the 17
th
 
September 2013). 
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4.2.3.1 Ineffective Administrative Reconsideration in China 
The AML 2008 has been implemented for about six years. There has been no 
administrative reconsideration of the decisions on merger control, although 
criticism of case decisions abound.109 The reasons for this absence are fourfold. 
First of all there is no specific legislation on the procedure of administrative 
reconsideration of merger decision. The plaintiff should bring the action according 
to general Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL). 110 Secondly, the departments 
making and reconsidering merger decisions both belong to the MOFCOM.111 They 
are under the same control of the minister of MOFCOM who will maintain 
consistency of decisions in the MOFCOM.112 In addition, as the department of 
reconsideration is in the system of the State Council, it will not overturn merger 
decisions involving industrial considerations which may contradict the aim of 
maintaining market competition. 113 Thirdly is the separation of reconsidering 
merger decision and making final decision. The staffs who investigate merger 
decisions have no right to make the final decision. They can only provide 
recommendations. It is the head of the DTL, who is not involved in the 
                                         
109
 The defects of published merger decisions will be discussed in chapters 2 to 5.   
110
 The Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted at the 
Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on the 29
th
 April 
1999, and came into force on the 1
st
 October 1999. An unofficial English translation is available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5279&CGid= (accessed on the 4
th
 October 
2013). Apart from bringing an administrative lawsuit the parties can also institute civil proceedings 
under article 50 of the AML 2008: where any loss was caused by a business operator's monopolistic 
conduct to other entities and individuals, the business operator shall assume the civil liabilities. 
111
 In the MOFCOM the Administrative Monopoly Bureau (AMB) is to accept and review the applied 
concentration. Administrative reconsideration of decisions of merger control is undertaken by the 
Department of Treaty and Law (DTL) in the MOFCOM. Article 14 of the ARL provides that any citizen, 
legal person, or any organisation that refuses to accept a specific administrative act of a department 
under the State Council […], shall apply for administrative reconsideration to the department under 
the State Council […] that undertook the specific administrative act. Therefore administrative 
reconsideration of merger decision shall appeal to the MOFCOM. This was also applied in Zhengwei 
Dong v. the MOFCOM, see infra note 100. 
112
 Pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitution 2004 ministers in charge of ministries or commissions of 
the State Council are responsible for the work of their respective departments, convene and preside 
over their ministerial meetings or commission meetings. They discuss and decide important issues in 
the work of their respective departments. The Constitution, see supra note 67. 
113
 According to article 89 (3) of the Constitution 2004 the State Council has the function of setting the 
tasks and responsibilities of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, exercising unified 
leadership over the work of ministries and commissions and directing all other administrative work of 
a national character that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ministries and commissions. The 
Constitution 2004, see supra note 67. 
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reconsideration and has no legal background, who takes the final decision.114 
Finally, even if reconsideration rectifies the errors of a merger decision, its 
enforcement is not guaranteed. The official documents from superior governments 
can change the decision of administrative reconsideration which has already been 
effective. These four reasons explain the weakness of administrative 
reconsideration and its poor reputation.115 
4.2.3.2 Ineffective Administrative Lawsuit in China  
Provision for judicial review of merger decisions is set out in the Administrative 
Procedure Law (APL).116 There has been only one lawsuit on nonfeasance of merger 
control in the restructuring of the state-owned telecommunications enterprises. 
The court rejected the lawsuit owning to the plaintiff’s lack of standing. 117   
At present, judicial review is not independent of executive power. The 
interpretation from the Supreme Court of China provides that the court should 
respect the demarcation of executive power and judicial review according to the 
Constitution. When the administrative decisions under the AML 2008 concern the 
                                         
114
 C Lin, Analysing the issues of administrative reconsideration and its judicial reform [论我国行政复
议的困境及其司法化改革, Lun Woguo Xingzheng Fuyi de Kunjing jiqi Sifahua Gaige], (December, 
2010),  Legislative Affairs of Xiamen Government, [厦门政府法制,Xiamen Zhengfu Fazhi], the journal 
is available on the official site of Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council P.R.China at: 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/llyj/201101/20110100333104.shtml (accessed on the 18
th
 
September 2013). 
115
 Actually, there is little public trust in the  impartiality and authority of  administrative reconsideration 
bodies and staff. They are reluctant to make good damage through the approach of administrative 
reconsideration. Ibid. 
116
 The Administrative Procedure Law was adopted at the Second Session of the Seventh National 
People's Congress on the 4
th
 April 1989, and took effect on the 1
st
 October 1990. An official English 
version is available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695, (Viewed on the 25
th
 August 
2013).  
117
 On the 6
th
 October 2008, two months after the AML 2008 came into force; Zhengwei Dong lodged 
an administrative lawsuit.
 
He claimed that the MOFCOM did not conduct any review of the 
restructuring of the telecommunications industry. The court accepted the claim and the MOFCOM 
responded to the application in writing. The MOFCOM in its defence contended that the application 
raised by the applicant lacked sufficient facts and evidence, and advising refusal of the request of the 
applicant. Ultimately the court adopted the advice of the MOFCOM, and did not accept the claim. The 
plaintiff, Zhengwei Dong recalled that the judges asked him, ‘Is there any connection between you 
and the restructuring among the state-owned telecommunications enterprises?’ The plaintiff replied 
that he was a consumer. The judge claimed that there were 1.3 billion consumers in China. If they 
were all to institute suits, what should the court do? See: 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001030134?page=3 (Viewed on the 18
th
 September 2013). 
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discretion of the executive department, quantitative restriction, important policy 
orientation and other public interest, the court will not initiate a ‘depth 
judgement’.118 Therefore, in the implementation of judicial review, the judicial 
power is subordinated to the government. The structure which leads to such a 
situation is that the courts are just government organs that happen to fulfil 
judicial functions.119  
In conclusion, neither administrative reconsideration nor judicial review is robust 
enough to make good damages resulting from faulty merger decision under the AML 
2008. This point underlines the importance of MOFCOM’s taking appropriate 
decisions on the effects of mergers on market competition. Meanwhile merger 
decisions should also be transparent in order to prevent MOFCOM from abusing its 
discretion and discriminating between SOEs and other kinds of enterprise. 
                                         
118
 The superintendent of the administrative front courtyard of the Supreme People's Court answered 
questions on the implementation of the AML2008 in a press conference. It is available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-11/03/content_10299026.htm (Viewed on the 30
th
 August 2011).  
119
 See J Chen et al., Implementation of law in the People's Republic of China (London-Leiden Series 
on Law, Administration & Development), (Brill, 2002), 58; M U Killion, Post-WTO China and 
Independent Judicial Review, (2004), Volume 26 No.3, Houston Journal of International Law, pp. 507-
559. 
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Chapter 2: the Definition of the Relevant Market 
1 Introduction 
The birth of the concept of ‘market definition’ took place in the USA. It was used 
as an analytical tool in merger cases in the late 1940s.1 Most other jurisdictions 
have followed this example and incorporated the term ‘relevant market’ in their 
guidance or case law.2 In antitrust assessment it may be interpreted as ‘the 
smallest set of products that can create a monopoly’. Products in the ‘relevant 
market’ can increase in price substantially without significant competitive 
constraints by products outside the market.3 It differs from the concept of 
‘economic market’. Companies may, e.g. use the term ‘economic market’ to refer 
to the area where it sells its products or to refer broadly to the industry or sector 
where it belongs.4 However, for the purpose of competition law, a relevant market 
comprises goods or services in a specified area and, where appropriate, over an 
identified period that provide close competitive mutual constraint, like economic 
substitutes, for instance. It might be wider than the products which companies 
only sell. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that products outside the relevant 
definition do not pose any competitive constraint on products within it. Rather, it 
implies that products within a relevant market should be directly substitutable and 
impose a sufficiently strong constraint on each other.5  
                                         
1
 G Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, (1992) Volume 76, Marquette Law Review, 
pp. 123-215; M Oinonen, Modern economic advances in contemporary merger control: an imminent 
farewell to the market definition?, (2011) Volume 32 Issue 12, E.C.L.R., pp. 629-637. 
2
 There are at least 12 jurisdictions in the world that have adopted the definition of ‘relevant market’ in 
their antitrust assessments, including the EU and China. See S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics 
of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, Second Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002), 88. 
3
 L Kokkoris, The concept of market definition and the SSNIP test in the merger appraisal, (2005) 
Volume 26 No.4, E.C.L.R., 209. However, even now scholars believe it is still a concept searching for 
a definite definition. See A T Kate and G Niels, The relevant market: a concept still in search of a 
definition, (2009) Volume 5 No.4, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp. 297-333. 
4
 Paragraph 3, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law (hereinafter Notice on Market Definition) [1997] O.J. C372/5.  
5
 There is still an issue about the extent to which  substitution of two products can be taken as 
effective. See L Wu & S Baker, Applying the market definition guidelines of the European 
Commission, (1998) Volume 19 No.5, European Competition Law Review, 275. A market is worth 
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A proper definition of ‘relevant market’ is a necessary precondition of any 
assessment of the effects of a concentration on competition.6 Within the relevant 
market it is possible to take into account systematically ‘all the variables and 
factors which might affect competition, inter alia an analysis of market shares and 
concentration ratios’.7 Within the scope of the relevant market it is possible to 
determine the market power of a merged entity from market shares or other 
related considerations.8 If the ‘relevant market’ is defined too narrowly, indication 
of high market shares may lead to a transaction’s becoming subject to merger 
control restrictions. However, in the absence of market power, concentration 
would not be capable of harming consumers (this is Type II false negative error). If 
markets are defined too widely, suppliers which do in fact have significant market 
power may be under the legal standard of merger control obligation because of the 
indication of low market shares. Therefore they might be able to make profit in 
ways that harm consumers, by raising prices or reducing quality, innovation or 
choice (this is Type I false positive error). 
In this chapter two problems will be examined through comparison. Firstly whether 
a proper scope of the relevant market can be determined according to the method 
                                                                                                                               
monopolising if monopolisation permits prices to be profitably increased. For more detail on this 
notion see S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, supra note 2, 89. 
6
 See Case C-68/94 & 30/95 France v Comission [1998] ECR I-1075, paragraph 143; Case T-2/93 Air 
France v Commission [1994] ECR II-323, paragraph 80; See Chapter 2 Worksheet in ICN Merger 
Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, (2006), 
available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc321.pdf (accessed on 
the 8
th  
May 2013); Chapter 4 Worksheet-Market Definition in ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical 
Framework Subgroup, Project on Merger Guidelines, (April, 2004), available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc488.pdf (accessed on the 5th June 
2013). 
7
 Point 339 in European Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy (1986). See Case T-
342/99 Airtours plc v Commission, E.C.R. [2002] II-2585, paragraph 19; Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-
30/95 France and Other v Commission (Kali & Salz), E.C.R. [1998] I-1375, paragraph 143. See also S 
Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement, supra note 2, 83. 
8
 According to the ICN report ‘market power’ is variously defined in the relevant jurisdictions, but a 
definition that might be viewed as common to all would be the ability of the merged firm, or of the 
firms remaining in the market after the merger, profitably to raise prices significantly above (or reduce 
output significantly below) competitive levels (or otherwise to reduce rivalry). The objective (and 
challenge) of merger control is to prevent those mergers that do pose such a threat while not 
impeding those that do not. See Chapter 2, Project on Merger Guidelines, ICN Merger Working 
Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup, April 2004, p 1. Available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc488.pdf  (Accessed on the 1
st
 
March 2012). 
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of merger control in China, and secondly whether legislation and case decisions 
under AML 2008 show sufficient public transparency regarding the reasoning 
process of defining ‘relevant market’.9 This chapter is divided into three parts: the 
first looks at approaches to definition in merger control of the EU. Secondly, the 
method in the jurisdiction of China will be reviewed. Thirdly, pursuant to 
comparison of the EU and China, this chapter proposes some recommendations on 
likely future developments for delineating a proper scope of ‘relevant market’ in 
merger assessment in China, and also on how to make the approach of merger 
assessment more transparent in legislation and case decisions. 
2 Market Definition in the EU 
Before 1997 the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance stated on 
a number of occasions that a definition of ‘relevant market’ is required to be 
applied in Community competition policy.10 In 1997 the Commission published the 
Notice on Market Definition.11 This Notice applies to all EU competition rules, 
including articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU as well as the merger control 
regulation.12 Market definition is delineated as a tool to identify the boundaries of 
competition between firms:  
The objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic 
dimension is to identify those actual competitors of the undertakings 
involved that are capable of constraining those undertakings’ behaviour and 
of preventing them from behaving independently of effective pressure.13 
                                         
9
 The reasons for choosing these two standards have been discussed in ‘1 Research Questions’ in 
Chapter 1. 
10
 See European Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy, (1986), paragraph 337; Case 
6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v EC Commission [1973] E.C.R. 
215, paragraph 247;  
11
 The Notice on Market Definition, see supra note 4.  For discussion of the Notice  see A Criscuolo, 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market: a change of policy?, (1998) Volume 4, EU 
Focus, pp. 2-4; L Wu and S Baker, Applying the market definition guidelines of the European 
Commission, (1998) Volume 19 No.5, European Competition Law Review, 275. 
12
 Paragraph 1, Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
13
 Paragraph 2, ibid. 
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In recent years the increasing economic approach to competition policy in the EU 
has put market definition at the centre of the process of application of EU 
competition rules.14   
2.1 Factors Considered in Defining the Relevant Product 
Market15 
The Notice on Market Definition defines a relevant product market as all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable 
by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and 
intended use.16 The scope of relevant product market is defined in three aspects, 
namely demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential 
competition.17 
2.1.1 Demand-side substitution 
Demand-side substitution takes place when consumers switch from one product to 
another when the relative price of the product changes.18 Such substitution can 
occur when customers switch to other products, or source their requirements from 
suppliers elsewhere. Both these situations are likely to make price increases 
unprofitable. From an economic point of view, for the definition of the relevant 
market, demand-side substitution constitutes an immediate and effective 
disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product, in particular in relation to 
                                         
14
 Speech of Mario Monti, who was the European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Market 
Definition as a Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, (5
th
 October 2001), available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-439_en.pdf (accessed on the 9
th
  June 2013). 
15
 Not all the evidence and factors used by the EU in defining ‘relevant market’ have been adopted by 
China. Accordingly this thesis focuses on analysing evidence and factors adopted by both the EU and 
China in legislation and practice. 
16
 Paragraph 7, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. The concept of relevant product market 
is also seen in section 6, Form CO Relating to the Notification of A Concentration Pursuant to 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, (1994), O.J. L377 (hereinafter ‘Form CO’). 
17
 Paragraph 13, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. Demand-side substitution and supply-
side substitution will be analysed in detail in this chapter. Potential competition will be taken into 
account in Chapter 5. 
18
 See paragraphs 15-19, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
36 
Chapter 2 the Definition of the Relevant Market 
 
their pricing decisions.19 The following section sums up evidence relied on to 
define demand-side substitution of a relevant product market. 
a. Evidence of substitution in the recent past 
Such evidence might offer actual examples of substitution between two products. 
If there was a change of price in the past, the quantitative loss might be an 
indication of substitutability. In addition, the switch to new products in the past 
also offers useful information on the substitution relationship.20 However, the fact 
that switching has taken place in the past may not be reliable evidence that this 
would occur again.21 Similarly, evidence showing that purchasers switched from 
product A to B does not establish whether purchasers would in the future switch 
from B to A; in other words, market definition may not be symmetrical.22  
b. Physical characteristics of the product/services and intended use 
Analysis of product characteristics and intended use allows the Commission, as a 
first step, to limit the field of investigation of possible substitutes.23 The 
Commission has stated that for two products to form part of the same product 
market it is necessary but not sufficient that they are functionally 
interchangeable.24 In certain conditions customers may not regard similar products 
as adequate substitutions under the SSNIP test.25 The reasons might be switching 
costs, brand loyalty and so on. In Procter/Gamble/VP Schickedanz (II), the 
                                         
19
 See paragraph 13, the Notice on Relevant Market, ibid. See also Case T-342/99,Airtours plc v The 
Commission, E.C.R. [2002] II-2585, paragraph 45;  
20
 It is possible precisely to analyse which products have lost sales to the new product in historical 
switching evidence. These products may then be substituted for the new product. 
21
 See Joint Case T-125 & 127/97 Coca Cola v Commission, E.C.R. [2002] II-1773, paragraph 81-82. 
22
 This is called a ‘one-way’ market; if product A exerts a close competitive constraint on the price 
increase of product B, then products  A and B should belong to a relevant market. However, the 
reverse may be not true: when the price of product A increases, the supplier of product B may not be 
capable of quickly switching to the supply of product A. Therefore when the substitution test is to 
product A, products A and B should be separated as independent market. See Case COMP/M.3396 
Group4 Flack / Securicor, [2004] O.J. C 178/03, paragraph16, 
23
 Paragraph 36, Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
24
 Paragraph 36, Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4; see also Alistair Lindsay, EC Merger 
Regulation: Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 124. 
25
 The SSNIP test are provided infra ‘2.3 The SSNIP test and its Limitations’ of this chapter. 
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Commission investigated whether tampons and sanitary towels form separate 
relevant markets or whether they both belong to a wider feminine products 
market.26 Although they perform the same function, the Commission identified 
them as different product markets. This is because there are not enough marginal 
customers who will switch under the SSNIP test, once their established preference 
or pattern of use had been established. The product characteristics detected are 
unable to reflect the substitution of marginal customers. However, even if a 
product is unique in some way, this does not imply that it constitutes a relevant 
market in itself.27 Bishop proposes an example: in the truck industry, trucks of 5 to 
16 tons and those of 16 tons and over are identified as two separate relevant 
markets. This is because of their different uses, larger trucks being used in long-
haul construction and long-distance distribution traffic.28 However, it is also likely 
that in response to an increase in the price of 18-ton trucks, customers might 
choose two 9-ton trucks instead. If the number of customers is sufficient to make 
the SSNIP test unprofitable, these two categories of truck should belong to the 
same relevant market. 
In sum, the question is not whether two items are similar in some way, but 
whether they act as effective substitutes both in mutually constraining their prices 
and in meeting the same needs of consumers.29 If two similar products are to be 
placed in the same market, this is because they are substitutes (perhaps due to 
their similarity), not merely because they are similar. Conversely, that a product is 
unique in some way does not imply that it constitutes a relevant market in itself. 
Its uniqueness must be such that there are no effective substitutes meeting the 
same purpose, so that a price increase would not be constrained by competition.  
c. Quantitative tests  
                                         
26
 Case IV/M.430 Procter/Gamble/VP Schickedanz (II), [1994] O.J. L 354/32. 
27
 See Alistair Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 125.  
28
 See Case IV/M.4 Renault/Volvo, [1990] O.J. C281/2. 
29
 Report by Europe Economics for the European Commission, DG Competition, Market Definition in 
the Media Sector-Economic Issues, (November, 2002), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/documents/european_economics.pdf (accessed on the  
16
th
 February 2013). 
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Many of the factors employed by the Commission can only reflect whether two 
kinds of product might be substituted. This paves the way for the Commission’s 
making an assessment. Nevertheless, the result of these factors should be 
supported by the results of the SSNIP test as well as some empirical evidence. 
Through quantitative analysis of causation between price series and similarity of 
price levels and/or their convergence, the Commission can establish past patterns 
of substitution. These econometric and statistical approaches contain own-price 
elasticity, cross-price elasticity and critical loss analysis.30 However, it is 
inappropriate to define the market only by analysis of price evidence. In Roberts 
the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) held that consumer choice 
is influenced by considerations other than price.31 
d. Consumer preferences 
Despite the existence of substitutes at similar prices, consumer loyalty will limit 
substitution of the product concerned following a price rise. These consumer 
preferences may be reflected in ‘the market studies that the companies conducted 
in the past and that are used by companies in their own decision-making on pricing 
of their products and/or marketing actions’.32 The Commission may examine this 
evidence from the notifying and third parties. 
Apart from above, there are other barriers and costs associated with switching 
demand to potential substitutes.33 The extent of the product market might be 
                                         
30
 Own-price elasticity of demand for product X is a measure of the responsiveness of demand to the 
percentage change in its own price. Cross-price elasticity between products X and Y is the  
responsiveness of demand for product X to percentage change in the price of product Y. Critical loss 
assesses the sales which would have to be lost in making its hypothetical price increase unprofitable. 
See The Merger Working Group presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the ICN, The Role of 
Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis, (2013), available at: 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc903.pdf (accessed on the 13
th
  October 
2013). 
31
 The consumption of products may not depend essentially on economic considerations. It may be 
associated with the provision of services in the consumer’s view, or the specific distribution system in 
the buyer’s. In this respect price evidence may not indicate the scope of relevant market. See Case T-
25/99, Colin Arthur Roberts and Valerie Ann Roberts v Commission [2001] E.C.R page II-01881, 
paragraphs 39 and 40. 
32
 Paragraph 41, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. See Case IV/M.469 MSG Media 
Service, O.J. L364/1. 
33
 Paragraph 42, ibid. 
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narrowed in the presence of different categories of customers or price 
discrimination when such the group could be subject to price discrimination.  
This will usually be the case when two conditions are met: (i) it is possible 
to identify clearly which group an individual customer belongs to at the 
moment of selling the relevant products to him, and (ii) trade among 
customers or arbitrage by third parties is not feasible.34  
Thus the Commission often contacts the main customers and competitors of 
merging parties, and collects their views on the likely result of the SSNIP analysis.35  
2.1.2 Supply-side substitution 
In addition to demand-side substitution the relevant product market is also 
influenced by supply-side substitution. In responding to the increase in relative 
price of the products, the suppliers of other products may switch production 
facilities to produce the monopolised collection of products, or suppliers of 
products outside the given set of areas might enter into the market. The increased 
level of supply may render the attempt at price increase unprofitable.36 
Supply-side substitution has been accepted as a part of market assessment by the 
Commission on some occasions. In Continental Can the Commission stated the 
disputed merger threatened to eliminate competition in a 'market for light 
containers for canned meat products', a ‘market for light containers for canned 
seafood', and a 'market for metal closures for the food packing industry, other than 
crown corks'. The Commission’s definition of the relevant market was rejected by 
the Court because the Commission had failed to consider substitutes on the supply-
side. The EUCJ emphasised that in order to support its market definitions the 
                                         
34
 Paragraph 43, ibid.  
35
 Evidence defining markets is generally indicated in the Market Definition Notice. A questionnaire 
used in collecting evidence was criticised by the notifying party on the grounds that the results were 
subjective, arbitrary and unreliable, although such criticism was rejected by the Commission. See 
Case No COMP/M.2187 CVC / Lenzing, [2004] O.J. L82/20, paragraph 25. 
36
 Paragraphs 20-23, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
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Commission needs to explain why producers of other types would not be able to 
begin producing cans that competed directly against those of Continental Can.  37  
Although supply-side substitution has long been recognised by the Commission, its 
application in cases tends to be an after-thought compared with the principle 
consideration of demand-side substitution in delineating the relevant market. 
According to the Notice on Market Definition supply-side substitution is only set as 
a possible factor which might be taken into account in defining market definition. 
The premise of using supply-side substitution is that ‘its effects are equivalent to 
those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy’.38 This 
means that: 
Suppliers are able to switch production to the relevant products and market 
them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks 
in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices.39 
Supply-side substitution is even excluded in deciding a relevant product market; 
Forms RS and CO state: 
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services 
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer.40 
After-thought of supply-side substitution is criticised.41 Neglecting supply-side 
substitution might make the defined scope of relevant market narrower than the 
actual situation. Take various qualities of paper, for instance. Paper of different 
                                         
37
 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission, E.C.R 
[1973], 215, paragraph 33. The case was also discussed in Seanshen, The principles of Market 
definition under E.C. competition law and enlighten to Chinese legislator, (2002), available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1UjVZPmL09cJ:www.tahota.com:85/lw2e.s
htm+&cd=1&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&gl=uk (accessed on the 11
th
 October 2013). 
38
 Paragraph 20, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
39
 Paragraph 20, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. See also Mario Monti, Market 
Definition as a Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, supra note 14. 
40
 Section 4 of Form RS (reasoned submission pursuant to Article 4(4) and (5) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004) and Section 6 of Form CO.  
41
 See Alistair Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 135. 
C Boeshertz et al., Big Deal in a Small World, (spring, 2004), Competition Policy Newsletter, pp. 8-15. 
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standard of quality (from standard writing paper to high-quality paper) may not be 
substitutes from the perspective of demand-side. However, manufacturers of 
paper can adjust different qualities of paper at negligible cost and in a short time-
frame. In the absence of particular difficulties in distribution paper manufacturers 
are able to compete for orders of the various quality levels.42 Therefore the market 
share of merging parties based on the relatively narrow definition is bigger than 
the actual competitive situation.43 Competitive assessment based on indication of 
market share will lead to a false negative error. 
Although neglecting supply-side substitution in defining relevant market may cause 
problems, the EU still includes its consideration in the subsequent step of anti-
competitive assessment.44 The reason may lie in its uncertainty and uneasiness. In 
general, demand-side substitution can be seen as actual competition. Nevertheless, 
supply-side substitution is potential competition.45 In addition to capacity for 
potential entry, the Commission still needs to determine whether suppliers have 
incentives to switch, and if such shift is sufficient to make price increase 
unprofitable.46 Despite this, the authorities cannot ignore supply-side substitution 
in carrying out merger assessment. As a compromise it might be irrelevant at what 
stage the relevant factors are considered, as long as all the competitive influences 
facing a firm are analysed.47 
                                         
42
 Paragraph 22, the Notice on Market Definition, see supra note 4. In the case of Culture goods, 
books for instance, supply side substitution should be divided according to different content.  
43
 The Commission would not define a separate market for each quality of paper and its respective 
use. The various qualities of paper are included in the relevant market and their sales added up to 
estimate total market value and volume. Supply-side substitution is also found in other situations, like 
different buses designed for specific types of travel service in Case No IV/M. 477 Mercedes- Benz / 
Kässbohrer [1995] O.J. L 211/1, paragraphs1-29; An example of supply-side substitution is seen in L 
Wu and S Baker, Applying the market definition guidelines of the European Commission, supra note 
11, 275. 
44
 According to paragraph 23 of the Notice on Relevant Market, which states that ‘when supply-side 
substitutability would entail the need to adjust significantly existing tangible and intangible assets, 
additional investments, strategic decisions or time delays, it will not be considered at the stage of 
market definition’. The Notice on Relevant Market, see supra note 4. 
45
 P Crowther, Product market definition in E.C. competition law: the compatibility of legal and 
economic approaches, (March, 1996), Journal of Business, 179. 
46
 Potential entry will be discussed further in infra Chapter 5. 
47
 See P Crowther, Product market definition in E.C. competition law: the compatibility of legal and 
economic approaches, supra note 45, 180. 
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Evidence of supply-side substitution is similar to that of demand-side substitution, 
including: (i) switching evidence; (ii) trade flows and buying patterns; and (iii) 
extent of switching cost, like the costs incurred by suppliers in adjusting to the 
supply of the new product (such as altering the production process, establishing a 
distribution network, marketing or obtaining a release from existing contractual 
commitments and so on).48  
In addition, in Varta/Bosch the Commission intended to separate markets upon 
supply-side consideration, although demand-side assessment suggests a single 
market.49 The point is that either potential demand-side substitution or potential 
supply-side substitution is able to render the price increase unprofitable. This 
means that, having considered one form of substitution, consideration of the other 
can only widen the market, and the market should never be narrowed again.  
The Commission does not take account of potential competition when defining 
relevant market but only at a subsequent stage if required. This is because the 
potential competition depends on ‘specific factors and circumstances related to 
the conditions of entry’. 50 
2.2 Factors Considered when Defining the Relevant 
Geographic Market 
The geographic market is defined as: 
The area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply 
and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
                                         
48
 Examples of cases concerning this factor are available in Alistair Lindsay, the EC Merger 
Regulation: Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 136. This will be further discussed in infra 
chapter 5. 
49
 In Varta/Bosch the Commission used differences in conditions of competition to distinguish relevant 
product markets, although ‘the distinction between the two product markets is not mainly based on a 
difference in the product itself or in the function of the product’. Case IV/M.12 Varta/Bosch [1991] O.J. 
L320/27, point 13. For further analysis see S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC Competition 
Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, supra note 2, 97. 
50
 Paragraph 24, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
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neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably 
different in those areas.51 
The scope of relevant geographic market is also determined by the combination of 
demand-side and supply-side substitution.52  
Factors in assessing demand-side substitution of geographic market include: (i) 
past evidence of diversion of orders to other areas;53 (ii) regional differences, 
often cited by the Commission as a basis for defining a relevant geographic market. 
Differences are reflected in legal restrictions and capacity constraints including 
tariffs, national procurement policies, the existence of cross-border import duties, 
the need to access distribution and marketing infrastructures, environmental 
protection and technical standards;54 (iii) trade flows and buying patterns;55 (iv) in 
the EU, the Commission has used evidence of differences in absolute price levels 
to define separate geographic markets.56 In the development of its case law it has 
found that even where there are differences in absolute price between two regions, 
they can form the same part of the geographic market as well, and the relevant 
market is not necessarily symmetrical;57 and (v) transport costs and other 
transaction costs. If the disparity in transport cost is obvious, it may indicate why 
trade between these two regions is unfeasible. Nevertheless, the Commission has 
also accepted that transport costs are not by themselves sufficient to define 
                                         
51
 Paragraph 8, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
52
 Paragraph 9, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
53
 Paragraph 45, ibid. 
54
 Cases regarding such consideration can refer to Alistair Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: 
Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 174. 
55
 Paragraph 49, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
56
 See Case No IV/M.315 Mannesmann / Vallourec / Ilva, [1994], O.J. L 257/13, paragraph 19. 
57
 One hypothetical example is where the price in region A is 100 GBP and 120 GBP in region B. 
However, the transport cost between these two areas is 20 GBP. When the price in region A rises by 
5 percent to 105 GBP, suppliers in region B will not export their products to region B. When the price 
in region B rises by 5 percent to 126 GBP, suppliers in region A can make more profit if they export to 
region B. Therefore, when a market includes area B it should also involve region A although the 
absolute price of these two areas is not the same. However, region A is still a distinct market. In light 
of the above issue the Commission investigates whether areas in a geographic market have similar 
price movement or surveys the demand-substitution of consumers to the relative price changes 
directly. See S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, supra note 2, pp. 115-117.  
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national markets.58 For example, in Pilkingon-Techint/SIV, due to the transport 
cost of a glass manufacturer, a producer in Spain may not compete directly with a 
producer in Northern Germany. However, as there is competitive linkage between 
these two, the Commission eventually defined the relevant geographic market as 
the whole of the Community.59 When the relevant geographic market is considered 
from supply-side substitution, it is relevant to consider evidence of those sellers’ 
business decisions on the prospect of switching to other areas in response to small 
changes in prices, the cost of transition and so on.60 
2.3 The SSNIP Test and its Limitations 
There is a common approach to defining the relevant market nowadays and it is 
adopted by most competition jurisdictions worldwide.61 The test is known as the 
‘Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT)’, ‘SSNIP test’ or the ‘5-10% test’. The SSNIP 
test was first proposed in the 1992 Department of Justice merger guidelines. The 
1992 Guidelines state:62  
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area 
in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximising 
firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future 
producer or seller of those products in that area likely would impose at least 
                                         
58
 The impact of transport costs will usually limit the scope of the geographic market for bulky, low-
value products; however, a transport disadvantage might also be compensated by a comparative 
advantage in other costs (labour or raw materials). See paragraph 50, the Notice on Market Definition, 
supra note 4.Case No COMP/M.2502 Cargill / Cerestar, [2002], O.J. C 40/05. 
59
 In this case the highest market shares of the plant’s production are sold in the Member States 
where their float glass production is located. However, given the dispersion of the individual float 
plants and the varying degrees of overlap of the natural supply areas, making the Commission believe 
the effects can be transmitted from one circle to another, it seems appropriate to consider that the 
geographical reference market is the Community as a whole. See Case No IV/M.358 Pilkington- 
Techint/SIV [1994] O.J. L 158/24, paragraph 16.  
60
 See paragraph 30, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
61
 The hypothetical monopolist test has been adopted worldwide, including in Australia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, the EFTA, the European Union and Israel. See S Bishop and M Walker, The 
Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, supra note 2, 88.  
62
 The test was not new in 1992. It was included in the 1982 US Merger Guidelines and Adelman 
expressed the core idea in his 1959 article, ‘Economic aspects of the Bethlehem opinion’ in the 
Virginia Law Review. See note 17 in S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement, supra note 2, 86. 
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a ‘small but significant and non-transitory’ increase in price, assuming the 
terms of sale of all other products are held constant.63 
The SSNIP test can be defeated (rendered no profit) if consumers switch from one 
product to other goods or another location (demand-side substitution), or if the 
supplier of other products, or suppliers present in other locations, commence 
supply (supply-side substitution). The test is usually applied on the basis of a 5-10% 
price increase, and non-transparency of price increase is to avoid the consumer’s 
delaying purchases until the price returns to its previous price. The SSNIP is 
applied iteratively. If the increase in price by 5-10% is profitable, then only this set 
of products is defined as the relevant market, and competition between suppliers 
of these products determines the scope of relevant market. If the increase in price 
is unprofitable, due to the competitive constraints of other products or suppliers in 
other locations, then suppliers of other products should also be included in the 
scope of the relevant market. The process is applied iteratively until the set of 
products and geographic areas is such that small, permanent increases in relative 
prices would be profitable.64  
The Commission also sets the SSNIP test as ‘a speculative experiment’.65 The SSNIP 
test and substitute test provide a conceptual framework within which to conduct 
the analytical assessment. Any quantitative or qualitative evidence of competitive 
constraints can be analysed within this framework. Nevertheless, this model has 
limitations in certain situations.66  
Firstly, the SSNIP test may not be applied in all circumstances. The test focuses on 
the response of purchasers and suppliers to a SSNIP applied to the prevailing 
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 The Small and Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) is usually taken to be either 
5 or 10 percent. 
64
 See paragraph 17, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
65
 Paragraph 15, ibid. 
66
 See P Crocioni, The hypothetical monopolist test: what it can and cannot tell you, (2002) Volume 23 
No.7, E.C.L.R., pp. 354-362; G Niels, the SSNIP test: some common misconceptions, Competition 
Law Journal, (2004) Volume 3 No.4, pp. 267-276; L Kokkoris, The concept of market definition and 
the SSNIP test in the merger appraisal, supra note 3, pp. 209-214; M B Coate and J H Fischer, A 
practical guide to the hypothetical monopolist test for market definition, (2008) Volume 4 No.4, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, pp. 1031-1063.  
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market price. However, in certain instances market price is meaningless. In certain 
industries, price is subject to regulation (rather than being determined freely); or 
the product is free of charge, or a new product has not been supplied before, or 
the conduct being considered is alleged predatory pricing.67  
The second issue is the ‘Cellophane Fallacy’. This issue became known in 
competition policy analysis after the celebrated Du Pont case.68 It has to do with 
defining a benchmark for the SSNIP test. Since this issue does not arise in the 
context of merger analysis, even in the presence of pre-existing dominance,69 it 
does not require further analysis here.70 
The third point which may mislead the final result of SSNIP test is the selection of 
evidence. The SSNIP test is quantitative. Unless data are sufficient and reliable, 
the SSNIP test is not enough to prove the scope of the relevant market. This is 
especially true when evidence just reflects the views of average customers and 
disguises the position of customers at the margins.71 That a majority of consumers 
responds that they would not switch may not mean the relevant market should be 
narrowed, because there might be enough marginal consumers who would like to 
switch outside the sample. The mistake of focusing on average or particular 
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 In principle the ‘SSNIP’ is relevant only with regard to products or services, the price of which are 
freely determined and not subject to regulation. See Commission guidelines on market analysis and 
the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (the ‘SMP Guidelines’) [2002] O.J. C165/6, paragraph 42. 
See also P Roth and V Rose, European Community Law of Competition, Sixth Edition, (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 257. 
68
 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1956) 351 U.S. 377. This is a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court concerning the dominant supplier of cellophane. 
69
 Generally, for analysis of merger cases the benchmarked price will be the prevailing market price. 
See paragraph 19, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. This is because in the aspect of 
merger control it focuses on whether the merger will result in an increase in prices above the 
prevailing level (or a reduction in quality). It identifies the competitive constraints at prevailing levels. 
70
 Regarding the Cellophane Fallacy discussion, see S Bishop and M Walker, the Economics of EC 
Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, supra note 2, pp. 98-104. D J Aron and D 
E Bernstein, Regulatory policy and the reverse cellophane fallacy, (2010) Volume 6 Issue 4, Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics, pp. 973-994; G J Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger 
Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches, (2000) Volume 16, Reviews of Industrial 
Organization, pp.211-218. 
71
 Therefore, a market decision is made based on evidence from the SSNIP test and other 
considerations. As in Case Novartis / Alcon, in analysing the substitution among anti-glaucoma 
products, results of SSNIP test was concerned in accompany with the considerations of product price, 
and intended use. See COMP/M.5778 Novartis / Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8, paragraph 88.  
47 
Chapter 2 the Definition of the Relevant Market 
 
customers in defining a relevant market has been called the ‘toothless fallacy’ 
after the United Brands Decision.72 In this case bananas were defined as a relevant 
market separate from those of other fruit because the very young and very old 
(those without teeth) did not consider other fruit a suitable substitute for 
bananas.73 However, that there are a number of people for whom no substitutes 
were available cannot be sufficient reason for defining the relevant market. The 
question changes to ‘Will enough consumers switch to other fruit in response to a 
rise in the price of bananas to make the price rise unprofitable?’.74 If the 
convergence between two products is not sufficient to the extent of constraining 
each other’s price, those two products should be in separate relevant markets. In 
another case, Airtours, one issue was whether holiday packages to short-haul 
destinations should be separate from the market of holiday packages to long-haul 
destinations.75 The Commission took account of consumer preferences, average 
flight time, the level of average prices and the limited interchangeability of the 
aircraft used for each type of destination, and reached a conclusion that those 
short-haul destinations belonged to a market separate and distinct from that of 
long-haul packages.76 Regarding this decision, the applicants argued that the use of 
evidence from average customers disguised the position of customers at the 
margins. The Court accepted the convergence of short and long-haul packages in 
special circumstances. Nevertheless it denied that this very limited overlap would 
suffice to constrain prices throughout the short-haul market since ‘the long-haul 
holidays concerned would not be regarded as effective substitutes -either on price 
or other grounds –by more than a very small proportion of customers’.77 Therefore 
the SSNIP test should select a proper response from marginal consumers rather 
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 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission of the 
European Communities, E.C.R. [1978] II-207. 
73
 An example of the extent of substitution is seen in L Wu & S Baker, Applying the market definition 
guidelines of the European Commission, (1998) Volume 19 No.5, European Competition Law Review, 
276. 
74
 For more detailed analysis see S Bishop and M Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement, supra note 2, 92. 
75
 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission, E.C.R.[2002] II-2585, paragraphs 17-48. 
76
 Airtours plc v Commission, ibid, paragraph 25. 
77
 Ibid, paragraphs 21 and 34. The Court upheld the Commission’s reasoning and eventually rejected 
the plea of the applicant which was to define the relevant market comprising all foreign package 
holidays, including long-haul packages. 
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than the average consumer. Non-marginal consumers will be protected by the 
switching action of marginal consumers who make the increase of price 
unprofitable. The time period of switching might be taken as one year.78 In 
addition, the questionnaire design affects the customer survey results. Most 
customers are not likely to predict what their response to a hypothetical situation 
would be if the price range increase or the length of the price rise is not given.79 
2.4 Experience in Defining Relevant Market 
2.4.1 Methods of Collecting Evidence 
A relevant market has two dimensions: the product market and the geographic 
market. The Commission published a clear notice on the procedures it follows 
when considering market definition. The starting hypothesis for the definition is 
based on the market definition provided by the notifying parties in a substantial 
part of Form CO. Parties are asked to define the relevant product and geographic 
markets and to provide very detailed additional information to allow the 
Commission to check that definition.80 Consumers and competitors may provide 
information in order to assist the Commission in identifying both product and 
geographic markets. The Commission may also refer to the categorisation by 
international organisations.81 The Commission will make an objective assessment 
based on such materials.  
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 Paragraphs 16 and 20, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. The period of three to four 
years of substitution has been ruled out by the Commission in specific cases. See note 79 in P Roth 
and V Rose, European Community Law of Competition, supra note 67, 255. 
79
 P Crowther, Product market definition in E.C. competition law: the compatibility of legal and 
economic approaches, supra note 45, 184. 
80
 Paragraphs 33 and 34, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. 
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 In Novartis/Alcon the pharmaceuticals market was subdivided according to the ‘Anatomical 
Therapeutic Chemical’ classification (‘ATC) which is devised by the European Pharmaceutical 
Marketing Research Association (‘EphMRA) and maintained by EphMRA and International Medical 
Statistics (‘IMS’).See Case COMP/M.5778, Novartis/Alcon, [2011] O.J. C20/8, paragraph 9. See also 
Alistair Lindsay, EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, (London, 2006), 134. 
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2.4.2 Priority of demand-side substitution 
It appears that the Commission’s assessment of the relevant product market 
focuses almost exclusively on demand-side substitution. However, analysis shows 
that a failure to consider supply-side issues will lead to overly narrow relevant 
product markets.  
2.4.3 Limited Application of the SSNIP Test 
The SSNIP test is not an exclusive test for market definition. It is ‘one way’ of 
determining the relevant market.82 The SSNIP has not been applied frequently by 
the Commission.83 This may be because the Commission is not ready to challenge 
the limits of the SSNIP test. Without a quantitative test, however, the extent of 
substitution which can make the SSNIP test unprofitable cannot be precisely 
measured. 
2.4.4 Harmonising Various Approaches to Market Definition 
Since the quantitative SSNIP test has limitations, a qualitative assessment is 
carried out. Within the framework of the substitution test qualitative assessment 
takes into account all available evidence in order to get the best possible 
approximation for the SSNIP test. Harmonisation is a multifaceted process under 
the Notice on Relevant market, subsequent case law and decisional practice. 
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 Paragraph 15, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4.  
83
 From the sample of Phase II merger cases between 1990 and 2001 it was found that the SSNIP 
test was used in just 4 percent of geographic market definitions and 11 percent of product market 
definitions. Copenhagen Economics, the internal market and the relevant geographic market (2003), 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=533 (accessed on 
the 15
th
 February 2013). 
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2.4.5 Market Definition Is Not Unique84 
Market definitions are not independent of the particular competition issue under 
consideration. The contextual relationship is reflected in two aspects. Firstly, a 
different market definition might be adopted in different cases even in the same 
industry. The first reason lies in the different activities in each merger case. For 
example, markets for glass packaging might generally be national. However, when 
merging parties’ plant shows significant competitive overlap in two regional 
markets, the geographic market might be defined as cross-border.85 The second 
reason lies in changing market conditions. Market definition is based on analysis of 
the structure of the market and of competition prevailing at the time the 
Commission adopts each decision. Changes will occur in the structure of demand or 
supply, technology and innovation, or legislation. Therefore, faced with a new 
case, ‘the Commission must define the relevant market again and make a fresh 
analysis of the conditions of competition, which will not necessarily be based on 
the same considerations as those underlying the previous finding’.86 This has been 
proved by the practice of the Commission.87  
Secondly, on most occasions the Commission will leave definitions open if, under 
conceivable alternative market definitions the operation in question does not raise 
significant concerns at the next stage of competitive assessment.88 On the one 
hand, this is because there are disagreements on the precise definition. 
Disagreement may arise because of differing views as to the proposed 
concentration and various ways of considering factors and evidence. In order to 
                                         
84
 ‘The criteria for defining the relevant market might lead to different results depending on the nature 
of the competition issue being examined. Examples are seen in point 12, Commission notice on the 
definition of relevant market for the purpose of community competition, O.J. C372/5. 
85
 See Case COMP/M.3397 Owens-Illinois / BSN Glasspack [2004] O.J. C 174/16, paragraphs 24-26. 
86
 See Joint Case T-125 & 127/97, Coca Cola v Commission, E.C.R. [2002] II-1773, [2000] 5 C.M.L.R 
467, [2000] All ER (EC) 460, paragraphs 81-82. 
87
 Paragraph 12, the Notice on Relevant Market, supra note 4. Case No COMP/M.2337 Nestlé / 
Ralston Purina, [2001] O.J.C 239/07, paragraph 21: While it is true that the Commission in two 
previous decisions indicated that the relevant geographic market for industrial pet food is EEA-wide, a 
closer examination of the market condition conducted in this case has revealed that the markets 
remain national in scope. 
88
 This is indicated in its 1997 Notice on the definition of the relevant market; see also paragraph 27, 
the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4;  
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reduce the burden on companies to supply information a definition will open when 
it may have no influence on the final decision of competitive assessment.89  
2.4.6 Transparency of Factors in Considering Relevant Market   
The Commission expects to increase the transparency of its policy and decision- 
making in the area of competition policy. 90 With respect to the relevant market, 
the Commission renders public the procedures which the Commission follows when 
considering market definition, and indicates the criteria and evidence on which it 
relies to reach a decision’. 91 
At the legislation level the Notice on Market Definition provides guidance for the 
process of defining the relevant market. It defines the relevant market, 
substitution principles for market definition and evidence relied on to define the 
relevant market.  
Transparency of case decision here refers to the ability of the public to see and 
understand the workings of the merger review process of market definition. 
Evidence collected for defining the market differs in each transaction. Therefore 
in each case decision the Commission reveals the evidence on which it relies. The 
reasoning process is introduced below.92  
                                         
89
 The definition of ‘relevant market’ is open in two situations. First of all it will be open when the 
concentration has no serious effect on competition on any occasion of market definition. It will also be 
open if serious doubts have been identified, irrespective of the precise ‘relevant market definition’. 
See paragraph 26, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
90
 Transparency of competitive analysis in a case might comprise three parts, namely how the 
agencies view the relevant markets, why they believe a particular transaction might violate the Anti-
monopoly Laws and  proposal of a remedy. This chapter only concerns the transparency in defining 
‘relevant market’.  
91
 Paragraph 4, the Notice on Market Definition, Ibid. 
92
 Apart from the Commission’s case decision, the judgment of the court in the appeal case also 
makes its contribution to the development of defining ‘relevant market’. As this thesis only discusses 
the substantive test of merger control, the contribution of the court to the transparency of relevant 
market definition is not considered here. 
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3 Market Definition in China 
A year after entry into force of the AML 2008 the Anti-monopoly Committee of the 
State council (AMC)93 published a Guideline on the Definition of Relevant Market 
(Guideline on Market Definition).94 The Guideline clearly identified the definition 
of relevant market,95 its functions96 and the basis and general methods of defining 
the market.97 As compared with the EU, which published its formal Notice on 
Market Definition more than seven years after the European Merger Regulation 
came into force; the transparency of market definition in China came earlier in the 
legislation.  
Under the Guideline ‘relevant market’ refers to the product scope and geographic 
scope within which business operators compete for specific products or services 
during a particular period of time. The Guideline also admits that competition 
within the relevant market should be the extent to which a product (or geographic 
area) can be substituted.98  
The definition of ‘relevant market’ in China’s merger control regime is also a 
requirement of competitive assessment. 
Defining the relevant market in a scientific and reasonable manner plays an 
important role in key issues such as recognising competitors and potential 
                                         
93
 On 15
th
 June 2011 MOFCOM announced that its Anti-monopoly Bureau would put up a signboard 
for the "Office of State Council's Anti-Monopoly Commission".  (Actually the office of Anti-Monopoly 
Commission has been in the MOFCOM since the enactment of the AML in 2008). The news is 
available at: http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/06/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/formal-
establishment-of-antimonopoly-commission-office-within-mofcom-approved/ (accessed on the 23
rd
 
January 2013) 
94
 The Guideline was promulgated by the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State council on the 24
th
 
May 2009 and took effect on the same day (hereinafter called ‘the Guideline on Relevant Market’). An 
unofficial English translation is available at: http://www.cuplge.com/info_show.asp?news_id=30705 
(accessed on the 23
rd
 January 2012). The official translation is not issued in this thesis. 
95
 Article 3 of the Guideline on Market Definition. 
96
 Article 2, ibid. 
97
 Substitution analysis is mentioned in Chapter 2 of the Guideline. It includes demand-side and 
supply-side substitution, which are similar to the basic principles for market definition revealed in the 
Notice on Market Definition of EU, supra note 4, paragraphs 13 to 23.  
98
 Article 4 of the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
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competitors, determining the market share of business operators and the 
degree of market concentration, deciding the market position of the 
business operators, analysing the effect of business operators’ behavior on 
market competition, judging whether the business operators’ behavior is 
lawful and the legal liabilities of unlawful conduct. As a result, the relevant 
market definition is usually the starting point of conducting analysis of 
competitive behavior and an important step of anti-monopoly law 
enforcement.99 
3.1 Factors Considered When Defining the Relevant 
Product Market 
Supply-side substitution is excluded in deciding a relevant product market. The 
Guideline states: 
The relevant product market is a market composed of a group or category of 
products which is considered by the consumers to be closely substitutable 
according to the features, use and price of the products. These products are 
mutually intensively competitive. In antitrust enforcement they may be 
used as the product scope within which business operators compete.100 
From the perspective of demand-side substitution the relevant product market 
definition may be considered from the following at least: 
a. Evidence showing consumers switch or consider switching to purchasing 
other products due to a change in the products’ price or other competitive 
factors.  
b. Products’ overall characteristics and uses including their exterior shape, 
peculiarities, qualities, technical features etc. There may be certain 
differences between the characteristics; nevertheless, consumers may 
                                         
99
 Article 2, ibid. 
100
 Paragraph 2, article 3, ibid. The wording is consistent with its counterpart in EU competition law. 
See Section 4 of Form RS and Section 6 of Form CO, supra note 37.  
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regard the products as close substitutes given identical or similar uses 
thereof. 
c. Products’ price variance. Usually products with a strong substitution 
relationship share a similar range of prices and present the same trend in 
price changes. In price analysis, if price changes were not caused by 
competitive factors, the circumstances should be excluded. 
d. Products’ distribution channel. Products that have different distribution 
channels may service different consumers, and it is difficult for such 
products to compete. Therefore the possibility that such products constitute 
relevant products is slim.  
e. Other important factors. For example consumers’ loyalty to specific 
products; barriers, risks and costs associated with a large number of 
consumers’ switching to substitutes; and differential pricing.101 
Similar to the EU Commission, MOFCOM is mainly concerned with demand-side 
substitution in defining the relevant market. Supply-side substitution is only 
conducted when it is ‘necessary’.102 From the perspective of supply, the following 
factors are commonly considered in delineating a relevant product market:  
evidence showing other business operators’ reactions to changes in 
competitive factors, such as price; the production process or crafts of other 
business operators’, extent of switching cost like the costs and time needed 
for producers to adjust the production process, to establish a distribution 
channel; extra costs and risks in relation to a production switch; the 
competitiveness of the products supplied after a switch.103  
                                         
101
 Article 8, the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
102
 MOFCOM gives no further clarification of the term ‘necessary’. See article 7, the Guideline on 
Market Definition, supra note 94. 
103
 Article 8, the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
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Different treatment for demand-side and supply-side substitution may cause more 
serious problems in China’s merger control regime than in the EU’s. This is because 
competitive assessment in China mainly concerns market structures. Market share 
and concentration ratio are important indications of a market structure.104 
Neglecting supply-side substitution will narrow the actual scope of ‘relevant 
market’ and lead to false negative merger decisions.105 As the Guideline states, the 
contribution of each factor in defining a relevant market is differs according to the 
circumstances of each case.106 Therefore the following will examine the definition 
of ‘relevant market’ in practice. 
By the end of June 2013 nineteen cases of merger control had been published 
under the AML 2008. In addition to the prohibition Coca Cola/Huiyuan, other 
transactions were cleared with restriction conditions. In the first published case, 
Inbev /Anheuser-Busch, the analysis and definition of ‘relevant market’ was not 
mentioned at all before the addition of restrictive conditions. In Coca 
Cola/Huiyuan, ‘fruit juice’ was defined as a relevant product market; MOFCOM did 
not reveal any information on the factors on which the decision was based, nor was 
information provided in Panasonic/Sanyo or Novartis/Alcon. 107 Since Mitsubishi 
Rayon/Lucite, discussion of the relevant market has been separated, appearing in 
a section independent of anti-competitive assessment in published decisions. In 
this case the overlap of industry between merging parties was considered to be the 
scope of relevant product market. 
Business of Mitsubishi and Lucite China mainly overlapped in MAA’s 
manufacturing and distribution. These two companies have a small scope of 
overlap in producing SpMAs, PMMA particles and PMMA sheet. Therefore the 
relevant product markets are MMA, SpMAs, PMMA particles and PMMA sheet. 
                                         
104
 The positions of market share and concentration ratio in China’s merger review were analysed in 
‘3.1 Initial Review of Market Shares and Concentration Ratio’ in chapter 3. 
105
 See supra ‘2.1.2 Supply-side Substitution’.  
106
 Article 8, the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
107
 See part 4 of Novartis/Alcon. Announcement of MOFCOM (2010) No.53, Novartis /Alcon. 
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Except for MMA this concentration has limited effects on the product market 
of the other three.108  
The same reasoning appeared in case Pfizer/Wyeth.109 In practice the scope of 
‘relevant market’ might be broader than the overlapping product. This is because 
there are other available alternatives for the overlapping product; the overlapping 
product and its substitutes should belong to a relevant market. Until recent cases, 
more reasons for defining a relevant product market were provided. In 
Uralkali/Silvinit the MOFCOM defined potassium chloride as a relevant product 
market given its unique product feature and purpose which cannot be substituted 
by other potassic fertilizers or vice versa.110 In Savio/Penelope, during the 
investigation the MOFCOM found that the market of electronic yarn clearers for 
automatic winders constituted a separate market.111 Its function cannot be 
substituted by other devices.112 Nevertheless, evidence of comparison with other 
available devices was not published. In GE/Shenhua, since coal-water slurry 
gasification technology differs significantly from that of other coal gasification, 
requirements for raw coal, feeding method and so on, the licensing market of coal-
water slurry gasification technology constituted the relevant product market.113 In 
Seagate/Samsung, Seagate was in pursuit of sole control of Samsung’s hard disk 
drive (HDD) business, involving all factories, equipments and assets for R&D, 
production and sales of HHD. HDD constituted a separate product market as:  
                                         
108
 See Part 4 of Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite. Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi 
Rayon/Lucite. 
109
 In paragraph 1 of part IV relevant products markets in this transaction are defined as human drugs 
and animal health products. Products of merging parties overlap in the domestic market of China in: 
(1) human drugs, including JIC and N6A (2) animal health products, including Mycoplasma 
Pneumonia of Swine (MPS), Swine Pseudorabies Vaccine (SPV) and Combination Vaccine for Dogs 
(CVD). Announcement of MOFCOM [2009] No.77, Pfizer/Wyeth. 
110
 Paragraph 2 of Part II, case Uralkali/Silvinit: Potassium chloride is primarily used as potassic 
fertilizer. Potassic fertilizers include at least potassium chloride, potassium sulphate, potassium nitrate, 
potassium dihydrogen phosphate and potassium magnesium of sulphate. Potassium chloride is 
generally used as raw material for other forms of potassic fertilizer and compound fertilizer. 
Announcement of MOFCOM [2011] No.33 Uralkali/Silvinit. 
111
 See paragraph 3 of Part II, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio/Penelope.  
112
 It has the unique function of expeditiously treating yarn defects in an extremely short time; other 
devices are unable to do so.  
113
 Paragraph 3 of Part IV, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.74 GE/Shenhua. 
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It differs from solid-state hard drives, flash drive and other secondary 
storage devices in terms of volume, price, purpose and so on. HDDs are 
customarily further categorised by reference to their end use including 
enterprise HDDs, desktop HDDs, mobile HDDs and consumer electronics 
HDDs.114  
Substitution of these four sub-industries was not analysed. Obviously this is an 
incomplete assessment of the product market. In Henkel HK/Tian De products 
involved in this transaction were ethyl cyanoacetate, cyanoacrylate monomer and 
cyanoacrylate adhesives. Given their product characteristics, process of 
manufacture, intended use and other factors, MOFCOM found that ethyl 
cyanoacetate, cyano acrylate monomer and cyanoacrylate ester adhesives 
constituted their separate relevant product markets.115  
To summarise, in most published decisions a definite product market was defined 
before competitive assessment. In a few cases MOFCOM offered limited intuitive 
factors supporting its conclusion, such as product features, intended use, unique 
function of related industry and evidence of past bidding in the market.116 EU cases  
have shown that product characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show 
whether two products are demand substitutes.117 Customers’ responsiveness to 
relative price changes may be determined by other considerations as well. This will 
depend to a large extent on how customers value different characteristics. Nor it 
                                         
114
 Part II-(A), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
115
 Paragraph 2 of Part II, Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.06 Hankel HK/Tiande. 
116
 Section two, part 1, Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.35 UTC /Goodrich. The MOFCOM does 
not reveal its process of assessment of each factor. For example, in the latest case, Marubeni/Gavilon, 
the relevant product market was China's ‘import’ market for soybean, corn, bean pulp and dry and 
course distiller’s grains. The MOFCOM based this definition on considerations of the scope and 
nature of the merging parties and demand and supply substitutability. There is doubt about the 
substitution of import and local products. However, the MOFCOM does not give further explanation. 
Hence the decision was criticised as being ‘driven by industrial policy considerations and indicates 
that any transaction that involves key industries-food and agriculture in Marubeni/Gavilon – will be 
scrutinized closely and regulated with an eye toward broader strategic interests’. See H Ha et al. 
(Mayor Brown), the MOFCOM conditionally approves Marubeni/Gavilon: competition law and 
industrial policy in the agricultural sector (8 May 2013), publications, available at: 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/mofcom-conditionally-approves-marubenigavilon-competition-law-and-
industrial-policy-in-the-agricultural-sector-05-08-2013/  (accessed on the 7
th
 June 2013). 
117
 See section b in ‘2.1.1 Demand-side Substitution’ in this chapter.  
58 
Chapter 2 the Definition of the Relevant Market 
 
seems did the MOFCOM consider supply-side substitutes in defining ‘product 
market’. 
3.2 Factors Considered in Defining the Relevant 
Geographic Market 
The relevant geographic market is an area in which consumers can get good 
substitutes for products. During implementation of the AML 2008 the authority can 
take this geographic area to be that within which business operators compete.118 
In demand-side substitution, factors in deciding geographic market include: 
a. Evidence showing consumers shift to or consider shifting to other geographic 
areas to purchase products due to change in product price or other competitive 
factors. 
b. Products’ transport cost and characteristics. Relative to product price, the 
higher the cost of transport, the smaller the scope of the relevant geographic 
market is (e.g., in the case of cement); the transport characteristics of 
products also determine the geographic area of sales (e.g., in the case of 
industrial gas supplied through pipeline transport). 
c. The actual regions where the majority of consumers choose their products 
and the product distribution locations of the main business operators. 
d. Trade barriers between geographic areas, such as tariffs, local regulations, 
environmental factors, technological factors. When the tariff is higher than the 
price of the products, the relevant geographic market is very likely to be a 
regional market. 
e. Other important factors. For example consumers’ preference for a particular 
area or the number of products transported into/out of this geographic area.119 
                                         
118
 Paragraph 3 of Article 3, the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
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From the perspective of supply, the following factors are commonly considered 
in defining the relevant geographic market: evidence showing other business 
operators’ reactions to a competitive factor change such as price; the 
immediacy and feasibility of supply or distribution of the relevant product by 
the business operators in other geographic areas (for example costs associated 
with switching orders to operators in other geographic areas). 
In the first two published cases, Inbev/Anheuser-Busch and Coca Cola/Huiyuan, 
there was no delineation of the relevant geographic markets. Remedies aimed at 
reducing adverse effects of mergers on the future competition in China’s relevant 
market.120 Xinzhu Zhang and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang thought the geographic market 
in case Inbev/Anheuser-Busch was narrower than that of China. They pointed out 
that,  
Beer is sold to consumers in regional geographic markets through a special 
distribution system in which the breweries sell beer to distributors, which, 
in turn, sell to retailers. The distributors' contracts with brewers contain 
territorial limits and prohibit the distributors from selling beer outside their 
respective territories. Because the distributors cannot sell a brewer’s 
products outside their territories without violating their contracts with the 
brewer, brewers can charge different prices in different regions for the 
same package and brand of beer, and individual distributors (and retailers) 
cannot defeat such price differences through arbitrage. In other words, due 
to such contractual arrangements, the relevant geographic beer market 
should be defined as regional.121 
                                                                                                                               
119
 Article 9, the Guideline on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
120
 In Inbev/Anheuser-Busch, the MOFCOM cleared concentration with commitments in order to 
‘reduce anti-competitive effects of mergers on China’s beer market’. In Coca cola/Huiyuan, the 
MOFCOM stated ‘concentration would have negative effect on the effective competition in China’s 
market of fruit juice drinks as well as the market’s healthy development’. Announcement of MOFCOM 
[2008] No.95, Inbev/Anheuser-Busch, part III; Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22, Coca 
cola/Huiyuan, part IV-(iii). 
121
 See X Zhang and V Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, (2010) Volume 6 
Issue 2, E.C.L.R., pp. 482-486. In addition, administrative protection of local beer producers may be a 
barrier deterring suppliers in other areas from accessing local market when the price of local products 
increases. See ‘4.3.1.1 Barriers of Accessing into Some Administrative Zones’ in chapter 1. 
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Therefore competition conditions might differ in various regional markets. If the 
geographic market were defined as separate regional markets, anti-competitive 
concerns might only arise in some regional markets, especially the breweries of 
Inbev, mainly in southeast China.122 Remedies should only target those regional 
markets that raise competition concerns. 
In the following four case decisions, the geographic market was either China123 or 
global.124 In Novartis/Alco MOFCOM set out the market share of both merging 
parties in the global and Chinese markets respectively. However, the competitive 
assessment only focused on China.125 In Uralkali/Silvini, competitive assessment 
revealed that the concentration might have a substantial effect on competition 
whether in the global market or China’s internal market.126 Reasons supporting the 
definition of geographic market have begun to appear since GE/Shenhua.  
Since the operational scope of the contemplated joint venture post-merger 
is in China, and domestic buyers of coal water slurry gasification technology 
only choose its suppliers inside China, the relevant geographic market for 
this concentration is the China market.127 
In Seagate/Samsung the geographic market for HDDs was global since the 
procurement and supply of HDDs were on a world-wide basis.128 In Henkel 
HK/Tiande historical evidence of the import and export situation was the basis for 
defining geographic market as global market.129  
                                         
122
 This is similar to the condition in the EU: when the geographic market is defined as being national 
in scope, the ensuing anti-competitive assessment will be conducted at national level rather than  
European. 
123
 These cases are Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite; Announcement 
MOFCOM [2009] No.76 General Motors/Delphi; Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.77 Pfizer/Wyeth.  
124
 Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic/Sanyo. 
125
 Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53 Novartis/Alcon. 
126
 The same situation also exists in the Savio/Penelope case. Announcement MOFCOM [2011] 
No.73 Savio/Penelope. 
127
 Paragraph 3 of part II, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.74 GE/Shenhua. 
128
 Paragraph 2 of part II-(a), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
129
 Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.06 Hankel HK/Tiande. 
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In conclusion, a definite scope of geographic market was not given in a number of 
published cases.130 Nor did the MOFCOM clarify evidence considered in defining a 
geographic market.131 Apart from national and global markets, there are in fact 
other possible geographic markets in China. Because of administrative monopolies 
suppliers may not be able easily to switch from one area to another in China.132 
Thus geographic markets may be narrower than nationwide. On the other hand, 
where certain products within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
are free of tariffs, the geographic market may be wider in scope than China. 133 
3.3 The SSNIP test 
The SSNIP test is applied when the market definition is unclear or hard to 
determine.134 However, it has not been applied in any case published by June 2013. 
The MOFCOM may not be ready to deal with the limits of the SSNIP test. 
The Guidelines fixed the benchmark price and the scale of price increase for the 
SSNIP test.135 In addition,  
Where substitution reactions are different, tests with different margins of 
price increases are given to different consumer groups (or geographic areas). 
                                         
130
 Of nineteen published cases there are six which offer no clear definition of ‘geographic market’. 
Competitive assessment is focused on the effects of merger national wide in China. Xinzhu Zhang 
and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang also state that ‘it is unclear whether the critical issue of geographic 
market has been properly addressed by China’s antitrust agency’. see X Zhang and V Zhang, 
Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, supra note 122, 485. 
131
 In the latest case, Marubeni/Gavilon, the MOFCOM merely outlined factors relied on to delineate 
geographic market, namely trade flows, consumption habits, transport and imports. The market 
situation of each factor was not clarified. See paragraph 3, Section 2-2) Announcement MOFCOM 
[2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
132
 The situation of administrative monopoly was introduced in ‘4.3.1 The Role of Government in 
Merger Control’ in chapter 1. 
133
 See infra case study of Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite in ‘3.3.3 To What Extent is Sufficiency’ in Chapter 
5. Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon / Lucite. 
134
 Article 7, the Guidelines on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
135
 Pursuant to Article 11 of the Guideline on Market Definition, the prevailing fully competitive market 
price is the benchmarked price used in assessing all competition issues, including merger cases.  
Normally the price increase is on a scale from 5 to 10 percent. However, in legal enforcement the 
scale of a small price increase may be determined through analysis in light of various different 
circumstances.  
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In this case, the relevant market definition shall take into account the 
specific circumstances of consumer groups and geographic areas.136  
3.4 Experience in Defining the Relevant Market 
In conclusion, China and the EU have a consensus on the method of defining the 
relevant market, its role in merger assessment and its economic fundamentals. 
They set the market definition as a premise for further competitive assessment.137 
The extent of substitution is primarily evaluated from the demand-side (customer-
side). Supply-side substitution is considered on conditions.138 These similarities are 
not coincidental. These are prevailing notions shared in international competition 
law.139 Before the entry into force of the AML 2008 antitrust merger control in 
China was rare.140 The legislature learnt a lot from foreign jurisdictions including 
the experience and skills of the EU.141  
                                         
136
 Specific circumstances will not be further discussed until different margins of price increases 
appear in future. 
137
 The OECD confirms that the starting point in any type of competition analysis is the definition of 
the ‘relevant market’. OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, 
(1990), 54, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (accessed on the 3
rd
 March 
2013). 
138
 Paragraph 20, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
139
 See supra note 62. 
140
 For the development of antitrust control of merger in China; see K Li et al., Antitrust control of 
mergers and acquisitions: a case study of China, Journal of Business Law, September (2005), pp. 
597-616. 
141
 See S B Farmer, The Evolution of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: a Work in Progress 
Integrating Global Consensus and Domestic Imperatives, (May 2009), available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/susan_farmer/1 (accessed on the 19
th
 February 2013). In May 2004, DG 
Competition agreed terms of reference with the Chinese Government of an EU-China competition 
policy dialogue. This is a permanent mechanism for consultation and transparency between China 
and the EU in the competition field, with the aim of enhancing the EU's technical and capacity building 
assistance to China, which is carried out through the EU-China Trade Project. The dialogue is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/cn2b_en.pdf (accessed on the19
th
 
February 2013). Key documents and speeches in establishing the bilateral relations are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/china.html (accessed on the 19
th
 February 2013). 
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4 Discussion and Recommendations  
4.1 Methods of Collecting Evidence  
In published cases the MOFCOM seeks the views of the relevant government 
departments, industry associations, competitors and downstream enterprises to 
determine a relevant market. Views of individual customers are not collected by 
the MOFCOM.142 This is in contrast with the EU. When a precise market definition is 
deemed necessary the Commission will often contact the main customers and 
companies in the industry to gather their views and evidence on the scope of the 
relevant market.143 The significance of customers’ views for the competitive 
assessment is obvious, since the goal of antitrust merger control is to protect 
consumer welfare. If customers object to a transaction, this suggests that the 
concentration is likely to lead to lessening their welfare through higher prices, 
reduced service quality or a loss of choice or innovation.144 Although products may 
have the same characteristics or intended use, there might be many other factors 
deterring customers from switching under SSNIP, and vice versa. These factors may 
not be fully considered by the authority. The actual demand-side substitution can 
be obtained by directly asking customers their response to a SSNIP.145  
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 Even in the latest case, Henkel HK/Tiande, during the review process the MOFCOM only sought 
opinions from the relevant government departments, industry associations, competitors and 
downstream enterprises on the definition of relevant market, market structure, industry characteristics 
and future development trend of the market. 
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 Paragraph 33, the Notice on Market Definition, supra note 4. 
144
 There are specific situations in which customers may choose not to object to a merger, even 
though it is anti-competitive. See Alistair Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 545.  
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 G Reynolds and C Walters, The use of customer surveys for market definition and the competitive 
assessment of horizontal mergers, (2008) Volume 4 No.2, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 
pp. 411-431; M Hughes and N Beale, Customer surveys in UK merger cases - the art and science of 
asking the right people the right questions, (2005) Volume 26 No.5, E.C.L.R, pp. 297-303; B Dubow, 
Understanding consumers: the value of stated preferences in antitrust proceedings, (2003) Volume 24 
No.3, E.C.L.R, pp.141-147; Chapter 3: Developing Reliable Evidence in Merger Cases in ICN 
Investigative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review, (June 2005), available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc322.pdf  (accessed on the 28th 
February 2013). 
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4.2 The Scope of Possible Substitutes 
The overlapping products between merging parties might be narrower than the 
scope of the relevant product market.146 Case Coca Cola/Huiyuan is an example.147  
On the 18th of September 2008 Coca Cola submitted an application of 
concentration to MOFCOM. The transaction concerned the acquisition by the 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Coca Cola Company of sole control of China’s Huiyuan 
Juice with the offer of $2.4 billion (£1.5 billion). The relevant product market in 
this transaction was delineated as the market for fruit juice drinks.148 The MOMCOM 
believed products of the merging parties were two types of non-alcoholic drink, 
namely juice and carbonated soft drinks. According to the evidence collected by 
the MOFCOM, Coco Cola and Huiyuan overlapped in manufacturing juice drinks. 
Only Coca Cola Company produced carbonated soft drinks; Hui Yuan did not. Given 
the substitution between juice and carbonated soft drink products was relatively 
low, they did not belong to a relevant market. Juice products were categorised by 
reference to the ratio of juice content, including 100% fruit juice, mixed juice with 
26-99% fruit juice, and juice with 25% or less fruit juice. The demand-side 
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 G J Stigler and R A Sherwin, the Extent of the Market, (1985) Volume 28, No.3, Journal of Law 
and Economics, pp. 555-585. 
147
 Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22, Coca Cola/Huiyuan. 
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 The Coca Cola/Huiyuan case caught the attention of scholars worldwide. There are many articles 
analysing the case; including the following. There are related articles in English, such as H Zhang, 
Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law: A Case Study of Coca Cola/Huiyuan, (2011) Volume 3, 
Peking University Journal of Legal Studies, Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569836 (access on the 3
rd
 March 2013); Q Bu, Coca Cola v. Huiyuan - 
market-economy driven or protectionism?, International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, (2010) Volume 41 No. 2, pp.202-210; related articles in Chinese: J Zhang, 
Research on the Development of China’s Antimonopoly Law in the Case of Coca- Cola Company 
Acquiring Huiyuan Group, (2010) Volume 11 No. 5, Journal of University of South China (Social 
Science Edition),  pp. 69-71; P Guang, Some Thoughts about the Proposed Acquisition of Huiyuan by 
Coca Cola from the Perspective of Antimonopoly Law, (2010) Volume 12 No.6, Journal of Southwest 
University of Political Science & Law, pp.42-48; J Sun and M Zhai, Thinking over the Anti-Monopoly 
Law on China’s Foreign Investors’ Merger and Acquisition -- taking Coca Cola from America acquired 
Huiyuan in China as an example, (2009) Volume 37 No.3, Journal of Xinjiang University (Philosophy, 
Humanities & Social Sciences), pp.45-51;  
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substitution and supply-side substitution among the three kinds of juice products 
are relatively high; they comprise a relevant market.149 
However, according to the Report on the Market of Soft Drinks in China, the soft 
drink industry is comprised of eight kinds of product in China: carbonated soft 
drinks, fruit juice and juice beverages, vegetable juices, milk beverages, 
vegetable protein drinks, speciality beverages, bottled water and tea drinks.150 
With the exception of carbonated soft drinks the MOFCOM did not investigate 
whether customers would switch to the other six kinds of soft drink when the price 
of juice drink increased. If the substitution between these six kinds of product and 
juice drinks were all taken into consideration, the final decision on the relevant 
market might be broader. The following is a simulation of a comprehensive SSNIP 
test. 
a. Demand-side Substitution 
(i) Physical characteristics of the product and intended use 
All varieties of soft drink have a common use, which is to quench thirst. In addition, 
these products are particular in function. Bottled water provides some minerals 
and micronutrients; juices and vegetable drinks contain a lot of vitamins and 
dietary fibre; milk beverages provide protein. Because of these differences, those 
subsidiaries are divided into three segments: the first is bottled water (no taste), 
the second is carbonated soft drinks, and the third is nutritional drinks (including 
fruit juice and juice beverages, vegetable juice, milk beverages, vegetable protein 
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  The MOFCOM did not define a relevant market in Coca Cola/Huiyuan. The above information on 
the substitution test was revealed in a press conference held by the MOFCOM one week after the 
decision was published. The MOFCOM stated, ‘In the process of defining relevant market, the 
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(accessed on the 20
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 See National Bureau of Statistics of China, Report on the Market of Soft Drinks in China (the 
second quarter of 2008), available at: http://whlg.cei.gov.cn/doc/hyc05/2008082218771.pdf (accessed 
on the 3
rd
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drinks, speciality beverages and tea.151 From the perspective of the consumer, 
carbonated soft drinks may not raise enough competitive constraints on the 
nutritional drinks in the SSNIP test.152  
(ii) Product price 
The MOFCOM has often inferred that two products are not reasonably substitutable 
if they are sold at substantially different prices. A related investigation indicates 
that the prices of fruit juices and juice beverages, vegetable juice, milk beverages 
and tea drinks are similar.153 Their absolute prices are more than two times the 
absolute price of bottled water. From the disparity in price, bottled water might 
have no substitute in juice drinks. A critical loss test is used between juice drinks 
and other potential substitutes in order to find out whether the loss of sales would 
reduce the profit when the price of juice drinks has a small but significant non-
transitory increase. Results reveal that vegetable juice, milk beverages and tea 
drinks can have a competitive constraint on the price increase of juice drinks. By 
contrast, carbonated drinks and bottled water cannot impose enough competitive 
constraint on the price increase of juice drink.154 
(iii) Consumer preferences 
Despite the existence of substitutes at similar prices, consumer loyalty may deter 
substitution following a price rise. However, in the soft drink market evidence 
shows that consumer preference may not be sufficiently stubborn to deter 
customers from switching to vegetable juice or tea drinks when the price of juice 
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 Ibid.  
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 Increasing numbers of consumers recognise that products of carbonate are rich in sugar and are 
not much nutritious as juice drink. See Report on the Market in Soft Drink in China (the second 
quarter of 2008), ibid. The MOFCOM also stated that carbonated drinks and juice drinks did not 
belong to a relevant market. However, evidence supporting the conclusion was undisclosed in the 
case decision. 
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 See figure1 in Xin Hong Jun’s Study Studio about Business and industrial economy, Lack of 
Empirical Analysis in Defining Relevant Market in China—Case Study of Coca Cola/Huiyuan, [论我国
相关市场界定实证分析的缺失--以汇源并购案为研究视角,  Lun Woguo Xiangguan Shichang Jieding 
Shizhengfenxi de Queshi—Yi Huiyuan Binggouan Wei Yanjiu Shijiao], (21
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 March 2011), available at: 
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drinks increases. In the investigation of 2008, 65.5 percent of tea drinkers also 
drank vegetable juice and juice drinks.155 
b. Supply-side Substitution 
There are suppliers who can produce milk beverages and juice drinks at the same 
time in the commercial market.156 Owning the technical skill, suppliers have the 
ability to increase manufacture of juice drinks without incurring significant 
additional cost or risk in response to price increases.   
From the perspective of demand-side substitution, vegetable juice and tea drinks 
might be involved in the relevant product market as alternatives to juice drinks for 
customers. From the standpoint of supply-side substitution milk beverages may 
belong to the relevant product market with juice drinks together. The MOFCOM 
obviously narrowed the scope of readily available substitutes, and the market 
power of post-merger enterprises will be exaggerated. If the relevant product 
market includes juice drinks and vegetable juice, the market share of the merged 
entity post-merger would only be 20.3 percent.157 This may be considered not 
liable to impede effective competition, and presumed to be compatible with the 
market.158 
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 See the news, leading position is exchanging between old and fresh brands in China’s market in 
soft drink, (2006), available at: http://info.china.alibaba.com/news/detail/v0-d5736595.Html (accessed 
on 21
st
 February 2012). 
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 There are at least two enterprises in the market which sell drinks mixed with juice and milk. (China 
Mengniu Dairy Company Limited and Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co. Ltd). See Xin Hong Jun’s Study 
Studio about Business and industrial economy, Lack of Empirical Analysis in Defining Relevant 
Market in China—Case Study about Coca Cola/Huiyuan, supra note 154. 
157
 Huiyuan has 56.1 percent market share in China’s high concentrate juice market. As the demand-
side substitution and supply-side substitution between three kinds of juice product with different levels 
of concentration are relatively high, they are delineated to form the same part of the relevant product 
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Business and industrial economy, Lack of Empirical Analysis in Defining Relevant Market in China—
Case Study about Coca Cola/Huiyuan, supra note 154. 
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 Further analysis of competitive assessment will be conducted in chapters 3, 4 and 5.   
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4.3 Priority of Demand-side Substitution  
It appears that the MOFCOM’s assessment of the product market depends entirely 
on demand-side factors. From a procedural perspective there are two advantages 
to a purely demand-side approach.159 The first is securing competitive assessment 
in a relatively short time span. Especially when the market share of merging 
parties is small, within a defined relevant product market, transactions might have 
no significant effect on market competition. This is because supply-side 
substitution can only broaden the scope of the relevant market; the competitive 
effect will be less significant in a larger market. The antitrust authority might 
consider supply-side substitution when demand-side substitutions are relatively 
weak and high market share indicates significant competitive concern. 160 Secondly, 
involving supply-side substitution enables consistency in case decision. Where 
supply-side substitutions are excluded at the stage of market definition, further 
suppliers and products will be considered in the next stage. This means that the 
market is not delimited correctly in the first place. 
In order to make market shares significant and take proper account of competitive 
constraints, supply-side consideration is best considered at the relevant market 
stage rather than in the subsequent competitive assessment or neglecting it 
altogether. The MOFCOM in particular mainly takes market share and 
concentration ratio as indications of anti-competitive effects of a merger.161 If 
demand-side substitution is weak or low, competitive concerns arise because the 
loss of sales may not be enough to countervail the profit of price increase; supply-
side substitution should be considered in defining the scope of the market.162 When 
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 P Crowther, Product market definition in E.C. competition law: the compatibility of legal and 
economic approaches, supra note 45, pp.177-198. 
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 One example is different flavours of carbonated drinks. Demand substitutability between cola and 
other flavours of drink might be low, but suppliers can add flavours to carbonated drinks at low cost 
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 supra note 104. 
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 Similarly to the EU, delineating the relevant market in China also starts from the notification form of 
merging parties. In this form, notifying parties are required to define the relevant market and provide 
supporting reasons. See part 7.2, the MOFCOM-amended merger notification form. An unofficial 
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demand-side substitution is sufficient to make the price increase of the merged 
entity unprofitable, supply-side substitution can be examined at a later stage. 
4.4 Limited Application of the SSNIP test 
According to the Guideline, the SSNIP test is not the prime method of defining the 
relevant market.163 It has not been used in practice in China. However, without the 
quantitative test, the extent of substitution between products cannot be precisely 
measured.164 Accordingly, if there are sufficient reliable data, it is advisable to 
reconcile the quantitative and qualitative approaches in defining the market.  
If sufficient and reliable data are not available, then a qualitative test is carried 
out. All available evidence upon which to identify those goods or services that 
provide a close competitive constraint on one another should be taken into 
account, in order to provide the best possible approximation for the SSNIP test.  
4.5 Development of Factors under Consideration 
Chinese legislation sets forth the principles and criteria applied in defining the 
relevant market, which are similar to those in the Notice of the EU. However, 
there is disparity in enforcement. In merger control in the EU, product 
characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show whether two products are 
demand substitutes. In order to have a comprehensive market definition, a variety 
of evidence is collected and investigated in each case. In China, although similar 
factors are listed in the legislation, consideration in practice mostly focuses on 
product characteristics and intended use. Other factors have not yet been taken 
into consideration. 
                                                                                                                               
translation of the form is  available at: http://www.zhonglun.com/UpFile/File/201206121011281858.pdf 
(accessed on the 6
th
 June 2013). 
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 Article 7, the Guideline on Market Definition, see supra note 94. 
164
 These econometric and statistical approaches for the substitutive test contain own-price and cross-
price elasticity and critical loss analysis. See supra note 29. 
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4.6 Transparency of Case Decisions 
General principles and criteria in China’s guidelines should be interpreted through 
administrative practice and case decisions. Although case decisions have no legally 
binding effect in China, the need for transparency of merger review is universally 
agreed.165 There are certain areas where the application of the principles above 
has to be undertaken with care. This is because there is no an exhaustive list for 
the assessment of the relevant market. Meanwhile, no single item of evidence can 
precisely fix the scope of relevant market. The enforcement authority has the 
discretion to reach a conclusion on relevant market with a subset of the 
checklist.166 Transparency of the reasoning process has an important role to play in 
restraining the discretion of the antitrust authority.167 Transparency of deliberation 
on how market definition is determined in case decisions in the EU and China is 
compared below.  
Due to the great worldwide revenues and combined market shares in relevant 
markets some concentrations have to be reviewed by the anti-monopoly 
authorities in various jurisdictions including China and Europe. Eleven transactions 
out of nineteen published merger cases in China were also reviewed by the 
Commission by the June 2013. In China these eleven transactions were approved 
with restrictive conditions. In the EU, four of them got outright clearance; seven 
cases got clearance with commitments.168 The following analysis is based on those 
transactions which were reviewed by both the Commission and the MOFCOM.  
a. Decisions of outright clearance  
In the decision of outright clearance the Commission will issue a brief statement 
identifying the parties and the nature of the transaction, and discuss the relevant 
                                         
165
 Discussion of the importance of transparency of merger review is available at ‘1.3 Transparency of 
Merger Analysis’ in Chapter 1. 
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 On the additional considerations see part V, the Notice on Market Definition; Alistair Lindsay, The 
EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), part 3.4 and 3.7, 
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 See infra ‘4.6 Transparency of Case Decision’ in this chapter.  
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 Results of merger assessment in the EU and China on the same transactions are presented in the 
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product and geographic markets. The statements are often limited in detail but 
still typically provide the Commission’s view of the affected markets, the structure 
of related industry, the factors considered in analysing the substitution test and 
the degree of overlap of the participating firms.169 In China the MOFCOM is not 
required to publish its reasoning if mergers are cleared without commitment.170 
There is only a public acknowledgement by the agency of the name of the case, 
the names of the merging parties and the date of approval after assessment.171 
Cătălin Ştefan Rusu believed that publishing statements explaining the authorities’ 
reasoning in every transaction would be ‘imprudent and tremendously burdensome, 
and would result in hundreds of cursory opinions that provide little guidance to the 
public’. 172 The author believes that the extent of clarification on outright 
clearance decisions in China should at least match that of the EU. This is to 
prevent the MOFCOM from clearing transactions based on non-competitive 
considerations, especially since the MOFCOM is under the control of the highest 
organ of state administration.173 Transparency helps the public to scrutinise the 
enforcement authority’s activities. 
b. Decisions of prohibition or clearance with commitments 
The Commission publishes more details of reasoning in merger cases which are 
blocked or cleared with commitments. These concentrations often entail in-depth 
analysis, and take a longer time to evaluate specific factors in transactions. 
Publishing the complete and in-depth analysis sets a reference for merger parties 
in future transactions. Consistency and predictability in applying merger norms can 
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 See Case COMP/M.5778 Novartis/Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8. 
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 Article 30, the AML 2008. 
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 On 6
th
 January 2013 the MOFCOM published its outright merger cases during the last quarter of 
2012 for the first time. Since then, outright cases are published on the MOFCOM’s official website at 
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 See C S Rusu, A Few Considerations Regarding Transparency and Legal Certainty in European 
Merger Control, (2007), SUBB Jurisprudential, 185, available at: http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
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‘4.3.2.2 Mission of Implementing Non-competitive Considerations’ in Chapter 1. 
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only be checked if there is transparency. This practice also promotes discussion 
and understanding of the working procedure of competition authorities.174  
An intuitive comparison of transparency in the EU and Chinese systems is reflected 
in the number of pages devoted to each case decision. The Commission publishes 
about 50 pages of explanation of its competitive assessment in each case which 
might be blocked or cleared with commitments. However, in China, the entire 
case decision is about three to four pages.175 What information is neglected by the 
MOFCOM? Does reporting of these decisions contribute to improving transparency? 
These questions will be answered by comparing case reports in China and the EU. 
(i) A preliminary remark on the markets which might be affected by the proposed 
transaction. 
Definition of the relevant market in the EU begins with a preliminary remark on 
the markets which might be affected by the proposed transaction.176 Affected 
products are those which are manufactured by the merger parties.177 
(ii) Confirming products which might substitute for merging parties’ overlapping 
products 
After a preliminary remark the Commission gives a general introduction about 
affected products, including their composition, and how to classify them according 
to size, use or raw materials. The Commission analyses the substitution among 
products which are on the same level with the affected products in the structure 
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 See K R Fisher, Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?, (2006) 
Volume 11 No.327, Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401204 (accessed on the 3
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 March 2012). 
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 In case decisions of Pfizer/Wyeth, Novartis/Alcon and Panasonic/Sanyo, the Commission used 96, 
58 and 45 A4 pages respectively to illustrate the process of competitive assessment. See Case 
COMP/M.5476 Pfizer/Wyeth [2009] O.J. C 262/1; Case COMP/M.5421 Panasonic/Sanyo [2009] O.J. 
C322/13; Case COMP/M.5778 Novartis v. Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8. Clarifying competitive 
assessment of these three transactions in China only took 3, 4 and 3 A4 pages respectively.  
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 Interpretation of ‘affected markets’ can refer to Section 6 (III) Form CO. 
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 Case COMP/M.5421 Panasonic/Sanyo [2009] O.J. C322/13, paragraphs 8-17. 
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of related products. 178 This is to ensure likely alternatives to affected products can 
all be included in the substitution test. Affected products might also have sub-
segmentations. A substitution test should be conducted among these sub-
segmentations to see if affected products should be further divided. 
(iii) Evidence of substitution test 
In conducting each substitution test the Commission first sets out the views of the 
parties. In order to reduce anti-competitive concern the merging parties often 
provide evidence for widening the scope of the market. Their market power could 
be lessened in a broader market. Accordingly the Commission should check the 
views of the parties through market investigation. The methods may include giving 
the SSNIP test to customers and suppliers and obtaining the views of competitors, 
related experts, industry associations and so on.  
(iv)  Result of market definition 
The Commission will publish its market investigation to all affected markets; some 
of them have no significant anti-competitive concerns after assessment. In the 
meantime the Commission can only make a decision on the published 
reasons.179Thus the reasoning processes of the Commission on all affected markets 
are under public scrutiny.  
Unlike these four steps in the EU, MOFCOM’s scrutiny of the relevant market is far 
from transparent; its policy is not clear and predictable.  
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 Information about the structure of related products can be collected through consulting related 
industry associations or international organisations. For example, in case Novartis / Alcon the 
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First of all, on most occasions the MOFCOM only lists markets in which competition 
would be significantly affected by the proposed transaction.180 The reasoning 
process of the MOFCOM on the affected market with no significant competitive 
concerns is not discernible by the public. This is unlike the EU, which briefly shows 
the views of the parties and market investigation on all affected markets even 
with no serious competitive concerns. The advantage of the Commission’s policy is 
obvious. Differing views are expressed, although the authority believes merger 
would not raise significant anti-competitive effects on certain affected markets. 
The final decision provides an important opportunity for the enforcement authority 
to clarify how it has reviewed those different opinions. It also increases 
predictability in applying merger norms. The MOFCOM should publish and make 
transparent its reasoning process to all markets affected by the merger. 
Secondly, the MOFCOM does not introduce the background of the related industry 
and the position of the affected product in the structure of industry. For instance, 
in Panasonic/Sanyo three categories of battery are defined as the relevant product 
market. 181 The placement of merging parties’ overlapping products in the structure 
of the battery industry is not clear. The criterion for choosing available substitutes 
for the overlapping products of merging parties is not disclosed. In Coca 
Cola/Huiyuan it can only be presumed from the following anti-competitive 
assessment that juice drinks are the relevant product market.182 The platform for 
substitution test is unknown.  
Thirdly evidence collected from the parties and market investigation remains 
undisclosed. The MOFCOM publishes general factors it considered in evaluating the 
relevant market. In Seagate/Samsung hard disk drive (HHD) constitutes a separate 
product market. This is given one sentence of explanation:  
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 In Panasonic / Sanyo, MOFCOM only set out the markets in which the Concentration will create or 
increase significant anti-competitive effects. A similar condition also existed in Novartis / Alcon, GE / 
Shenhua. Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic/Sanyo; Announcement MOFCOM 
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 Ibid. 
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 In Coca cola / Huiyuan, the MOFCOM concerns ‘after the concentration, Coca Cola will have the 
ability to leverage its dominant position in the market of carbonated soft drinks to the market of fruit 
juice drinks’. Therefore it deduces the relevant product market is the fruit juice drink. See Part IV-(1) 
of Coca cola/Huiyuan, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22, Coca cola/Huiyuan. 
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Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) has distinguished disparities with other data storage 
devices like Solid State Drives (SSDs) and branded External Storage Devices 
(ESDs) in the aspects of the storage space, prices, and intended use and so 
on. The MOFCOM defines the HDDs as a separate relevant market. 183 
The MOFCOM further divided products of HDDs into four sub-categories, but the 
extent of substitution among sub-categories was not discussed. The transparency 
of MOFCOM’s clearance decision with commitments is limited only to the extent of 
the EU’s outright clearance decision.184 Seagate/Samsung got outright clearance in 
the EU. In order to illustrate the difference between HDDs, SSDs and ESDs, the 
Commission gave a brief introduction to each product and pointed out the 
differences of HDDs, SSDs and ESDs in product characteristics, prices and suppliers. 
In addition the market investigation suggested that there might be separate sub-
markets within HDDs based on end-use and form factors, given the limited 
demand-side substitutability. These sub-categories are: (i) Enterprise or Server 
HDDs (used in servers and enterprise storage systems), (ii) Desktop HDDs (used in 
PCs), (iii) Mobile HDDs (used in notebooks); and (iv) Consumer Electronics (used in 
applications such as digital video recorders or camcorders).185 Finally, the main 
effect of the transaction was held to be on the sub-markets for 3.5” desktop hard 
disk drives and 2.5” mobile hard disk drives.  
The MOFCOM only listed differences between products’ characteristics, intended 
use or process of manufacture; the views of the parties and the result of market 
investigation are absent from the case decision. The parties do not know what 
information was accepted by the MOFCOM. The public cannot predict the methods 
or evidence that the MOFCOM will adopt in assessment. The MOFCOM’s decision is 
not under scrutiny to introduce non-competitive considerations, which results in 
economically adverse effects of an anticompetitive transaction’s being allowed, or 
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 Case Seagate/Samsung, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
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 Transaction of Seagate/Samsung was approved without commitment in the EU. Case 
COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics, [2011] O.J. C 
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 Case Seagate/Samsung, ibid. 
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a healthy, profitable transaction’s being blocked.186 The ‘black box’ also grants 
space for rent-seeking. The controversial case of SEB/Supor is an example. 187  
French home appliances giant SEB International acquired a controlling interest in 
Supor. With regard to this concentration there was dissent about the relevant 
product market.  Supor insisted that pressure cookers belong to one kind of cooker, 
and that the relevant product market should be the whole cooker market. Under 
such a definition, Supor insisted, the sale of cookers in China was 8 to 10 billion 
RMB in 2005. The sale of Supor was about 700 million RMB. Its market share was 
less than 10 percent, which would not substantially affect competition in the 
cooker market. However, if the relevant product market was defined as the 
pressure cooker market, the effect of concentration would be substantial. 
According to the report from China Industrial Information Issuing Centre, Supor’s 
share of the pressure cooker market was 47.05% in 2005, 48.65% in 1999, 52% in 
2000 and 53.1% in 2001. If the countryside were included, the market share of 
Supor would exceed 70 percent.188 Obviously the effect of concentration on the 
market depended on whether the scope of the product market was the pressure 
cooker or all cookers. Eventually the MOFCOM granted outright clearance to the 
transaction and did not reply to dissenting opinion. Opacity of the merger decision 
provides opportunity for the merging parties to bribe staff in the enforcement 
authority.189 
                                         
186
 It is doubted whether the decision of the Commission is influenced by national interests. See Q Bu, 
Coca Cola v. Huiyuan - market-economy driven or protectionism?, International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, (2010) Volume 41 No. 2, pp. 202-210. 
187
 Lyon-based Groupe SEB (EPA:SK), the world’s largest manufacturer of countertop kitchen 
appliances, has reportedly agreed to raise its stake in Zhejiang Supor Co. (SZ:002032), a Hangzhou-
based manufacturer of cookware and small electric house ware, from 51.31% to 71.31% to US$526 
million. After a Chinese anti-monopoly investigation Groupe SEB was permitted to increase its 30% 
stake in Supor to a majority stake in November 2007. However, the MOFCOM’s decision of outright 
approval did not clarify any dissent of the public. The scandal of bribery and lobbying was aroused by 
the vague case decision. See: http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_csg_ChinaMADigest_022211.pdf (accessed on the 
19th September 2013). 
188
 The statistic appears in X Wang, Definition of Relevant Market in Enforcing Antimonopoly Law [论
反垄断法实施中的相关市场界定, Lun Fanlongduanfa Shishi zhong de Xiangguan Shichang Jieding], 
(2008) Volume 1, Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law,[ 法律
科学(西北政法学院学报), Falv Kexue(Xibei Zhengfa Xueyuan Xuebao),125. 
189
 According to the investigation of the court Jingyi Guo ( a former member of staff of the MOFCOM) 
accepted a bribe from Supor. The aim of the bribe was to look for support from Guo in order to secure 
approval of the controversial concentration between SEB and Supor. The same lack of disclosure 
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The fourth difference from EU practice concerns the outcome of the relevant 
market. Not all market definitions are precisely delineated. It depends on the 
particular competition issue under consideration. This has been proved by the 
Commission.190 In China the decision on relevant market is fixed. This situation may 
change when the MOFCOM includes more considerations in its assessment, and 
increasing disputes are raised. The MOFCOM can learn from the EU, and only fix 
the definition of ‘relevant market’ when necessary.191 The process begins with a 
quick ‘virtual market definition’ that identifies candidate problem markets, 
proceeds to competitive effects analysis and returns to ‘confirmation of market 
definition’ according to the preliminary remarks of the competitive assessment.192  
In conclusion, the Notice on Market Definition in the EU generally describes the 
underlying principles and criteria for market definition and provides a list of 
factors and evidence on which the authorities rely in defining the ‘relevant 
market’. In case decision, the Commission interprets how it enforces general 
factors in the guidelines, and provides precedents for similar transactions in future. 
In China the Guideline on Market Definition shares the principles and methods of 
the EU. However, enforcement of the Guideline and transparency of case decisions 
in China still need improvement in many respects.  
 
 
                                                                                                                               
also characterised Coca Cola/ Huiyuan. Further discussion of this case can be found in ‘4.2 The 
Scope of Possible Substitutes’ in this chapter. 
190
 See ‘2.4.5 Market definition is not unique’ in this chapter. 
191
 For instance, with respect to the product market, the issue will often be to determine whether 
products  A and B belong to the same product market. The possible relevant market should be 
confirmed if the inclusion of product B would be enough to remove any competition concerns. See 
paragraph 26, Notice on Market Definition, supra note 94. 
192
 The approach was provided by W Blumenthal in Statement before the FTC/DOJ Merger 
Enforcement Workshop, Why Bother?: On Market Definition under the Merger Guidelines, (February, 
2004), 5, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217blumenthal.pdf 
(accessed on the 13
th
 October 2013). 
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Chapter 3: Horizontal Mergers – Unilateral Effects 
1 Introduction  
After delineating the relevant market the next step is to assess the anti-
competitive effects of a merger.1 Horizontal mergers produce two related 
consequences that do not arise in either vertical or conglomerate mergers. They 
reduce the number of firms active in the relevant market and they result in an 
increase in market concentration. Thus a horizontal merger may remove important 
competitive constraints in concentrated markets. The merged group is able 
profitably to increase price or reduce quality, choice or innovation which is not in 
the interest of consumers.2 Generally, such harm is realised through two channels: 
(a) by eliminating important competitive constraints on one or more firms, which 
consequently increases market power, without resorting to coordinated behaviour 
(‘unilateral effects’ also called ‘non-coordinated effects’);3 (b) by changing the 
nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously did not coordinate 
their behaviour are now significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or 
otherwise harm effective competition. A merger may also make coordination 
easier, more stable or more effective for firms which were coordinated prior to 
                                         
1
 Paragraph10, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers), 
[2004] O.J. C31/5. 
2
 The reason for evaluating unilateral effects in anti-monopoly assessment can be seen in: M Ivaldi 
and F Verboven, Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy, 
(2005) Volume 23, International Journal of Industrial Organization, pp. 669-691; H J Hovenkamp, 
Harm to Competition under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (2011) Volume 39 Numbers 1-2, 
Review of Industrial Organization, 16; J B Baker, Why did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral 
Effects?, (2003-2004) Volume 12 Issue 1,George Mason Law Review; pp. 31-38; R B Starek III and S 
Stockum, What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive? : ‘Unilateral Effects’ Analysis Under the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, (1994-1995) Volume 63 Issue 3, Antitrust Law Journal, 801; J B Baker and C Shapiro, 
Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, (June 2007), available at: 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/mergerpolicy.pdf (accessed on the 8
th 
May 2013); M Ivaldi et 
al., The Economics of Unilateral Effects, (November 2003), Interim Report for DG Competition, 
European Commission, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_unilateral_effects_en.pdf 
(accessed on the 8
th 
May 2013); 
3
 Paragraph 24, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1; the introduction of unilateral effects 
is also illustrated in Chapter 4 in Worksheet C, ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis 
Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, (2006), available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc321.pdf (accessed on the 8
th 
May 
2013). 
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the merger (co-ordinate effects).4 The following is a comparative study of 
unilateral effects in the EU and China. Coordinated effects will be assessed in 
chapter 4. 
The first criterion detertmines in which jurisdiction the assessment is better able 
to reflect the unilateral effects of merger on the competitive process; the second 
criterion is which jurisdiction has greater public transparency of competitive 
process. In order to answer these two questions an analysis will be conducted in 
three steps. Firstly, it attempts to look at the approaches for assessing unilateral 
effects of horizontal merger in the EU. Secondly, the jurisdiction of China will be 
reviewed. Thirdly, upon comparison, some recommendations on likely future 
developments of horizontal merger assessment in China are made. 
Recommendations are expected to be proposed in two parts: 1) how to make the 
result of merger assessment better reflect the effects of a horizontal merger on 
the competition process; and 2) how to secure the approach of merger assessment 
in China more transparent to the public through legislation and case reporting.  
2 Horizontal Mergers: Evaluating Unilateral Effects 
in the EU 
Article 2(1) of the EUMR contains a non-exhaustive list of considerations which the 
Commission must take into account when making merger control appraisal, namely: 
(a) The need to maintain and develop effective competition within the 
common market in view of, among other things: the structure of all the 
markets concerned; and the actual or potential competition from 
undertakings located either within or without the Community; 
(b) The following specific factors: the market position of the undertakings 
concerned and their economic and financial power; the alternatives 
                                         
4
 Paragraph 39, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1; see also Case T-102/96, Gencor v 
Commission, [1999] E.C.R II-753, paragraph 277; Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission, [2002] 
E.C.R. II-2585, paragraph 61. 
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available to suppliers and users; their access to supplies or markets; any 
legal or other barriers to entry; supply and demand trends for the relevant 
goods and services, the interests of  intermediate and ultimate consumers, 
and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is 
to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.5 
Under the EUMR the Commission published Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal merger.6 These identified six principal conditions under which 
significant unilateral effects are likely to result from a merger. Firstly, that the 
merging firms have large market shares; secondly, that merging firms are close 
competitors; thirdly, that customers have limited possibilities of switching 
suppliers if prices increase; fourthly, that competitors are unlikely to increase 
supply if prices increase; fifthly, that the merged entity is able to hinder expansion 
by competitors; and sixthly, that the merger eliminates an important competitive 
force.7 A number of these factors, separately or together, may lead the 
Commission to conclude that a merger may be likely to harm consumers due to 
significant unilateral effect.8 The following examines how the Commission 
evaluates each factor to identify unilateral effect. 
2.1 Initial Review of Market Share and Concentration Data 
The Commission relies on data on market shares and concentration levels as 
‘useful first indications ‘of the market structure and the competitive importance 
of the merging parties and their competitors.9 The larger the market share, the 
                                         
5
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (hereinafter ‘EUMR’), O.J.L24/1. 
6
 The evaluation of non-coordinated effects in the EU is discussed in: N Horne, Unilateral Effects and 
the EC Merger Regulation–How The Commission Had its Cake and Ate it Too, (2006) Volume 2 
Number 1, Hanse Law Review, pp.23-43. 
7
 Paragraphs 27-38, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
8
 The Commission states that ‘not all of these factors need to be present for unilateral effects to be 
likely. Nor should this be considered an exhaustive list’. Paragraph 26, Guidelines on Horizontal 
Mergers, supra note 1. 
9
 Paragraph 14, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. See G J Werden, Assigning Market 
Shares, (2002), Volume 70 Issue 1, Antitrust Law Journal, pp. 67-103; Chapter 4 in Worksheet C, ICN 
Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, supra note 3; M Ivaldi et al., The 
Economics of Unilateral Effects, supra note 2. 
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greater the competitive constraint. First of all the Commission considers a merger 
involving a firm whose market share will be 50% or more to be evidence of a 
dominant market position.10 Secondly, the Commission has also in several cases 
considered mergers resulting in firms holding market shares between 40% and 
50%.11 Thirdly, in some cases the Commission has considered mergers leading to 
firms with market shares below 40%.12 Nevertheless, a high combined market share 
was found not necessarily to be a good indication of the market power that the 
proposed merger will obtain as a result of the merger. Market share may only 
reflect a snapshot of the structure of the relevant market at a given time.13 
Following the transaction, the merged group will not enjoy market power, 
notwithstanding its high market share. A market leader which holds a large market 
share is not dominant where:  
(i) Innovation is taking place as a rapid pace; (ii) there is fierce competition 
between large players; (iii) entry into a market is easy. Moreover, even a 
monopolist may be unable to exercise latent market power if it sells durable 
goods or if it cannot expand sales beyond the monopoly level.14  
By contrast, small market shares may understate the competitive significance of 
one or more of the merging parties, particularly if the company is coordinating 
with other rivals, innovating, expanding, cutting prices or generally independent as 
                                         
10
 The General Court (previously the Court of First Instance) believes that if an undertaking has a 
particularly high market share and holds it for some time by means of the volume of production and 
the scale of the supply, this may in itself be evidence of the existence of a dominant position, in 
particular where the other operators in the market hold only much smaller shares. See note 20, 
Horizontal Merger Guideline, citing cases T-221/95, Endemol v Commission, [1999] E.C.R. II-1299, 
paragraph 134, and Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, [1999] E.C.R. II-753, paragraph 205.  
11
 This may be because merging parties are the No.1 and No. 2 competitors in the market. Meanwhile 
the market also lacks sizeable competitors constraining the market power of merging parties. See, 
e.g. Case COMP/M.2337 Nestle/Ralston Purina, [2001] O.J.C 239/7, paragraphs 48-50. 
12
 For example, the merged entity has competitive advantages in the procurement markets which 
none of its competitors has. See Case No IV/M.1221, Rewe/Mein, [1999] O.J L 274/1, paragraphs 98-
114. 
13
 B.12 in Chapter 4, Worksheet C, ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, 
supra note 3. 
14
 Note 12, L Roller and M Mano, the Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control,  (2006) Volume 2 No.1, European Competition Journal, 16. 
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compared with the rest of the market.15 Therefore merger assessment today can 
be less reliant on the rather blunt and imprecise market share test than it was 10 
years ago.16 A number of concentrations with high market share (between 65% and 
90%) post-merger have also been cleared by the Commission.17  
Apart from the parameter of market share, the Commission also uses a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to analyse the overall structure of the market, in particular 
the extent to which a few large firms control supplies or purchases. 18 In addition, 
the EU establishes a ‘safe harbour’19 with the HHI index: 
The Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000. Such markets normally do not 
require extensive analysis. 
The Commission is also unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns 
in a merger with a post-merger HHI between 1 000 and 2 000 and a delta 
                                         
15
 See Note 69, A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, Second Edition, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006), 219. Under the 1989 Merger Regulation a merger was prohibited when it ‘Creates or 
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded’ (‘dominant’ test). Under the ‘dominant’ test the Commission lacks power to prohibit merger 
with coordinated effect, while merged entity has no dominant position post-merger. The ‘gap’ issue 
finally leads the Commission to change its substantive test of merger control from ‘dominant test’ to 
the ‘SIEC’ test, according to which merger will be declared incompatible with the common market if it 
presents a ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ (SIEC test). The ‘gap’ issue will be 
discussed further in chapter 4.The old dominant test can be seen in article 2(2), the 1989 Merger 
Regulation; the new ‘SIEC’ test can be seen in article 2(2), EUMR. 
16
 Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No.4064/89, 11
th
 December 
2001, COM (2001) 745/6 final, 39. 
17
 Examples of cases can be seen in note 67, A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive 
issues, supra note 15, 219. 
18
 For example, a market containing five firms with market shares of 40%, 20%, 15%, 15% and 10%, 
respectively, has an HHI of 2,550 (40
2
 + 20
2
 + 15
2
 + 15
2
 + 10
2
 = 2 550). The HHI ranges from close to 
zero (in an atomistic market) to 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly).  
19
 Safe harbour is a scope within which mergers are immune from challenge or are presumed unlikely 
to be challenged, having a significant anti-competitive effect. See section III. The Use of Safe-
Harbours in Chapter 3- Unilateral Effects, the ICN Report on Merger Guidelines, 2004, available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc561.pdf (accessed on the 20
th
 
September 2013). 
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below 250, or a merger with a post-merger HHI above 2 000 and a delta 
below 150.20 
Unlike a ‘strong safe harbour’ criterion, the ‘soft safe harbour’ is just a 
presumption within which transactions will not be prohibited.21 It can be rebutted 
in exceptional conditions.22 Although a ‘strong safe harbour’ has more legal 
certainty than a ‘weak safe harbour’ criterion, the EU still adopts a ‘weak safe 
harbour’ criterion. This may be based on two considerations. On the one hand the 
HHI is based on a precise definition of ‘relevant market’. However, market 
definition is difficult to define accurately due to a lack of exact science. On the 
other hand transactions with low market share or concentration data will all be 
cleared under ‘strong safe harbour’ criterion. A false positive error will have no 
chance of being corrected in the subsequent competitive assessment.23   
                                         
20
 The approach for calculating HHI level and its increase in concentration has been illustrated in note 
19, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
21
 ‘Strong safe harbour’ is a guarantee within which transactions are absolutely immune from 
challenge by the antitrust authority. Paragraph 36, ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework 
Subgroup, Project on Merger Guidelines, (April, 2004), available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc488.pdf (accessed on the 8
th 
May 
2013). 
22
 The Commission lists special circumstances such as: ‘(a) a merger involves a potential entrant or a 
recent entrant with a small market share; (b) one or more merging parties are important innovators in 
ways not reflected in market shares; (c) there are significant cross-shareholdings among the market 
participants; (d) one of the merging firms is a maverick firm with a high likelihood of disrupting 
coordinated conduct; (e) indications of past or on-going coordination, or facilitating practices, are 
present; (f) one of the merging parties has a pre-merger market share of 50 % of more’. Paragraphs 
19-20, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
23
 For example, a merger between suppliers of differentiated products may still result in substantial 
increases in price even if the merged group has relatively low market shares. See ICN Merger 
Working Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup, supra note 3, 6. 
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2.2 Merging Firms Are Close Competitors24 
The reasoning underlying unilateral effects is as follows: as the price of Brand A 
rises, some customers will shift from Brand A to Brand B. Prior to the merger these 
customers would be lost to the firm owning Brand A. After the merger this same 
firm owns Brand B and thus does not lose these customers. As a result the price 
increase is more profitable to the merged entity.25 Therefore the substitution of 
merging parties is essential in evaluating unilateral effects.26 If merging parties are 
seen as the first and second choices by customers, the customers have no other 
alternative suppliers they can switch to in order to reduce the sale of the merged 
group and make its price increase unprofitable. Even the market share of the 
merged group is relatively low; it may still be significantly detrimental to the 
consumers’ interest. By contrast, if the merging parties’ products are not regarded 
by customers as close substitutes, then relatively high market shares post-merger 
may not be indicative of the increase of market power because customers could 
switch to other competitors. The loss of sales will make the price increase of the 
merged entity unprofitable. The analysis merely on the market definition and 
market shares may cope poorly with different product markets because it neglects 
the different extent of substitution among products within the same market 
definition. In order to find out the extent of substitution among products within 
the same market several sources of information were considered by the 
                                         
24
 Paragraph 28, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. see also C Shapir, Mergers with 
Differentiated Product, (1996) Antitrust , pp.23-30; G J Werden, Simulating the Effects of 
Differentiated Products: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, (1997) Volume 5 Issue 3, 
George Mason Law Review, pp.363-386; J B Baker and C Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, supra note 2; The International Competition Network, ICN Investigative Techniques 
Handbook for Merger Review, (June 2005), available at:  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc322.pdf (accessed on the 4
th
 June 
2013). 
25
 Chapter 4 Worksheet C, ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, supra 
note 3, 39. 
26
 S Bishop and A Lofaro, Assessing unilateral effects in practice lessons from GE/Instrumentarium, 
(2005) Volume 26 Issue 4, pp.205-208; G Loriot and F Rouxel (DG Competition, Chief Economist 
Team), GE/Instrumentarium: a practical example of the use of quantitative analyses in merger control, 
(Spring 2004), No. 1, Merger Control, pp.58-62 available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_1_58.pdf (accessed on the 9
th
 May 2013); M 
Walker, The potential for significant inaccuracies in merger simulation models, (2005) Volume 1 Issue 
3, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp.473-496; C Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, supra note 26, pp. 23-30; G J Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products: A 
Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, supra note 24, pp.363-386. 
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Commission.27 Firstly, the Commission may request customers to rank the first and 
second best substitutes to the products they are using currently.28 Secondly, 
specific evidence like shock analysis and internal documents can also reveal the 
close relationship between the products of merging parties.29 Thirdly, a bidding 
study may be used in cases involving tendering markets. The rationale for this 
exercise was used in GE/Instrumentarium:30  
If the studies were to show that each merging party offers relatively higher 
discounts ( i.e. lower price) when the other merging party participates in the 
bid compared to the discount offered in those tenders in which the other 
party does not participate, this would indicate that the merging parties 
currently exert an important competitive constraint on one another. This 
would in turn suggest that the proposed merger may be expected to lead to a 
post-merger price increase.31  
Alternatively, if the studies show that the discount offered by the merging parties 
is largely unaffected by the other merging party, this indicates that the merging 
parties exert no competitive constraint on each other. Therefore the proposed 
                                         
27
 Kinds of evidence at every stage of merger review include pre-existing documentary evidence, 
documents created in connection with the merger; descriptive evidence from market participants; 
written responses to inquiries and compulsory requests for information and expert and quantitative 
evidence. See Chapter 3, The International Competition Network, ICN Investigative Techniques 
Handbook for Merger Review, supra note 25.  
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Shock analysis can be used to assess the effects of previous launches of new products or similar 
significant changes in the operation of the market. See The International Competition Network, ICN 
Investigative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review, supra note 25, 61. More utilisation about this 
method can be seen in case COMP/M.3191 Philip Morris/Papastratos, [2003] O.J. C 258/4, paragraph 
27. Internal documents, such as business plans, competitor analysis and marketing studies may 
reveal the parties’ own perceptions of the relative market positions of the different products or the 
extent to which different rivals’ prices are taken into account in determining price. See e.g. Case 
COMP/M. 2861 Siemens/Drägewerk /JV [2003] O.J.L291/1, paragraphs 91-93 and 127-131.  
30
 See S Bishop and A Lofaro, Assessing unilateral effects in practice lessons from 
GE/Instrumentarium, supra note 26, pp.205-208; G Loriot and F Rouxel (DG Competition, Chief 
Economist Team), GE/Instrumentarium: a practical example of the use of quantitative analyses in 
merger control, supra note 26; M Walker, The potential for significant inaccuracies in merger 
simulation models, supra note 26, pp. 473-496. 
31
 See Case COMP.3083 GE/Instrumentariu, [2004] O.J. L109/1. 
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merger would be unlikely to give rise to significant unilateral effects.32 In addition 
to qualitative investigation, economic techniques can also be employed to assess 
the profitability of price increase post-merger. In order to determine the actual 
closeness of competitors the Commission may conduct customer preference 
surveys, analyse purchasing patterns, estimate the cross-price elasticity of the 
products involved or use diversion ratio.33 Regardless, each type of evidence 
presents different reliability issues.34 Firstly, evidence may not reflect the average 
customers’ appetite if the group being investigated is over- or under-sampled; 
secondly, competitors of merging parties are likely to focus on the effect of the 
merger on its own interest rather than the merger’s effect on customers or 
competition. Rivals of merging parties have incentives to favour an anticompetitive 
merger and oppose an actually pro-competitive merger; thirdly, merging parties 
want to consummate their transaction, so they will argue that the merger poses 
little or no competitive risk. Notifying parties may provide selected and screened 
documents that they expect to be seen by the agency rather than comprehensive 
materials. Therefore the Commission is advised to supplement some economic 
analysis with the conclusion from market survey to see if these investigations point 
to the same conclusion.35  
                                         
32
 Case COMP /M.3687 Johnson &Johnson/Guidant, [2006] O.J.L173/16, paragraphs 265, 266, 270 
and note 146. Case COMP/M.3436 Continetal/Phoenix, [2006] O.J.L353/7, paragraphs 121,122 and 
135. 
33
 Paragraph 29, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
34
 See chapter 3, The International Competition Network, ICN Investigative Techniques Handbook for 
Merger Review, supra note 25, 37. 
35
 See A Coscelli and S Baker, the role of market shares in differentiated product markets, (1999) 
Volume 20 Issue 8, E.C.L.R. pp.412-419 
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2.3 Customers Have Limited Possibilities of Switching 
Suppliers or Competitors are Unlikely to Increase 
Supply if Price Increases 
If the available alternative suppliers are few or the switching cost is substantial, 
customers of the merging parties may have difficulty switching to other suppliers.36 
These customers may be vulnerable to price increases, particularly where they are 
engaged in dual sourcing from the merging parties to obtain competitive prices. 37  
In addition, if the competitors of merging parties are unlikely substantially to 
increase their output when prices increase, the merging firms may have an 
incentive to reduce their output and raise their market prices.38 Therefore the 
Commission will evaluate the likelihood of expanded output by the competitors in 
three areas, namely the ability, incentive and sufficiency of competitors to expand 
output.39 
2.3.1 Ability to Expand Output 
For competitors to be viable alternative suppliers to the merged group they must 
have the ability to expand, either through existing spare capacity or the ability  
readily to add new capacity.40 The Commission considers the competitive 
constraint of rivals from three aspects: market share, concentration data and the 
                                         
36
 Paragraph 31, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. Citing Cases IV/M.877 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, [1997] O.J. L 336/16, paragraph 70; Case IV/M.986 Agfa 
Gevaert/DuPont, [1998] O.J. L 211/ 22, paragraphs 63-71. 
37
 Lindsay discusses the limited possibilities of switching suppliers in A Lindsay, the EC Merger 
Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, pp.280-283. As the substitution test has been 
analysed in Chapter 2, it will be discussed in detail here. 
38
 Paragraph 32-35, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. Following price increase with 
merged entity post-merger is distinctive of cartel or tacit collusion, because the strategy does not 
need any cooperation.  
39
 See A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, pp. 450-458.The 
capacity constraint may be broken by either entry or expansion of competitors. Assessment of entry is 
available in Chapter 5.  
40
 A Lindsay, ibid., 453. See case COMP/M.3178 Bertelsmann/Springer/JV, [2006] O.J. L61/17, 
paragraph 106. 
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results of any bidding studies.41 In the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers the 
Commission concluded that  
Output expansion is, in particular, unlikely when competitors face binding 
capacity constraints and the expansion of capacity is costly or if existing 
excess capacity is significantly more costly to operate than capacity 
currently in use.42 
Therefore, unlike in the case of adding new facilities, competitors can increase 
their production in the very short term without incurring significant costs if they 
have available spare capacity, overcapacity or excess capacity.43 By contrast, if 
capacity is constrained, the competitor may not be able to increase production as 
they are not able to supply more customers in the market in order to capture more 
market share.44  
2.3.2 Incentive to Expand Output 
Expansion is a lengthy and costly endeavour: it cannot be easily, quickly or 
inexpensively accomplished.45 The sunk costs and costs of advertising may deter 
rivals from expanding.46 If rival suppliers are unlikely to expand production in the 
short to medium term, then the merged group may have an incentive to reduce its 
output with the aim of raising prices.47 On the basis of EU merger cases Lindsay 
                                         
41
 A Lindsay, ibid., 450. 
42
 Paragraphs 32 and 34, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
43
 In Kali und Salz /Solvay /JV, although the combined market share of the merged group will be [50-
60%] which is more than the second largest competitor (10-20%), the positions of the parties were 
indicated not give rise to any competition concerns because of the general overcapacity of the 
competitors and significant buyer power. Case COMP /M.2176, Kali und Salz /Solvay /JV, [2002] 
O.J.C 130/05, paragraph 41. 
44
 For example, in Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, the Commission’s investigation indicates that customers could 
not defeat that price rise of merged group by obtaining larger quantities from other producers. This is 
due to the high capacity utilisation rate (92%) and no new suppliers were opened during 1999 or 2000. 
Case COMP/M.2420, Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi,[2004] O.J.L92/50, paragraph 183.  
45
 R B Starek III and S Stockum, supra note 2, 819. 
46
 Sunk costs are costs which are unrecoverable upon exit from the market. See note 41, Guidelines 
on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1.   
47
 Paragraph 32, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. See also Case COMP/M/2187 
CVC/Lenzing [2004] O.J. L82/20, paragraphs 162 to 170. 
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concluded that competitors may lack the incentive to expand, particularly in the 
following circumstances:  
Firstly, when the cost structure means that expanding output would not 
increase their profits: i) their marginal costs of production rise significantly as 
output increases even though capacity is available; ii) their production 
facilities are inferior or operate at relatively higher cost; or iii) they lack 
economies of scale which are available to the merged group.  
Secondly, rivals can deploy their assets more profitably for other purposes.  
Thirdly, when competitors are precluded from expanding their sales by quota 
or treaty and therefore have no incentive to compete intensively to gain 
share.48 
2.3.3 Sufficiency of Competitors’ Increasing Output  
If competitors of merging parties have the ability and incentive to expand output, 
the Commission will consider whether activity by competitors would be sufficient 
to defeat an attempt by the merged group to exercise market power.49 This mostly 
happens when the fixed costs are high; the merged entity should keep a level of 
capacity use and can only afford to lose a limited proportion of sales if it wants to 
increase its profitability by raising prices. In this case competitors would probably 
be able to defeat any price increase by raising their own sales by at least the same 
amount.50  
In addition to expansion of incumbent competitors the price increase of the 
merged group can also be constrained by the repositioning of potential competitors 
                                         
48
 A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, 452. 
49
 Paragraph 33, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
50
 In Bertelsmann /Springer/JV, the Commission found that printing magazines involved high fixed 
costs and suppliers generally required as high a level of capacity use as possible. This meant that the 
merged group could only afford to lose a limited proportion of sales if it wanted to increase its 
profitability by raising prices. See case COMP/M.3178, Bertelsmann /Springer/JV, [2006] O.J. L61/17, 
paragraph 139.  
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from neighbouring markets or neighbouring products. Neglecting the potential 
entry will lead to false negative errors.51 
2.4 Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by 
Competitors 
Some proposed mergers would, if allowed to proceed, substantially impede 
effective competition by leaving the merged firm in a position where it would have 
the ability and incentive to make the expansion of smaller firms and potential 
competitors more difficult or otherwise restrict the ability of rival firms to 
compete. Their channels contain control of supply of input or distribution 
possibilities, intellectual property rights and, in some cases, interoperability 
between infrastructures. 52 In making this assessment the Commission may take 
into account, inter alia, the financial strength of the merged entity relative to its 
rivals.53 With the advantages in the above aspects over competitors the merged 
entity may be able to raise the costs or decrease the quality of service of its rivals. 
First of all a merger may increase the merged group’s ability and incentive to 
influence the input and distribution which makes the expansion or entry of rival 
firms more costly.54 The reduction in the intensity of competition in the upstream 
market will indirectly influence the merged group’s consumer welfare. The 
elimination or marginalisation approaches include the circumstance where: 1) 
merger combines the procumbent volumes of two merging parties, and the merged 
entity could ask for more favourable buying conditions from its suppliers. 55 As the 
                                         
51
 Potential entry will be analysed further in Chapter 5. 
52
 Paragraph 36, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
53
 Ibid, citing case Case T-156/98 RJB Mining v Commission, [2001] E.C.R II-337.  
54
 Ibid. The implications of the buying side impact of mergers and the approach of merger analysis 
can be seen in: J B Nordemann, Buying power and sophisticated buyers in merger control law: the 
need for a more sophisticated approach, (1995) Volume 16 No.5, E.C.L.R., pp.270-281; P C 
Carstensen, the Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics, (February 17, 
2004), available to see at: http://www3.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217carstensen.pdf 
(accessed on the 8
th 
May 2013); M L Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, (1992-
1993) Volume 61 Issue 2, Antitrust Law Journal, pp.493-504; A Lofaro and S Baker, Buyer power and 
the Enso/Stora decision, (2000) Volume 21 No.3, E.C.L.R., pp.187-190. R Clarke et al. Buyer Power 
and Competition in European Food Retailing, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2002). 
55
 See P C Carstensen, the Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics, ibid., 9. 
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cost of input is lower than that of the other competitor, the merged entity has 
greater opportunity than competitors to drive down its product price. Customers 
may benefit in the short term. However, as competitors are edged out in 
competition, the merged entity would secure an individual dominant position in 
the distribution or procurement market. In the long run the merged group with a 
dominant position can raise prices without the restraint of other rivals.  Customers 
will not be able to switch, as few alternatives are left in the market;56 2) when the 
loss of a contract to supply the merged group would result in the supplier’s risking 
insolvency (the thread point), the merged group would enjoy excessive buyer 
power.57 Therefore the downstream merged entity is able to coerce upstream 
suppliers into adopting practices that exclude or impose serious competitive 
disadvantages on rivals.58  
In the EU the creation or strengthening of market power in a procurement market 
is considered  a competitive harm’, and is a possible reason to object a 
concentration. However, according to paragraph 62 of the Guidelines on Horizontal 
Mergers, ‘if increased buyer power lowers input costs without restricting 
downstream competition or total output, then a proportion of these cost 
reductions are likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices’. 
Therefore the concerns are when the increased buyer power of the merged entity 
is not likely to impair competition in the downstream market to which merging 
parties belong. 
In determining the influence of a merger on the supply-side market the 
Commission considers market competition in three types of market, namely the 
procurement market, downstream market and buyers of the merged entity: 59 
                                         
56
 The ‘spiral effect’ was identified by the Commission in Rewe/Meinl. See the Case IV/M.1221 
Rewe/Meinl, [1999] O.J.L274/1, paragraphs 71-74. A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive 
issues, supra note 15, 371. 
57
 Case COMP/M.1684 Carrefour/Promodès, [2000] O.J. C 164/5, Paragraph 61. 
58
 See P C Carstensen, the Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics, supra 
note 55, 12. 
59
 A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, 368. 
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Firstly, the Commission will evaluate whether the merger results in a 
substantial enhancement in buyer power. In particular, whether there are 
substantial overlaps in the goods purchased by the merging parties and 
whether post-merger joint purchasing would be practicable;  
Secondly, the structure of buying markets plays a very significant role in both 
creating incentives for and the opportunity to exploit buyer power.60 If 
upstream suppliers are a ‘must have brand’, this can counterbalance the 
merged group’s buyer power;61 if supply is elastic, changes in quantities 
purchased have no effect on price because suppliers can, without cost, 
redirect their efforts to producing other products.62 
Thirdly, competitors in the downstream market can seek to negotiate terms of 
supply comparable with those enjoyed by the merged group, whether alone or 
through joint purchasing schemes. Buyer power can only be exercised if the 
buyer or buyers in question represent a substantial proportion of purchase in 
the market. 63 In this case purchasing schemes of competitors may be not big 
enough to countervail the merged entity’s purchase order.  
Fourthly, buyer power can only be exercised in the long run if there are 
barriers to entry into the buyer’s market. Otherwise the profits of monopsony 
will be eroded by new entry.64 
                                         
60
 See P C Carstensen, the Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics, supra 
note 55, 1. 
61
 In Promodes/Casino the transaction was approved on the grounds that suppliers were often of 
significant size, some supplied ‘must have’ brands (conferring power on them); the suppliers had 
numerous other substantial customers (in particular the other buyer collectives) in addition to the 
merged group, and there was no evidence that the merged group’s buyer power would prove 
detrimental to the final customer. Case IV/M.991 Promodes/Casino, [1997] O.J. C376/11, paragraph 
47.Similarly in Intermarche/Spar, the Commission allowed the merger although it would enhance 
buyer power. This is because the upstream suppliers were essentially international-scale producers of 
‘Eurobrand’ products which would have sufficient power to counterbalance the merged group’s buyer 
power. See Case IV/M.946 Intermarche/Spar, [1997] O.J. C227/04, paragraph 15; the above two 
cases are quoted from A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, 370. 
62
 A Lindsay, the EC Merger Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, 367. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 See COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 
165/3, paragraph 583. 
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2.5 Merger eliminates an important competitive force 
(sometimes referred to as a ‘maverick’) 
Merging firms have no significant market share; nevertheless, they can constrain 
the competitive process substantially if they are a recent entrant or innovative.65 
In future they might play the role of a ‘maverick’ in a concentrated market.66 A 
merger involving such a firm may change the competitive dynamic in a significant, 
anti-competitive way, in particular when the market is already concentrated.67 A 
non-dominant firm acquiring control over a small innovative rival will prevent or 
delay the introduction of a new product and soften competition in the market.68 
The Commission will evaluate a recent entrant as the loss of potential 
competition.69 However, innovation markets are usually dependent on a large 
number of uncertain parameters and therefore often do not justify regulatory 
intervention.70 Therefore there is no special approach for dealing with mergers in 
high innovation markets in the EU.71 When the Commission finds some specific 
characteristics of high innovation markets it will place less emphasis on the 
prevailing market shares and more on barriers to entry and dynamic effect, such as 
                                         
65
 Paragraphs 37 and 38, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
66
 See OECD, Merger Review in Emerging High Innovation Markets, DAFFE/COMP(2002) 20, 8; R W 
Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective, (2003) Volume 
71 Issue 2, Antitrust Law Journal, pp. 677-704. 
67
 Note 53, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. Citing Case COMP/M.2568 Haniel/Ytong, 
[2003] O.J. L111/1, paragraph 126. 
68
 L Roller and M Mano, the Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger Control, supra 
note 14, pp.20-21. 
69
 The Commission clarifies that, ‘for a merger with a potential competitor to have significant anti-
competitive effects, two basic conditions must be fulfilled. First, the potential competitor must already 
exert a significant constraining influence or there must be a significant likelihood that it would grow 
into an effective competitive force. Evidence that a potential competitor has plans to enter a market in 
a significant way could help the Commission to reach such a conclusion. Second, there must not be a 
sufficient number of other potential competitors which could maintain sufficient competitive pressure 
after the merger’. See Case IV/M.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, [1997] O.J. L 336/16, paragraph 60. 
Market entry will be further evaluated in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
70
 It is hard to define an innovation market precisely. The OECD points out some prominent 
characteristics of innovation intensive markets: high R&D intensity and dependence on intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) coupled with a closely related heavy reliance on human rather than physical 
capital; a high degree of technical complexity; rapid technological change and short product cycles; 
increasing returns to scale; important network effects (in which buyers are the better off the more 
buyers there are); and significant compatibility and standards issues.OECD, Merger Review in 
Emerging High Innovation Markets, DAFFE/COMP(2002) 20, 7. 
71
 OECD, ibid. 
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the likelihood of vertical integration or market foreclosure effects caused by the 
merged entity’s advantage in human capacity or IP rights.72 
To sum up, in the development of merger assessment in the EU assessment of anti-
competitive concerns of a merger is moving from reliance on market structure to a 
more effects-based approach.73 The trend is firstly reflected in the introduction of 
a new substantive test. One interpretation of the old substantive test in the EU is 
that the dominant position of a merged entity is a necessary and sufficient 
condition to prohibiting a merger or raising significant concerns.74 It was argued 
that the old ‘dominant’ test would lead to false negative errors, as some 
transactions raise serious anti-competitive concerns even in the absence of 
dominance.75 For instance, where merging parties are not closest substitutes to 
customers; where merger between the second and third largest producers in the 
market which does not create or strengthen the paramount firm in the market; 
merger creates the likelihood of coordination between the oligopolists or make 
coordination easier; customer foreclosure will result from vertical or conglomerate 
mergers;76 a merger eliminates potential competition,77 or controls of entry 
barriers.78  
                                         
72
 Remedies for eliminating anti-competitive concerns in innovation market are to lower entry barriers 
rather than classical divestiture. J T Lang, European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets 
and High Technology Industries, (1997), Volume 20 Issue 3, Fordham International Law Journal, 
pp.717-818; T B Marcotullio, Battle Against Drug-Makers: An Analysis of European Union and United 
States Merger Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry 1995–1999, (2001) Volume 32 Issue 2, 
Law and Policy in International Business, pp.449-486. 
73
 L Roeller and O Stehmann, The year 2005 at DG competition: The trend towards a more effects-
based approach, (2006) Volume 29 Issue 4, Review of Industrial Organization, pp.281-304. 
74
 Under the 1989 Merger Regulation a merger was prohibited when it tended to ‘create or strengthen 
a dominant position’ as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded’. 
75
 Under the old substantive test the Commission had no right to prohibit an anti-competitive merger if 
it has no single dominant position. The Commission tried two approaches to solve the ‘gap’ issue. The 
first approach was to stretch the concept of dominance to reach all significant anticompetitive effects 
from mergers which would have divorced the concept from the plain meaning of the word ’dominance’. 
This created a serious risk of excessive enforcement under Article 102. The other approach was to 
reword a new substantive test in the EUMR which widened the scope for intervention of non-
coordinated effects. The ‘gap’ issue will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
76
 Vertical and conglomerate situations will not be further discussed here. Vertical integration can 
considerably harm consumer welfare even if none of the merging firms is pre se dominant in their 
respective markets. For instance, if an upstream undertaking merges with a downstream undertaking, 
the upstream firm might have low incentive to engage in price-cut competition with other up-stream 
enterprises in order to serve the downstream undertaking’s pre-integration. The rival upstream firm 
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On the other hand the ‘dominant’ test may also carry a risk of leading to over-
enforcement. For example, a merger could only have a trivial impact on 
competitive performance, but it would still be caught because of the merging 
parties’ dominant position pre-merger.79 Secondly, the position of market share 
and concentration ratio were changed from exclusive factors to the ‘first 
indicative’ factors for deciding unilateral effects.80 Thirdly, as the assessment of 
merger case is changing to consider the effects of company’s actions on the 
market, the Commission needs to identify the efficiencies initiated by a merger, 
and the extent to which the negative effect on consumers can be outweighed by 
the efficiency gains.81 Fourthly, institutional development was conducted for a 
‘more economic approach’.82 Regarding the transparency of merger assessment of 
horizontal mergers the Commission published Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
The Guidelines contribute to clarifying the economic framework for assessing the 
                                                                                                                               
can charge higher prices for their products. As the downstream enterprises, they may pass the 
increase in cost onto the price of final product and consumer welfare is the worse off. 
77
 A single potential entrant exercises a constraint not on any individual incumbent firm, but more 
generally, on all member of the oligopoly. A pre-emptive take-over of the potential entrant by an 
incumbent will allow all members of the oligopoly to raise prices even if there are no dominant 
enterprises and no possibility tacitly to collude. See L Roller and M Mano, the Impact of the New 
Substantive Test in European Merger Control, supra note 14,19; see also, A Lindsay, the EC Merger 
Regulation: Substantive issues, supra note 15, 355. 
78
 Although merging parties have relatively low combined market shares measured by sales or total 
capacity, their competitors are capacity constrained, which may enable the merged group profitably to 
reduce its output and raise prices following the merger.  
79
 To avoid raising anti-competitive concerns merging parties may divide an anti-competitive 
transaction into several trivial mergers. In order to prevent such situation the Commission will 
evaluate the aggregate effect of several mergers which take place within a certain number of years 
between the same entities. The Commission regulates rules that ‘two or more transactions which take 
place within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings shall be treated as one and 
the same concentration arising on the date of the last transactions’. See article 5(2), Guidelines on 
Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
80
 J B Baker and C Shapiro, Reinvigorating horizontal merger enforcement, supra note 2.  
81
 Efficiency created by a merger will be considered if it is merger-specific, timely, verifiable and 
benefits consumers. See paragraphs 76-88, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
82
 The institutional developments include establishing the European Competitive Network (ECN) and 
Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP).They support case team of merger review 
to share technical expertise and to improve understanding of complicated analysis tools. L Roeller 
and O Stehmann, The year 2005 at DG competition: The trend towards a more effects-based 
approach, supra note 73, 285. 
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competitive effects of horizontal mergers, and also illustrate the extent to which 
economics has been explicitly adopted in EU merger assessment.83 
3 Horizontal Mergers: Evaluating Unilateral Effects 
in China84 
There is no dedicated guideline on the assessment of horizontal mergers in China. 
In the examination of all the concentrations the MOFCOM shall consider the 
relevant elements as follows: 
(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant 
market and their market power; (2) the degree of concentration in the 
relevant market; (3) the influence of the concentration on the market 
access and technological progress;(4) the influence of the concentration on 
the consumers and other business operators;(5) the influence of the 
concentration on the national economic development; and (6) other 
elements that may have an effect on the market competition and shall be 
taken into account as regarded by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council.85 
As a supplement to the AML 2008 the Interim Rules on Evaluating Competitive 
Effects of Concentration of Business Operators (hereinafter ‘Interim Rules’) states 
that the MOFCOM will consider the following items in determining whether a 
                                         
83
 D Ridyard, The Commission’s New Horizontal Merger Guidelines: an Economic Commentary, The 
Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series (GCLC Working Paper 02/05), 12, available 
at: http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/gclc_wp_02-05.pdf (accessed on the 8
th 
June 2013). 
84
 See N Duan, Research on EU <Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentration between Undertakings>[欧盟《横向并购指南》研
究, Oumeng <Hengxiang Binggou Zhinan> Yanjiu] (Master’s thesis), (2009), Available in Chinese 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Database; H Wu and X Shan, Discussion of Horizontal 
Mergers Guidelines of China [中国企业横向并购指南探讨, Zhongguoqiye Hengxiang Binggou Zhinan 
Tantao], (2007) Volume 5, Journal of Social Sciences [社会科学, Shehui Kexue], pp.315-323; X 
Zhang, Unilateral Effects of Horizontal Mergers: Theory, Evidence and Antitrust Policy [横向合并的单
边效应：理论、实证与反垄断政策, Hengxiang Hebing de Danbian Xiaoying: Lilun, Shizheng yu 
Fanlongduan Zhengce] (PhD Thesis), (2011), Available in Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure 
(CNKI) Database. 
85
 Article 27, the AML 2008, 
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business operator obtains or increases the degree of control over the relevant 
market:  
i the market share of merging parties and the competition in relevant 
market; ii the extent of substitutes for the products/services of the business 
operators involved in the concentration; iii the production capacity of the 
business operators in the relevant market which are not involved in the 
concentration, and the availability of substitutes for their products/services 
compared to those of the business operators involved in the concentration; 
iv the ability of the business operators involved in the concentration to 
control sales or supplies; v the ability of the consumers of the business 
operators involved in the concentration to switch their suppliers; vi the 
financial and technical capacity of the business operators involved in the 
concentration; vii the purchase capacity of the downstream customers of 
the business operators involved in the concentration; and viii other factors 
which should be taken into account. 86 
The following will review how these factors are applied in practice in analysing the 
unilateral effect of horizontal mergers. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Interim Rules, 
when evaluating the likelihood of adverse effects of concentration on the 
competition in the market, the MOFCOM will firstly examine whether the merged 
entity would result in or strengthen a business operator’s ability, incentive and 
possibility to exclude or restrict competition unilaterally.  
3.1 Initial Review of Market Shares and Concentration 
Ratio 
The Interim Rules require the MOFCOM, in line with other major anti-monopoly 
jurisdictions, to adopt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) and the 
Concentration Ratio Index (“CRn”) to measure market concentration level in its 
                                         
86
 Article 5, Interim Rules on Evaluating Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business Operators 
(hereinafter the Interim Rules), (29
th
 August, 2011), MOFCOM Announcement No. 55. The rule has 
no official English translation. An unofficial English translation is available in the appendix.  
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review of merger.87 The higher the market concentration level, the more anti-
competitive effects a concentration would be deemed to have.88 In general the 
MOFCOM considers that very large market shares — 50% or more — may in 
themselves be evidence of the existence of a dominant market position. The 
MOFCOM considers that merger would lead to the creation or the strengthening of 
a dominant position if it results in firms’ holding market shares between 40% and 
50%.89 The market share levels indicating likelihood of a dominant market position 
accord with those of the EU.90 
In the first two published cases concerning horizontal issues high market share 
seems to be considered by the MOFCOM to be a sufficient condition to raising 
unilateral effect. InBe/Anheuser-Busch was the first case in which the MOFCOM 
imposed restrictive conditions. The MOFCOM indicated that the market power of 
the merged entity would be increased significantly only because ‘the scale of the 
transaction is large and market share of merged entity will be high’.91 In 
Mitsubishi/Lucite the MOFCOM stated the concentration was very likely to impose 
adverse effects on the PRC MMA market since ‘market share after this 
concentration will reach 64% which is much higher than Jilin Petrochemical Co., 
Ltd. and Heilongjiang Longxin Company, who rank in the second and the third 
place, respectively. The market dominance will enable Mitsubishi to exclude and 
restrict competitors after concentration’.92 In later cases, apart from high market 
share, additional factors were involved in considering market structure, such as 
the disparity of market shares between merged entity and the next competitors, 
                                         
87
 The concept of HHI is explained in supra note 18. Concentration ratio here means the total market 
shares of the top N largest firms in the relevant merging market. See Article 6, ibid. 
88
 See Articles 27 (1) and (2) of the AML 2008; article 5 of the Interim Rules, supra note 86. 
89
 In Phizer/Wyeth the share of the merged entity in the relevant market would be 49.4%; in 
Panasonic/Sanyo the share of the merged entity in civilian-use NiMH Battery market would be 46.3%; 
in Seagate/Sansung the share of the merged entity in the relevant market would be 43%. 
90
 See paragraph 17, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
91
 Point 3, Announcement of MOFCOM [2008] No.95, Inbev/Anheuser-Busch. 
92
 Section V, paragraph 1, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite. 
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and concentration level in the market. The HHI index was used in assessment for 
the first time in Pfizer/Wyeth.93  
According to the approach of the EU there are two misunderstandings if the 
MOFCOM took high market share of merged entity as the sufficient condition of 
unilateral effects. First of all high market share does not mean a dominant 
position. Independent price increase of merged entity may be unprofitable 
because of constraint from its competitors, buyers or final customers post-merger. 
In Urakali/Silvinct the MOFCOM identified unilateral effects of concentration 
because the merged company would have more abundant potassium resources and 
greater capacity in production, supply and export, and thus more control over the 
global potassium chloride market. This would have an adverse impact on the global 
maritime trade in potassium chloride, including the Chinese market.94 According to 
the investigation of the MOFCOM: 
The world’s second largest potassium chloride supplier will be created upon 
completion of this concentration of business operators. The merged 
company’s market share will exceed 1/3 of the global market, and together 
with the world’s largest potassium chloride supplier, they control about 70% 
of the global supply of potassium chloride.95 
However, the increased market power of the merged entity may be constrained by 
the first largest potassium chloride supplier. The latter may increase output upon 
facing the price increase of the merged firm, unless the merged entity is able to 
hinder its expansion. Customers will switch from the merged firm to the largest 
                                         
93
 Apart from the disparity of market shares between merged entity and other competitors, the 
MOFCOM raised unilateral effects of the merger depending on the results of HHI as well. It said in the 
case decision, ‘according to the investigation of the MOFCOM, the merged firm will own 49.4% 
market share in the relevant market (of which Pfizer owns 38% and Pfizer owns 11.4%), which is 
much higher than other competitors. Intervet, who is the second biggest rival of merged entity, only 
has 18.35% market share, and other competitors’ market share is less than 10%. In addition, 
‘according to data collected by MOFCOM, HHI Index shall be 2181 after concentration, increased by 
336 Concentration level was considered to be significant increased by the concentration.’ Section 4, 
(ii)-2, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.77 Pfizer / Wyeth. 
94
 Paragraph 4, Section two, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.33 Uralkali/Silvinit. Apart from high 
market share of the concentration, investigation also found the barriers to entering the relevant market 
were high. Paragraph 6. Section two, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.33 Uralkali/Silvinit. 
95
 Paragraph 3, Section two, ibid. 
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supplier, and the loss in sales will render the price increase of the merged entity 
unprofitable. The MOFCOM does not exclude the possibilities of competitive 
restraints from competitors of merging parties or customers. On the other hand, 
the acquired party may be a small firm, although acquiring party is close to being 
dominant. In this case merger may create dominance, while the merger itself may 
have only a negligible impact on the change in competitive performance. For 
instance, in Novartis/Alcon the MOFCOM found that the incumbent market share of 
Alcon in China was over 60%, while Novartis’ share of this Chinese market was less 
than 1%. The MOFCOM still raised anti-competitive concern, although Novartis 
notified its decision to withdraw its existing operations in the global and Chinese 
markets for the relevant product.96 Such anti-competitive concern might be a false 
negative error. 
On the other hand unilateral effects were not raised in transaction when the 
market share of the merged firm was below 40% post-merger.97 This may be 
because the MOFCOM still considers high market share a necessary condition to 
raising competitive concerns. However, anti-competitive concern still exists in the 
absence of a dominant firm. This has been proved in previous EU cases.98 Failing to 
consider such a scenario may result in a false positive decision. As outright 
clearance decisions are not disclosed, it is unknown whether such false positive 
situations have already occurred. 
                                         
96
 The MOFCOM had concerns about the prospect of Novartis’ seeking to strengthen its position in 
the relevant market in China by reserving its withdrawal decision after its acquisition of Alcon. 
However, the MOFCOM did not give any evidence on the ability or incentive of Novartis to access a 
relevant market in future as a potential entry. Paragraph 1, Section four, Announcement MOFCOM 
[2010] No.53 Novartis/Alcon. 
97
 In the exceptional case of Glencor/Xstrata the combined market share of the merged entity was 
only 17.8% in China’s import market of copper concentrate. The MOFCOM still raised anti-competitive 
concerns because the transaction risked significantly increasing the vertical integration in the industry 
chains of copper. The market power of the merged entity would not be ameliorated by the restraint of 
prevailing competitors nor by the ability of competitors to enter the market, nor by countervailing buyer 
power. Case study is available at N Dodoo et al. (Clifford Chance), Implications of China's conditional 
competition approval of Glencore/Xstrata, 24 April 2013, Publications & Views, available at:  
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2013/04/implications_of_chinascondition
alcompetitio.html (accessed on the 7
th
  June 2013); The Commission approved the transaction subject 
to conditions as well. See Case COMP/M.6541 Glencore/Xstrata, [2012] O.J. C304/6. 
98
 See ‘2.1 Initial Review of Market Share and Concentration Data’ in this chapter. 
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In Marubeni/Gavilon the MOFCOM defined the relevant market as China’s import 
market for soybean, corn, bean pulp and dry and course distillers’ grains.99 In 2012 
China imported 58.38 million tons of soybeans. Marubeni, as one of the main 
soybean exporters, exported 10.5 million tons of soybean to China. The acquired 
firm (Gavilon) only exported 400,000 tons of soybean. According to the evidence, 
the market share of the merged entity in China’s import market for soybean would 
not be improved significantly (about 0.7%). However, the MOFCOM was concerned 
that the deal would significantly boost Marubeni’s access to global soybean 
resources through the acquisition of Gavilon’s capacity for soybean origination, 
storage and logistics in North America, thus enhancing Marubeni’s ability to export 
soybean to China. However, the MOFCOM did not clarify how such combination 
could impede effective competition in China’s import market of soybean.100 It is 
presumed such improvement in market power can be conducted through two 
channels. On the one hand the acquired entity Gavilon would significantly expand 
its export of soybean to the Chinese market by using the acquired entity 
Merubeni’s distribution channel in China’s relevant market. However, the MOFCOM 
did not show whether the import of soybean from Gavilon would substitute the 
import from Merubeni. If they were not the closest substitutes, customers would 
switch to buying products from rivals of merging parties which would make the 
price increase of the merged entity unprofitable. Unilateral effects of merger 
could be excluded. Nor does the MOFCOM investigation prove that Gavilon, as a 
potential competitor, would have excessive ability and incentive to increase 
procurement of soybean in order significantly to increase its supply of soybean to 
China. Thirdly, the MOFCOM appears not sufficiently to have considered the degree 
of competitive constraint provided by rivals of merging parties or the ability of 
competitors to expand in response to attempts by the merged firm to increase 
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 Announcement MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
100
 see N Dodoo et al. (Clifford Change), MOFCOM's conditional approval of Marubeni/Gavilon and 
implications for mergers in the agricultural sector, (7 May 2013), Publication & Views, available at: 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2013/05/mofcom_s_conditionalapprovalo
fmarubenigavilo.html (accessed on the 8
th
 June 2013); H Ha et al. (Mayor Brown), MOFCOM 
conditionally approves Marubeni/Gavilon: competition law and industrial policy in the agricultural 
sector, (8 May 2013), publications, available at: http://www.mayerbrown.com/mofcom-conditionally-
approves-marubenigavilon-competition-law-and-industrial-policy-in-the-agricultural-sector-05-08-
2013/ (accessed on the 8
th
 June 2013). 
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prices and/or lower output.101 Finally, the MOFCOM required the merged entity 
within six months to establish two separate legal entities and two independent 
operating teams to export and sell soybean to China, and report the plan of 
implementation to a supervising trustee approved by the MOFCOM.102 The 
MOFCOM’s reasoning in this case led to much criticism, especially since the 
transactions were cleared outright both in the EU and US jurisdictions.103  
In conclusion, China appeared to adopt policies that closely resembled the old EU 
‘dominant’ test idea which has been abandoned. On some occasions the MOFCOM 
may still take dominant position as a necessary and sufficient condition to show 
anti-competitive effect. This may lead to a false negative condition in 
concentration with high market share after merger, and lead to a false positive 
condition in concentration with relatively low market share. This might also be the 
reason why there is no ‘maverick’ merging party to raise horizontal competitive 
concern with market share below 40%.104 Recently the MOFCOM has been trying to 
accept that dominant position is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
anti-competitive concern. However, the reasoning for concerns of unilateral 
effects is still ambiguous when market share of merging parties is not high. 
 HHI levels, in combination with the relevant deltas, may be used as an initial 
indicator raising competition concerns. The MOFCOM identifies horizontal 
competition concerns in mergers with post-merger HHIs above 2,000 and deltas 
above 250.105 However, unlike the EU, the MOFCOM does not clarify a ‘safe 
                                         
101
 See H Ha et al. (Mayor Brown), ibid.  
102
 Section 4-a-1), Announcement MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
103
 Criticisms refer to note 100 supra. The EU Case is COMP/M.6657 Marubeni Corporation/Gavilon 
Holdings, [2012] O.J.C261/1. 
104
 One reason may be that the merger control under MOFCOM is too young which has not met 
related transactions. As cases of clearance are not published, we are unable to detect if any false 
positive scenario has occurred. 
105
 In Phizer/Wyeth, according to data collected by the MOFCOM, the HHI Index was 2181 after 
concentration, increased by 336. This was used to indicate a significant increase of concentration 
degree; in UTC/Goodrich, HHI (7158) and delta value (1728) were used to indicate a very high level 
of market concentration.  
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harbour’ criterion with HHI index as an initial indicator excluding competition 
concerns.106 
3.2 Merging firms are close competitors   
Similarly to the EU, in assessing the market power of the merged group the 
MOFCOM considers the degree of substitutability between merging parties 
themselves and with their competitors in a relevant market.107 The extent of 
substitution for products within the same market was not investigated in every 
case. Seagate/Samsung was a typical instance of negligence.108 This transaction in 
China was considered to raise the unilateral effects which would eliminate and 
restrict competition.109 Nevertheless, the Commission granted unconditional 
clearance to Seagate/Samsung.110 One important reason for the different outcome 
was that the Commission did not consider Samsung to be the closest competitor of 
Seagate within the relevant hard disk drive (HHD) market. The Commission 
determined that Seagate, West Digital (WD) and HGST belonged to Tier-one 
standard quality, whereas Samsung did not. The investigation confirmed that 
Samsung was regarded as a second-tier player with weaknesses in terms of cost 
competitiveness, difficulties in expanding production capacity and weakness in the 
development of original technologies. Samsung had struggled with sustained 
deficits.111 WD and HGST appeared to be closer competitors with Seagate than 
Samsung.112 Although the market share of the merged entity and the increment 
that the proposed transaction would bring about were significant, the merged 
                                         
106
 For more about HHI levels in the EU, refer to paragraphs 19-21, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, 
supra note 1.  
107
 Article 5-2) and 3), the Interim Rules, see supra note 86. 
108
 Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
109
 Paragraph 540, COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics 
[2011] O.J. C 165/3. In addition to non-coordinated effects, the Commission assessed the likelihood 
of coordination effect and vertical foreclosure because of the merging parties’ relationship with the 
upstream market in media. The final conclusion rests on the finding that the proposed transaction 
would not significantly impede effective competition in any of the HDD markets.  
110
 See case Seagate/Samsung, ibid. 
111
 The analysis showed that overall WD, Seagate and HGST took part in most of the bids for the 
selected customers, whereas Samsung showed the lowest participation rate. See paragraph 409, 
case Seagate/Samsung, ibid 
112
 Paragraph 415, ibid. 
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entity would continue to face competition from two strong HDD suppliers, WD and 
HGST.113On this conclusion the Commission did not identify Samsung as an 
important competitive force.  
Another relevant case was InBev/Anheuser-Busch. The four largest beer companies 
in China were China Resources Snow Breweries, Tsingtao Breweries, Beijing Yanjing 
Brewery and Zhujiang Brewery. One report estimated that these four companies 
accounted for around 41 percent of industry revenue.114 In the beer market it be 
assumed that the merging parties did not hold dominant positions. Once the 
undertaking post-merger increased price independently customers could switch to 
other at least four alternative suppliers. The loss of sales can trade off the profits 
of price increase. Therefore the merged firm would have no incentive to increase 
prices and harm consumer welfare. The MOFCOM did not indicate its consideration 
of the likelihood of such switch. 
The next question is why is the MOFCOM’s conclusion about the extent of 
substitution among products different from that of the EU? Was it because of the 
different market situations in the EU and China? Such doubt can be eliminated in 
Seagate/Samsung. Both the EU and China revealed that the relevant product 
market was the hard disk drives (HHDs) market,115 and the relevant geographic 
market was worldwide.116 The two regimes had agreed on the scope of the relevant 
market. Was it because the MOFCOM did not investigate the substitution as 
thoroughly as did the EU? Actually, the MOFCOM divided the HDDs market into four 
sub-markets according to different end-use, namely enterprise applications, 
desktop applications, portable computer applications and consumer electronics 
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 Paragraph 406, ibid. 
114
 See the Report on Development Strategy of Beer Industry in China 2008, March, 2008, available 
at: http://www.reportbus.com/Article/SP/PJ/200801/Article_78181.html (accessed on the 13
th
 May 
2013).                                                            
115
 The Commission even divided the HHDs market into seven segments according to their difference 
end-use. However, even in the narrower market, the Commission still believed Samsung was not 
particularly close to the Seagate product. See paragraph 82-262, COMP/M.6214 Seagate 
Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3. 
116
 The MOFCOM defines the relevant market as the worldwide HDD market. This HHD market is 
found to be highly concentrated within five manufacturers, including Seagate (33%), Western Digital 
(29%), Hitachi (18%), Toshiba (10%) and Samsung (10%), whether worldwide or in China. See Point 
2-(1), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. See also section 5.2.3, 
COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3. 
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applications. Nevertheless, the MOFCOM did not state whether these four sub-
markets substitute each other. In analysing anti-competitive effects of the merger 
the MOFCOM defined these four sub-markets as belonging to a whole HDDs product 
market directly without stating its reasons or citing evidence.117  
3.3 Customers Have Limited Possibilities of Switching 
Suppliers, or Competitors are Unlikely to Increase 
Supply if Prices are Increased 
In assessing whether a transaction will create or strengthen market power the 
MOFCOM considers the ability of consumers to switch their suppliers when the 
prices of merging parties’ products increase.118 No further provisions explain how 
to conduct the customer investigation. It was only known that the MOFCOM 
collected the public’s online feedback on a transaction once.119 There were four 
general questions in the questionnaire.120 Compared with the EU customer 
investigation is neither scientific nor systematic.121  
According to article 5 of the Interim Rules, the MOFCOM will assess the production 
capacity of the business operators in the relevant market which are not involved in 
the concentration.122 In practice the MOFCOM began to consider the rival’s 
                                         
117
 Conversely, in the EU four separate relevant product markets are determined: (i) Mission Critical 
Enterprise HDDs, (ii) 3.5" Business Critical HDDs, (iii) 3.5" Desktop HDDs, (iv) 3.5" CE HDDs, (v) 2.5" 
Mobile HDDs and (vi) 2.5" CE HDDs. For the content of the substitution test refer to Section 5.2.1, 
COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3. 
Recommendations to the MOFCOM on  improvements in defining ’relevant market’ can be seen in 
‘section 4 Recommendations for Defining the Relevant Market in China’ in Chapter 2.  
118
 Article 5, the Interim Rules, see supra note 86. 
119
 In assessing Coca cola/Huiyuan there was a questionnaire for customers on a popular website in 
China which is available at: http://survey.news.sina.com.cn/voteresult.php?pid=26772 (accessed on 
the 20
th
 September 2012).  
120
 These four questions are ‘whether you approve the acquisition of Huiyuan by Coca cola’; ’whether 
the transaction will raise the concern of eliminating ‘national pillar industry’; ‘whether respondents are 
optimistic about Huiyuan juice after the acquisition’; and ‘whether they think the 17.9billion HK dollars 
is appropriate for the transaction. 
121
 The approaches to market investigation can be seen in 2.2 Merging Firms Are Close Competitors.   
122
The Interim Rules, see supra note 86. 
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competitive constraints in light of three factors: market share,123 concentration 
data and the results of any bidding studies.124 In addition the index of capacity use 
was also adopted to show whether other rivals were able to expand output. In 
Seagate/Samsung the MOFCOM believed the competitors of the merging parties 
were unlikely to increase their output substantially if prices increased. Such 
conclusion is deduced from its finding that the unused production capacity of the 
five HDD manufacturers was very limited due to the recent increase in market 
demand, noting that capacity use rates were about 90% in the fourth quarter of 
2010.125  
The difference between the EU and China is that the MOFCOM does not state when 
the rivals of merging parties have incentives to expand output when the merged 
entity increases price post-merger. In Panasonic/Sanyo the MOFCOM identified that 
Panasonic would have power to raise price unilaterally post-merger. One reason 
was that Panasonic's price increase might be beneficial to other competitors who 
will not have incentives to effectively restrain the price increase of Panasonic. 
However, the MOFCOM did not explain why it is optimal for the competitors to 
raise prices in response to higher prices set by the merged entity rather than 
expand output in order to get a greater market share.126  
                                         
123
 In Panasonic/Sanyo the MOFCOM found that the structure of Button-type Rechargeable Lithium 
Battery market was highly concentrated. The merging parties were the largest and second largest 
manufacturers respectively in the market. After the concentration, Panasonic would have a 61.6% 
market share. Since most of the downstream customers adopt the policy of procuring products from 
two or more suppliers, the restrictive competitive effect resulting from the concentration would be 
more significant. See Case Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic/Sanyo. 
124
 In Seagate/ Samsung the relevant product market was in HHDs. The buyers (computer 
manufacturers) use confidential bidding to purchase HHDs. In order to ensure continuity and security 
of production computer manufacturers distribute their order to two to four suppliers. During bidding, 
the most competitive suppliers get the largest order, secondary suppliers get a smaller order and 
worse suppliers have no order. Merger reduces the number of HHDs’ producers from five to four, and 
increases the chance of remaining producers to get orders at the same time. There would be less 
pressure of competition to win orders in bidding process post-merger. See section 2, point 8, 
Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 See Point 4-(2), Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic/Sanyo. 
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3.4 Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by 
Competitors 
According to Article 5 of the Interim Rules the MOFCOM will assess the ability of 
the business operators involved in the concentration to control sales or supplies, 
and the financial and technical capacity of those involved in the concentration.127 
The advantages of merged entity in supplies, distribution or finance may not be 
sufficient to affect the expansion of its competitors. 
In Seagate/Samsung the European Commission found before the proposed 
transaction that Seagate was vertically integrated into the upstream supply of 
components for HDDs, notably heads and media. After the proposed transaction 
the combined entity might prefer in-house supply of heads and media to purchases 
on the merchant market. 128 The Commission therefore carried out an assessment 
on the risk of customer foreclosure stemming from the proposed transaction to the 
detriment  respectively of heads and media suppliers. 
In assessing the likelihood of anti-competitive customer foreclosure the 
Commission examined whether  
(i) the combined entity would have the ability post-merger to foreclose 
access of heads' and/or media's suppliers to a sufficient customer base by 
removing Samsung as an independent market player and significant 
customer; (ii) the combined entity would have the incentive to do so; (iii) a 
foreclosure strategy would have a negative impact on the viability of heads’ 
and/or media's suppliers' business; (iv) a foreclosure strategy would have a 
significant detrimental effect on the downstream markets for HDDs by 
impairing competitor (Toshiba)'s ability to effectively compete in those 
                                         
127
 Points 4 and 6, Article 6, the Interim Rules, see supra note 86. 
128
 paragraph 557, COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics 
[2011] O.J. C 165/3.  
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markets and therefore by allowing the merged entity to raise HDDs' 
prices.129  
The investigation showed that: 
(i) the merged entity would not be able to foreclose external sourcing (TDK) 
from Samsung's purchases in the short term as it does not currently have 
spare capacity to meet the overall heads demand of Samsung; (ii) the 
merged entity would have limited incentives to source all its heads 
requirements internally; As a consequence, the ability of downstream HHDs 
producer (Toshiba) to source sufficient and competitive heads will not be 
negatively impacted by the proposed transaction. Therefore, potential 
customer foreclosure after the proposed transaction is unlikely to 
undermine Toshiba's competitiveness in the HDD markets.130 
Therefore, although the merging party has a vertical relationship with the 
upstream market for heads, merger would have no significant effect on 
components’ suppliers or in consequence on the downstream HDDs markets.131  
Of the same transaction the MOFCOM did not mention the merging parties’ vertical 
relationship with the upstream market. Actually, in Mavebeni/Gavilon the 
MOFCOM had the opportunity to explain how the merged entity was able to hinder 
the expansion of competitors. Nevertheless, the MOFCOM only stated, ‘in China, 
the merging party (Mavebeni) has more advantages than its competitors in 
distribution and client resources than its competitors’.132 There was no further 
investigation to show whether the advantages of the merging parties are sufficient 
to deter the expansion of competitors.  
                                         
129
 See paragraph 560, ibid. 
130
 This was the result of investigation of the likelihood of transaction to the detriment of heads 
suppliers. Paragraph 568, ibid. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 Point 1 in Section 3, case Mavebeni/Gavilon. 
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In addition, the economies of scale owned by the merged firm were considered by 
the MOFCOM in a number of reported cases. Nevertheless, it is noted that 
economies of scale that would result from the merger are used as evidence of 
increased market power, rather than representing potential benefits to society.133 
Merger-related efficiencies were often used as evidence against a proposed 
merger.134 
3.5 Merger eliminates an important competitive force 
(sometimes referred to as a ‘maverick’) 
Pursuant to the experience of the EU it is recognised that although merging firms 
have no significant market share, they can significantly constrain competition if 
they are recent entrants or innovative (‘maverick’ firms.135  However, as the 
MOFCOM mostly relies on the market share to assess the competitive effect, it may 
clear merger with a ‘maverick’ firm, which leads to a false positive outcome.  
Overall, China’s merger control provisions as contained in the AML 2008 are in line 
with international standards. The various factors that are listed to assess unilateral 
effects are broadly similar to the key aspects of merger assessment that have been 
adopted by the EU. The following discusses disparities between the EU and China 
in assessing unilateral effects. 
First of all the MOFCOM is more conservative than European authorities. This has 
resulted in the same transactions’ being cleared outright in the EU but cleared 
with commitments by the MOFCOM. Examples are the recent cases involving the 
                                         
133
 In Pfizer/Wyeth because of the high barriers to entry the MOFCOM stated that post-merger Pfizer 
was very likely to use the scale advantage further to expand its market in China, to compress the 
market space of other enterprises. See point 2, part four, Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.77 
Pfizer/Wyeth. Similar concern also appears in Savio/Penelope, Seagate/Samsung, and Western 
Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. See paragraph 7, part two, case Announcement MOFCOM [2011] 
No.73 Savio/Penelope; paragraph 7, part two, Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.09 Western 
Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. 
134
 This line of reasoning coincides with the early approach of US antitrust authorities during the 
1960s-1970s; see P Lin and J Zhao, Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, (2012) 
Volume 41, Numbers 1-2, Review of Industrial Organization,126. 
135
 Paragraphs 37 and 38, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, supra note 1. 
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global hard disk drive market of Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi.136 
These two transactions were both notified elsewhere, including in the EU and the 
US. Both the EU and US cleared the transaction Seagate/Samsung without 
condition, and cleared the transaction Western Digital/Hitachi with a divestment 
remedy. The MOFCOM went further than the EU and the US agencies on both 
occasions. It imposed behavioural remedies on Seagate/Samsung and both 
behavioural and structural remedies on Western Digital/ Hitachi even though the 
relevant markets examined were the same in the EU and China.137 Secondly, 
although the MOFCOM had already shown a fast learning ability in the 19 reported  
merger cases, the reasoning justifying  a case decision in case decisions still needs 
to be made clear. There is much room for improving clarification.138 Thirdly, there 
is no analytical framework within which unilateral effects are analysed. 
Considerations in each decision are various and uncertain. In the first two cases 
the MOFCOM only considered competitive effects from the indication of market 
shares. More factors were considered in the following cases. Fourthly the EU 
conducts deeper and more systematic investigations into the extent of substitution 
among competitors within the same relevant market.139 Finally, there is the no 
consideration of ‘maverick’ firms. This might be the result that the MOFCOM still 
relies on the ‘dominant’ test in merger assessment. 
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 In China these two cases are Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung; 
Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.09 Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies; in the EU, these 
two cases are COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] 
O.J. C 165/3; Case COMP/M.6203 Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies [2011] O.J. C 165/4. 
137
 Of the published 19 cases four transactions were cleared outright in the EU, while they were 
approved subject to conditions in China. Two of the four cases raised horizontal concerns, namely 
Seagate/Samsung and Marubeni/Gavilon. Another two cases concerned vertical merger, General 
Motors/Delphi and conglomerate merger, case Google/Motorola Mobility. See Announcement 
MOFCOM [2009] No.76 General Motors / Delphi; Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.25 Google / 
Motorola Mobility; Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate / Samsung; Announcement 
MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
138
 P Lin and J Zhao, Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, (2012) Volume 41, 
Numbers 1-2, Review of Industrial Organization, 130; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Key trends 
in PRC merger control over the last year, August 2012, available to see at: 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Key%20trends%20in%20PRC%20mer
ger%20control%20.pdf (viewed on the 22
nd
. September 2013). The MOFCOM is only required to 
publish decisions to block transactions or impose restrictive conditions on a transaction. See Article 
30, the AML 2008.  
139
 See ‘3.2 Merging firms are close competitors’ in this chapter. 
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4 Discussion and Recommendations 
4.1 Reasons for Differences 
4.1.1 Still in the Process of Learning 
It has only been five years since entry into force of the AML 2008.140 This young 
regime is still in the process of learning from various developed and mature 
regimes in the world. The Merger Regulation in the EU has been implemented for 
22 years since it came into force on 21st September 1990.141 Looking back to the 
history of merger review in the EU, the first five years can only be seen as a 
discovery phase.142 The Commission issued a number of Notices intended to provide 
guidance on the jurisdictional and substantive scope of the Merger Regulation, and 
prohibited a transaction for the first time in 1991.143 More substantial 
improvements were adopted in the following years.  
                                         
140
 The AML 2008 came into force on 1st August 2008. 
141
 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4046/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, O.J. L 395, 30.12.89. This Regulation introduced into EU competition law a 
legal framework for the systematic review of mergers, acquisitions and other forms of concentration, 
with amendments introduced by Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. L180/1; corrigendum 1998 
O.J. L40/17. Further changes to the Merger Regulation were agreed in November 2003 (Commission 
Press Release IP/03/1621 of November 27, 2003) and formally adopted in January 2004 
(Commission Press Release IP/04/70 of January 20, 2004). Before that, merger control was under the 
regulation of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
O.J.C115/47. 
142
 During this period the Commissions’ application of the Merger Regulation exceeded the 
expectations of the most optimistic commentators in several important respects: 1) the Commission 
met the right deadlines prescribed in the Implementing Regulation in virtually every case; 2) the 
Commission was flexible and open in its application of the procedural rules of the Merger Regulation, 
notwithstanding the significant innovations in practice; 3) the Commission began to use economic 
evidence and systematic marketing testing; 4) the Commission proved itself able to withstand political 
pressure;  5) the Commission worked closely with Member State authorities, using the Member 
Regulation to develop a common appreciation of competition law and policy across the EU; and 6) the 
Commission started the process of fostering international cooperation with other antitrust authorities, 
including, in particular, the US federal agencies. See N Levy et al., EU Merger Control: A Brief 
History, (2004), p10, available at: http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/39346756-bc80-4fd2-9584-
f358ffc72239/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/05b61f33-f646-4c9e-a7ec-
f6b8b0bfce4f/CGSH_CGSH_Paper_IBC_Conference_EU_Merger_Control_-_A_Brief_History.pdf 
(accessed on the 24
th
 September 2012); a prior version of this paper entitled EU Merger Control: 
From Birth to Adolescence was published in World Competition, (2003) Volume 26, Number 2, 
pp.195-218.  
143
 These provisions are: i) the notion of a concentration, [1994] O.J. C385/5; ii) the calculation of 
turnover, [1994] O.J. C385/21; iii) the distinction between co-operative and concentrative joint 
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Between 1995 and 1998 there was increasing maturity, confidence and 
sophistication in the Commission’s substantive review of reportable transactions. 
The Commission’s decisions reported after Phase II investigation became 
increasingly detailed and lengthy;144 transactions might be prohibited largely 
because of vertical effects.145 The Commission also began to consider conglomerate 
or ‘portfolio’ effects in cases, and the Court confirmed that ‘a failing firm defence 
is available under the Merger Regulation.146  
During the period 1999 to 2001 the Commission employed an increasingly wide 
array of antitrust theories, including: 1) neighbouring market and potential entrant 
theories; 2) conglomerate and portfolio effects; 3) vertical effects; and 4) spill-
over effects;147 The Commission for the first time identified single-form dominance 
concerns where the transaction market share would have been below 40%.148 The 
Commission applied the Merger Regulation’s procedural rules more rigorously, 
including, in particular, those barring consideration of remedies offered out-of 
time.149  
In 2002 a number of reforms were adopted. The package reform included a wide-
ranging revision of the Merger Regulation (the ‘Draft Merger Regulation’),150 a Draft 
Horizontal Mergers Notice151 and Draft Best Practices Guidelines.152 The Commission 
intended to clarify the law in three significant ways: the first was intended to 
                                                                                                                               
ventures, [1994] O.J. C385/1; and iv) the notion of ‘undertakings concerned’, [1994] O.J. C385/12. 
The first prohibition case was Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland in 1991. It was not until 1994 that the 
Commission prohibited a second transaction; see Case IV/M.469 MSG Media Service [1994] O.J. 
L364/1.Case IV/M.53 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, [1991] O.J. L334/42.  
144
 Example of cases can refer to note 37 in N Levy et al., EC Merger Control: A brief History, supra 
note 142. 
145
 Example of cases can be seen in note 39 in N Levy et al., ibid. 
146
 Note 44 in ibid. 
147
 Note 50-53 in ibid. 
148
 In Case Carrefour/Promodes, merging parties would supply 20-30% consumer products to French 
supermarkets. The Commission still raised the concern that the merged entity could exert market 
power over suppliers. See Case COMP/M.1684 Carrefour/Promodes,[2000] O.J. L164/5. 
149
 Note 56 in N Levy etc, EU Merger Control: A Brief History, supra note 142. 
150
 Note 89, ibid. 
151
 Note 90, ibid. 
152
 Note 91, ibid. 
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remedy the ‘enforcement gap’ of the ‘dominance’ test with SIEC test; in the 
second the Commission considered accepting  the analytical framework of 
collective dominance based on Airtours case;153 thirdly the Commission began to 
recognise that assessments made under the Merger Regulation should ‘take 
account of any substantiated and likely efficiencies put forward by the 
undertakings concerned’ as ‘it is possible that the efficiencies brought about by 
the concentration [may] counteract the effects on competition.’154 Therefore, 
after 14 years of development, the Commission finally adopted its current 
Horizontal Mergers Notice in 2003 which ‘provides a sound economic framework for 
the assessment of concentration’.155 In addition, for more extensive and detailed 
analysis, the Commission appointed its first chief economic expert in the Merger 
Team Force.156 
The EU issued its Horizontal Merger Notice based on 14 years of development. 
Compared with the history of the EU the MOFCOM may lack sufficient case 
experience to establish a proper economic framework for the assessment of 
horizontal concentration in five years of implementation. However, the trend of 
improvement in the EU could be an example for the MOFCOM to follow.  
4.1.2 Restricted Communication amongst the MOFCOM, 
Notifying Parties and the Third Parties  
Lack of communication may explain the different case decisions on the same 
transaction in the EU and China. The enforcement authorities’ power to collect 
information is similar in the EU and China.157 However, the Commission has deeper 
                                         
153
 This decision will be further analysed in Chapter 4. 
154
 Recital 29, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), [2004] O.J. L24 (hereinafter 
EUMR). 
155
 Recital 28, EUMR. 
156
 Note 105 and 106 in N Levy et al., EU Merger Control: A Brief History, supra note 142. 
157
 Merger assessment on Seagate/Samsung got different decisions in the EU and China. Reasons 
leading to the difference can see following‘4.2.7 Improving Communication amongst the MOFCOM, 
Notifying Parties and Third Parties’ in this chapter. The Commission has power to collect information 
from merging parties, or third parties (e.g. customers, upstream suppliers, or rivals), by means of a 
simple requires or decision or an inspection. See Article 11 and 13 EUMR. Similar power of the 
MOFCOM in investigation can see in Article 6 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of 
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investigation with its power. This is because notifying parties and related third 
parties have more opportunities to know the concerns of the Commission, and have 
more channels to make their views known by the authority before a final decision 
is made.  
4.2 Recommendations 
4.2.1 Rewording the Substantive Test 
The AML 2008 adopted a substantive test: that a concentration would be 
prohibited if it ‘has or is likely to have effects of eliminating or restricting 
competition’ (the ‘EERC’ test).158 Similar to the ‘SIEC’ test in the EU, the ‘EERC’ 
test links the result of merger assessment with its effect on prevailing competition 
rather than the change of market structure. This helps ward off the ‘gap’ of 
enforcement under the ‘dominant’ test. A merger may raise serious anti-
competitive concerns even it does not create or strengthen a dominant position.159 
For example, a merger eliminates potential competition160 or controls of entry 
barriers;161 merger between the second and third largest producer in the market 
which does not create or strengthen the paramount firm in the market; merger 
creates the likelihood of coordination between the oligopolists or makes 
                                                                                                                               
China, Announcement No.12 of 1
st
 January 2010, Measures on the review of concentrations of 
undertakings (the ‘Review Measures’) and Article 39 of the AML 2008. 
158
 Article 28, the AML 2008. However, there is no illustration of the ‘extent’ of effect on competition. 
Some scholars comment that China adopts the US ‘substantial lessening of competition’ standard. 
Others believe that the EERC test follows worldwide trends, through combining the ‘substantial 
lessening of competition’ test and the traditional ‘creation or strengthening of a dominant position’ test. 
See Z Wu, Study on Anti-Monopoly Law of P.R. China, (2007), China People's Court Press, 488; J 
Shi, Understanding and Using of the Anti-Monopoly Law of P.R. China, (2007), Beijing: China Legal 
Publication House, 237. 
159
 The change of substantive test was discussed in K Fountoukakos and S Ryan, A new substantive 
test for EU merger control, [2005] Volume 26 Issue 5, E.C.L.R., 277; A Heimler, Was the change of 
the Test for Merger Control in Europe Justified? An Assessment (Four Years after the Introduction of 
SIEC), (2008) Volume4 Number1, European Competition Journal, pp. 85-94; L Roller and M Mano, 
the Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger Control, supra note 14, pp. 9-28. 
160
 See supra note 77.  
161
 Although merging parties have relatively low combined market shares measured by sales or total 
capacity, their competitors are capacity constrained, which may enable the merged group profitably to 
reduce its output and raise prices following the merger.  
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coordination easier; and merger raises rivals’ costs. 162However, unlike the SIEC 
test under the EUMR, merger review under the ‘EERC’ test may be overestimated 
when a merger only carries trivial or non-material reduction of market competition. 
Actually, any horizontal concentration has the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition, as the number of competitors in the market will be reduced. 
Nevertheless, in practice, all horizontal merger cases have been cleared with or 
without restrictive conditions.163 There is thus a logical paradox between the 
expression of substantive test in legislation and practice. Hence the substantive 
test should be amended.164  
The ‘SIEC’ test has an advantage in clarifying the criteria for merger assessment. 
The words ‘significant impediment’ imply that a merger will be prohibited only if 
it materially reduces or lessens the extent of ‘competition’ within the market.165 A 
merger which does not materially harm consumers could not be prohibited, even if 
it reduces rivalry by removing an independent supplier from the market. 
                                         
162
 Vertical integration can greatly harm consumer welfare even if none of the merging firms is per se 
dominant in their respective markets. For instance, if an upstream undertaking merges with a 
downstream undertaking, the upstream firm might has low incentive to engage in price-cut 
competition with other up-stream enterprises in order to serve the downstream undertakings pre-
integration. The rival upstream firm can charge higher price for its products. As the downstream 
enterprises, they may pass the increase of cost onto the price of final product and consumer welfare 
is diminished. 
163
 Only one proposed conglomerate merger case was prohibited by the MOFCOM. See 
Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.22, Coca Cola / Huiyuan. 
164
 For discussion of substantive test see J Shi and S Qian, Study on Chinese Substantive 
Examination Standard on Concentration of Undertakings from an International Perspective [以国际视
野看我国经营者集中的实质审查标准, Yi Guoji Shiye Kan Woguo Jingyingzhe Jizhong de Shizhi 
Shencha Biaozhun], China Management Studies[中大管理研究, Zhongda Guanli Yanjiu], (2009) 
Volume 4, Issue 4, pp.155-169; U Bernitz and S An, An Convergence or parallel paths? Comparison 
of substantive tests of merger control in EU and China, (2010) Volume 31 Issue 6, E. C. L. R., pp.248-
257; Huang Jin, Merger Regulation in China, What Constitutes an Appropriate Regime, available at 
Asian Competition Forum website: http://www.asiancompetitionforum.org/asianfile.html (Accessed on 
the 19
th
 May 2012); L Ren, the Criteria of Substantive Test for Vertical Merger Antitrust Review, [纵向
合并反垄断实质审查标准研究, Zongxiang Hebing Fanlongduan Shizhi Shencha Biaozhun Yanjiu] 
(Master’s Thesis), (2011), Available in Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI)Database; Y 
Shen, Defence Measures for Chinese Enterprises When Facing EU’s Merge and Acquisition Review, 
[中国企业在欧盟实施并购面临的反垄断审查及应对措施, Zhongguo Qiye zai Oumeng Shishi Binggou 
Mianlian de Fanlongduan Shencha Ji Yingdui Cuoshi] (Master’s Thesis), (2011), Available in Chinese 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Database; Y Liu, Substantive test and its Defence System 
in Antitrust Merger Review, [企业并购中的反垄断实体审查及其抗辩, Qiye Binggou zhong de 
Fanlongduan Shiti Shencha jiqi Kangbian] (Master’s Thesis) (2008), Available in Chinese National 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Database. 
165
 See N Horner, Unilateral Effects and the EC Merger Regulation – How the Commission had its 
Cake and Ate it Too?, (2006) Volume2 No.1, Hanse Law Review, pp.23-44. 
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4.2.2 Market Share and Concentration Ratio 
Apart from rewording the ‘substantive test’ criteria, 166 the MOFCOM should also 
change the competitive assessment from the focus on market structure to a focus 
on the effect of concentration on competition.167 Firstly the MOFCOM should use 
market share and HHI levels as initial indicators of competition concerns, which 
are not in themselves determinative of whether unilateral effects will arise as a 
result of a transaction.168 Concerning concentration with high market share or high 
HHI level post-merger the MOFCOM should also competitive constraints to price 
increase of the merged entity from actual or potential competitors, buyers as well 
as customers. A concentrated market structure might not lead to anti-competitive 
effect. Seagate/Samsung is an example.169 If merged entity would only have 
market share below 50% post-merger, the MOFCOM still needs to be careful 
whether merger eliminates a ‘maverick’ firm in the market. A transaction with no 
significant market share may also raise competitive concerns. 
Secondly the MOFCOM is advised to establish a ‘safe harbour’ for merger 
assessment. This can increase the predictability of merger assessment. 
Transactions with low market shares and concentration ratio can be reviewed in 
less time and with fewer resources. The MOFCOM can focus more on mergers with 
significant competitive concerns. The exact standard of safe harbour is still to be 
issued by the MOFCOM. Adopting the HHI index as the proxy for a safe harbour has 
its advantages. The HHI index not only shows the extent of concentration in 
industry, but also reveals the scale of enterprises.170 The consideration of delta HHI 
before and after a merger can avoid raising anti-competitive arguments when the 
                                         
166
 R Gibert and D Rubinfeld, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons from the U.S. and 
the E.U., in M Faure and X Zhang, Competition Policy and Regulation: Recent Developments in 
China, Europe and the US, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011), pp.262-280. 
167
 See J F Stewart et al., The Role of Market Structure in Merger Behavior, (1984) Volume 32 No.3, 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, pp 293-312; G J Werden, Assigning Market Shares, supra note 
9, pp.67-104. 
168
 For the meaning of HHI, refer to supra note 19. 
169
 Announcement of MOFCOM [2011] No.90, Seagate/Samsung. 
170
 Q Yang and M Pickford, Safe Harbours in Merger Guidelines: What Should They Be?, (2011) 
volume 44, no. 1, the Australian Economic Review, pp.13-35; G J Werden, Assigning Market Shares, 
supra note 9, pp.67-104.  
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change of concentration level in market is minimal.171 The scope of safe harbour 
could be smaller in China than in the EU. The intervention of non-competitive 
factors cannot be monitored in the space of immunity.172 However, such scope 
should not be too small, as China is a developing country; the extent of 
concentration in majority industries is low.173 Therefore concentration between 
small- or medium-sized enterprises could be welcomed currently.174 However, 
there is a range of points which should be considered in implementing the safe 
harbour standard in future: 1) the indexes of HHI and market share should be 
based on the definition of ‘relevant market’. Yet this definition cannot be precise 
in most conditions. 2) Transactions outside the scope of safe harbour can also be 
cleared because of the presence of countervailing effects; 3) mergers within the 
safe harbour zone are not a definite excuse for exemption from merger review. 
There are still special circumstances.175 Therefore a safe harbour can only be a 
reference for identifying anti-competitive effects. In order to ensure legal 
certainty challenges to ‘safe harbour’ should be clarified by the MOFCOM in a 
published decision.  
With regard to EU experience, in addition to high market share, assessment should 
also include whether customers have the possibility to switch suppliers; 176 whether 
                                         
171
 Q Yang and M Pickford, ibid. 
172
 See D Yu et al., Research on the Safe Harbor Rules in the Horizontal Mergers & Acquisitions 
Antimonopoly Regulation, [横向并购反垄断规制中的安全港规则研究, Hengxiang Binggou 
Fanlongduan Guizhizhong de Anquangang Guize Yanjiu], (2010) Volume 46, Issue 3, Industrial 
Economics Research[产业经济研究，Chanye Jingji Yanjiu], pp.70-76. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 Hence Yu advises that 1) the MOFCOM is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000. Such markets normally do not require extensive 
analysis; 2) the MOFCOM is also unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a merger with 
a post-merger HHI between 1,000 and 2,000 and a delta below 200, or a merger with a post-merger 
HHI above 2,000 and a delta below 100. D Yu, Y Qiao and W Zhang, ibid. 
175
 a) A merger involves a potential entrant or a recent entrant with a small market share; b) one or 
more merging parties is an important innovator in ways not reflected in market share; c) there are 
significant cross-shareholdings among the market participants; d) one of the merging firms is a 
maverick with a high likelihood of disrupting coordinated conduct; e) indication of past or ongoing 
coordination or facilitating practices are present; f) one of the merging parties has a pre-merger 
market share of 50% or more. These situations are provided pursuant to Paragraph 20, Guidelines on 
Horizontal Mergers of the EU, supra note 1. 
176
 For instance, in China’s beer market, brand loyalty deters the switch between products. After 
concentration the entity would own some of the most popular global beer brands, such as InBev’s 
Stella Artois and Anheuser-Busch’s Budweiser. See X Zhang and V Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: 
Patterns and Implications, (2010) Volume 6 Issue 2, E.C.L.R., 485. 
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competitors are likely to increase supply if price increases; 177 and whether the 
merged entity is able to hinder expansion by competitors. In addition, market 
entry and buyer power will be considered countervailing effects to unilateral 
effects.178  
4.2.3 Focus on the substitution of merging products in the 
relevant Market 
In a highly differentiated product market the market shares of the various products 
may not indicate constraints on competitors.179 According to the experience of the 
EU, customers consider products differently according to brand, quality or the 
products’ geographic location of sales.180 The MOFCOM should survey the closeness 
of merging parties, especially when notifying parties argue that they are not the 
closest competitors in the market. Approaches of investigation contain market 
studies and consumer surveys, panel data on a sample of consumers and internal 
documents of merging parties and their rivals.181Ineffective judicial review cannot 
correct the error of merger decisions. 182 In order to ensure the rightness of 
anticompetitive assessment the MOFCOM is advised to use more than one kind of 
market survey and see if these methods lead to the same result. An economic 
                                         
177
 Some regions in China are notorious for local protectionism of their beer markets. Beer is sold to 
consumers through a special distribution system. Breweries sell beer to distributors which in turn sell 
to retailers. The distributors' contracts with brewers contain territorial limits and prohibit the distributors 
from selling beer outside their respective territories. Because the distributors cannot sell a brewer's 
products outside their territories without violating their contracts with the brewer, brewers can charge 
different prices in different regions for the same package and brand of beer, and individual distributors 
(and retailers) cannot defeat such price differences through arbitrage. Therefore local protectionism 
would prevent market entry from outside territory when the local price of beer increased. Evidence of 
local protectionism can be seen in the Report on Development Strategy of Beer Industry in China 
2008, in which the beer market situation in seven districts was illustrated. Specific analysis of local 
protectionism was discussed in ‘4.3.1.1 Barriers of Accessing into Some Administrative Zones’ in 
Chapter 1. Report on Development Strategy of Beer Industry in China 2008, see supra note 114. 
178
 Countervailing market entry and buyer power will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
179
 A Coscelli and S Baker, The role of market shares in differentiated product markets, supra note 35; 
G J Werden, Simulating the effects of differentiated products mergers: a practical alternative to 
structural merger policy, supra note 24, pp.363-386. 
180
 A Coscelli and S Baker, ibid., 419; 
181
 See ‘2.2 Merging Firms Are Close Competitors’ in this chapter. 
182
 The MOFCOM’s function in implementing non-competitive policy has been discussed in ‘4.3.2.2 
Mission of Implementing Non-competitive Considerations’ in Chapter 1. 
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approach should be used with caution when the results of different market surveys 
are divergent. 
4.2.4 Competitors are Unlikely to Increase Supply if Price 
Increases 
The MOFCOM should additionally evaluate the incentive of competitors to increase 
supply if they have the ability to do so. According to the experience of the EU, if 
the expansion of capacity is not costly and not binding by any quota or treaty 
constraints, the actual rivals may have an incentive to expand output to gain more 
market share from economies of scale. Therefore, in addition to market structure, 
the MOFCOM should also investigate competitors’ marginal costs of production and 
quotas of manufacture.183 Once competitive constraint from rivals is available a 
merger might be cleared outright. The MOFCOM should reveal why it considers a 
competitive constraint from rivals is likely and sufficient in clearance decision.  
4.2.5 Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by Competitors 
According to the experience of the EU a merged entity is able to hinder expansion 
by competitors through control of supply of inputs or distribution possibilities, 
control of intellectual property rights and interoperability between 
infrastructures.184 Once these occur they will make the anticompetitive effect of a 
merger more likely. The MOFCOM should be careful that a proposed transaction 
will not raise anti-competitive concerns, although merging parties have market 
power in the procurement market or distribution channel. Reasons include, firstly, 
that merger does not substantially enhance monopsony of merging parties. The 
merged entity still lacks the ability and/or incentive to procure materials from its 
own upstream entity exclusively and foreclose access of other upstream suppliers 
to a sufficient customer base;185 secondly, the suppliers of the merged entity might 
                                         
183
See Section ‘2.3.2 Incentive to Expand Output’ in this chapter. 
184
 See above ‘2.4 Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by Competitors’ in this chapter. 
185
 Seagate/Samsung in the EU is an example. See discussion in Section 3.4 Merged Entity Able to 
Hinder Expansion by Competitors. Case COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of 
Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3.  
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own ‘must have brands’; foreclosure strategy would not significantly harm 
suppliers’ business. On the other hand the market power of the merged entity is 
reflected in controlling patent or IP rights. If the market has enough pipeline 
products or is characterised as active innovation, rivals can realise expansion 
through developing pipeline products or upgrading their products. 
In addition to countervailing factors, the efficiency created by merger can offset 
its anticompetitive effects. The MOFCOM should clarify the welfare standard for 
evaluating efficiency. It is recommended that consumer interests are set as the 
exclusive welfare standard in merger assessment. Since the MOFCOM is a 
government department, lobbies from domestic enterprises, especially SOEs, can 
mostly work.186 Under the lobbying of the domestic rivals the concentration 
bringing efficiency to competitors might be cleared, although the interest of 
consumers will be harmed. On the other hand concentration promoting consumer 
welfare will be prohibited or significant commitments might be imposed if it harms 
competitor interest.187 Nor are there are guidelines on the scope of producer 
welfare and how to quantify or qualify producers’ welfare, which will be 
influenced by the concentration. The extent of transparency and accountability of 
merger assessment cannot be improved in the foreseeable future. Under consumer 
welfare standard the efficiency defence should be of benefit to consumers. Gains 
                                         
186
 P Ying, The Reasons for Antitrust Merger Control: A Undetermined Standpoint [经营者集中反垄断
规制的理由:一个不确定的立场, Jingyingzhe Jizhong Fanlongduan Guizhi de Liyou: Yige Buqueding 
de Lichang], (2009) Volume 2, Anhui University Law Review [安徽大学法学评论，Anhui Daxue Faxue 
Pinglun], pp.66-74; P Ying, The Welfare Standards of Anti-monopoly Control on Concentration of 
Business Operators: A Comparison Study and the Choice of China [经营者集中反垄断控制的福利标准
-类型化之研究及我国的选择，Jingyingzhe Jizhong Fanlongduan Kongzhi de Fuli Biaozhun-
Leixinghua zhi Yanjiu ji Woguo de Xuanze], Volume 4 (2010), Journal of Lanzhou Commercial 
College[兰州商学院学报，Lanzhou Shangxueyuan Xuebao], pp.114-121. 
187
 Detriment to the interest of competitors does not necessarily harm competition. If the influence on 
competitors does not affect competition, the concentration should be approved. See : D Spector, 
From Harm to Competitors to Harm to Competition: One more effort, Please!, (2006) Volume 2, 
European Competition Journal, pp.145-184;  E. T. Waine, "Competition, Not Competitors’, Nor 
Canards: Ways of Criticizing the Commission, (2002) Volume 23 Issue 3, University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law, pp.597-636; E. M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect 
Competitors, (2003) Volume 26 Issue 2, World Competition, pp.149-165. 
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of producer welfare should be passed on to consumers after the merger. This 
avoids ‘political lobbying’ of domestic rivals for their own interests.188  
To sum up, when the MOFCOM finds the possibility of a merged entity which is able 
to hinder expansion by its competitors, it should early signal its concern to the 
notifying parties. The parties could provide views and even evidence in order to 
allay the MOFCOM’s concerns. In the meanwhile the MOFCOM should investigate 
the market structure of the upstream supplying market in order to make a 
judgment on whether a monopsony of a merged entity exists. 
4.2.6 Eliminate a ‘Maverick’ Firm 
Even if merging parties have no significant market share the MOFCOM still needs to 
consider their power of innovation or whether there are recent entrants, especially 
when the market is already concentrated.189 Because decisions of clearance are not 
published the public does not know if there is any false positive decision due to 
failure to consider the effects of a ‘maverick’ firm. In addition, if the relevant 
market of merging parties is the innovation market, the MOFCOM should conduct 
some adjustments based on normal merger assessment.190 Firstly, advanced 
technology of the merged entity at present does not indicate its power in the 
future. Customers might switch to rivals with upgraded products even if the 
merged entity has a relatively high market share. Therefore the MOFCOM should 
                                         
188
 Comparing protection of total welfare standard, less notified mergers will be approved under the 
aim of protecting consumer welfare. This is conflict with the aim of ‘relaxing concentration’ in order to 
increase the GDP of a developing country like China. However, involving industry policy in anti-
monopoly assessment has been proved to mess up the market even in times of economic crisis. 
Therefore, in order to limit the ‘lobby’ effect and special relationship between the government and 
domestic firms, the consumer welfare standard is more suited to adoption in China, currently at least. 
Besides, the adoption of total welfare will increase the risk of conflicting with other jurisdictions. See  
Y Liu, 欧盟企业合并审查中的效率分析 [Efficiency Assessment in Merger Review of the EU, Oumeng 
Qiye Hebing Shengcha zhong de Xiaolv Fenxi], (2008) Volume 12, 政治与法律[Political Science and 
Law, Zhengzhi Yu Falv], 151. 
189
 For assessment of ‘maverick’ firm see sections 2.5 and 3.5 of this chapter. 
190
 An innovative market can be identified by the degree of recent instability of market shares, the rate 
of growth of the market and estimates of the rate of technological change. See OECD, Merger Review 
in Emerging High Innovation Markets, DAFFE/COMP(2002)20, 9. 
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investigate the human capital and intellectual property of the merged entity which 
it could use to hinder the innovation of its rivals.191 
In conclusion, merger assessment on unilateral effects in China can be improved 
from the following aspects: firstly, the MOFCOM should continue changing its 
competitive assessment from a focus on market structure to the effects of 
concentration on market competition; secondly, reasoning should be made explicit 
and public as experience of case review increases; thirdly, more measures should 
be adopted in order to fully protect communication between the antitrust 
authority, notifying parties and third parties.  
4.2.7 Improving Communication amongst the MOFCOM, 
Notifying Parties and the Third Parties192 
Unlike that of the EU the MOFCOM’s merger assessment is not comprehensive. In 
Seagate/Samsung the market power of the merging parties in the upstream market 
was not analysed. The MOFCOM did not reveal its opinions on factors which might 
have had countervailing effects on anti-competitive concerns; for example, the 
merging parties were not the closest competitors in Seagate/Samsung.193  
The MOFCOM should be made responsible for its incomplete investigation. 
Nevertheless, rivals of merging parties who might be affected by a merger will 
report neglected anti-competitive concerns to the MOFCOM in order to secure their 
own interests. The notifying parties would commit to advocate countervailing 
factors in order to ensure approval.  
                                         
191
 See above 2.5 Merger eliminates an important competitive force. 
192
 Notifying parties are persons or undertakings submitting a notification on merger review; Third 
party means natural or legal persons considered to have a ‘sufficient interest’ in merger review and 
include customers, suppliers and competitors, members of the administrative or management bodies 
of the undertakings concerned or the recognised representatives of their employees; consumer 
associations, where the proposed concentration concerns products or services used by final 
consumers. See Article 11 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 
implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the Implementing Regulation). 
193
 The neglect of countervailing factors was shown in comparison of case decisions of the EU and 
China in ‘3.2 Merging firms are close competitors’ in this chapter. 
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In the EU the European Commission and notifying parties have opportunities for 
communication. During pre-notification discussions are held in strict confidence 
between the DG Competition and notifying parties.194 This provides DG 
Competition and the notifying parties with the possibility, prior to notification, to 
discuss jurisdictional and other legal issues. They also provide an opportunity to 
discuss issues such as the scope of the information to be submitted, and to prepare 
for the forthcoming investigation by identifying key issues and possible competition 
concerns (of harm) at an early stage.195 Within 15 days of notification the 
Commission will offer ‘state of play’ to the notifying parties.196  
In Phase II investigation communication between the notifying parties and the 
Commission is mainly based on the ‘statement of objections’.197 Pursuant to the 
‘state of play meetings’ in Best Practice, notifying parties will be offered the first 
time of meeting normally within two weeks of the initiation of the second phase of 
investigation in order to discuss, inter alia, the Commission’s competition concerns 
raised by the proposed concentration and the approximate timetable of the second 
phase procedure.198 
The second meeting will typically be scheduled before the issuing of the statement 
of objections (hereafter ‘SO’), in order for the notifying parties to be informed of 
the Commission's view resulting from the investigation. The experience of the EU is 
that the SO can be succinct, but should be very clear in order to express the 
Commission’s views and facts on which it relies.199 It is sometimes not until the SO 
has been sent that the notifying parties know what the Commission’s real concerns 
                                         
194
 See Paragraph 8, DG Competition Best Practice on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings 
(Best Practice), 20/01/2004, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/proceedings.pdf (accessed 24
th
 
 
September 2013).  
195
 The purposes of pre-notification contacts refer to point 3, Best practice, ibid, 2. 
196
 Paragraph 6, Best Practice, ibid.  
197
 The Statement of Objections will set out all the facts and law on which these objections are based, 
and the defendant parties must comment not only on these objections but also on the evidence on 
which the Commission relied in formulating its objections on. See note 12 in M Kekelekis, the 
‘statement of objections’ as an inherent part of the right to be heard in EC merger proceedings: issues 
of concern, (2004) Volume 25 Issue 8, E.C.L.R., pp. 518-527. 
198
 Point 33-b), Best Practice. 
199
 M Kekelekis, ibid, 524, see also paragraph 9, case C-45/69 Boehringer Mannheim v Commission 
[1970], E.C.R, 769. 
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are.200 Regarding the SO, the notifying parties could make known their views on 
every document used by the Commission to support its anti-competitive concerns. 
In the EU the defendants’ right to be heard is absolute.201 They can submit their 
observations in writing or present their case at the oral hearing.202 The Commission 
is not entitled to base its arguments on documents and figures based on 
confidential information that are not going to be made available to the notifying 
parties.203 In other words the Commission must base its decision only on objections 
on which the parties have been able to submit their observations. 
A third meeting is to be offered following the parties’ reply to the Statement of 
Objections and/or the oral hearing, which will mainly serve as an opportunity to 
discuss possible remedial proposals.204 A last meeting will be offered before the 
Advisory Committee, enabling the notifying parties to discuss with the Commission 
the result of the latter's market test of the remedies proposed and formulate 
improvements if necessary.205   
In China, until the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision the full procedures of hearings 
were not defined.206 Prior to formal notification merger parties could apply to 
                                         
200
 See M Kekelekis, ibid, 525. 
201
 See Article 13, the Implementing Regulation, supra note 192. 
202
 See Article 13 (3) and (4), ibid. 
203
 In Telefunken v. Commission, the court revealed that ‘Since these documents were not mentioned 
in the Statement of Objections, Aeg was entitled to take the view that they were of no importance for 
the purposes of the case. By not informing the applicant that these documents would be used in the 
decision, the Commission prevented Aeg from putting forward at the appropriate time its view of the 
probative value of such documents. It follows that these documents cannot be regarded as admissible 
evidence for the purpose of this case.’ See paragraph 27, Case C-107/82 Telefunken v. 
Commission,[1983] E.C.R.,II-3151, and see also note 18 in M Kekelekis, The EC Merger Control 
Regulation: Rights of Defence, (Netherlands, 2006), 149.  
204
 Point 33 (d), Best Practice, supra note 194. 
205
 See Paragraphs 23-41, Best Practice, ibid. There is not much secondary literature dealing 
exclusively with the Commission’s investigatory power and the parties’ rights involved during the 
preliminary investigation procedure under the EUMR. Most of it is related to the practices under 
Regulation 17. It must be stressed that none of the secondary literature does more than simply 
present a description of the preliminary investigation procedure and related case law. Citing from note 
3 in M Kekelekis, The EC Merger Control Regulation: Rights of Defence, (Kluwer Law International, 
2006), 111. The cited Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty changed into Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on 16 December 2002. 
206
 The standpoint here serves for the enforcement authority to conduct more complete investigation 
rather than for the better protection of the rights of notifying and third parties particularly. In Coca 
Cola/Huiyuan, during the merger review, there was no hearing procedure available, and consumers’ 
opinions were not fully heard. See D Wei, China’s Anti-monopoly Law and Its Merger Enforcement: 
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discuss related issues of notification with the MOFCOM.207 The consultative process 
might increase the transparency and certainty of the merger review and might 
provide the parties with a ready mechanism by which to dispose of transactions 
that raise few competition concerns. Undertakings are allowed to submit written 
statements and arguments regarding their notifications. The MOFCOM must 
consider those materials.208 The MOFCOM has also enhanced its communication 
system by using its website to update applicants on the status of each merger 
filing.209 
When a merger review enters Phase II, there is bilateral meeting between the 
MOFCOM and notifying parties on the ‘Statement of Objections’.210  However, the 
views in the SO have no links with the facts on which the MOFCOM relies in the 
final decision. The concerns and facts on which the MOFCOM relies in the final 
decision are not compulsorily to be all checked and reviewed by the notifying 
parties. In other words the MOFCOM could base its decision on objections on which 
the parties have not been able to submit their observation. As judicial review in 
China is ineffective, the notifying parties can hardly challenge those concerns and 
materials for merger decision in future.211 The notifying parties should be entitled 
                                                                                                                               
Convergence and Flexibility, (2011) Volume 14 Issue 4, Journal of International Economic Law, 818. 
The procedure of hearing is regulated in article 7, Review Measures, supra note 157. 
207
 See article 8, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement No.11 of 1
at
 
January 2010, Measures for Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators (the “Notification 
Measures”). According to Articles 25 and 26 of the AML 2008 merger review in China can have two 
phases. The Anti-monopoly Authority l conducts a preliminary review of the declared concentration 
and  takes  a decision whether to initiate a further review within 30 days. If the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council decides not to carry out further review or fails to take a decision at 
expiry of the stipulated period, the concentration may be implemented. If the Anti-Monopoly Authority 
decides to carry out a further review, it must inform the parties to the transaction of this in writing. The 
Anti-monopoly Authority has 90 days to carry out a further review. However, phase II can be extended 
by up to 60 days if the business operators concerned agree to extend the time limit; or the documents 
or materials submitted are inaccurate and need further verification; or things have significantly 
changed after declaration. 
208
 See Article 5, Review Measures, supra note 157.  
209
 The notifying parties are given a password to view the status of their filings on the MOFCOM’s 
website at: http://xzsw.mofcom.gov.cn (visited on the 27
th
 April 2013). 
210
 Article 10 of Review Measures states: ‘In the further review stage, if the MOFCOM considers that 
the concentration of undertakings has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, 
it shall inform the undertakings participating in the concentration of its statement of objection, and set 
a reasonable deadline within which the undertakings participating in the concentration may submit 
their defense in writing’. Review Measures, supra note 157. 
211
 The ineffectiveness of judicial review in China has been proved in ‘4.3.3 Ineffectiveness of Judicial 
Review’ in Chapter 1. 
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to make known their views on every document used by the MOFCOM as evidence of 
the existence of anti-competitive concern. The MOFCOM should base its decision 
only on objections raised in the SO. Communication concerning the SO should be 
compulsory in cases raising significant anti-competitive concerns.  
b. Communication between the MOFCOM, Notifying Parties and Third Parties 
In addition to bilateral communication between merging parties and the 
Commission, DG Competition may also decide to invite third parties and the 
notifying parties to a ‘triangular’ meeting, when DG Competition believes it is 
desirable.212 When merger assessment proceeds to Phase II of investigation, DG 
Competition may, in the interest of the investigation, in appropriate cases provide 
third parties that have shown a sufficient interest in the procedure with an edited 
version of the SO, with business secrets removed, in order to allow them to make 
their views on the Commission’s preliminary assessment known.213 DG Competition 
may also invite third parties to meetings to discuss and clarify specific issues raised 
in the formal oral hearing in Phase II.214 Third parties are also entitled, upon 
application, to be heard, and the Commission must inform them in writing of the 
nature and subject matter of the procedure and fix a time limit within which they 
may make their views known in writing.215 
However, communication between the MOFCOM, notifying and third parties in 
merger assessment has a number of drawbacks not disclosed in the EU system. 
Firstly, decisions will not be published if the concentration notified does not fall 
within the scope of merger control.216 The voices of objection from third parties to 
these transactions cannot be heard by the MOFCOM. The MOFCOM does not declare 
its acceptance of a notification. Third parties have no chance to initiate a hearing 
                                         
212
 See paragraphs 38 and 48, Best Practice, note 194 supra; the right is also set out in Article 16 of 
the EUMR; and Articles 14 -16 of the Implementing Regulation, note 193 supra. 
213
 In such cases the SO is provided under strict confidentiality obligations and restrictions of use, 
which the third parties have to accept prior to receipt. Section 7, Best Practice, supra note 194. 
214
  For more information on third parties’ right to a hearing see paragraph 35, Best Practice, ibid. 
215
 See article 16 of the Implementing Regulation, supra note 193. 
216
 For standard of notification see Article 3, the State Council Order No.529, Provisions of the State 
Council on the Standard for Declaration of Concentration was promulgated on the 3rd August 2008.  
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unless the MOFCOM consults them in the investigation.217 In addition, further 
review notifications only inform the business operators of the transaction. 
Therefore third parties do not know whether transactions are proceeding to Phase 
II investigation.218 They have no chance to apply for a formal oral hearing. The 
Statement of Objections is not issued to third parties.219 Other than by invitation 
from the MOFCOM third parties have no opportunity to discuss their views with the 
MOFCOM. The MOFCOM is not capable of thinking of all related third parties in 
merger review. In Inbev/AB the consumers in Wenzhou City had no opportunity to 
express their views, even though they might have been affected by the merger. In 
Wenzhou City of Zhejiang Province the corporations Inbev and AB had intense 
competition in the relevant market for beer. In order to take a greater market 
share, they competed to produce better beer at a lower price. Consumer welfare 
was secured by the competition. Reducing competition between them might have 
an effect on the interest of consumers in this district.220 Nevertheless, as the 
enforcement authority did not invite representatives of the Wenzhou Consumer 
Association to merger proceedings, their views on the merger were not heard in 
the merger review. 
In order to collect all the information which may be important for its decision, 
third parties should have the opportunity actively to submit their comments on the 
proposed concentration. Once a merger notification is accepted the MOFCOM 
should publicly post a notification on concentration on its official website.221 This 
                                         
217
 According to Article 6 of the Review Measures, during review the MOFCOM may seek opinions 
from entities or individuals such as relevant government authorities, industry associations, 
undertakings and consumers when necessary. The Review Measures, supra note 157. 
218
 If the MOFCOM considers a further review necessary, a decision to conduct a further review will 
not inform the third parties and the public. According to Article 9 of the Review Measures, if the 
MOFCOM considers a further review is necessary, a decision to conduct a further review shall be 
made, and the notifying parties shall be informed in writing. The Review Measures, ibid. 
219
 According to Article 10 of the Review Measures the MOFCOM only needs to inform the 
undertakings participating in the concentration of its statement of objection if it considers that the 
concentration of undertakings has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. The 
Review Measures, ibid. 
220
 W Sheng, Looking through the war of beer between Shuanglu and Budweiser [从品牌角度看双鹿
与百威的啤酒之战, Cong Pinpai Jiaodu Kan Shuanglu Yu Baiwei de Pijiu Zhi Zhan], (2006) Volume 2, 
Management and administration [经营与管理，JingyingyuGuanli], 37. 
221
 An example of the EU model on prior notification of a concentration is available at:http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:195:0023:0023:EN:PDF (accessed on the 
3
rd
  February 2013). 
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notification may include the names of the persons concerned and the type of 
concentration. This may allow interested parties to provide information and 
request a hearing within a certain period. In addition, in order for the MOFCOM to 
be able appropriately to evaluate the information contained in the notification 
form and effectively assess the compatibility of the notified concentration within 
the relevant market, third parties’ observations should be respected. Third parties 
are entitled to receive a copy of a non-confidential version of the statement of 
objections, enabling them to provide necessary information regarding the impact 
of a concentration on their interests. 
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Chapter 4: Horizontal Mergers-- Coordinated Effects 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Concept of Coordinated Effects 
Apart from unilateral effects a horizontal merger may raise another type of anti-
competitive concern. Tacit or explicit collusion between remaining firms in the 
market becomes more likely through a reduction of competitors or a change in 
market structures post-merger. Such effect is known as the coordinated effect of 
merger.1Once coordinated effects occur they reduce internal competition between 
coordinating firms. These can raise their prices above the competitive level 
without considering the interruption from fringe rivals, buyers and customers. This 
is a collective dominance (dominant oligopoly) situation, and is detrimental to 
consumer welfare. Collective dominance is based on ‘modern oligopoly theory’.2In 
game theory each player can be better off if they cooperate with other players. 
However, the profit of every firm cannot be maximised in collusion. Each player 
can earn more individually if they deviate from the common agreement and 
undercut the agreed monopoly price. The risk is that the short-run gain from 
deviation in the form of temporarily higher prices may be countervailed by the 
longer-term losses that would result from the ensuing price war once other 
                                         
1
See Section 2 in National Economic Research Associates, Merger Appraisal in Oligopolistic Market, 
(November 1999), Prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, available at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft267.pdf (accessed on the 23
rd
 September 
2013). 
2
The economic models of collective monopoly contain Game Theory and the Prisoners’Dilemma. 
seeM Ivaldi et al., the Economics of Tacit Collusion, (March 2003), Final Report for DG Competition, 
European Commission, available to see at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf 
(viewed on the 23
rd
 September 2013); H Haupt, Collective dominance under Article 82 E.C. and E.C. 
merger control in the light of the Airtours judgment, (2002), Volume 23 Issue 9, E.C.L.R., pp.434-444; 
European Economics, Study of Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control, (May 2001), Final Report for the European Commission 
Enterprise Directorate General, available to see at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=2683 (accessed on the 23
rd
 
September 2013); D TScheffman and M Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive 
Effects from a Merger, Volume 12 Issue 2, GeorgeMason Law Review, 319. 
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members retaliate by lowering their price. The possibility of punishment may deter 
firms from deviating. 
There are two types of coordination between firms. Explicit coordination is illegal 
both in the EU and China. It is regulated under Article 101TFEU and under Chapter 
2 of the AML 2008 in China.3 Existing tacit coordination without explicit agreement 
is legal in the EU and China. Merger assessment refers to predicting market 
behaviour as a result of changes brought by a concentration, and to blocking 
mergers which suggest that the outcome will be closer to a collective monopoly. 
There are various forms of tacit coordination, including coordination on price, 
coordination on capacity decision,4 alignment on customer or market sharing,5 
multimarket contacts6and bid-rigging.7 
1.2 Aim and Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter considers the approaches of the EU and China in evaluating 
coordinated effect in a merger.8 The first comparison will show which 
jurisdiction has more advantages in evaluating the coordinated effect of a 
                                         
3
In this thesis collective dominance and dominant oligopoly have the same meaning. The 
EUCommission also stated that ‘the terms collective, joint and oligopolistic dominance are used as 
synonyms in this decision’, see, note 26 in case COMP/M.2498 UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,[2002] 
O.J.L233/38,paragraph 75 
4
 When products are highly differentiated it is hard to reach an agreement on (the same) product price. 
Firms may be able to agree on capacity at the capacity setting stage or the product selling stage. 
Prices may be expected to rise by restricting production capacity.SeeS Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal 
and economic consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger control, 
(2004) Volume 49 Issues 1 and 2, Antitrust Bulletin, pp. 195-242. 
5
 Effective competition can be reduced if firms tacitly agree not to target each other’s customers or 
areas of the market. This means that each firm will not offer its rivals’ customers lower prices, since 
this will lead to retaliation with its own customers. In this case each firm is able to charge a higher 
price than the competitive level to its customers. Similarly, market sharing means firms agree to 
separatethe relevant market into several parts. In each one’s ‘home’ area other rivals should not offer 
lower price to customers. Customer or market sharing may be exist when price transparency is low 
and demand side is relatively concentrated. See S Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal and economic 
consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger control,supra note 4, 205. 
6
 When firms compete in more than one market they may have fewer incentives to deviate. This is 
because punishment by other competitors will be conducted in more than one market. Ibid, 205. 
7
RobertandHudsonstate that coordination takes four forms: price-fixing, capacity co-ordination, market 
sharing and bid rigging. SeeG Robert and C Hudson, Past co-ordination and the Commission Notice 
on the appraisal of horizontal mergers, (2004) Volume 25 No.3,E.C.L.R., pp. 163-168. 
8
 In the following coordination means only tacit collusion . 
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merger; the second which jurisdiction offers greater transparencyof merger 
assessment to the public.9 
This chapter is divided into three parts: it first examines the approaches for 
assessing the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers in the EU historically. 
Second, China’s approach will be reviewed. Given the results of comparison, this 
chapter then offers some recommendations on assessment of coordinated effects 
in China.These suggestions concern : 1) how better to assess thecoordinated 
effects of horizontal mergers on the competitive process,and 2) how to clarify 
merger assessment more transparent to the public through legislation and case 
decisions. 
2 Assessment of Coordinated Effects in EU 
Merger Control 
2.1 Checklist Period 
2.1.1 General Checklists 
In 1992in Nestlé/Perrier the Commission decided to include oligopolistic market 
under the Merger Regulation.10 The Commission cleared Nestlé/Perrier with 
commitments because it would create collective dominance post-merger.11The 
market characteristics raisingconcerns of coordinated effectsinclude thatthe 
remaining market players were similar in respect of their size and nature, their 
                                         
9
The reasons for choosing these two analytical standards have been revealed in Chapter 1. 
10
 Before this case the Commission had taken the view that the EU Merger Regulation does apply to 
oligopolistic dominance. See C Olsson, Collective Dominance - Merger Control on Oligopolistic 
Markets, (2001), 16, available at: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/2124/1/200105.pdf 
(Accessed on the 22
nd
 2013). In light of previous legal and economic experience Article 2 (3) of 
EUMR 1989 was interpreted as covering both single firm and oligopolistic dominance. See paragraph 
115, Case IV/M.190Nestlé/Perrier, [1992] O.J. L 356/1.The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) also approved the Merger Regulation applying to cases involving a collective dominant 
position. See paragraph 163, Joined Cases C 68/94 and 30/95 France v. European Commission 
[1998] E.C.R. I-1375., EUMR1989 means Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 
1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [1989] O.J. L395. 
11
 Post-merger, Nestlé has undertaken to divest part of its brand names and capacity to other 
competitors. Case IV/M.190Nestlé/Perrier, [1992] O.J. L 356/1, point 136. 
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capacities and their market shares.12 In 1997 the court clarified that merger 
control should focus exclusively on whether a merger will increase the feasibility 
of coordination or tacit collusion. Explicit collusion will have to be assessed under 
Article 101 TFEU.13 In the following year experience in assessing coordinated effect 
increased. The General Courtexplicitly indicated the possibility of retaliatory 
measures’ being necessary to enforce compliance of members of an oligopoly with 
certain collusive market behaviour.14The following gives an overview of the 
checklists considered by the Commission. 
First of all the Commission appears to apply an initial screening test based on the 
number of significant firms and their combined market share.15 Early cases 
suggested that the Commission drew the line at three-to-two mergers. 
Airtours/First Choice was the first case which the Commission prohibited a merger 
that would have left three major firms in the market post-merger.16In the Price 
Waterhouse/Cooperscase the Commission set a tentative upper 
boundofcoordination post-merger at four players: 
From a general viewpoint, collective dominance involving more than three 
orfoursuppliers is unlikely simply because of the complexity of the 
                                         
12
 Case IV/M.190 Nestlé/Perrier, [1992] O.J.L356/1,paragraphs 119-130. 
13
This was the first proposed mergerwhich was prohibited under the Merger Regulation on the 
grounds of collective dominance. Although an appeal was lodged, the General Court (European 
Union)(ex Court of First Instance) eventually upheld the Commission’s decision in its entirety.See 
Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30, paragraph 164. The case came on appeal before 
the General Courtsee Case T-102/96 Gencor v. European Commission [1999] E.C.R. II-753. 
Discussion of this case is available at C Caffarra and J Ysewyn, Two's company, three's a crowd: the 
future of collective dominance after the Kali and Salz judgment, (1998) Volume 19 Issue 7, E.C.L.R., 
pp. 468-472; S Bishop, Power and responsibility: the CJEU's Kali-Salz judgment, (1999) Volume 20 
Issue 1, E.C.L.R., pp. 37-39. 
14
 See Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30,paragraph 158. 
15
 This is according to the structural assumption of oligopoly analysis, namely that the fewer the 
market players, the higher the likelihood of collusion. See note 8 inF Polverino, Assessment of 
Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and Analysis, (2006), SSRN working 
paper, 8,available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901688(Accessed on the 22
nd
September 2013). 
16
European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control,supra note 2, 3. 
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interrelationships involved,and the consequent temptation to deviate; such 
a situation is unstable and untenable inthe long term.17 
To sum up, the Commission does not clarify how few are few.18The indication of 
market structure is taken as the primary consideration in the checklist 
approach.19Nevertheless, there are exceptional conditions where market 
coordination remains unfeasible, notwithstanding a high level of concentration. 
One example is where a merger generates efficiency and creates a ‘maverick’ firm 
with more power than other firms.20 In such a case fewer competitors would 
decrease rather than increase the coordination of the market.21 
The second pro-coordination market characteristic is the homogeneity of products. 
The Commission concludes that it is easier to coordinate price for a single, 
homogeneous product, than for hundreds of prices in a market with many 
differentiated products.22 However, evidence of parallel prices is not conclusive of 
coordination. Intense competition can still lead to similar prices among firms.23 In 
order to ease confusion the European Commission suggests analysing the 
                                         
17
 Case IV/M.1016 Price Waterhouse/Coopers and Lybrand, [1999] O.J. L50/27, paragraph103. The 
Commission cleared the transaction becausethere would be five players remaining in the industry in 
little danger of collective dominance post-merger. 
18
Scholarsobject that the concept of collective dominance does not only imply duopolies. Conversely, 
even the ‘duopoly’ standard has its exceptions. In markets characterised by bidding competition it is 
possible that even two firms are sufficient for effective competition. See CCaffarra and J Ysewyn, 
Two's company, three's a crowd: the future of collective dominance after the Kali and Salz judgment, 
supra note 13, pp. 470-471. 
19
 J B Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the 
Antitrust Laws, (2002) Volume 77 Issue 1, New York University Law Review, 135. 
20
According to Guidelines on Horizontal Mergersa ‘maverick’ firm is a kind of enterprise that can 
prevent or disrupt coordination, ‘for example by failing to follow price increases by its competitors, or 
has characteristics that gives it an incentive to favour different strategic choices than its coordinating 
competitors would prefer’. See paragraph 42, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
21
 See F Polverino, Assessment of Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and 
Analysis,supra note 15,12. 
22
Paragraph 45, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. A homogeneous product is one indication that 
there will be no effective competition between merging parties. See Case No IV/M.308 
Kali+Salz/Mdk/Treuhand, [1994] O.J. L186/38,paragraph57; Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] 
O.J. L11/30, paragraph 138;Case No IV/M.1517 Rhodia/DonauChemie/Albright and Wilson, [1999] 
O.J.C 248/10,paragraph 52. 
23
 G Robert and C Hudson, Past co-ordination and the Commission Notice on the appraisal of 
horizontal mergers,supra note 7,pp.163-168. 
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‘profitability and the response of prices to changing demand and supply conditions’ 
as ways of identifying pre-existing co-ordinated effects’.24 
Thirdly, the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers also suggest that it is easier to 
coordinate on price when demand and supply conditions are relatively stable than 
when they are continuously changing.25In Gencor/Lonrho the Commission noted 
that low price elasticity ‘creates an incentive for anti-competitive parallel 
behaviour, since all suppliers would lose by engaging in price competition’.26Stable 
demand or supplies are conducive to reaching terms of coordination between firms 
and detecting deviation. In a market with fluctuating demand it is hard to tell 
whether sales are lost because the level of demand is reduced or because one 
competitor deviated from the collusion to offer particularly low prices.27 
Fourthly, the Commission places considerable weight on any evidence of 
asymmetry in market shares and cost structures.28Actually, apart from asymmetry 
in cost structure, asymmetry is also reflected in remaining competitors’ capacity 
levels,29 the degree to which the remaining competitors are vertically integrated30 
and in the financial power of remaining competitors’ parent companies. 
Nevertheless, in specific cases the Commission did not consider cost symmetry, 
                                         
24
 In intense competition prices may fluctuate with a change in demand or supply. Nevertheless, in the 
situation of coordination the agreed price may be stable despite a change in demand or supply.Ibid. 
25
Paragraph 45, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. Citing cases COMP/M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue, 
[2002] O.J. L/ 1, point 148; Case IV/M.1298 Kodak/Imation, [1999] O.J.C17/2, point 60. 
26
Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30,paragraph 151. 
27
ICN, Report on Merger Guidelines- Chapter 4 Coordinated Effects Analysis under International 
Merger Regimes, (April 2004), 18, available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc560.pdf (accessed on the 18
th
 April 
2013). 
28
Paragraph 48, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. The effects of similarities of cost structure to 
synergies can be seen in Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30,paragraphs 182-183; 
See also OECD,Oligopoly, Policy Roundtables, October 1999, DAFFE/CLP(99)25, 81; available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/34/1920526.pdf (accessed on the 10
th
July 2013). 
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Case No IV/M.315 Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, [1994] O.J.L102/15,paragraph 64. 
30
 In Airtours/First Choice the vertically integrated nature of the major tour operators particularly 
distinguished them from fringe operators,Case IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice, [2000] O.J. L 93/1.  
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especially when there was other evidence to indicate that coordination was 
unlikely.31 
Fifthly, the Commission indicates that structural links such as cross-shareholding or 
participation in joint ventures may also help in aligning incentives among 
coordinating firms.32Examples of structural links include cross-shareholding, third 
party interest in competing firms, cross-licensing agreements and strategic 
alliances.33Priorto Kali und Salzstructural links were considered a necessary 
condition of coordinated behaviour.34 Since Goncer/Lonrholinks between firms 
have been regarded only as one factor among others that can help encourage 
coordinated behaviour.35In fact the effect of structural linkson coordination effect 
is ambiguous. For example, cross-shareholding may improve the transparency of 
information between major firms. However, structural links also reduce incentives 
for retaliation, which can make coordination unsustainable. This example shows 
that what matters in the evaluation of collective dominance is a causal link 
showing how structural links create an incentive to collude and how this collusion 
is sustained by a possible retaliation mechanism, rather than the presence of 
structural links themselves.36 
                                         
31
In the AKZO Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vetcase there were three strong competitors in the market with 
asymmetric market shares. Therefore the cost of structure was notfurther analysed. SeeCase 
COMP/M.1681AKZO Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, [2000] O.J.C11/07,paragraph 94. 
32
Paragraph 48, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
33
European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control,supra note 2, 41. 
34
The role of structural links between coordinating firms was seen as a necessary condition of raising 
coordination concern in Kali und Salz. In itsjudgment , the Court asserted that the Commission relied 
on special links between ‘Kali und Sals’ and SCPA to ascertain the likelihood of their parallel 
behaviour. However, the Commission had not given sufficient reasons for establishing the links it had 
alleged. Joined Cases C 68/94 and 30/95 France v. European Commission [1998] E.C.R. I-1375, 
paragraphs 227-230. 
35
See Case T-102/96 Gencor v. European Commission [1999] E.C.R. II-753, point 27.See also Case 
IV/M.1016 Price Waterhouse/Coopers and Lybrand, [1999] O.J. L50/27, paragraph 101; Case No 
IV/M.358 Pilkington-Technict/SIV, [1993] O.J. L158/24,paragraph 39.F Polverino, Assessment of 
Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and Analysis,supra note 15, 22. 
36
 See C Olsson, Collective Dominance - Merger Control on Oligopolistic Markets,supra note 10,25. 
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Finally, the Commission suggests that coordination is more likely to exist in 
markets where repeated interaction between firms is frequent,37the reference 
point is transparent38 or the technology is mature.39 
2.1.2 An Evaluation of the ChecklistApproach 
Between 1992 and 2004there was no specific method for assessing coordinated 
behaviour.40 The Commission generally relied too heavily on going through a 
checklist of factors to decide how they would influence the likelihood of 
coordinated behaviour. A checklist can be a helpful guide to the factors that 
should be taken into account. However, the drawbacks of such an approach are 
also obvious.  
Firstly, the outcome is still uncertain in the light of both plus- and minus- market 
characteristicsof tacit collusion. That the ‘pluses’ outweigh the ‘minuses’ in no 
way implies coordinated effects are to be expected. For example, existing firms 
are still unlikely to give rise to coordinated effects if a merger in a market fulfils a 
number of oligopoly-plus factors but is characterised by easy entry or easy 
expansion as well.41Secondly, a checklist approach only offers a static analysis of 
                                         
37
 European Economists note that ‘By setting choice variables such as price, quantity or advertising 
levels in subsequent periods, firms can find out what triggers an aggressive reaction by rivals and 
what is met by corporation. Using this trial-and-error method, firms can arrive at a collusive equilibrium 
without any communication’. See M Ivaldi, the Economics of Tacit Collusion,supra note 2, pp. 19-22; 
European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control,supra note 2, 22. 
38
Paragraph 47, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
39
Paragraph 45, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. It is one consideration of the Commission when 
drawing its conclusions in a case. Even if market concentration is high and there are other facilitating 
factors such as similar cost structures in the market, the Commission will not oppose a merger on the 
grounds of heavy RandD and rapid innovation. For example, in Nestle/Perrier, Kali und Salz and 
Gencor/Lonrhothe maturity of the market was one of several factors inclining the Commission to the 
sameview. See paragraph 126, Case IV/M.190 Nestlé/Perrier,[1992] O. J. L 356/1; paragraph 57, 
Case No IV/M.308 Kali+Salz/Mdk/Treuhand, [1994] O.J. L186/38; Paragraph 152, Case IV/M.619 
Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30. However, in Rhodia/Donau the Commission also found the 
relevant markets to be mature, though, due to other considerations, it concluded that the merger did 
not raise competitive concerns. Case No IV/M.1517 Rhodia/DonauChemie/Albright 
andWilsonRhodia/Donau, [1999] O.J.C248/10, paragraph 52. 
40
 G Robert and C Hudson, Past co-ordination and the Commission Notice on the appraisal of 
horizontal mergers,supra note 7, 166. 
41
 See S Bishop, Power and Responsibility: The ECJ's Kali-Salz Judgment, supra note 13, pp.37-39.S 
Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal and economic consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated 
effects in EC merger control,supra note 4,211. 
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market characteristics. It cannot show how a merger significantly impedes 
effective competition or how coordination is predicted to be sustained post-
merger.42Thirdly, the Commission does not appear to have placed the various 
factors in a clear hierarchy.43It has ample discretion to find support for its 
conclusions. This increases the uncertainty of merger decisions. Fourthly, as 
discussed above, certain factors have an ambiguous effect on the creation or 
sustaining of coordination. The Commission does not state clearly how to treat 
such factors in assessment. All of these factors are contrary to the aim of 
transparency to the public, and also makes the result of coordinated assessment 
unpredictable. 
2.2 Assessment under a Fixed Framework 
Airtours/First Choicerepresents a significant improvementon the checklist 
approach commonly used by the Commission.It established a general framework 
for finding collective dominance.44The General Court finally established three 
cumulative factors in coordination assessment: 
Firstly, the market must be transparent enough to allow for monitoring of the 
other firms’ market conduct. Secondly, coordination must be sustainable, 
which means that the participants must be deterred from defection by fear of 
                                         
42
S Bishop and A Lofaro state that the checklist approach does not address ‘how the merger affects 
the mode of competition other than in the obvious sense of reducing the number of suppliers and 
changing the distribution of market shares’.S Bishop and A Lofaro, ibid.,197. 
43
 Scholars have discussed the possibility and reasonability of attaching a ranking of criteria to the 
assessment of coordinated effect. See Section 2.6 Interaction and Relative Importance of the Market 
Characteristics for Tacit Collusion inEuropean Economics,Study on Assessment Criteria for 
Distinguishing between Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control, supra note 2.  
44
 Case IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice, [2000] O.J. L 93/1. The General Court’s review of this case is 
in Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] E. C. R II-02585. For discussion of the cumulative 
criteria see S Baxter and F Dethmers, Collective dominance under EC merger control - after Airtours 
and the introduction of unilateral effects is there still a future for collective dominance?, (2006) Volume 
27 Issue 3, E.C.L.R., pp. 148-160; M Motta, E.C. merger policy and the Airtours case, (2000) Volume 
21 Issue 4, E.C.L.R., pp. 199-207; K Kühn, Closing Pandora’s Box? Joint Dominance after the 
“Airtours” Judgment, (June, 2002). Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No.02-013, 18, 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349521 (Accessed on the 13
th
 June 2012); A Nikpay and F 
Houwen, Tour de force or a little local turbulence? A heretical view on the Airtours judgment, (2003) 
Volume 24 Issue 5, E.C.L.R., pp. 193-202; V Rabassa and P Christensen, The Airtours decision: is 
there a new Commission approach to collective dominance?, (2001) Volume 22 Issue 6, E.C.L.R., pp. 
227-237. 
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retaliation. Thirdly, the benefits of coordination must not be jeopardised by 
the actions of current or future competitors or by customers.45 
In 2004 an analytical framework for coordinated effect was published in the 
Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers.46 It drew on deliberations in cases such as 
Airtours/First Choice and Gencor/Lonrho.47 According to the analytical framework 
four criteria should be fulfilled if the Commission raises coordinated effects in any 
mergercase.  
2.2.1 Reaching Terms of Coordination 
First of all ‘coordination is more likely to emerge if competitors can easily arrive 
at a common perception as to how the coordination should work.’48 All market 
characteristics mentioned in the checklist approach are conducive to reaching a 
consensus of coordination between remaining firms. However, in order to sustain a 
merger punishment should be available to deter deviation. Punishment is effective 
only when deviation can be detected in time. Therefore a monitoring mechanism is 
necessary. Finally, coordination can be sustained when outsiders have limited 
power to constrain the price increase of coordinated effect. To sum up, when 
assessment is made within an analytical framework the Commission pays more 
attention to how coordination can be operated and sustained in the long term.  
                                         
45
Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] E.C.R II-02585, paragraph 62. 
46
Paragraphs39-57, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
47
In 2002, the Commission’s three prohibition case decisions were reversed by the General Court. 
These three prohibition cases are Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission [2002] E.C.R.-II2585; Case 
T-310/01, Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] E.C.R. II-4071 and Case-T-5/02, Tetra Laval v 
Commission [2002] E.C.R. II-4381. This has occasioned the Commission’s concern with improving 
the certainty of merger assessment on coordinated effect. Another important case in the development 
of coordinated effect assessment in the EU is Sony/BMG. As it was determined in 2004, the same 
year as the EU Merger Regulation was issued, its influence on the establishment of an analytical 
framework might be limited. The contribution of Sony/BMG to merger assessment is mainly analysed 
in the following section ‘2.4.2 The Standard of Proof’ in this chapter. 
48
Paragraph 44, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
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2.2.2 Monitoring Deviations 
Coordinating firms are often tempted to increase their share of the market by 
deviating from the terms of coordination, for instance by lowering prices, offering 
secret discounts, increasing product quality or capacity or trying to win new 
customers. Only the credible threat of timelyand sufficient retaliation prevents 
firms from deviation.49Market transparency is necessary in order to monitor 
whether other firms are deviating, and thus knowwhen to retaliate. Transparency 
in the market is often higher when it has fewer active participants.50 Transparency 
also depends on how market transactions take place in a particular market. 
Transactions taking place by public exchange or at an open auction are more 
transparent than those conducted in confidential negotiation between buyers and 
sellers on a bilateral basis.51If market demand fluctuates, other competitors cannot 
identify whether a competitor lowers its price because it expects the coordinated 
price to fall or because it is deviating.Stable demand conditions, no 
growth/mature market and no demand shocksallow firms more easily to predict 
the reasons for other firms’actions.  
2.2.3 Deterrent Mechanism 
In early cases the Commission embraced an ambiguous attitude toward punishment 
mechanisms. In the assessment of Airtours/First Choice credit retaliation was not 
included inconsideration. In its decision the Commission said: 
The Commission does not consider that it is necessary to show that the 
marketparticipants as a result of the proposed merger would behave as if 
there were acartel, with a tacit rather than explicit cartel agreement [… ]. 
In particular it is notnecessary to show that there would be a strict 
                                         
49
Paragraphs 49-51, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers.Citing Case COMP/M.2389 Shell/DEA, 
[2003]O.J. L15/35, points 112; and Case COMP/M.2533 BP/E.ON, [2002] O.J. L276/31, points 102. 
50
Paragraph 50, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. In Sony/BMG the Commission found the different 
majors’ various ‘campaign discounts’ prevented the parallel price from being monitored. The opacity 
of discount was evidence for clearing the transaction finally.See Case COMP/M.3333 Sony/BMG, 
[2005] O.J. L62/30. 
51
 Note 67, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
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punishment mechanism. Whatmatters for collective dominance in the 
present case is whether the degree ofinterdependence between the 
oligopolists is such that it is rational for theoligopolists to restrict output, 
and in this sense reduce competition in such a waythat a collective 
dominant position is created.52 
 A question arose with regard to the decision, namely how a mechanism of 
collusion can be sustained if firms can benefit from deviation, and do not need to 
bear any loss.53The decision proved controversial and was later successfully 
appealed by Airtours.54A timely retaliation mechanism has become a necessary 
condition ofestablishing coordinated effect. The General Courtshows that 
demonstrating coordinated effect of a merger does not require evidence of actual 
punishment of deviators in the past. Rather, establishing the existence of a 
potential mechanism for deterrence is enough.55In general the more rapid the 
detection and punishment, the greater the incentivesof firms to adhere to tacit 
coordination. Conversely, if detection and punishment are slow, there are greater 
opportunities to cheat.56 The second consideration is the incentive for coordinating 
firms to retaliate. 'A critical condition for coordinated behaviourto be sustainable 
is that the benefits of deviation for each firm in the coordinatinggroup must be 
outweighed by the expected costsresulting from the breakdown of the tacit 
understanding not tocompete vigorously against one another’.57 Thus a weaker 
punishment mechanism may be sufficient if the gains from cheating are limited. 
The third point which should be noted is that retaliation need not take place in the 
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Case IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice, [2000] O.J. L 93/1, paragraph 150. 
53
See COlsson, Collective Dominance - Merger Control on Oligopolistic Markets,supra note 10, 21. 
54
Paragraph 54, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers.Excess capacity is a preconditionof retaliation 
against any cheater.Case paragraph 261, Case COMP/M.1741 MCI WorldCom/Sprint [2003] 
O.J.L300/1. 
55
 See case T-464/04Impala v Commission, [2006] E.C.R. II-2289,paragraphs 463-474. For analysis 
of this case seeG Aigneret al., The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where do 
We Stand after Sony/BMG and Impala, (2006) Volume 2 No. 2, E.C.J, pp.311-336. 
56
 See paragraph 52, the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. Numerous game-theoretic models that 
explore different scenarios of coordination, cheating and enforcementexist in the economics literature. 
SeeE Green and R Porter, Non-cooperative Collusion underImperfect Price Information, (1984) 
Volume 52 No.1, Econometrica, pp. 87-100. 
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S Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal and economic consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated 
effects in EC merger control, supra note 4,200. 
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same market as the deviation, e.g. cancellation of joint ventures or other forms of 
cooperation or selling of shares in jointly owned companies.58 
2.2.4 Reaction of Outsiders 
Even if the internal factors suggest that the firms in the coordinated group are 
able to reach and sustain a coordinated agreement not to compete aggressively, 
collective dominance may still not be possible. Nor should supporters of a 
collective dominance agreement have any market power to increase price above 
their current level if there is sufficient constraint from competitors outside the 
coordinating group in the market. Competitive constraints to coordination have no 
significant differences from competitors’ constraints to single firm dominance in 
the market. Theyincludeease of entry, the ability of fringe competitors to react to 
a post-merger price increase by oligopolistic companies, the extent of supply-side 
substitutability and theability of large buyers to counteract the market power of 
thecoordinating group.59These countervailing factors will be further examined in 
Chapter 5.60 
2.3 Causal Link between the Merger and the 
Coordinated Effects61 
In order to assess how the merger changes the market competition dynamically the 
Commission states that a causal link should exist if as a result of the merger:a) it is 
significantly more likely that firms which did not previously coordinate their 
behaviour would begin to do so; orb) coordination would be easier, more stable or 
                                         
58
Paragraph 55, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
59
 The relationship between unilateral effect and coordinated effect is discussed in S Bishop and A 
Lofaro,A legal and economic consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger 
control,supra note 4,207. 
60
Coordinated effect could be disrupted by the presence of a fringe of smaller firms or by the presence 
of a maverick competitor who does not share the collusive strategies of the large firms.Both factors 
have been considered by the Commission in analysing synergies. See CVC/Danone/Gerresheimer, 
[1999] O.J.C 214/7, paragraph 38; France Telecom/Orange, [2000] O.J.C261/06, paragraph 28. 
61
 A discussion of the causal link can be found in A R Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Premerger 
Constraints and Post-merger Effects, (2003) Volume 12 Issues 1, George Mason Law Review, 65; K 
Kühn, Closing Pandora’s Box? Joint Dominance after the “Airtours” Judgment,supra note 44, 18. 
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more effective for firms which were coordinating prior to the merger.62First of all 
premerger competition is assessed as a reference point from which to compare 
with post-mergercompetition. For example, although a reduction in competitors 
will induce the remaining competitors to reach terms of coordination, too many 
competitors premerger may countervail the concern.63However, as the market 
situation is changing, the Court’s judgment in France v Commissionmakes it clear 
that reliance on evidenceof past behaviour should be limited.64The second step is 
to see the change brought about by merger on market competition, namely why 
the industry did not coordinate premerger but would post-merger, or why 
coordination premerger might occur again in future.65Such point ‘tipping’ from 
competition to coordination is frequently missing from the European Commission’s 
assessment of coordinated effects.66 In this respect the contribution of economic 
theory is also limited.67 
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Paragraphs 22(b) and 39, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
63
 One issue is whether that collusion or parallel conduct was likely before the merger and can 
constitute an argument for blocking a merger. In the 2002 draft Commission Notice on Horizontal 
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Joined Cases C 68/94 and 30/95 France v. European Commission [1998] E.C.R. I-
1375,Paragraph163, 
65
Changes of merger to market competition include merger’s affecting the degree of asymmetry of 
market shares of the various firms;or removal of a maverick firm; or enhancement of the partitioning of 
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See J Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Effects under the Antitrust 
Laws, (2002) Volume 77 Issue1, New York University Law Review, pp. 135-203; K Kühn, Closing 
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Polverino, Assessment of Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and 
Analysis,supra note 15, pp.11-16.  
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S Bishop and A Lofaro,A legal and economic consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated 
effects in EC merger control, supra note 4, 212. 
67
 It could be argued that economic theory has focused more on the mechanism by which 
coordination is sustained rather than the mechanism through which coordination is reached in the first 
place. In economic theorya merger can make coordination more likely by reducing the number of 
competitors, removing a ‘maverick’ firm or narrowing asymmetry.See S Bishop and A Lofaro,ibid,217; 
H Haupt, Collective dominance under Article 82 E.C. and E.C. merger control in the light of the 
Airtours judgment,supra note 2, 435. 
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2.4 The Standard of Proof68 
2.4.1 Reason for Proposing a Standard of Proof 
a. Factors have No Clear Hierarchy 
As the market characteristics for tacit collusion are numerous one possible issue is 
whether it is necessary and possible to put the factors in order.Such sorting makes 
the process of assessing a merger more transparent if published. It also saves the 
antitrust authority time since the coordination effect does not need to be 
considered if the most relevant factors are absent.69 The Commission does not 
publish the flowchartit uses in assessing different factors.70 The difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of ranking factors is generally recognised and agreed.71However, in a 
final report some suggestions are still given.72It is found that a high market 
concentration and barriers to entry are prerequisitesto a tacit collusion 
mechanism’s feasibility; product homogeneity, market transparency and a mature 
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 P Szilagyi, The CJEU has spoken: where do we stand with the Commission’s Cases, (2008) 
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Volume1 No.1, Competition Policy International, pp. 123-125. 
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European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control,supra note 2,42. 
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 Point 62 in B Alonson, European Study Conference, Oligopolistic Dominance, Is there a Common 
Approach in Different Jurisdictions? A Review of Decisions Adopted by the Commission under the 
Merger Regulation, Brussels 18/11/1995, available at: 
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market are very important factors which can result in a high probability of 
collusion.73If the above factors are fulfilled, the antitrust authority needs only to 
check if there is any countervailing effect like buyer power or maverick firm. If 
products are heterogeneous and the market is not transparent, the antitrust 
authority should ask if there is another form of coordination than price. The most 
complicated condition is that some but not all necessary conditions for coordinated 
effects are fulfilled in a merger case. The antitrust authority can only go back to 
the checklist approach and balancing the pros and cons factors carefully.74From a 
practical standpoint the Commission is advised to place greater weight on factors 
which have a clearer influence on the likelihood of collusion, such as market 
structure, rather than some behavioural indications, like multi-market contacts.75 
2. Factors have an Ambiguous Effect 
Some market characteristics such as excess capacity and cross-shareholding can 
have both positive and negative effects on coordination.76 Explaining the same 
factor from a different angle may lead to a different outcome. Therefore a 
conclusion of coordination can be easily criticised or even overturned by the Court. 
In order to ensure transparency and certainty the Court proposes the evidential 
threshold that the Commission must satisfy before it can prohibit a transaction.77 
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There is still a view that the homogeneity of the suppliers cannot be accounted a strict requirement, 
unless the heterogeneity is likely to lead to different interests and strategies among remaining firms. 
See B Alonson,Is there a Common Approach in Different Jurisdictions? A Review of Decisions 
Adopted by the Commission under the Merger Regulation,supra note 70. 
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Ibid, 42.Section 3 inOECD,Oligopoly,supra note 28, 266. 
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European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and 
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2.4.2 Reviewing the Establishment of the Standard of Proof 
In 2002 the EU General Court annulled three consecutive merger decisions, which 
raised an interesting debate among practitioners and academics as to the standard 
of proof that the Commission must meet in order to prohibit concentrations under 
the EU Merger Regulation.78 Through judicial review of Sony/BMG, the Courts 
finally set the standard of proof for the Commission.79 
Firstly, the Commission should have the symmetric assessment on likely or unlikely 
coordinated effects. In Impala v Commissionthe Commission declared it must  
‘either prove to the required standard that post-merger coordinated effects occur 
or it must prove to the same standard that post-merger coordinated effects do not 
occur’.80Under the requirement of the symmetric assessment there might be a 
‘grey area’ where neither merger-specific anticompetitive effects nor their 
absence can be proved sufficiently.81Case decisions in ‘grey areas’not only damage 
predictability but also give parties more space to overturn the decision in appeal 
proceedings.82 
Secondly, the Commission should distinguishbetween the ex post analysis of past 
coordination and the forward-looking assessment of the possibility of post-merger 
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The reasoning was claimedto have‘manifest errors’. See supra note 47.  
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 See Case No COMP/M.3333 Sony/BMG [2005] O.J. L62/30.The Appeal on this decision is Case T-
464/04 Impala v Commission, [2006] E.C.R. II-2289.In the US the FTC had also unconditionally 
approved the transaction. See FTC Press Release: FTC Closes Investigation of Joint Venture 
Between Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America, (July 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/sonybmg.htm (accessed on the 25
th
 October 2012).  
80
Case T-464/04 Impala v Commission, [2006] E.C.R. II-2289, paragraph 290; see also M F Bay and 
J R Calzado, Tetra Laval II: the Coming of Age of the Judicial Review of Merger Decisions, (2005) 
Volume 28 Issue 4, World Competition, pp. 433-453. 
81
See K Wright, Perfect symmetry? Impala v Commission and standard of proof in mergers, (2007) 
Volume 32 Issue3, European Law Review, pp. 408-418. 
82
If so, in the EU a problem remains: there should be an optimal balance between the effective judicial 
protection of the rights of all the parties affected by merger and the merging parties’ need for legal 
certainty. This problem will not be further discussed in the thesisas there is currently no effective 
judicial review of merger decision in China. Discussion of this issue can found inRBrandeburger and 
TJanssens,European Merger Control: Do the Checks and Balances Need to Be Re-set?, [2001] 
Fordham Corp Law Institute, 177; LPrete and A Nucara, Standard of Proof and Scope of Judicial 
Review in EC Merger Cases: Everything Clear after Tetra Laval?, E.C. L.R., Volume 26 Issue 12, 
2005, pp. 692-704; A Christiansen and WKerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated 
Rules Instead of 'Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason', (2006) Volume 2 Issue 2, Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics, pp 215-244. 
146 
Chapter 4 Horizontal Mergers—Coordinated Effects 
 
 
coordinated behaviour.83The historical evidence concerning the assessment of 
coordinated effects includes the coordination record before,84cartel record 
beforeand the movement evidence of effective competition.85 The issue is 
howappropriate it is to compare the market over time or across geographical areas. 
In Sony/BMG the Commission paid great attention to proving that there was no 
collective dominant position before the concentration.86 Nevertheless, the General 
Courtdemanded a much more detailed analysis of the probable effects of the 
change in market and firm characteristics caused by the merger.87 Finally, the 
clearance decision of the Commission was annulled by the General Court because 
of ‘manifest errors of assessment’. To use evidence of past coordination the 
Commission should state clearlythat the relevant market characteristics have not 
changed appreciably or are not likely to doso in the near future.88However, past 
coordination may be either express or tacit, depending on different market 
situations.89 One weakness of the EU is that it fails to illustrate the distinct 
treatment to the two kinds of past coordination. 
                                         
83
 G Robert and C Hudson, Past co-ordination and the Commission Notice on the appraisal of 
horizontal mergers,supra note 7, 167. 
84
 See Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. L11/30,paragraphs168-172;Case No IV/M.308 
Kali+Salz/Mdk/Treuhand, [1994] O.J. L186/38,paragraph 57. 
85
 In AKZO Nobel the Commission established that in some of the affected markets the fluctuation in 
market shares was evidence of competition, and concerns at coordinated behaviour were 
unwarranted. Case COMP/M.1681AKZO Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, [2000] O.J.C11/07. 
86
Case COMP/M.3333, Sony/BMG [2005] O.J. L62/30. 
87
In respect of forward orientated analysis the Commission’s examination was considered ‘extremely 
succinct’and was so superficial that it couldnot satisfy the Commission’s obligation to carry out a 
prospective analysis. SeeCase T-464/04 Impala v Commission, 2006, E.C.R. II-2289,paragraph 
525.Appeal case before the ECJ wasC-413/06 P,Bertelsmann AG v. Impala, 2008, E.C.R. I-04951. 
88
Paragraph 43, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers.Evidence of coordinated effects premerger 
includes similarities in price movements, evidence of suppliers’ ability to increase prices, of retaliation 
and so on. For an approach to collecting evidence seeS Bishop and ALofaro, A legal and economic 
consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger control,supra note 4, pp. 
195-242;International Competition Network, InvestigativeTechniques Handbookfor Merger Review, 
(June 2005), available at:http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc322.pdf 
(accessed on the 9
th
 June 2012). 
89
 For past cartel scholars refer to the finding of the US authorities that the cartels are more prone to 
happen in markets with low concentration which is in contrast to the operation of tacit coordination. 
Therefore notifying parties are recommended to use the ways of operating cartel to prove the 
impossibility of tacit collusion post-merger. See G Robert and C Hudson, Past co-ordination and the 
Commission Notice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers,supra note 7, 168. 
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In order to meet the standard of proof, mergerassessment is moving towards to a 
more economic approach.90 A detailed economic analysis was undertaken by the 
Commission in Sony/BMG, whichcan rightfully be called one of the largest and 
most complex econometric analyses conducted thus far in the context of EU 
merger control.91The new EU Merger Regulation in 2004 clearly recognised the 
need for a sound economic framework.The Commissionappointed a chief economist 
and an accompanying team of economists to advance the use of economics in the 
Commission’s decision-making.92However, the standard of ‘cogent evidence’ is 
hard to reach at the current stage.93Scholars conclude that there are no market 
share thresholds that can be applied and there is no presumption of competitive 
harm, even if a merger reduces the number of players from three to two.94Indeed, 
unlike unilateral effects, no economic theory can predict that a horizontal merger 
would tend to result in a price increase based on coordinated effects. Likewise, 
economists have not (yet) been able to develop refined econometric techniques 
for the assessment of collective dominance cases.95 AlthoughSony/BMG indicates 
the increased importance of economic analysis, it raises the question of whether 
the requirement of a quantitative test willundermine the efficiency of the 
                                         
90
 For discussion of a more economic approach to EU merger control see: A Christiansen, the Reform 
of EU Merger Control - Fundamental Reversal or Mere Refinement?, (2006), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=898845; A Christiansen, The ‘More Economic Approach’ in EU Merger 
Control, CESifo Forum, 7 (1), Spring 2006, pp.4-39, available at:http://www.cesifo-
group.de/link/forum1-06-focus6.pdf(the above two articles were accessed on the 25
th
 October 2012). 
See also YBotteman, Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, (2006) Volume 2 Issue1, pp.71-100.   
91
 See Mergers: Commission confirms approval of recorded music joint venture between Sony and 
Bertelsmann after re-assessment subsequent to Court decision, (3
rd
 October 2007), Commission 
Press Release IP/07/1437. 
92
 See A Christiansen, the Reform of EU Merger Control - Fundamental Reversal or Mere 
Refinement?,supra note 90, pp.123-125.  
93
For example, the General Court criticised one of the Commission’s points as not being supported by 
a ‘sufficiently cogent and consistent body of evidence’. See Case C-68/94France v Commission of the 
European Communities [1998] E.C.R. I-1375. However, the criterion of ‘cogent evidence’ has not 
been explained by the court to date. 
94
See Point 1 in ‘2.1.2An Evaluation of the Checklist Approach’. 
95
 For discussion of the economic techniques of coordinating assessment seeP Sabbatini, How to 
simulate the coordinated effect of a merger, (2006)Volume 12,AutoritàGarantedellaConcorrenza e del 
Mercato, Temi e Problemi,Available at: http://www.agcm.it/temieproblemi.htm (accessed on the 23
rd
 
September 2013); W JKolasky, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to 
Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, (April 2002), available 
at:http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/n_america/USA/11050.pdf (accessed on the 23
rd
 
September 2013). 
148 
Chapter 4 Horizontal Mergers—Coordinated Effects 
 
 
Commission’s merger control and increase legal uncertainty.96Because coordinated 
effect is hard to predict and prove, the Commission's ability and incentive to apply 
collective dominance in merger cases has been much reduced in the past few years, 
resulting in fewer cases in which such a theory was seriously or successfully 
pursued.97 Some find that the standard of proof in the EU makes ‘the Commission’s 
decisions more economically sound’.98However, another view regards the 
symmetric assessment as too conservative and likely to result in the undue 
clearance of mergers which eventually prove harmful to competition.99 
To sum up, in order to reflect the coordinated effect of a merger on market 
competition, a number of improvements have been adopted. These are made 
through ‘gradual refinement on the conceptual level coupled with an increasing 
standard for finding of coordinated effects in a particular case and economic 
approach’.100The first improvement was atransition from the checklist approach to 
use of an analytical frameworkto assess coordinated effects. This avoids the 
uncertaintythat the number of market characteristicsfavouring coordination 
outweigh those against, while coordinated effects still do not appear; The second 
improvement was to add the dynamic analysis of causal link between merger and 
coordinated effect. This prevents the error of the Commission’s only focusing on 
the static market situation before or after merger. A false negative error would 
result if the Commission’s decision depends on the pre-merger situation, while 
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 For brief analyses of this case see F Dethmers, Collective Dominance under EC Merger Control – 
After Airtours and the Introduction of Unilateral Effects is there still a Future for Collective 
Dominance?, supra note 44, pp.638-649; F Polverino,Assessment of Coordinated Effects in Merger 
Control: between Presumption and Analysis, supra note 15. PEerl, following an in-depth Investigation 
the Commission approved the Creation of the Sony/BMG Music Recording Joint Venture,19 July 
2004, No. 3, Competition Policy Newsletter, pp.7-10; V R Ben and P Caroline, Is the standard of proof 
imposed by the Community Courts undermining the efficiency of EC merger control? The SONY/BMG 
joint venture case in perspective, (May, 2007), EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 
available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/8013/1/rompuy-b-02g.pdf(accessed on the 25
th
 October 2012). 
97
AWeitbrecht, EU Merger Control in 2005–An Overview, (2006) Volume 27 Issue 2, E.C.L.R., pp 43-
50. 
98
E V Liberis, Impala V. Commission: Changing the Tune of European Competition Law, (2008) 
Volume 83 Issue 3, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1521 
99
F Polverino, Assessment of Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and 
Analysis, supra note 15, 1. 
100
 See G Aigneret al., The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We 
Stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?,supra note 55, pp. 3-9. See III.3 in F Polverino, Assessment of 
Coordinated Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and Analysis, supra note 15, pp.36-38. 
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coordination is less likely post-merger. A false positive error would result if the 
Commission makes a decision depending on market characteristics post-merger 
which have existed in the market prior to the merger. The merger does not 
significantly change the market situation. The third improvement wasincreasing 
the standard of proof to the ‘most-likely’ and ‘symmetric’ level.101 This reduces 
the chance of the merger decision’s being overturned by the Court.  
Nevertheless, certain weaknesses in merger assessment still exist. Some 
weaknesses seem unavoidable within the current economic theory, such as that no 
theory provides guidance as to the situation in which coordination would definitely 
happen in future. The Commission still has the discretion to make case decisions 
depending on unpredicted market factors and economic theory. Merging parties 
have no possibility to disprove the Commission’s claims. Secondly, the point of 
transition from competition to coordination still cannot be proved by any 
qualitative or quantitative test. The Commission has space to predict when this 
transition could happen.Thirdly, a high standard of proof leaves a ‘grey area’ in 
which evidence is not sufficient to prove a decision of clearance or prohibition. In 
such situations the outcome is unpredictable. 
3 Assessment of Coordinated Effects in China’s 
Merger Control 
This section will briefly examine the assessment of coordinated effects under 
China’s merger control regime. The purpose is to see whether coordinated effects 
are evaluated properly, and whether the reasoning process of merger review is 
made transparent to the public. 
                                         
101
 According to the ‘symmetric’ requirement, if the coordinated effects will be created post merger, 
the MOFCOM should prove the probability is more than 51% ,although the precise percentage is 
impossible to estimate as there is uncertainty about future facts and the rigorous time-limit; on the 
other hand, if the coordinated effect will be strengthened post-merger, the MOFCOM should prove the 
existence of coordination prior to the merger. 
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3.1 Checklist Period in China 
According to the Interim Rules, when there are only a few business operators in 
the relevant market to which the concentration belongs the MOFCOM should 
investigate whether transactions will create or increase the ability, incentive and 
likelihood of business operators to eliminate or restrict competition in 
cooperation.102 However, the MOFCOM does not clarify how to analyse the ‘ability’, 
‘incentive’ and ‘likelihood’ in investigation. The assessment of coordinated effect 
in China is analysed in line with the checklists approachin the EU. 
First of all the MOFCOM realises that fewer competitors may lead firms to reach a 
common understanding on the terms of coordination. However, the MOFCOM does 
not clarify the upper-bound of remaining competitors which is likely to reach terms 
of coordination post-merger. BeforeSeagate/Samsung, the MOFCOM raised 
coordinated effects in a duopolypost-merger.103This is similar to the circumstances 
of the EU before 1997. In Seagate/Samsungfour remaining competitors post-merger 
was also considered to reach terms of coordination.104 Secondly, the MOFCOM also 
recognises that parallel behaviour is more likely to take place among competitors 
producing homogeneousproducts who can easily acquire knowledge of each other’s 
technical skills, costs, output and sale conditions.105Thirdly, structural links 
between remaining firms are also considered by the MOFCOM in reaching terms of 
coordination post-merger. Examples of structural links includesales and 
distribution agreements between merging parties and their rivals.106The MOFCOM 
                                         
102
 Paragraph 2, Article 4, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement 
No. 55 of 29
th
August 2011, Interim Rules on Evaluating Competitive Effects of Concentration of 
Business Operators (hereinafter ‘Interim Rules’), available in appendix.  
103
 In Novartis/Alcon the MOFCOM was anxious about the coordinated effect between a subsidiary 
company of the merged entity and Haichang Company post-merger. In Uralkali/Silvinit concern was 
raised at thecoordinated effect on the merged entity and the world’s largest potassium chloride 
supplier; in Savio/Penelope, such concern was at collusion  between a subsidiary company of merged 
entity and Ulster Company. Case Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53 Novartis / 
Alcon;AnnouncementMOFCOM [2011] No.33Uralkali / Silvinit; Announcement MOFCOM [2011] 
No.73Savio / Penelope. 
104
Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
105
 Section 2-2)-point 2, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
106
Novartis/Alcon decision is the first case in which MOFCOM has imposed conditions to address 
'coordinated effects' in the market of contactlens care products. As shown by investigation, Shanghai 
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does not consider structural links to be a necessary condition of coordinated 
behaviour.107 This is also current practice in the EU.108 
The above three factors are all market characteristics that the MOFCOM has 
assessed in considering coordinated effect. Compared with its EU counterpart, this 
checklist is incomplete. There are a number of factors which the MOFCOM does not 
consider, like the demand and supply conditions of coordinating firms, the extent 
of symmetry between coordinating firms, and the influence of innovation on 
coordination. Neglect of these factors might make the decision of coordination 
unreliable. In Seagate/Samsung the MOFCOM did not consider theheterogeneityof 
leading firms’ products,asymmetrical market shares among major competitors 
andthe countervailing effect of innovation.This resulted in the MOFCOM’s 
overestimating the acquired firm’s-Samsung role in market competition, and 
imposing sharp commitments on clearance.109Conversely, the European Commission 
found that ‘it is apparent that it is unlikely that the proposed transactionwill 
                                                                                                                               
Shikang Trading Co., Ltd (Shanghai Shikang), a whollyowned subsidiary of Novartis, signed a Sales 
and Distribution Agreement with Haichang in 2008,which made Haichang the sole distributor of 
Shanghai Shikang in the territory of China.ShanghaiShikang and Haichang have set up a strategic 
affiliated partnership.The regulator might have been concerned that the link between the new 
Novartis/Alcon entity and Haichang (through the distribution agreement) would align their behavior in 
the marketplace. Therefore, within 12 months of the effective date of the MOFCOM review decision, 
Novartis was required to terminate the Sales and Distribution Agreement between Shanghai Shikang 
and Haichang.Section six-2), Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53Novartis/Alcon. 
107
 There are no structural links between or among coordinating firms in the case Savio/Penelopeor 
orSeagate/Samsung.Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73Savio/Penelope; Announcement 
MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
108
See suprapoint 5 in ‘2.1.1General Checklists’. Seealso Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho, [1997] O.J. 
L11/30,paragraphs 104-105. 
109
The MOFCOM asserted that a merger would lead to the loss of an important competitor (Samsung). 
It evaluated the important role of Samsung in the hard disk market on two criteria, ability to sustain the 
purchase model and maintain innovation. The MOFCOM found that large computer manufacturers 
generally adopt a confidential bidding process to conduct seasonal bilateral negotiations with HDD 
manufacturers. Investigation reveals that, to ensure security of supply, computer manufacturers will 
purchase from two to four HDD manufacturers in light of factors such as price (the most competitive 
bidder receiving the largest order, the second a smaller order, and the others maybe not receiving any 
order). Although four main competitors after merger are enough to sustain the purchase model, the 
MOFCOM was still concerned that the loss of Samsung would increase the possibilities of the rest of 
competitors’ getting orders at the same time. Therefore the pressure of competition coming from the 
purchase model will be reduced. Given the lower pressure of competition the MOFCOM further 
emphasised that competitors would have less motive to conduct innovation. In addition, as the HHD 
market is transparent, the MOFCOM speculated that HHD producers hadthe ability to supervise each 
other’s actions. Therefore the transaction would increase the likelihood of tacit collusion among 
competitors post-merger. Eventually, because of both coordinated effect and unilateral effect, the 
merger was cleared withsignificant remedies. Paragraph 3, point 2, section 2, Announcement 
MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
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increase the ability of the remaining HDD suppliers to reach terms ofcoordination’, 
which is directly at odds with the MOFCOM's conclusion above.110The Commission 
indicated that a reduction to four HDD manufacturers post-merger would not 
necessarily imply a merger-specific risk of coordination in those markets.111The 
factors include the following: 1.The Commission did not find evidence of successful 
coordination in the relevant markets such as 3.5" Desktop, in which only four HDD 
suppliers are currently competing with each other;1122. Samsung, as the acquired 
party, wasneither a particularly strong innovative force nor a particularly strong 
competitor.Therefore Samsung is unlikely uniquely to have constrained suppliers' 
ability tocoordinate or sustain coordination premerger in these markets. The effect 
ofSamsung's removal is therefore likely to be limited with regard to 
coordinatedeffects;113 3. Due to the asymmetry of market share both pre and 
postmerger, there would be a lack ofincentive for HGST to participate in any 
coordination.114The internal documents of HGST also showed that it had the 
incentive to expand sales and increase its share from[10-20]*% in 3.5" Desktop HDD 
after the proposed transaction.Finally, the same transaction was cleared outright 
in the EU. 
In conclusion, checklists for analysing coordination effect in China are incomplete. 
A number of necessary factors have not been considered in published case 
decisions. No rules further clarify whether those neglected factors should be taken 
into consideration. This leaves the public uncertain about the outcome of 
coordination effect, as they remain unsure what kind of factors will be considered 
by the MOFCOM in the final decision. Market transparency for monitoring 
                                         
110
Case COMP/M.6214Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 
165/3, paragraph 554, 
111
 The Commission did not find evidence of successful coordination in relevant markets such as 3.5” 
Desktop, in which only four HDD suppliers are currently competing . 
112
Previous evidence in a market might give useful insights into the likely future behaviour of the 
oligopoly as well as into the motives for the merger. This is true in markets where there have been 
structural links or which have a long-standing history of cartel behaviour. However, such elements are 
of course not sufficient to block a merger. See OECD, Oligopoly,supra note 28, 220. 
113
 Case COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. 
C 165/3, paragraph 550, 
114
 The Commission finds that in the 3.5" Desktop HDD market, the combined entity has [50-60]*% of 
sales, WD [30-40]*%, and HGST accounting for [10-20]*% of sales. Therefore there would be a clear 
lack of incentive for HGST to participate in any coordination. See case COMP/M.6214Seagate 
Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3, paragraph 551. 
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deviations is not a necessary step to creating or strengthening coordinated effect 
in China. By October 2012 the MOFCOM has only considered the transparency of 
product market which facilitatesmonitoring deviations in two cases, 
namelySeagate/Samsungand Western Digital/Hitachi.115TheMOFCOM states that 
transaction increases the probability of HDDs manufacturers’ coordinating their 
behaviour.Because of the relative transparency of the HDD market HDD 
manufacturers can predict the behaviour of their rivals.116 
Nor does the MOFCOM consider sufficient retaliation to be a necessary condition of 
keeping coordinating firms from deviating. Thusbefore July 2013 no published 
decision mentions whether past deviators have been punished or whether there is 
a possible mechanism for deterrence among coordinating firms. 
The third issue of assessment of coordinated effects is the reaction of 
outsiders.The MOFCOM is only concerned with the effects of entry on expected 
coordination. For instance, in Uralkaili/Silvinitthe MOFCOM considered entry 
barriers, in particularthe time and capital required to enter into or expand 
operations.The MOFCOM concluded that the entry barriers in the relevant market 
were relatively high.117 Apart from potential entry, the actions of non-coordinating 
firms as well as countervailing buyer power of customers are all able to jeopardise 
the outcome expected from coordination.118 
                                         
115
Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung; Announcement MOFCOM [2012] 
No.09 Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. 
116
 The MOFCOM found that the number of hard disk (HHD) manufacturers and major buyers wasfew 
and HHD products were homogeneous. Information on the technology, cost, production and sales of 
HHDs weretransparent to rivals. Given this information manufacturers were able to predict each 
other’s product price and price range. In addition, hard drive manufacturers could easily gain 
knowledge of other producers’ product information through sharing distribution channels. Section 2-
(2), point 3, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung. 
117
Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.09 Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. 
118
 Countervailing factors will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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3.2 Causal Link between Merger and Coordinated 
Effects 
The MOFCOM is ambiguous in its explanation of the causal link between a merger 
and its coordinated effects. It is common for finaldecisions not to explain how the 
collusive mechanism operatesor why collusion is significantly more likely post-
merger. For example, in Uralkali/Silvinit,119the MOFCOM found that the merger 
would create the second-largest potassium chloride supplier in the world, with a 
market share exceeding one third of the global market. In particular the MOFCOM 
found that the merger would increase the merging parties’ market power by 
creating a large leading supplier of potassium chloride. Furthermore, following the 
merger, the merged company and the market leader would constitute 70% of the 
global market,which would raise the prospect of coordination between major 
potassium chloride suppliers in China. Both unilateral and coordinated effects 
theories of harm underlay the decision. About the concern of coordinated effects 
the MOFCOM did not explain thepremergersituation, nor why collusion was 
significantly more likely post-merger, or how the collusive mechanism would 
operate after merger, or how deviation from the tacit collusion might be 
monitored and punished.120While few antitrust analysts would question the 
correctness of the MOFCOM’sexploring these concerns during its review process, 
the decision was mainly criticised for providing little evidence of intensive 
investigation of the issue.121 This decision suggests that the mere likelihood (or risk) 
                                         
119
Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.33 Uralkali/Silvinit. 
120
 See Clifford Chance, Horizontal mergers in the China context: The Uralkali/Silvinit potash merger 
and continuity of supply obligations,(August 2011), available at: 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/08/horizontal_mergersinthechinaco
ntextth.html (accessed on the 30
th
October 2012). 
121
In order to exclude anti-competitive concerns the Commission requires the merged entity to 
continue the status quo regarding supply and price-setting mechanisms applicable to Chinese buyers. 
There is still criticism of these behavioral commitments. The MOFCOM is blamed for not predicting 
the future changes in the market. Maintaining the status quois impossible and hard to monitor. See 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, MOFCOM conditionally clears Uralkali’s acquisition of Silvinit, 
(6
th
 June 2011), available at:  http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cda5cf6b-ce31-4d12-
99c2-1751d88c0506 (accessed on the 31
st
 October 2012); Clifford Chance, Horizontal mergers in the 
China context: The Uralkali/Silvinit potash merger and continuity of supply obligations, (August 2011), 
available at: 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/08/horizontal_mergersinthechinaco
ntextth.html (accessed on the 31
st
 October 2012); N.H. F. Chang, H Hai and G O’Brien, China: 
Antimonopoly Law, (2012), The Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review 2012, available at: 
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of coordination in an oligopolistic market may be enough to raise coordinated 
effects concerns. It also suggests that a market with few suppliers having very high 
market shares andhigh barriers to market entry may be enough to trigger concerns. 
A false negative error might result if the MOFCOM identified coordinated effects 
depending on high market shares of coordinating firms in the market exclusively. If 
the members of coordination have varied market shares, they are unwilling to 
reach the term of coordination. In addition, even if market concentration indicates 
that coordination is likely, the power of non-coordinating firms in the market 
might possiblycountervail the price increase of the collusion.122 The mechanism of 
operation in tacit collusion and constraints from fringe competitors has again been 
neglected by the MOFCOM. 
In Savio/Penelope the acquiring party, Penelope, was a special purpose vehicle set 
up specifically for this transaction.123 Penelope was wholly owned by Alpha Private 
Equity Fund V (Alpha V), a private equity fund. It was also the largest shareholder, 
with 27.9% equity stake in Uster Technologies CO. Ltd.(Uster). The target of the 
acquisition was Savio. Loepfe Brother Ltd. (Loepfe), which was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Savio. During the investigation the MOFCOM found that Uster and 
Leopfewere the only two manufacturers of electronic yarn clearers for automatic 
winders in the world. After the concentration Uster and Loepfewere likely to 
coordinate their business activities through Alpha V to restrict or eliminate 
competition in the market for electronic yarn clearers for automatic winders. At 
the same time Alpha V was also likely to engage in activities restricting or 
                                                                                                                               
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/42/sections/146/chapters/1643/china-antimonopoly-
law/ (accessed on the 31
st
 October 2012); Mayer Brown, China Imposes Conditions on Uralkali/Silvinit 
Merger after Anti-monopoly Review, (June 2011), available at: 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/China-Imposes-Conditions-on-UralkaliSilvinit-Merger-after-
Anti-monopoly-Review-06-08-2011/ (accessed on the 31
st
 October 2012). 
122
In Airtours/First Choice the Commission found that the market structure was characterised by four 
large operators integrated with upstream and downstream enterprises, plus numerous small, largely 
non-integrated independent operators and agents. Therefore the Commission believed that even 
without the merger the fringe small firms were not able to constrain the four large ones effectively. 
This argument was resisted by the General Court. It stated that ‘the small operators can increase 
capacity in order to take advantage of general under-supply brought about by the large tours 
operators’. In the meantime, ‘market entry is likely to allow potential competitors to gain access into 
the market’. Therefore, even without middle-size enterprises, a number of small competitors and 
potential entry can also countervail price increase of coordinating firms. See case T-342/99 Airtours v 
Commission [2002] E. C. R II-02585, paragraphs 261 and 269. 
123
The first case published by the MOFCOM where a private equity house is involved. 
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eliminating competition by way of its control and influence over Ulster and Leopfe. 
The difficulty with this question herewas how Alpha V controlled Ulster, which only 
held 27.9% of the shares in Ulster. The MOFCOM onlydescribes its scope of analysis 
in shareholding structure, voting mechanism and attendance records at 
shareholders’ meetings, board composition and board voting mechanism. However, 
it is not clear whether control over a de facto majority of votes is required in the 
general assembly and/or board of directors, or what other level indicated ‘control’ 
or ‘influence’. As a result market players did not have clear benchmarks for the 
assessment of their minority investments under the AML’s merger control rules.124In 
Novartis/Alcon the notice simply states that the agreement between No.1 and 
No.2 competitors in the market may lead them to coordination on pricing, sales 
volumes and sales regions. Competition in the market will be eliminated or 
restricted by the coordination. However, the issue is that the MOFCOM neither 
clarifies how exactly coordination works in practice, norindicates the likelihood 
and actual market impact of such coordination.125 
3.3 Requirement of the Standard of Proof 
In Savio/Penelope, when identifying the likelihood of coordination between the 
merged entity and the third party, the MOFCOM ascertained that it could not rule 
out the possibility ofAlpha V’s participating in or influencing the operations 
ofUster.126Therefore the merger transaction was considered to raise coordination 
concerns and Alpha V was asked to transfer its shares in Uster to an 
                                         
124
Indeed, the antitrust laws of both the EU and the US, for example, acknowledge that minority 
investments in competitors can, in certain circumstances, have anti-competitive effects. However, in 
the US and the EU the availability of public decisions by courts and authorities give market players 
some specific guidance on the legal benchmarks for this type of investments. In China, by contrast, 
while the Alpha V/Saviodecisionrepeats the principle that minority shareholdings in competitors can 
be problematic, it does not provide any details of how exactly coordination between Ulster and Loepfe 
would work in practice. See AEmch et al., MOFCOM Imposes Divestiture Obligation in Its Approval of 
Private Equity Transaction, (November 2011), Hogan Lovells News and Publications, available at: 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/mofcom-imposes-divestiture-obligation-in-its-approval-of-private-equity-
transaction-11-07-2011/(accessed on the 30
th
 October 2012). 
125
 Mayer Brown, Unusual Remedies a Feature of MOFCOM’s 6th Conditional Clearance Decision, 
(August 2012), available at:  http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/967c3a04-6e4d-4fe6-87c6-
070dba6dd979/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d95d82d9-1a83-44bd-9572-
1a2eff821564/Unusual-Mofcom.pdf (accessed on the 30
th
 October 2012). 
126
 The relationship between Alpha V and merging parties can be seen in the case study in ‘3.2 
Causal Link between the Merger and the Coordinated Effects’ in this chapter. 
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independentthird party within six months of the date of the MOFCOM’s decision.127 
The conclusion that ‘the possibility of control could not be excluded’ indicates a 
very low threshold and effectively places the burden of proof on the merging 
parties.128In Seagate/Samsung the MOFCOM only stated that the transaction 
increased the likelihood of firms’eliminating or restricting competition corporately 
post-merger.However, it did not statewhether there was coordination prior to the 
merger. In either condition the chance of coordination after transaction may not 
be greater than 50 percent or to ‘most likely’level.This standard of proof is 
significantly lower than the requirement of the EU. 
In the EU only if the Commission has evidence of coordination prior to the merger 
are the notifying parties responsible for proving that merger makes coordination 
less likely to happen post-merger.129However, in China, once a coordination 
concern is raised by the MOFCOM even without sufficient evidence, merging parties 
still need to prove that it is unlikely.The disparity raises a problem, namely that 
the burden of proof borne by the merging party is too heavy. 
In conclusion, where the competition authority in the EU has shown some 
reluctance to invoke coordinated effects in recent years,the MOFCOM continues to 
demonstrateample discretion when it comes to remedies.130Both the enforcement 
authorities in the EU and China have certain discretion in assessing coordinated 
effects. For example, collective dominance is not limited in the number of two 
enterprises after merger. Structural links between coordinating firms is not a 
necessary condition of finding tacit collusion. However, the MOFCOM enjoys more 
flexibility in assessing coordinated effect than the EU.There is no analytical 
framework in evaluating the anti-competitive coordinated effect; each decision is 
made according to different facts listed by the MOFCOM.The MOFCOM does not 
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Section 4, point 1, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio / Penelope. 
128
Linklaters, MOFCOM's Conditional Approval for Penelope's Acquisition of Savio, (November 2011), 
available at: http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/AsiaNews/LinkstoChina/Pages/MOFCOM-
Conditional-Approval-Penelopes-Acquisition-Savio.aspx (accessed on the 30
th
 October 2012). 
129
See ‘2.3 Causal Link between the Merger and the Coordinated Effects’ in the chapter. 
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 This point is also raised in Linklaters, MOFCOM conditionally approves Novartis/Alcon, (20
th
 
August 2012), available at: 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/AsiaNews/HongKongCorporateUpdate/Pages/MOFCOM_Cond
itionally_Approves_Novartis_Alcon.aspx (accessed on the 30
th
 October 2012).  
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takethe deterrent mechanisms as a necessary condition ofsuccessful coordination. 
The standard of proof for coordinated effect is lower than the ‘most likely’ 
criterion in the EU. All of this discretion means the merging parties andthe public 
are unsure about the results of notified transactions. In fact the MOFCOM may 
notbe sure the coordination effect will occur after a merger.Thereforeno 
transaction has been cleared with significant commitments or prohibited due to 
coordinated effect exclusively in China.131 
4 Discussion and Recommendations 
4.1 Establish Analytical Framework 
The most significant concernwith the ‘checklist approach’ currently may be that it 
does not provide a systematic framework within which to assess market 
characteristics.132Pandora’s Box was opened for all kinds of speculative argument 
about the potential effects of a merger.133In order to improve the degree of 
certaintythe checklist approach should be replaced by an analytical framework. 
Indeed, guidance on how the MOFCOM will analyse coordinated effects was already 
contained in the draft guidelines on horizontal mergers prepared by the MOFCOM 
for internal discussion towards the end of 2009. In the summer months of 2010the 
MOFCOM held internal seminars with a few select academics on topics including 
coordinated effects.134Nevertheless, framework for assessment of coordinated 
effects has not yet been clarified by now. In general the assessment of 
coordination effect has three aspects: ‘internal factors’ refers to the ability of 
firms that are alleged to form part of the coordinating group to act as if they were 
a single entity; ‘external factors’ refers to constraints of coordination that are 
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The MOFCOM raised the concerns of unilateral effects accompanied by coordinated effects in 
some cases.A H Zhang and M Hephcott, Merger Control in China, (2011) Volume 11 No.11, 
Competition Law Insight, 19. 
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 See the discussion in‘2.1.2 An Evaluation of the Checklist Approach’ in this chapter. 
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 The problem was raised in K Kühn, Closing Pandora’s Box? Joint Dominance after the “Airtours” 
Judgment,supra note 44, 19. 
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Hogan Lovells LLP, MOFCOM’s Stance on Novartis/Alcon, (September 2012), available at: 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/c4e3f64b-a523-482b-a6e8-
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external to the coordinating group; and ‘causal link’ refers to how the merger 
affects the ability of firms to reach andor sustain a tacit understanding.135 
In the EU ‘internal factors’ for tacit coordination include whether coordinating 
firms are able to reach terms of coordination, monitor deviationand retaliate to 
deviation.The question is why some of the EU’s ‘internal factors’ have not 
appeared in China’s case decisions.136 The first reason may be the comparatively 
short time of implementation. In 1992 the Commission applied the concept of 
collective dominance under the Merger Regulation for the first time,137three 
yearsafter the EU merger regulation came into force. After that great changes 
happened in assessing coordination effect, such as expanding the scope of 
coordination from a duopoly to fewer than four members after merger;138loosening 
the necessary relationship between structural links and the likelihood of 
coordination effect; laying down the retaliation mechanism as a necessary 
condition for sustaining coordination; and setting a standard of proof for the 
Commission in order to prove anticompetitive coordinated effect.139In 2002 in 
Airtours/First Choicean analytical framework was proposed by the General 
Courtwithin which to organise the competitive assessment into steps. Based on the 
decision the final framework for assessing coordinated effect was issued by the 
Commission in its Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers in 2004, which was 18 years 
after the entry into force ofEU Merger Regulation. The AML 2008 in China has only 
been implemented for four years. It may still need more time and experience to 
change from the checklist to a settled framework.Secondly, it may be because of 
restricted communication between the MOFCOM and related parties. Parties and 
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 This opinion was raised by S Bishop and A Lofaro in S Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal and economic 
consensus? For the theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger control, supra note 4, pp. 
195-242. 
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Seethe discussion in ‘3.1Checklist Period in China’ in the chapter. 
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Case IV/M.190 Nestlé/Perrier,[1992] O. J. L 356/1. 
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Airtours/First Choice was the first case in which the Commission prohibited a merger that would 
have left three major firms in the market.SeeEuropean Economics,Study on Assessment Criteria for 
Distinguishing between Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control,supra note 2, 73. 
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 In Sony/BMGthe standard of proof for proving coordinated effect was still facing overwhelming 
criticism .See supra note 68. 
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third parties lack opportunitiesto make their voice heard by the MOFCOM in order 
to supplement the MOFCOM’s insufficient investigation. 140 
These three factors’ contributions to the assessment of coordinated effect have 
been discussed above.141 The MOFCOM should confirm that the three factors will be 
considered in merger assessment. Such confirmation could be found in specific 
guidelines or future case decisions. In addition, assessment of coordinated effect 
in China relies too much on the extent of market concentration and the number of 
remaining competitors. This may possibly lead to false negative errors.142 In order 
to avoid these, the MOFCOM should consider more factors apart from market 
concentration. If majority market shares are concentrated in the hands of two or 
three competitors, the MOFCOM shouldfurther investigate product homogeneity, 
market transparency, and the stability of demand and supply conditions in the 
marketwhich may prevent remaining firms from reaching terms of coordination 
tacitly.On the other hand, coordination has so far all been in the form of parallel 
price. Other forms of synergyhave not to date, July 2013, been pointed out by the 
MOFCOM.143If products are heterogeneous and the market is not transparent, the 
antitrust authority should still determine whether there are other forms of 
coordination apart from price collusion, or false positive errors may 
occur.144Finallythe MOFCOM should assessretaliation mechanisms for the 
sustainability of coordination. There should be a potential relation mechanism 
within coordination, in order to detect deviations.145 
‘External factors’in the EU involve the reaction of outsidersto potential entry, 
fringe competitors and countervailing buyer power. To sum up, this analytical 
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 For suggestions see‘4.2.7 Improving Communication amongst the MOFCOM, Notifying Parties and 
the Third Parties’ in chapter 3. 
141
 See ‘2.2.1 Reaching Terms of Coordination’ in this chapter . 
142
 See the first point in ‘2.1.1General Checklists’ of this chapter. 
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 Apart from coordination on price, forms of coordination also include coordination on capacity, 
customer sharing, multimarket contacts. See S Bishop and A Lofaro, A legal and economic 
consensus? The theory and practice of coordinated effects in EC merger control,supra note 4, 203. 
144
Other forms of coordination are available in the introduction of this chapter, supra note 4 to 7. 
145
In considering the retaliation mechanism the MOFCOM should be attentiveto the speed of detection 
and punishment, as well as the incentive of firms to implement retaliation. The specific analysis is 
available in ‘2.2.3 Deterrent Mechanism’ of this chapter. 
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framework for analysing coordinated effects is in line with the thinking in 
economic theories, and is also suitable for the assessment of coordination in 
China.146The MOFCOM should accept this approach in case decisions or guidelines. 
In order to get more informationon the concerns of coordinated effects the 
MOFCOM should also expand channels for hearing views of notifying parties as well 
as related third parties.147 Besides, in their investigation the MOFCOM should not 
consider every factor exclusively.Some specific market characters will affect more 
than one factor composing the analytical framework of coordinated effects. For 
example, the structural links between coordinating firms help them to reach terms 
of coordination, but reduce incentives for retaliation.148 Therefore the 
MOFCOMshould learn to interpret the effects of a market character on the 
likelihood of tacit collusionfrom different aspects. 
4.2 Analysis of Causal Link 
The MOFCOM does not reveal its investigation of market situations pre-merger.It 
only gives an indication of the market situation after a merger.149In order to 
identify the likely anti-competitive effects made possible by a merger it would be 
desirable to compare the market equilibrium before the merger with what is 
expected to emerge following it.150This would show whether a collective dominant 
position has existed before the merger and whether the notified transaction is a 
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decisive factor in creating or strengtheninga collective dominant position.151In 
addition, the market situation premerger has a close relationshipwith the burden 
of proof.It is intuitive that the more competitive the market is pre-merger, the 
more dramatic the change arising from the merger has to be to justify the 
collective dominance finding.152 
There are various modes of assessment ofthe causal link of coordinated effects. 
One assumes that tacit coordination is unlikely even after a merger. The authority 
should as a first step find factors which detersuccessful coordination. The second 
step is to prove those deterring factors will not be changed significantly by a 
merger. In contrast, the other approach assumes that coordination is possible after 
a merger. The authority should then prove those factors conducive for coordination 
will be strengthened by a merger.153The latter approach is considered much harder 
to establish,as there are no specific market characteristics or economic theory 
that can presume that coordination will definitely occur in future.154Therefore the 
assumption of a potential positive test is easilyoverturned. It isrelatively easy to 
reject the assumption of collective dominance according to a former negative 
test.155 In order to ensure legal certainty the MOFCOM should have an impartial 
attitude to investigatingthe market situation pre-merger and should ascertain 
whether coordination has existed. If evidence of past practice indicates that tacit 
collusion is unlikely, the MOFCOM should find what constrains competitors’ 
incentives and ability to coordinate their actions. It needs then to see how the 
proposed merger will change those existing barriers to coordination.156At the same 
time it should be aware that evidence of past practice might not be a good guide 
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If there is past coordination premerger, then it is important for the approval of a merger if the 
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to the future. The facts of pre-merger may not be decisive if the market situation 
has changed. On the other hand, although the market is (relatively) competitive 
pre-merger, a merger may make it (relatively) uncompetitive because of 
coordinated effects.  
A causal link isdetermined to ascertain the change of merger to competitive 
processthrough investigating various chains of cause and effect.157From the 
evidence of the EU,  
First, coordination will be more likely post-merger if the transaction: a. 
reduces the number of independent decision-makers; b. removes a ‘maverick’ 
company; c.removes a supplier who has a history of disrupting coordination by 
under-pricing rivals or refusing a market leader’s pricing;second, coordination 
will be more completepost merger if the transaction: a. supports a higher 
coordinated price by creating a market leader so it can control coordination 
more easily; b. removes a source of independent pricing variation from the 
market; thirdly, coordination will be more stable if transaction enlarges the 
competitors’ overlap which enables suppliers to support coordinated pricing 
against a larger population of buyers for more products or for a longer 
duration.158 
In addition, opportunity for innovation can constrain coordination, and a merger 
can facilitate coordination by limiting innovation; non-transparency can constraint 
coordination, and a merger can facilitate coordination by increasing transparency 
among coordinating parties. 
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4.3 Improving the Standard of Proof 
4.3.1 Does the standard of proof need to be improved? 
The standard of proof that ‘the possibility cannot be ruled out’ in China should be 
improved, for at least the following reasons: 
Firstly, merger decisions may be false negativeif coordination is not the ‘the most 
likely’ situation post-merger.159The Genera Court in EDP v Commissionalso 
confirmed that the Commission cannot‘sit on the fence’ and rely on doubt in 
prohibiting a merger.160 
Secondly, a false negative decision can hardly be annulled through administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review in China.161In the development of coordination 
assessment the European Court plays a substantial role. Through judicial review an 
initial frameworkfor coordination assessment was established.162Cases which did 
not meet the standard of proof werecorrected. The Commission’s practice of 
merger control is externally monitored by the Court.163ByJuly 2013 there had been 
no record ofany judicial review of the MOFCOM’s merger decisions.There might be 
at least twoexplanations of this failure.The first is that the appeal process before 
the Court is seen as extremely lengthy (in any case too long for the parties of a 
merger to wait), and the antitrust authority enjoys a significant level of discretion 
in its application of economic analysis in merger decisions.164The second is the lack 
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of an independent judiciaryand the tradition of obeying the orders and decisions of 
the government; administrative decisions are seldom challenged in China.165Thus 
interpretation or correction of a merger assessment through the courts is absent in 
China.166Due to a lack of external supervisionparties in merger decisions which are 
made in doubt or even in error may have no recourse to appeal.The MOFCOM itself 
needs to collect ‘cogent evidence’ in order to ensure that coordination is the 
‘most likely’consequence. 
Thirdly, the current standard of proof in China places an undue burden of proof on 
the notifying parties. In the EU the notifying parties need only prove that a merger 
would make coordination less likely when pre-merger coordination has been 
identified by the authority. In such a situation the notifying parties only need 
prove themerged entity increases market asymmetry or becomes a ‘maverick’ firm 
because it becomes more effective after merger.167 It is relatively easy for the 
notifying parties to demonstrate the efficiencies which will be secured by merger 
alone. In China the MOFCOM places the burden of proof on the notifying partiesas 
long as the MOFCOM raises a concern that the merger may create coordination or 
make it more likely, sustainable or easier. The authority has the discretion to 
block a merger even if there are insufficient data to support this view.168In most 
instances the MOFCOM’sconcerns about coordination were indeed not supported by 
sufficient evidence. It is worse to combine such discretion with ineffective judicial 
review and the MOFCOM’s relationship with industrial policy.169The low standard of 
proof may become a shield for the MOFCOM to consider non-competitive matters 
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behind. The courthas no standing to correct the MOFCOM’s decisioneither.On the 
other hand, compared with the authority, the notifying parties have far fewer 
resources with which to conduct investigationsthan the antitrust authority. Under 
the procedural rules applicable under the AML 2008, the merging parties do not 
have any rights to obtain evidence from third parties, but the MOFCOM has 
extensive powers to do so.170The antitrust authority has more power to collect 
evidence and determine the‘most likely’ situation. Therefore it is recommended 
that the MOFCOM makes clear that the burden of proof is placed onto the notifying 
parties only when it needs to countervail the MOFCOM’s pre or post-coordinating 
concerns with sufficient evidence. 
4.3.2 Is a ‘Symmetric’Standard of Proof Suitable for China? 
If the standard of proof in China needs to be improved, the next question is 
whether a ‘symmetric’ standard of proof is suitable for China. In the EU, in line 
with the ‘most likely’ standard, the court requires the Commission to use a 
‘symmetric’ approach in assessing a merger which raises coordination concern.171 
Requirementsof the ‘symmetric’approach are as follows: 
i) Bearing a neutral attitude, of no bias against or in favour of the legality of 
mergersfrom the outset of merger review.172 This is to ensure the legal certainty 
that a merger decision will bepermanent, and the Commission's analysiscan 
withstand judicial scrutiny. In order to ensure certainty of a merger decision the 
MOFCOM should also bear a neutral attitude in a merger review. But the 
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‘symmetric’ standard might be too high to be implemented in China currently.The 
first barrier toits application is the MOFCOM’s limited resources. In applying the 
‘symmetry’ standard the authority must either prove to the required standard that 
post-merger coordinated effects will occur, or it must prove to the same standard 
that post-merger coordinated effects will not occur. This requisite legal standard 
for authorising a merger is even believed too high to be practised by the 
Commission in the EU.173Compared with the EU, the MOFCOM in China has far fewer 
resources and experience which might not meet the standard.174However, the 
MOFCOM still hasroom for improvement.  Firstly, the MOFCOM is expected to 
provide a consistent analytical framework for analysing coordinated effects in a 
public case as the judgment of the court inAirtours/First Choice in the EU. The 
MOFCOM could reduce the requirement of evidence collection in merger cases 
which are compatible with market competition.The MOFCOM should publish its 
every clearance decision and give simple reasons for them.175Thus more time and 
resources could be applied to complicated cases. Such an imbalance in the 
standard of proof cannot last long; relaxed criteria for clearing a merger may lead 
tounfounded prohibition decisions. In the long run, as the MOFCOM becomes more 
experienced in investigation and balancing various possibilities,the standard of 
proof forclearing a merger should be increased to the same level as decisions of 
significant coordinated concern.  
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mergers, even if cases raise no serious competition concerns. The MOFCOM’sresources are 
dispersed, and clearancedecisions cannot get approval timely. This problem is expected to diminish 
as merger parties gain experience and learn what information is essential to merger assessment, and 
the MOFCOM applies different evidence criteria to mergers which raise different competitive concerns. 
See N H F Chang et al., (Mayer Brown JSM), China: Antimonopoly Law, The Asia-Pacific Antitrust 
Review 2012, available at: 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/42/sections/146/chapters/1643/ (accessed on the 23
rd
 
April 2013). 
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ii) Balancing of various probabilities before making a decision in merger cases in a 
‘grey area’. As the standard of proof concerning the establishment of collective 
dominance is high, there arisesa situation in which the evidence is not sufficient to 
meet these requirements. Within the ‘grey area’, it is difficult to foresee the 
effects of a notified transaction and consequently it is difficult to arrive at a 
decisionwhether the merger would create or strengthen a collective dominant 
position.176The larger the ‘grey area’, the less legally certain is the final decision. 
One opinion in the EU suggests clearing cases within a ‘grey area’. Advocate 
General Tizzanoin Tetra Laval II made three points on this: 
First,Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation 4064/89 (now Article 10(6) 
EUMR )stipulates that if the Commission does not make adecision within the 
deadlines, the merger shall be deemed compatible with the common 
market.Secondly, there should be a presumption in favour of authorisation 
so as not unjustifiably to restrainthe parties' freedom of economic 
activity.Finally, if a merger is authorised which subsequently turns out to 
have significant anti-competitiveeffects (i.e. the Commission makes a false 
positive error), the Commission has an instrument with which to 
correctthese ex post in the form of Article 102 of the Treaty.177 
When considering the deterrent effect of Article 102 the Commissiondoes not have 
to establish that the post-merger behaviour of the parties would actually 
constitute anabuse of a dominant position. The constraint of Article 102 is to 
eliminate the likelihoodof such behaviouron balance of probability.178 If the 
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Note149 in V R Ben and P Caroline, Is the standard of proof imposed by the Community Courts 
undermining the efficiency of EC merger control? The SONY/BMG joint venture case in perspective, 
(May, 2007), EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 24, available at: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8013/1/rompuy-b-02g.pdf (accessed on the 25
th
October 2012),  
177
Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano-CASE C-12/03 ΡCommission ν. Tetra Laval,(25
th
 May 
2004),available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003CC0013:EN:PDF (accessed on the 
23
rd
April 2013). 
178
Reasons supporting the authorisation of cases inthe ‘grey area’ still include: (i)  that (re-) 
combinations of assets by rational market agents normally increase efficiency and (ii), therefore, 
enterprises andentrepreneurs have the basic right freely to combine their assets, then policy 
interventions in this type of market activity should be restricted to cases in which losses in social 
welfare due to anticompetitive effects either outweigh the benefits of the gaining producers (total 
welfare standard) or unduly exploit consumers (consumer welfare standard). See K Wright, Perfect 
symmetry? Impala v Commission and standard of proof in mergers, supra note 81, 411. 
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Commission clears an ambiguous coordinated effects case (or imposes sharp 
remedies), the false negative cases are reduced.However, expected 
anticompetitive mergers leading to a collusive post-merger equilibrium cannot be 
prohibited or adequately modified only because the effects cannot be proven 
according to the required standard of proof. Consumer welfare is expected to 
suffer because of these false positive errors.179 
To date, with the standard of proofin the EU, evidence supporting the concerns of 
coordinated effects in China is not ‘cogent’. However, the MOFCOM still raised the 
concern and added sharp commitments to the notified mergers. The decisions have 
resulted in false negative errors which are never corrected through judicial 
review.180 The MOFCOM should balance every possibility before clearing a 
transaction in a ‘grey area’. Firstly, the MOFCOM has opportunities to 
practisemerger assessment on coordinated effect. It is vital for a young authority 
to accumulate experience. Besides, more qualitative and quantitative tests will be 
introduced in order to compare each possibility and get a ‘most likely’ result. As 
judicial review in China is ineffective, the MOFCOM does not need to take the risk 
of legal uncertainty as does the EU. The MOFCOM’s final decision will not be 
annulled by the Court. 
iii) The standard of proof should be same for finding an existing or potential 
collective dominant position.181In Impala the General Court suggested that 
                                         
179
See L Prete and A Nucara, Standard of Proof and Scope of Judicial Review in EC Merger Cases: 
Everything Clear after Tetra Laval?,(2005) Volume 26 Issue12, E.C.L.R.,pp692-704. 
180
 Comparedwith ? / Unlike?false negative error, the effects of MOFCOM’s false positive decision are 
more likely to be modified by the court.The MOFCOM may wrongly clear a merger, which leads to a 
single or collective dominance in the market. According to Chapter 3 of the AML2008 affected parties 
can lodge a lawsuit if the leading firm(s) abuses its/their dominant position post-merger. There have 
been successful lawsuits on the abuse of dominant position in China. For example, the National 
Development and Reform Commission fined two pharmaceutical companies for abusive conduct, see 
S Ninget al.,NDRC Fined Two Pharmaceutical Companies for Abusive Conduct, (December 2011), 
King and Wood, available at: http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/12/articles/corporate/antitrust-
competition/ndrc-fined-two-pharmaceutical-companies-for-abusive-conducts/. More details on private 
action pursuant to Chapter 3 of the AML 2008 can be seen in NHFChanget al., (Mayer Brown JSM), 
China: Antimonopoly Law, supra note 177. 
181
 The facts and evidence adduced to clear a merger are broadly symmetric with the facts and 
evidence cited to prohibit it. In Sony/BMG on the symmetrical standard of proof the CJEU asserted 
that there is no need to presume the transaction is compatible with the market. No matter whether the 
merger will be cleared or prohibited, it should be proved with ‘cogent evidence’. See point 50, Case C-
413/06p, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and 
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conditions for a finding of collective dominance in the Airtours casecouldmore 
easily be satisfied in the investigation of a pre-existing collective dominant 
position than in the investigation of the potential creation of such a position.182The 
Court of Justice of the European Uniondid not object to this view. It stressed that: 
It is necessary to avoid a mechanical approach involving the separate 
verification of each of thosecriteria in isolation, while taking no account of 
the overall economic mechanism of a hypothetical tacit coordination.183 
Quite in contrast to the claim thatImpala imposed too high a standard of proof on 
the Commission, the General Court and the CJEU in factlowered the evidentiary 
threshold for establishing an existing collective dominant position.184 In China the 
MOFCOM did not find evidence of existing collective dominance pre-merger. All 
concerns are based on possibilities of potential collective dominant positionpost-
merger.It is unknown how the MOFCOM will prove the existence of collective 
dominance pre-merger. The MOFCOM should publish its presumption based on 
collected direct evidence, as the unrevealed process of presumption might render 
the outcome of existing collective dominance legallyuncertain within which the 
MOFCOM can have non-competitive considerations.  
In conclusion, in order to assess coordinated effect more precisely the MOFCOM 
should expand its checklist rather than just factors of market concentration and 
                                                                                                                               
Labels Association (Impala), [2008] E.C.R. I-04951. See also B V Rompuy, Implications for the 
standard of proof in EC merger proceedings: Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v. 
Impala,supra note 68, 612. 
182
 The CJEU deviated from this substantive test in stating that: ‘Although the three conditions are 
indeed also necessary, they may, however, in the appropriate circumstances, be established 
indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia and items of evidence relating to 
the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a collective dominant position. 
Thus, in particular, close alignment of prices over a long period, especially if they are above a 
competitive level, together with other factors typical of collective dominant position, might, in the 
absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of a collective 
dominant position, even where there is no firm direct evidence of strong market transparency, as such 
transparency may be presumed in such cases’. See paragraph 252, case C-413/06p, Bertelsmann 
AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association 
(Impala), [2008] E.C.R. I-04951. 
183
Point 5, Case C-413/06p, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music 
Publishers and Labels Association (Impala), [2008] E.C.R. I-04951. 
184
B V Rompuy, Implications for the standard of proof in EC merger proceedings: Bertelsmann and 
Sony Corporation of America v. Impala, supra note 68, 611. 
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number of competitors. In order to operate a tacit collusion in the long run the 
MOFCOMshould point out market characteristics which are conducive to internal 
monitoring and timely retaliation in coordination. Nevertheless, an expanded 
checklist is not just a burden for the MOFCOM. Merging parties can also raise more 
countervailing market characteristics to eliminate coordinated concerns raised by 
the MOFCOM.185The checklist approach also has unavoidable drawbacks in 
reflecting coordinated concern and legal certainty. The MOFCOM should adopt an 
analytical framework like that of the EU, as it brings more legal certainty and 
transparency to the public.186 Regarding the standard of proof on coordinated 
effect, the MOFCOM’s should not be lower than that of the EU in the long run. This 
is because of the ineffectiveness of the external judicial review, and a closer 
relationship between the antitrust authority and the government, which has an 
obligation to enforce non-competitive considerations.187 For example, when 
proving the existence of collective dominance pre-merger the MOFCOM should 
publish its presumption based on direct evidence. On the other hand, according to 
the historical development of coordinated assessment in the EU, the approach in 
China still needs more time to accumulate experience and become 
mature.188Therefore the standard of proof in the EU seems too high to be practised 
in China currently. Due to the tight reviewing period and limited experience of the 
MOFCOM, mergersraising no significant coordination concern can be cleared with a 
simple notice. Thus the MOFCOM will soon be able to have more resources and 
time in which to offer explicit explanationsof cases which raise significant concern 
as to coordination. 
 
 
                                         
185
 The parties to the concentration are encouraged to submit evidence to the MOFCOM with a view 
to rebut objections raised as soon as possible, since the MOFCOM would have enough time to carry 
out the necessary investigation. 
186
 See ‘2.2 Assessment under a Fixed Framework’ in this chapter. 
187
These two characteristicshave been analysed in chapter 1 as the background of merger 
assessment in China.  
188
Historical development of the assessment of coordinated effects in merger control of the EU has 
been introduced in ‘4.1 Establish Analytical Framework’ in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Countervailing Factors: Buyer Power 
and Market Entry 
1 Introduction 
After delineating the relevant market and the anti-competitive effects of a merger 
the third step is to see if there are any countervailing effects which can offset 
anti-competitive concerns. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the countervailing factors in China’s antitrust 
merger assessment. In particular, there are three questions to be posed: 1. How 
are countervailing factors evaluated in China’s antitrust merger control? 2. What is 
the experience of the EU in analysis of countervailing effects in horizontal-merger 
control? 3. What can be learned from the experience of the EU to improve the 
assessment of countervailing factors under China’s merger control regime? This 
chapter focuses on two countervailing factors, namely countervailing buyer power1 
and market entry.2 
                                         
1
It only concerns the power of the downstream purchaser to restrain the market power of the merging 
parties. The effect of the buyer power of the merged entity in curbing the supplier market will not be 
discussed here since it does not relate to any countervailing factor to restrain market power of the 
merged entity.   
2
Other countervailing factors of ant-competitive concern include efficiency created by the merger, 
failing firm defence, national economic development and public interest in China. Mark Furse states 
‘the assessment of countervailing factors in China has not been developed to any significant degree. 
The checklist in the AML and guidance is of limited value, and has not been significantly clarified in 
practice’. Especially, there is no evidence published concerning efficiency arguments or failing firm 
defence that have influenced MOFCOM in any particular case. Therefore, he said ‘it is not possible at 
the time of writing to draw any conclusions relating to the efficiency or failing firm defences’. M Furse, 
Merger Control in China: Four and a Half Years of Practice and Enforcement-A Critical Analysis, 
(2013) Volume 36 Issue 2, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, pp. 288-289. 
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2 Countervailing Buyer Power 
2.1 Countervailing Buyer Power in the EU 
According to the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers in the EU countervailing buyer 
power should be understood as ‘the bargaining strength that the buyer has vis-à-vis 
the seller in commercial negotiations due to its size, its commercial significance to 
the seller and its ability to switch to alternative suppliers’.3Big buyer power can 
restrain unilateral price increase by the merged entity or reduce the threat of 
upstream collusion.4The Commission takes three steps to evaluate countervailing 
buyer power. 
2.1.1 The Existence of Viable Alternatives or Credible Threats 
Once buyers find out the price increase they may adopt certain strategies to 
counteract the merged entity’s supra-competitive pricing. The premise of this 
conduct is the existence of viable alternatives or credible threats. In general, 
viable alternatives or credible threats may be divided into three kinds. The first 
happens when buyers switch to other suppliers or sponsor a new entry;5 the second 
                                         
3
Paragraph 64,Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. A Pera and V Bonfitto, Buyer power in anti-trust 
investigations: a review, (2011) Volume 32 Issue 8, E.C.L.R.,pp. 414-425; J Tirole, the Theory of 
Industrial Organization, (The MIT Press, 1988), 305;  A Lofaro and S Baker, Buyer power and the 
Enso/Stora decision, (2000) Volume 21 Issue 3, E.C.L.R., pp. 187-190;  A Lindsay et al., 
Econometrics study into European Commission merger decisions since 2000, (2003) Volume 24 
Issue 12, E.C.L.R., pp. 673-682; M L Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, (1992-
1993) Volume 61 Issue 2, Antitrust Law Journal, pp. 493-504; J B Nordemann,  Buying power and 
sophisticated buyers in merger control law: the need for a more sophisticated approach, Volume 16 
Issue 5, E.C.L.R., pp.  270-281; R D Blair and J L Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, (1991) 
Volume 76, Cornell Law Review, pp. 303–306; Y S Choi and K Fuchikawa, Comparative Analysis of 
Competition Laws on Buyer Power in Korea and Japan, (2010) Volume 33 Issue 3, World Competition, 
514; I Kokkoris, Buyer Power Assessment in Competition Law: A Boon or a Menace, (2006) Volume 
29 Issue 1, World Competition, pp.139-164. 
4
 A big buyer can withdraw or threaten to withdraw its order from merging parties in order to restrain 
its unilateral price increase. In addition, orders from a big buyer can make the collusion of suppliers 
unstable, since any member may intend to get the contract with big buyer seven deviating the terms 
of coordination. 
5
In Pirelli/BICC the relevant product market of transaction was the production and sale of power 
cables to energy utilities. The European Commission cleared the acquisition as the downstream 
buyers (energy utilities) still can switch to at least four alternative suppliers if Pirelli/BIC were to apply 
anti-competitive prices. Successful switching was promised by energy utilities’ substantial purchasing 
power. They have the possibility to attract additional cable suppliers through strategic allocation of 
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when buyers start manufacturing their own input products or increase purchasing 
their own input products;6 and the third when a buyer threatens to initiate either 
of the above actions.7 
In order to be credible threats the loss of buyers’ order should make the merged 
entity’s price increase unprofitable post-merger.8Therefore the buyers’ purchasing 
volume should be substantial, taking a large percentage of the suppliers’ output. 
Only in exceptional conditions, when large capacity is necessary for the suppliers 
to be profitable, a small volume of switch is enough to threaten the price increase 
of suppliers.9Even in the EU countervailing buyer power is insufficient to moderate 
a highly concentrated market on its own. Instead, it mostly serves as a competitive 
constraint together with other countervailing factors.10 
2.1.2 The Incentive of Buyers to Act 
However, the existence of credible suppliers does not mean buyers would choose 
to switch supply. They may still face a number of risks. Buyers should bear the risk 
of reputational and reliability factors if they switch suppliers to constrain the price 
increase of the merged entity.11Buyers may need a period of time in order to test if 
                                                                                                                               
orders and thus to broaden their supplier base if necessary. See Case IV/M.1882 Pirelli/BICC, [2003] 
O.J. L70/35, point 76. 
6
Steptoe notes that Coca Cola organised a joint venture to produce plastic bottles itself after failing to 
negotiate a price reduction from their original suppliers. Prices on bottles fell by about 33 per cent 
afterward. See M L Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 499. This case 
also indicates that, if a new entry is easy, even credible suppliers are shortage among incumbent 
firms; it does not mean the buyer power is weak. 
7
These three kinds of viable alternative or credible threat are illustrated in paragraph 64, Guidelines 
on Horizontal Mergers. They are also confirmed by other jurisdictions and articles. See I Kokkoris, 
Buyer Power Assessment in Competition Law: A Boon or a Menace, supra note 3, 142. 
8
The same conclusion can also be seen in paragraph 65, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
9
In Enso/Stora, merging parties operated in the production of liquid packaging board which is a high 
fixed-cost industry, where high rates of capacity use are necessary in order to achieve satisfactory 
levels of profitability. The Commission noted that the merged entity would find it hard to find other 
customers in the short term if it were to lose the large volumes purchased by its largest customer. 
Therefore the Commission considered that buyer power was sufficient to remove the possibility of the 
parties’ exercising market power. See Case IV/M.1225 Enso/Stora [1999] O.J. L254/9, points 90 and 
97. 
10
Evidence from EU cases can be seen in A Lindsay, TheEC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, 
(Sweet &Maxwell, 2006), 468. 
11
M L Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 498.In CVC/Lenzing, the 
European Commission prohibited the transaction since it would have led to very serious competition 
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the new supplier is fit for the required standard in the aspects of duration, purity 
or other factors. If buyers enter into the upstream market themselves or sponsor a 
new entry, they may face a giant sunk cost for buying large capacity costs, 
spending time on controlling complex manufacturing processes, or getting a 
licence or patent.12In order to encourage the expansion of a rival’s production or 
entry into an upstream market, the buyer will have to promise some form of long-
term contract relationship before the new supplier has proved its capability. The 
buyers have to take risks such as the new suppliers’ not being able to fulfil a 
contract on time, meet required quality, attain the necessary production schedules 
and so on.13Especially when a price reduction after a switch or entry will also be 
enjoyed by rivals, buyers may be reluctant, leading to ‘free-riding’ or ‘first-mover 
disadvantage’ situations.14 
According to Lindsay buyers are believed to have a greater incentive to exercise 
any power that they may have if the benefit is substantial:  
a) When the buyers’ purchases represent a large proportion of their input 
costs, the buyer will generally be more price-sensitive and more willing to 
shop around. b) When the end-product market is itself competitive, there will 
commonly be no or limited scope to pass through increases in input costs. c) 
When there is competition in a downstream market a purchaser of an input 
                                                                                                                               
concerns in the production of viscose staple fibres (viscose). The downstream big tampons 
manufacturers had insufficient buying power effectively to constrain the independence of competitive 
behaviour of the merged entity. These companies are to a large extent ‘locked in’ by high switching 
costs. See case COMP/M.2187 CVC/Lenzing, [2004] O.J. L82/20, point 223. 
12
In Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space &Telespazio, as a buyer of merging parties, ESA had 
countervailing power throughcreating a new independent supply source for the future. However, the 
Commission excluded the possibility that the ESA would to do so as ‘it would be difficult and costly for 
Astrium to gain radar altimeter expertise without having access to the expertise of either Alcatel or 
Alenia’. Finally, the Commission concludes that ‘there would be no alternative that could act as a 
reference point to which the parties’ prices and product performance could be compared’. See Case 
COMP/M.3680Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space &Telespazio, [2005] O.J. C139/37, 
paragraph 86. 
13
A Pera and V Bonfitto, Buyer power in anti-trust investigations: a review, supra note 3, 
414.Nevertheless, if the contract is elastic, the certainty of the new entry will be reduced 
accordingly.ML Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 498. 
14
Introducing a new entry may involve significant costs. The buyer’s competitors will be able to reap 
the benefit of new competition without, however, contributing to the costs. This situation is called ‘free 
riding’ or 'first-mover disadvantages’. See paragraph 66, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers; See also 
A Pera and V Bonfitto, ibid,501. 
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used to produce one of the products sold on that market but not others is 
more likely to restrain the conduct of the supplier of the input, because the 
purchaser has an incentive to control cost which cannot be passed on.15 
Steptoe also proposed two conditions when buyers are able to be well-informed 
that the sellers’ prices are supra-competitive. Firstly, buyers’ cost is largely 
determined by raw materials that trade at known and publicly reported market 
prices. Secondly, the supra-competitive price is more likely to be recognised if it is 
increased in a large jump than incrementally.16 
In addition, buyers of merging parties may not be the final customers. If they are 
intermediate producers, they should promise to pass the input savingsonto the 
final customers.17 Fierce price competition in the downstream market can force 
intermediate retailers to pass the cost reduction onto final customers.18 
                                         
15
 For more EU cases, see notes 50 and 51, A Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive 
Issues, supra note 11, pp.473-474.In addition, as the expense of purchase may take a large 
percentage of input cost to smaller buyers, they have greater incentive to negotiate with suppliers. 
Consequently they even receive better prices. This is another demonstration of benefit’s encouraging 
the exercise of buyer power. See point 5.62 in PricewaterhouseCoopers Ex post evaluation of 
mergers, Report prepared for the OFT, DTI and Competition Commission, (March 2005), available 
at:http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft767.pdf (accessed on the 22
nd
 
February2013). 
16
ML Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 496. 
17
 This is because merger control in the EU ultimately aims to protect the interest of customers. The 
attitude of the Commission to competitors of merging parties is clarified in the Guidelines on Non-
horizontal Mergers:‘ In the context of competition law, the concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses 
intermediate and ultimate consumers. When intermediate customers are actual or potential 
competitors of the parties to the merger, the Commission focuses on the effects of the merger on the 
customers to which the merged entity and those competitors are selling. Consequently, the fact that a 
merger affects competitors is not in itself a problem.’ Paragraph 16, the Guidelines on Non-horizontal 
Mergers. On the adoption of welfare standard, there are ample discussions in the EU, although a 
large number of voices back up consumer welfare standards. AJ Padilla, Efficiencies in horizontal 
mergers: Williamson revisited in W D Collins, Issues in Competition Law and Policy,(American Bar 
Association Press, 2005), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=812989 
(accessed on the 12
th
September 2013). Enterprise Directorate-General European Commission, For 
the customer’s sake: The competitive effects of efficiencies in European merger control, (2002) 
Enterprise Papers No.11, available at: http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim0.de/www-edz/pdf/entpap/ep-11-
2002.pdf (accessed on the 10
th
 December 2012); S Friodolfsson (Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics),A consumers’ surplus defence in merger control, (2007) IFN Working Paper No. 686, 
available at:http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp686.pdf (accessed on the 1
st
 January 2013); D J Neven 
and L Roller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger 
Control, (2005) Volume 23, International Journal of Industrial Organization, pp.829-848. 
18
 This point can also be found in PW Dobson and R Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and 
Selling Power Come Together, (2008) Volume 2, WisconsinLaw Review, 341. 
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2.1.3 The Role of Smaller Customers 
Buyer power may be asymmetric between larger and smaller customers. In such 
markets powerful buyers may be able to protect their positions, but their 
negotiating power may not be able to shield weaker purchasers. The merging 
parties will price discriminate to big buyers and other medium/small purchasers.19 
The Commission chooses to consider the positions of all, not just the larger 
customers. The Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers states: ‘countervailing buyer 
power cannot be found to sufficiently off-set potential adverse effects of a merger 
if it only ensures that a particular segment of customers, with particular 
bargaining strength, is shielded from significantly higher prices or deteriorated 
conditions after the merger’.20 Therefore buyer power arguments have no 
relevance in markets where price discrimination is possible.21The question is when 
price discrimination is more likely to arise and to be harmful to consumer welfare.  
In order to answer this question the Commission considers the symmetry of market 
structures on the supply-side and retailer-side.22 Symmetry of buyer and supplier 
markets is a significant indication of the existence of buyer powers.23 If 
                                         
19
As both the EU and China aim to protect ‘all’ sizes of customer, the vicious effect of price 
discrimination between customers will not be discussed in depth here. In general, discounts to a few 
large buyers can lead to a worsening of terms of supply for smaller buyers, thereby lessening retail 
competition. In the long run, as weaker competitors are excluded, dominant retailers can charge 
dominant price to consumers. They can also lower investment and the speed of innovation when 
there is less competitive pressure. The interest of consumers will then be harmed. See P Dobson and 
RInderst, ibid, 393; R Inderst and TMValletti, Buyer Power and the ‘Waterbed Effect’, (2011) The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 59. 
20
Paragraph 67, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
21
Case IV/M.190 Nestle/Perrier, [1992] O.J.L356/1, paragraph 78.See also Case COMP/M.2097 
SCA/Mesta Tissue, paragraphs 85-91. In the above two cases the Commission accepted that some 
buyers might have a certain buying power. However, since the Commission cannot exclude the 
possibility that the merged entity applies different conditions of sale to weaker buyers or customers, 
the countervailing buyer power is not in the end accepted.  
22
The market which merging parties belong to is in the upstream of the retailer market. Final 
customers are the downstream market of the retail market. 
23
See D E Mills, Buyer Power and Industry Structure, (2010) Volume 36, Issue 3, Review of Industrial 
Organization, pp. 213-225. R Inderst and G Shaffer said, ‘a more balanced market structure may 
ensure that both upstream and downstream firms have sufficient incentives to invest and to stay in the 
market in the long run’. See R Inderst and G Shaffer, Buyer Power in Merger Control, (2008) Issues 
on competition law and policy,22,available 
at:http://www.wiwi.unifrankfurt.de/profs/inderst/Competition_Policy/Articles%20and%20Book%20Cha
pters%20on%20applied%20Competition%20Economics/Buyer_power_in_merger_Control.pdf(access
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concentration ratio on the supplier-side is higher than on the buyer side, each 
buyer’s purchasing volume may only take parts of the sellers’ total output. By 
contrast, customers may buy a very high proportion of their total products from a 
certain supplier. In this case buyers depend on suppliers more than the reverse.24 
However, higher concentration on the buyer-side may result in the economic 
dependence of suppliers on big buyers. Such dependence will result in vertical 
foreclosure between suppliers and buyers. Small customers will get discriminatory 
treatment unlike its strong competitors. If the small buyers are intermediate 
retailers, their exclusion will increase the market power of remaining retailers 
which are able to charge supra-competitive prices to final customers.25So far the 
Commission has only cleared one merger case based on countervailing buyer power 
in which the markets of suppliers and buyers are symmetrical.26 In Enso/Stora the 
European Commission was concerned merged entity would discriminate between 
two buyers (Elopak, andSIG Combibloc ) which bought much smaller volumes of 
liquid packaging board than the largest purchaser(Tatra Pak). In order to address 
the concerns Enso had offered to Elopak to divest its share in the joint venturing 
activities with Elopak. In addition, the merged entity offered a price protection 
mechanism to Elopak and SIG Combibloc which would ensure that the two smaller 
buyers would not be discriminated in comparison to Tetra Pak.27 
In conclusion, neither suppliers nor buyers can be price makers if their market 
structures are fragile. On the contrary, if there are only a few sellers and buyers in 
                                                                                                                               
ed on the 30
th
 January 2013).By contrast, asymmetry of market shares between suppliers and buyers 
will lead to economic dependence. See the discussion in A Pera and V Bonfitto, Buyer power in anti-
trust investigations: a review, supra note3,415. 
24
The extent of dependence might be deeper if the suppliers have a ‘must stock’ brand or expertise. 
Although large supermarkets have buyer power to countervail its suppliers, the Commission is of the 
opinion that those supermarkets are still dependent on their suppliers because the products of 
suppliers are ‘must stock’ items. See Case No IV/M.1313 Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, [2000] 
O.J. L20/1, paragraph 173; case IV/M.833the Coca-Cola Company/Calsberg A/S [1998] O.J. L154/41, 
paragraph 81. 
25
Through the ‘waterbed effect’ or ‘spiral effect’ weaker buyers will be excluded by their competitors’ 
embracing stronger power. See I Kokkoris, Buyer Power Assessment in Competition Law: A Boon or 
a Menace, supra note 3, pp.139-164. 
26
InEnso/Stora merger would have resulted in one large and two smaller suppliers’ were being faced 
with one large and two smaller buyers. Finally, the Commission considered that the buyers in these 
rather special market situations had sufficient countervailing buyer power to remove the possibility of 
the parties’ exercising market power. See Case IV/M.1225 Enso/Stora [1999] O.J. L254/9, point 97. 
27
Case COMP/M.1225 Enso/Stora, [1999] O.J. L 254/9, points 84-97. 
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the market, they might collude vertically to the detriment of consumers.28 The 
Commission does not specify how much market share of buyers can be deemed to 
have countervailing buyer power.29 The actual effect of countervailing buyer power 
should be analysed case by case. But it is necessary to show benefits to the final 
consumers.30 
2.2 Countervailing Buyer Power in China 
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Interim Rules, in considering whether a merger will 
create or strengthen market power, the MOFCOM should assess the purchasing 
capacity of the downstream customers of the merging parties.31 This article 
indicates that the MOFCOM also involves countervailing buyer power in merger 
assessment. However, the MOFCOM does not establish an analytical framework 
within which the countervailing buyer power is assessed. The method of practice 
can only be reviewed in published decisions. 
2.2.1 The Existence of Viable Alternatives or Credible Threats 
The MOFCOM has not in published decisions accepted any successful countervailing 
buyer power. There are two possible reasons for such absence. On the one hand, 
successful tactics of buyer power were adopted by the MOFCOM, and the 
concentration was cleared outright without notice to the public. If the absence is 
for this reason, the MOFCOM should improve the transparency of its clearance 
                                         
28
W A Adams, Competition, monopoly and countervailing power, (1953)Volume 67,Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, pp.469-492. 
29
One opinion states ‘the EU Commission and many NCAs consider that when retailers have a market 
share of 22 per cent or more in a certain category, suppliers of products in that category are in a state 
of economic dependence, because they cannot renounce to supply them. Shares between 10 and 20 
per cent give a strong negotiating power to retailers, while below 10 per cent there would not be an 
asymmetric situation’. This criterion has not so far been adopted by the Commission. See A Pera and 
V Bonfitto, Buyer power in anti-trust investigations: a review, supra note 3, 415. 
30
 PW Dobson and R Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power Come Together, 
note 18, 341. 
31
The MOFCOM indicates that the entry of potential competitors might offset any anti-competitive 
effects caused by the transaction. See Article 5-(7) and Article 12, the Interim Rules.  
180 
Chapter 5 Countervailing Factors: Buyer Power and Market Entry 
 
decision, and give a more clear explanation of its considerations of buyer power.32 
On the other hand, the MOFCOM did not find any buyer powers which were 
sufficient to restrain the price increase of the merged entity post-merger. Actually, 
in General Motor/Delphi the MOFCOM might ignore might have ignored the 
possibility of the existence of viable alternatives and buyer power. General 
Motor/Delphi was a vertical merger which was reviewed both in the EU and China. 
In the EU the Commission cleared this case outright, while input foreclosure and 
customer foreclosure were raised by the MOFCOM.33One reason for this 
inconsistency is that the MOFCOM did not investigate the buyer power of 
downstream competitors. The Commission ruled out the risk of input foreclosure as 
the presence of numerous alternative suppliers and a majority of customers stated 
that it would not be a problem for them to switch to alternative suppliers if the 
combined entity were to increase prices by 5-10%. In addition customer foreclosure 
was unlikely as GM’s demand for the upstream products in the EEA only 
represented a limited fraction of total industry demand.34The MOFCOM raised input 
foreclosure without considering whether the downstream domestic manufacturers 
who relied on Delphi as sole supplier would be able to source from other suppliers 
when the new entity exercised its market power; regarding customer foreclosure 
the MOFCOM did not determine whether Delphi would have an incentive to refuse 
supply to other buyers except the acquiring firm (GM).35The MOFCOM cleared the 
case with behaviour conditions.36It raises the MOFCOM’s cost on supervising the 
                                         
32
A practical framework for analysis will be discussed in ‘2.3.1Establishing an Analytical Framework’ 
in this chapter. 
33
 GM manufactures passenger cases and commercial vehicles, whereas Delphi produces a range of 
auto parts of components. The MOFCOM was concerned that, as Delphi is the sole supplier of a 
number of car manufacturers in China, the transaction could have an adverse effect on the stability, 
price and quality of Delphi’s supplies to domestic car manufacturers. GM could increase its purchase 
of auto parts and components from Delphi, thereby potentially eliminating or restricting competition in 
the auto parts and components markets. The MOFCOM was also concerned that through Delphi GM 
could gain access to competitively sensitive information about its competitors. See Announcement 
MOFCOM [2009] No.76 General Motors / Delphi;Case COMP/M.5617 General Motors/Delphi 
Corporation[2010] O.J.C 9/1.  
34
Case COMP/M.5617 General Motors/Delphi Corporation[2010] O.J.C 9/1, points 37 and 38. 
35
L Ross and K Zhou, MOFCOM's Clearance of the Pfizer/Wyeth and GM/Delphi Transactions with 
Conditions, (October, 2009), available 
at:http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=89400 (accessed 
on 27
th
 September 2013). 
36
The MOFCOM required after concentration that GM/Delphi must continue to supply domestic auto 
enterprises without discrimination; GM’s procurement of auto parts was to continue to follow the 
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implementation of behaviour conditions post-merger while the anti-competitive 
concerns may have no basis.  
2.2.2 The Incentive of Buyers to Act 
The incentive of buyer power is considered in Seagate/Samsung and Western 
Digital/Viviti Technologies. According to historical evidence, the MOFCOM noted 
that  
A price hike of HDDs was not opposed by large computer manufacturers if 
the increase was not to specific companies. Large computer manufacturers 
can pass the increase part of price onto final consumers through increasing 
the prices of computer products. Therefore the large computer producers 
have no incentive to exercise buyer power to countervail price increase in 
HDDs market.37 
In published decision the MOFCOM has not clarified in which scenario the 
intermediate buyers would have incentives to rebut the price increase of merging 
parties and pass its input saving onto final customers. 
2.2.3 The Role of Smaller Customers 
As with the EU the MOFCOM will not accept buyer power if a company is able to 
price-discriminate between big buyers and medium/small enterprises. In 
Panasonic/Sanyo the MOFCOM ascertained:  
Although a portion of the large downstream customers has the buyer 
countervailing power to counterbalance the market power of the merged 
entity, such buyer countervailing power cannot extend to other 
                                                                                                                               
policies of multiple souring and non-discriminatory purchases. See section 7, Announcement 
MOFCOM [2009] No.76 General Motors /Delphi. 
37
Part II-6, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate/Samsung and Announcement MOFCOM 
[2012] No.09Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. 
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medium/small sized customers who do not have comparable bargaining 
power.38 
It is presumed that the MOFCOM believes small buyers would be harmed by the 
merger even if larger buyer firms were not. The protection of all customers may 
lead to a problem. When customers of merged entity are enterprises, which are 
not the final individual consumers, the harm of merger to the downstream entities 
might not cause harm to the downstream competition.39However, the reasoning 
proposed by the MOFCOM has sent a negative message to the business community 
in China: instead of striving to become more efficient competitors in the market, 
the domestic competitors could seek protection from the enforcement 
agencies.40Considering the MOFCOM’s role in implementing non-competitive policy, 
the uncertainty will leave room for the intervention of non-competitive 
considerations, and rent-seeking activities such as lobbying.41 
2.3 Discussion and Recommendations 
2.3.1 Establishing an Analytical Framework 
In China’s legislation on antitrust merger control assessment, countervailing buyer 
power is still only a concept in legislation. No further practical rules can be found. 
This leaves great discretion  to the MOFCOM. The buyer power defence in the EU is 
                                         
38
Part IV-1-(c), Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic/Sanyo. 
39
See the discussion in following ‘2.3.3Situation of Price Discrimination’. 
40
 The MOFCOM has missions to implement competition policy as well as industry policy. It has 
motive to deny the existence of countervailing buyer power and prohibit or impose substantial 
condition on notified foreign merger. Its excuse might be that small or medium domestic enterprises 
cannot countervail the market power of a merged entity. As the MOFCOM has incentive to protect 
domestic enterprises, in Coca cola/ Huiyuan competitors of the merged entity initiated the ‘lobbying’ 
activity to the MOFCOM. Many domestic juice enterprises jointly requested the MOFCOM to initiate a 
hearing regarding the concentration. They even sent these opposite views straight to the department 
which is at upper-level than the MOFCOM in the administrative system. This transaction was finally 
blocked. It does not know how much influence the domestic ‘lobby’ works in the procedure. See P 
Xieand Y Li, 可口可乐收购汇源被否的幕后博弈 [Backstage Game on prohibiting the acquisition of 
Huiyuan by Coca Cola, KekouKeleShougou Huiyuan Beifou de MuhouBoyi], (March, 2009), 南方周末
[Southern Weekly, Nanfang Zhoumo],available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/26050(accessed on 
the 20
th
 February 2013). 
41
The role of the MOFCOM in conducting industry policy is described in ‘4.2.2.2Mission of 
Implementing Non-competitive Considerations’ in chapter 1. 
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assessed according to three factors discussed above. These are established in the 
Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. The MOFCOM should consider including similar 
factors in published rules in future. The following section describes how to transfer 
the consideration factors from the EU to China. 
First of all the MOFCOM should make clear that buyers of merging parties can 
restrain the price increase of a merged entity in three ways.42Nevertheless, 
merging parties will exaggerate the effects of the buyer power in order to 
minimise the likelihood of anti-competitive effects of merger. The MOFCOM should 
especially care where buyer power is unlikely to switch supply when the merged 
entity’s price increases, although available alternatives or potential entry exist. 
According to the experience of the EU, barriers deterring the shift of suppliers 
include customers’ lack of enough information about other suppliers;43new 
suppliers’ not having enough surplus capacity to satisfy the switch of 
order;44merging parties’ own important product brands,45and the alternatives’ in 
the market not being the close substitutes of merging parties’ products. Secondly, 
if buyers intend to constrain the price increase of a merged entity through 
entering into the upstream market itself, they have to overcome various barriers 
or spend giant sunk cost. The MOFCOM should treat it as a potential entry in 
assessment.46Thirdly, buyer power does not need to be conducted before merger. 
A mere possibility of threat to conduct the above two scenarios is enough to prove 
the existence of buyer power defence. The MOFCOM could evaluate the effect of 
threats in the light of realistic entry.  
                                         
42
These three situations are discussed in ‘2.1.1The Existence of Viable Alternatives or Credible 
Threat’ in this chapter. 
43
 M L Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 497. 
44
As Steptoe analysed, ‘sophisticated buyers may become less astute in the face of such complexities 
as products that use a wide variety of materials, require negotiated payments for intangible such as 
patent licenses, or involve accounting problems such as the production of co-products from a single 
manufacturing process.’ Therefore, when the buyers use a wide variety of materials to manufacture 
their products, they will find it hard to tell when the sellers’ prices are supra-competitive especially 
when the price increases gradually. In this case the buyers would not switch suppliers when merged 
entity increases price post-merger’. See ML Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, 
supra note 3, 496. 
45
Buyers may find it hard to find alternatives for products with ‘must stock’ brand, like Coca Cola for 
retailers of carbonated beverage. 
46
Discussion of market entry refers to part 3 in the chapter. 
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2.3.2 When Buyers Have Greater Incentive to Initiate Their 
Countervailing Power 
The MOFCOM should be aware that the more potential benefit buyers can get, the 
greater incentive they have to initiate their countervailing power. If expenditure 
on the merging parties’ product takes a substantial percentage of buyer’s total 
input cost, the buyer will have incentive to constrain the price increase of merging 
parties. Secondly, the MOFCOM should investigate the fierce competition in the 
end-product market. It decides whether the intermediate retailer would like to 
save input costs or pass the price increase of input costs directly onto final 
customers. Thirdly, in order to protect itself against supply disruptions or to 
acquire a mix of products, buyers may prefer to keep multiple procurement rather 
than sponsoring a rival of merged parties through offering a long-term contract 
exclusively. This concern may deter buyers from switching or sponsoring a supplier 
exclusively.47 
2.3.3 Situation of Price Discrimination 
The MOFCOM should note when the buyer power may only benefit strong 
customers, while small customers will suffer or be excluded.48Price discrimination 
may develop strong buyers at the expense of weaker rivals. The MOFCOM should 
                                         
47
In Seagate/Samsung investigation showed that the merged entity would still keep its multi-sourcing 
policy post-merger on the merchant market rather than in-house supply of heads and media. The 
notifying party claimed that it currently does not have spare capacity immediately to internalise the 
whole of Samsung’s demand. Case COMP/M.6214Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of 
Samsung Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3, paragraph 568, 
48
 Suppliers grant preferential treatment to major than smaller buyers. This leads to two-fold 
advantages. Major buyers get more advantageous term for themselves. They can use the cost 
advantage to invest more in research and development in order to widen the gap between them and 
small buyers. Small buyers, in order to keep market share, are squeezed to cut prices to the same 
level as stronger buyers although the wholesale price is higher (the ‘waterbed’ effect).  In the short 
term the price of products to customers could be reduced. However, when small buyers are squeezed 
sufficiently and leave the market, the supply-side market will be further consolidated. Strong buyers 
could reduce the depth or breadth of their previous offering to customers or reduce outside options for 
consumers. In this situation consumer welfare is harmed. See P W Dobson and R Inderst, The 
Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power Come Together, supra note 18,337. 
185 
Chapter 5 Countervailing Factors: Buyer Power and Market Entry 
 
analyse buyer power and price discrimination based on a careful case-by-case 
analysis of ‘the interaction of horizontal and vertical effects’.49 
Firstly, if buyer power defence is initiated, the MOFCOM should investigate the 
market structures on the supply-side as well as the buyer-side. Price discrimination 
may arise if the markets of supply-side and buyer-side are both concentrated. 
Since horizontal merger raises anti-competitive concerns, the merged entity may 
take a single dominant position or collective dominant position with other 
competitors. The supply-side of the market is consolidated in a unique supplier or 
a number of competitors. If there are also dominant buyers on the downstream 
market, such strong buyers may negotiate terms of trade with merging parties that 
do not apply to small buyers. Such a price discrimination situation is more likely to 
happen in the market of the buyer-side if:  
1) The wholesale price has a closer relationship with the purchase volume; 
especially where ‘there is already substantial price discrimination among 
buyers of different size’; 2) there is a considerable overlap between the 
outlets controlled by the stronger buyer and those of the rivals discriminated 
against. In such situation the growth of the buyer will be more at the expense 
of its weaker rivals rather than through expanding the market as a whole;50 3) 
price discrimination appears more easily in cases where some merging parties 
also possess substantial power (or where such market power is created 
through merger) in the downstream market. It will increase the wholesale 
price to the other rivals in the buyer side market.51 
In light of the above the MOFCOM should investigate industrial practices and supply 
arrangement before concluding that price discrimination would take place in a 
specific case. If any of the above situations is detected in its investigations the 
MOFCOM should consider a possible consequence of price discrimination to the 
final consumers. Nevertheless, the MOFCOM should bear in mind that exclusion of 
                                         
49
See ‘2.1.3 The Role of Smaller Customers’ in the chapter. 
50
See Case IV/M.1221, Rewe/Meinl, [1999] O.J. L274/1. 
51
See P Dobson and RInderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power Come 
Together, supra note 18, pp.332-357. 
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fragile customers is not the only result. In order to countervail the market power 
of a merged entity, weaker buyers can enlarge its power through cooperation, such 
as ‘a group purchasing organisation or even a buyer cartel’.52In addition, some 
large buyers may also wish to resell products to small buyers in arbitrage 
transactions.53 The MOFCOM could undo a transaction on the condition of price 
protection to smaller buyers. The price protection will guarantee that, subject to 
objective cost justifications, any percentage increase in the parties' prices to 
larger buyers will not be smaller than the percentage increase in the prices to 
smaller customers. Similarly, any percentage price decrease to larger buyers will 
not be greater than any percentage price decrease to smaller purchasers.54 
2.3.4 Publishing Reasoning Process 
In the EU there is no definite situation in which buyer power exists and will be 
exercised after merger. Firstly, notwithstanding available alternatives or credible 
new entry are available, large buyers may not switch because of incomplete 
information, high switch cost or ‘multiple source’ strategy. Secondly, strong buyer 
power may not shield smaller buyers from the unilateral effects of an upstream 
merger. In the long run competition in the downstream market will still be 
affected. Therefore, in published decision, the MOFCOM should not just declare 
that ‘buyer power is insufficient to countervail the power of the merged entity’.55 
In order to set a reference for further cases the MOFCOM should disclose 
arguments submitted by merging parties, and its comparative reasoning on each 
point.  
                                         
52
See D E Mills, Buyer Power and Industry Structure, supra note 23, 3. 
53
 See section III. Treatment of cases where some buyers are large and some are small inM L 
Steptoe, the Power-Buyer Defence in Merger Cases, supra note 3, 499. 
54
Paragraph 78, Case IV/M.1882 Pirelli/BICC, points 78.See Case COMP/M.1225Enso/Stora, [1999] 
O.J. L 254/9, points 84-97.Imports make the supply of liquid packaging board more competitive. Case 
COMP/M.1225Enso/Stora, [1999] O.J. L 254/9, points 84-97. 
55
Part 4-1-(3), Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 Panasonic / Sanyo. 
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3 Entry 
3.1 The Ease of Entry in the EU 
Even when merger will create a dominant firm the Commission still believes it is 
compatible with market competition ‘if there exists strong evidence that this 
position is only temporary and would be quickly eroded because of high probability 
of strong market entry’.56It has various debates on the concept of entry barriers. 
The main argument concerns two distinct approaches to defining market entry. 
The first approach is proposed by Bain and the other is by Stigler.57Bain defines 
barriers to entry from the above-normal profits which incumbents can earn without 
inducing entry. Stigler analyses barriers to entry from cost advantage that entrants 
must bear but incumbents do not. The difference between these two concepts is 
treatment to scale economies and capital requirements. The former definition 
takes scale economies and capital requirements as barriers deterring entry, 
whereas the latter excludes these two considerations from barriers to entry as 
incumbents had to bear them as well in the past.58 The following reviews the 
approach of the Commission to analysing market entry in merger control.  
The concept of barriers to entry in the EU aligns more closely with Bain than with 
Stigler. Barriers to entry are defined as ‘specific features of the markets which 
give incumbent firms advantages over potential competitors’.59In determining 
whether entry is ‘easy’ the Commission indicates that they will explore whether 
‘entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient.’60 
                                         
56
 See Case No IV/M.53 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland,[1991] O.J. L334/42, paragraph 53. 
57
 Various definitions of market entry are concluded in R P Mcafee et al., What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 
(May 2004)Volume 94 No.2, AEA Papers and Proceedings, pp. 461-465.The differences between 
these two approach has been analysed in Editors of ABA, Market Power Handbook, (ABA publishing, 
2005), 123. 
58
Editors of ABA, ibid. 
59
Paragraph 70, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
60
 For discussion of market entry see, D Besankoand D Dranove etc, Economics of Strategy, Third 
Edition,(Wiley, 2003), pp. 297-326;R H Bork, Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, (the Free 
Press, 1980),pp. 310-330; D T Scheffinan and M Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential 
Competitive Effects From a Merger, (2003) Volume12 Issue 2, George Mason Law Review, pp. 319-
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3.1.1 Likelihood of Entry 
The Guidelines state that ‘potential entry is likely to constrain the behaviour of 
incumbents post-merger only if it is sufficiently profitable taking into account the 
price effects of injecting additional output into the market and the potential 
responses of the incumbents.’61 In the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers the 
Commission divides the barriers to entry into four kinds which accord with the 
legal entry barriers proposed in the literature.62 These barriers are legal 
advantages and technical advantages (economies of scale) secured by incumbent 
firms, the established position of incumbent firms on the market, and sunk costs of 
entry. Manufacturers may give up accessing into a market if the costs of 
overcoming barriers to entry outweigh the benefit of the supra-competitive price 
after entry.  
i. Legal advantage 
The Commission takes legal advantages of incumbent firms to be situations ‘where 
regulatory barriers limit the number of market participants by, for example, 
restricting the number of licences. They also cover tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers’.63 Scholars remind enforcement authorities to pay attention to specific 
situations. For example, legal advantages of incumbents may not be obvious if the 
                                                                                                                               
370; D Harbordand T Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition policy, (1994) 
Volume 14, International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 411-435; N Attenborough et al., Are 
three to two mergers in market with entry barriers necessarily problematic?, (2007) Volume 28 Issue 
10, E.C.L.R., pp. 539-552; M Leddy, Entry Issues in Merger Analysis, (1985) Volume 54, Antitrust 
Law Journal, pp. 1257-1985. 
61
Paragraph 69, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
62
 ‘Legal entry barriers’ is a term used to distinguish these from entry barriers in economic theory. 
Under the economic theory of the Chicago school, some legal entry barriers are not taken to be 
obstacles from the economic perspective, like vertical issues. Although classification is varied, the 
content of entry barriers has no significant differences. See D Harbordand T Hoehn, Barriers to Entry 
and Exit in European Competition policy, supra note 60, 415. 
63
Paragraph 71, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. See also notes 88 and 89, citing Cases IV/M.1430 
Vodafone/Airtouch, (1999)O.J.C295/02, paragraph 27; Case IV/M.2016France Télécom/Orange, 
(2000) O.J.C261/06, paragraph 33. 
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licence fee is lower than the profits after entry or patents can be avoided by 
redesigning products or processes easily.64 
ii. Technical advantages 
The Commission outlines a series of technical advantages enjoyed by the 
incumbents which make it difficult for any entrant to compete successfully.65The 
most controversial point among these advantages is economies of scale and scope 
secured by incumbents.66In the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers the effect of 
economies of scale and scope in easing entry is not illustrated. In general, 
economies of scale may result in a high ‘minimum viable scale of entry’ and a high 
‘minimum efficient scale’.67 It makes market entry through two channels 
unprofitable. The first is to spend more money on investment; the second is to 
have less chance to recoup investment as the increase of output post-merger 
would result in the reduction of product price even below the pre-merger 
level.68On the other hand, there are voices denying economies of scale are a 
barrier to entry in any instance because firstly the cost entrants pay for economies 
of scale is also paid by the previous incumbents.69 Secondly the cost savings 
brought by economies of scale may outweigh its detriment to the interest of 
consumers.70Thirdly scholars believe the cost of scale economies can be recouped 
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Editors of ABA, Market Power Handbook, supra note 57, 130. 
65
Point 71, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
66
See Chapter 2 in J Stennek and F Verboven, Merger control and enterprise competitiveness-
empirical analysis and policy recommendations in F Ilzkovitzand R Meiklejohn, European Merger 
Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2006), pp.202-302;J 
Farrell and C Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis, (2001) Volume 
68 No.3, Antitrust Law Journal, pp. 685-710. 
67
The minimum viable scale refers to the smallest annual level of sales that the committed entrant 
must persistently achieve for profitability at pre-merger prices. The minimum efficient scale 
(MES)refers to the output level at which the unit costs stop falling as output increases. See note 421, 
Editors of ABA, Market Power Handbook, supra note 57, 128. Citing the concepts from note 29 in the 
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992 (amended in 1997), s.3.3. 
68
These two effects have been pointed out in Editors of ABA, ibid., 128. 
69
This is the opinion of Stigler on the assessment of market entry. 
70
 Economies of scale are a vital part of efficiency created by merger. The cost savings brought by 
economies of scale may be more than the compensation for reduction in total output because of fewer 
firms post-merger. In this situation economies of scale as a barrier to entry are not detrimental to the 
interest of consumers. Efficiency defence involving economies of scale created by merger will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
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if a fraction of consumers can switch from the incumbents to new entrants or total 
output is increased due to market growth.71 To sum up, economies of scale can 
only be taken as barriers to entry when associated with substantial sunk costs 
which are uncertain to be recovered after merger.72 The EU embraces a cautious 
altitude to economies of scale. It was identified as a barrier to entry in many cases 
unless ‘the entrant can obtain a sufficiently large market share’.73 For example, in 
Sanitec/Sphinx, the Commission stated that barriers to entry in the European 
bathroom product market are high. One reason is that: 
High capacity utilisation is generally necessary for the production of 
bathroom products to be profitable and thus it must be assumed that a new 
market entrant would be required to sell a considerable volume of output.74 
iii. The established position of the incumbent firms on the market 
Incumbents often have a ‘first mover’ advantages because they have already built 
a quality or brand name reputation. New entrants may have to work harder and 
spend more on promotion or advertising in order to break ‘consumer loyalty to a 
particular brand and the closeness of relationships between suppliers and 
customers.75In addition, if incumbents still have excessive capacity, they may 
expand their output by excessive capacity with lower costs in the short term to 
deter the new entrant. Its advantage in expansion raises a barrier to entry. 
iv. Sunk costs of entry 
Sunk costs are those which are irrecoverable upon exit from the market.76 Their 
impact has three aspects. To new entrants sunk costs increase the risk of entry 
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Hence the Commission indicates that ‘entry is more likely to be profitable in a market that is 
expected to experience high growth in the future than in a market that is mature or expected to 
decline’. See paragraph 73, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
72
This point is also expressed in H M Mialon and M A Williams, What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 
(2004)Volume 94 No.2, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 423. 
73
Paragraph 72, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
74
Case IV/M.1578Sanitec/Sphinx, [2000] O.J. L 294/1, point 114. 
75
Paragraph 71-c), note 94 and 95, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
76
Note 41, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers.  
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because they cannot be recouped on exiting; to incumbents, it is a commitment to 
stay in the market, and they will think up a number of strategies to deter the entry 
of other entrants; sunk costs create a cost asymmetry between entrants and 
incumbents. 77 Therefore the Commission recognised that high risk and costs of 
failed entry may make entry less likely,78 unless an entrant must be sure that it 
will recoup its sunk costs through its sales.79Therefore entry is particularly likely if 
suppliers in other markets already possess production facilities that could be used 
to enter the market in question, thus reducing the sunk cost of entry,80 or 
investment for market entry can be protected by commitments. By contrast, entry 
is less likely if the expected output post-entry is not large relative to the size of 
the market, as large sunk costs may not be distributed across a limited volume of 
sales.81 
3.1.2 Timeliness 
The Commission examines whether entry would be sufficiently swift and sustained 
to deter or defeat the exercise of market power. The entry is normally only 
considered timely if it occurs within two years. However, the acceptable period 
can be adjusted according to ‘the characteristics and dynamics of the market, as 
well as on the specific capabilities of potential entrants’.82 For instance, the 
period of market entry can be prolonged if ‘goods and services are supplied and 
purchased on long-term contracts’ or ‘the relevant product is a durable good’.83 
                                         
77
Kinds of sunk cost and the influence of sunk cost on market entry have been analysed in D Harbord 
and T Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition policy, supra note 60, 414.See also 
BC Eaton and R GLipsey, Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to 
Entry, (1980) Volume 11, No. 2,The Bell Journal of Economics, pp.721-729. 
78
Paragraph 69, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
79
 Editors of ABA,Market power hand book, supra note 57, 127. 
80
Paragraph 73, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
81
 Editors of ABA,Market power hand book, supra note 57, 129. 
82
Paragraph 74, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. The Commission only states that a five- year 
period post-merger is ‘clearly outside the time frame used to assess the impact of potential 
competition on a proposed merger’. See Case No COMP/M.1693 Alcoa / Reynolds, O.J. L 58/25, 
point 31. 
83
See chapter 5, ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup, Project on Merger 
Guidelines: Report for the Third ICN Annual Conference in Seoul (April, 2004), point 37, note 75 and 
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3.1.3 Sufficiency 
The Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers states: ‘entry must be of sufficient scope and 
magnitude to deter or defeat the anti-competitive effects of the merger’.84 The 
meaning of sufficiency is obvious. Small entry in scope and magnitude still cannot 
restrict the merged entity with high market share to behave independently of its 
competitors following the concentration. In Tetra Pak/Alfa Laval, although the 
Commission had identified at least one potential entrant, market of entry wasstill 
not considered to be significant enough to limit Tetra Pak’s freedom of action.An 
entrant is required to get patents, have track records and invest heavily, which 
might exceed returns. Therefore the Commission still believed the barriers to 
entry were high.85 
However, in the Guidelines the Commission does not further define the criteria for 
the extent of ‘scope and magnitude’ which can be seen as sufficient. In general, 
the output of new entrant should be large enough to fill the gap between the likely 
output in the absences of the merger and the likely post-merger output.86 
3.1.3.1 Historical Evidence on Entry 
The Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers indicate that historical examples of entry 
and exit in the industry may provide useful information about the size of entry 
barriers.87 In general, historical entry may imply the future condition if the market 
situation shows little change. If market situation changes historical evidence may 
not indicate the future entry properly. One condition is that historical entry may 
                                                                                                                               
76. Capabilities of market entry can only be checked when long-term contracts are terminated or the 
durable goods need to be changed after being used for a period of time. 
84
Paragraph 75, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
85
 Note 101, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. Citing Case IV/M.68 Tetra Pak/Alfa Laval, [1991]O.J. 
L 290/35, point 3.4. 
86
Note 38 in Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues,supranote11, 486. The reason 
has been explained in US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992, s3.4. ‘As merged entity will increase 
the price post-merger, its sales will be reduced. Entry will make the merged firm be unable to 
internalize enough of the sales loss due to the price rise, rendering the price increase unprofitable’.  
87
Paragraph 70, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers. 
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not imply that future entry is easy or likely;88 on the other hand, recent changes in 
the market may make market entry easier than before.89 In conclusion, no single 
item of evidence can make sure that entry will be likely, timely or successful. 
Rather, analysis must consider a wide range of evidence.90 
3.2 Ease of Entry in China 
As with the EU the Interim Rules in China also make clear that MOFCOM will review 
the ‘likelihood’, ‘timeliness’ and ‘sufficiency’ of proposed entry.91 However, the 
Assessment Rules provide no guidance on the meaning of these three terms.92It is 
unknown whether there is any new entrant that was considered sufficient to 
counteract the anti-competitive issue of merger in China. Once a merger is cleared 
because of countervailing entry power, the decision will not be published by the 
MOFCOM.93Thus, in merger case analysis following, it can only be known in which 
condition entry is not able to countervail anti-competitive concerns caused by the 
concentration. It is opaque on the standard of a successful market entry.  
3.2.1 Likelihood of Entry 
In practice the MOFCOM considered the technical requirements leading to high 
sunk cost of entry, such as natural resources,94 innovation and R&D,95intellectual 
                                         
88
 The market power handbook also lists four such conditions: 1) the structural characteristics of the 
market were substantially different currently; 2) the previous entrant has entered with large scale 
which makes up the gap between capacity and demand in the market. For the current entrant large 
scale of entry will lead to excessive capacity and unprofitability; 3) previous entrants have some rare 
resources for entry which the new entrant cannot get, or 4) where the legal/regulatory environment 
has been stricter to new entrants currently. Editors of ABA, Market power hand book, supra note 
57,127. 
89
 The market power handbook also described such a scenario, ‘the expiration of a patent, sudden 
growth in demand or changes in regulation all can work to facilitate entry’. Editors of ABA,ibid.,138.  
90
Ibid., 139. 
91
See also Article 7 and Article 12 of the Interim Rules, ‘if barriers deterring accessing into the 
relevant market of merging parties are low, business operators who do not participate in the 
concentration are able to restrain merging parties to eliminate or restrict competition post-merger’. 
92
No secondary literature can be found on the topic.  
93
According to article 28 of the AML2008 only clearance with restrictive conditions and prohibition 
need to be published.  
94
In Uralkali/Silvinit, barrier to entry to the relevant market is considered to be high, since ‘after the 
review, the MOFCOM found that potassium resources are mainly concentrated in the existing 
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property rights,96 the cost that customers confronted in switching to a new 
supplier.97In addition, economies of scale may also constitute barriers to 
entry.98Apart from sunk costs, barriers to entry considered by the MOFCOM also 
included the expected evolution of the market99 and historical examples of entry 
and exit in the industry.100 
                                                                                                                               
potassium chloride manufacturers, because the exploitation of new mines or expansion of existing 
facilities require massive funds, which are time-consuming and involve significant risks in terms of 
industry, technology, geology and environment. Hence, it is relatively difficult for other competitors to 
enter the potassium chloride market’. Section 2, paragraph 5, Announcement of MOFCOM [2011] 
No.33,Uralkali / Silvinit. 
95
In Pfizer/Wyeth, the MOFCOM indicated that ‘R&D of drug needs high cost and a long period. 
According to statistics, to develop a new product takes about three to ten years with the investment of 
2.5 million to 10 million U.S. dollars. Market investigation indicated that technical barriers for entering 
into MPS market are even higher. After Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth, Pfizer is very likely to use the 
scale advantage to further expand its market in China, to suppress other competitors and compress 
market space of other enterprises.’ Section 4, 2)-3, Announcement of MOFCOM [2009] 
No.77,Pfizer/Wyeth.In case GE/Shenhuathe investigation revealed that the coal-water slurry 
gasification technology is a complex of many sophisticated technologies, and the process and 
engineering technologies involved could only become mature after a long period of practice, and there 
are significant commercial risks for new technologies that have not been sufficiently tested. Section 2-
paragraph 6, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.74 GE/Shenhua. 
96
In Savio / Penelope, investigation found that the relevant patents, know-how and trade secrets play 
a key role in the research, development and production of electronic yarn clearers for automatic 
winders, and the relevant technologies are protected by patents and other intellectual property rights, 
which is a significant barrier or new entrants. Section 2-4),Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 
Savio / Penelope. 
97
InGoogle/Motorola Mobility the MOFCOM indicated that the barriers to entry to the market of 
operating systems for smart mobile phones are high. One of the reasons is the high switching cost to 
customers. See part two, point 7, Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.25Google/Motorola Mobility. 
98
In Savio/Penelope economies of scale were quite important in the industry of textile machinery 
including electronic yarn clearers, and it was very difficult for new entrants to establish economies of 
scale in a short time. Section 2-4),Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio / Penelope.In 
Samsung/Seagate the MOFCOM investigated the importance of economies of scale in the relevant 
market. New entrants could not survive unless their manufacture and sales reached a certain amount. 
In order to realise the economies of scale, new entrants should invest significantly in production, R&D 
and marketing which has high risk in the process. Section 2-7),Announcement MOFCOM [2011] 
No.90 Seagate / Samsung. 
99
 In Panasonic/Sanyo the MOFCOM found that the development of Nickel Hydrogen Battery market 
had slowed down and therefore it was fairly difficult to attract sufficient market entrants  to offset the 
restrictive and eliminative competitive effect. Section IV-2-c), Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.82 
Panasonic / Sanyo. 
100
 InSavio/Penelope investigation did not find any successful case of new entry into this market 
during the past three years. Evidence showed that there were companies collaborating in research 
and development in electronic yarn clearers for automatic winders in 2009, but their product did not 
receive customer recognition, and did not win any market share in 2010. MOFCOM concluded that 
there were considerable difficulties for new entry into the market of automatic yarn clearers for 
automatic winders. Section 2-7), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio / Penelope.In 
Seagate/Samsung the MOFCOM found that ‘in the latest decade, there is no new entrant access to 
the market’. Section 2-4), Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate / Samsung. 
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Unlike in the EU legal advantages of incumbent firms have not appeared in the 
MOFCOM’s published decisions to date. These include the limited number of 
licences, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. 
3.2.2 Timeliness 
By June 2013 the MOFCOM still had not given a clear response to the question how 
they would react to the expected entry post-merger. According to the rules of the 
MOFCOM merger investigation is based on the statistics of the year before 
notification.101Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite was notified on 22 December 2008. 
Therefore the MOFCOM was supposed to investigate the statistics of market 
situation in 2007.However, the MOFCOM neither mentioned the market entry in 
2007, nor expected the effects of a potential entrant on market competition in the 
year following merger.102 
3.2.3 Sufficiency 
To date the MOFCOM has not indicated the meaning of ‘sufficiency’ in its 
regulation or published decisions. Market entry has become a necessary condition 
to evaluating the likely effects of concentration on market competition in China. 
The case decisions of the MOFCOM show a cautious attitude towards allowing 
potential competition as a countervailing of anti-competitive concern.  
                                         
101
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Guidance for notification of concentrations of undertakings, ‘the turnover 
of notification shall comprise the amount of the revenue received by the undertakings concerned in 
the preceding fiscal year from product sale and service provision, after the exclusion of relevant taxes 
and surcharges’. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement No.11 of 
1
th
January 2010, Measures for Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators (the ‘Notification 
Measures’).  
102
See the case analysis in ‘3.3.3Sufficiency of Market Entry’ in this chapter. 
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3.3 Discussion and Recommendations 
3.3.1 When Entry is more likely 
Up to June 2013, eleven notified concentrations getting published case decisions in 
China were also reviewed in the EU. Except Pfizer/Wyeth, the barriers to entry in 
other transactions were considered high both in the EU and China.103It can be said 
that the threshold to market entry in China is not lower than in the EU.104 In order 
to avoid the standard’s being too cautious in China, certain recommendations are 
listed. 
First of all the MOFCOM needs to draw up a check-list of entry barriers in related 
rules. This is to clarify the discretion of the MOFCOM, and give notifying parties a 
basis for argument. According to the experience of the EU the barriers to market 
entry include at least legal advantages, technical advantages of the incumbents, 
‘first-mover’ advantages of incumbents and the expected evolution of the 
market.105 As legal advantages are straightforward and obvious, their use needs no 
further discussion here. The following evaluates another three factors.  
1. Economies of scale are not a reason for deterring market entry at any time, 
because market entry is still likely even where economies of scale are required. It 
depends on the scale of sunk costs, and whether such costs will certainly be 
compensated for post-merger.106 On the other hand, economies of scale enjoyed by 
the merged entity might not be a barrier to entry either. For example, if a 
                                         
103
In Pfizer/Wyeth the MOFCOM stated that the barriers to entry are high. However, the Commission 
concluded that pipeline products were expected to enter the market. It is one of the reasons for 
concluding that merger does not raise serious doubts in any MRCC market. See Case 
COMP/M.5476Pfize /Wyeth[2009] O.J. C 262/1, paragraph 38. 
104
Indeed, from analysis in Mitsubishi Rayon /Lucite it is presumed that the MOFCOM has a higher 
threshold on the likelihood of market entry than the EU. See ‘3.3.3Sufficiency of Market Entry’ in the 
chapter. 
105
See the discussion in ‘2.1.1The Existence of Viable Alternatives or Credible Threats’ in this chapter. 
106
Sunk cost might be low if the new entrant is in the neighbouring relevant market. In addition, a new 
entrant will still enter a market if sunk cost is likely to be compensated through its sale. Microsoft’s 
entering the internet browser business is an instance of the entrant’s overcoming sunk cost and 
accessing the market as the size is larger than the largest incumbent. Thus it is presumed that sunk 
cost itself is not a barrier to entry. It is only a concern to the new entrant when it is associated with 
uncertain result. SeeR P Mcafee et al., What Is a Barrier to Entry?, supra note 57, 464. 
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substantial output is a requirement for profitability, then a small switch of 
customers may make it unprofitable;107or the market is in the growth. Therefore 
the MOFCOM should investigate the expected evolution of the market. 
2. The established position of the incumbent may be temporarily and easily broken. 
Patents are not a barrier if they can be avoided by redesigning at low cost.108 
Technical advantage can be broken if R&D is fast. For example, in the pharmacy 
market pipeline products will enter the market when they are ripe.109 Therefore 
the MOFCOM should also investigate the speed of evolution in assessing market 
entry.  
3.3.2 Timeliness 
Market entry within a certain period after merger should be considered. The 
specific time range is expected to be issued by the MOFCOM. However, the specific 
range should be adjusted in light of certain characteristics and dynamics of the 
market, such as the ‘long-term contract of supply’ or ‘the duration of products’.110 
3.3.3 Sufficiency of Market Entry 
Given entry is likely, the next step is to consider whether the size of potential 
entrant is sufficient to restrict the merged group’s behaving unilaterally. Up to 
now the MOFCOM has not identified any potential entrant in published decisions. 
Its criteria in evaluating sufficiency can only be detected in Mitsubishi 
Rayon/Lucite.111On 12 December 2008, the MOFCOM received the notification of 
the proposed transaction. Later, Mitsubishi submitted supplementary documents 
according to MOFCOM’s requirements. On 20 January 2009, the MOFCOM thought 
the filing documents met the standards and initiated merger review. After 
                                         
107
See supra note 9. 
108
See supra note 64. 
109
See case analysis about Pfizer/Wyeth in supra note 96. 
110
See above note 84 in ‘3.1.2 Timeliness. 
111
Announcement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon / Lucite. 
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investigation, the MOFCOM concerned the notified concentration was very likely to 
impose adverse effects on China’s MMA market. The market share of merged entity 
would reach 64% which would be much higher than Jilin Petrochemical Co., Ltd. 
and Heilongjiang Longxin Company, who were the second and the third largest 
players in the market. Therefore, the merged entity with dominant position would 
exclude and restrict competitors after concentration.  
Actually, in 2007, the capability of MMA in Chinese market was 290,000 tons within 
which the capacity of Mitsubishi Rayon in China was 90,000 tons and the capacity 
of Lucite in China was 100,000 tons. The combined market share of merging parties 
was about 65.5% in 2007 which was close to 64% clarified by the MOFCOM in case 
decision. However, market structure had substantive changes in 2008. There exists 
strong evidence that this position of merged entity was only temporary and would 
be quickly eroded because of high probability of strong market entry. Firstly, 
Sinopec of Jilin Chemical Industry expanded its output to 100,000 tons, sothe total 
capability of MMA in Chinese market increased to 340,000 tons in 2008. The 
capacity of merged entity would be 190,000 tons which took 55.9% share in 
Chinese MMA market. In 2009, Evonik (Shanghai) would conduct a project 
producing 115,000 tons of MMA per year. Thus, the share of merged entity in 
Chinese MMA market would be less than 40%. In addition, based on the Zero-Tariff 
policy between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China, MMA 
producers in Southeast Asia (e.g. the MMA manufacturers in Thailand and Korea) 
would easily access into China if the merged entity initiated its market power 
unilaterally. In light of the above, the transaction would not raise anti-competitive 
concerns on market competition.112The MOFCOM finally ignored those expected 
market entry in the published case decision which raised the criticism of 
specifically protecting domestic enterprises in merger control.113 
                                         
112
See B Wang and K Yan, Dispute on Market Share—Follow-up on Mitsubishi v. Rayon, (1
st
 May 
2009), The Economic Observer, 6, available at: http://epaper.eeo.com.cn/pdf/pdf/eeo/418/06.pdf 
(accessed on the22
nd
 February 2013) 
113
Domestic enterprises reported their concerns to transaction Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite to State 
Council which has superior administrative authority than the MOFCOM. They argued that the 
transaction would further reduce the market power of domestic enterprises in competition, and create 
a monopoly. One opinion said the lobby from domestic enterprises and related trade association 
made great impact on case review. In addition, the MOFCOM did not organise a hearing in which 
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It is presumed that the MOFCOM still adopts an over-cautious altitude to proposed 
entry. When market entrant is likely and sufficient the MOFCOM can approve a 
transaction given countervailing market entry.114 No matter whether the defence 
of market entry is accepted or denied, the MOFCOM should present its reasons in 
published decisions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
merging parties could defend their views before domestic enterprises and industrial associations face 
to face. Merging parties and their rivals expressed their views to the MOFCOM separately.The 
merging parties were not entitled adequately to answer the anti-competitive concerns of their 
domestic rivals. In addition, the MOFCOM expressed its favour of protection of domestic enterprises 
in other cases. In Uralkali / Silvinitthe MOFCOM stated the importance of agricultural fertiliser to 
China’s economy and food production stability. In remedies the MOFCOM requires the merged entity 
to maintain the status quo to customers in China. In order to prevent the ‘political lobbying’ from 
influencing its final decision, the MOFCOM should go a step further which not only clarifies the harm 
of proposed merger to domestic enterprises, but also to the market competition in case decisions.See 
B Wang and K Yan, ibid. 
114
 See note 87supra. The product of a new entrant should also be a close substitute for the merged 
group’s products in quality, duration and other essential respects. 
200 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
1 Key Findings in the Study 
The development of an anti-trust merger control regime in China has been fast. 
More progress is expected with accumulation of merger review experience.1 
However, at present the horizontal merger analysis in the EU is better able to 
predict the effects of mergers on the competitive process. The EU also shows 
greater public transparency in merger assessment.2 A number of shortcomings have 
been found in the Chinese system which deters merger assessment from properly 
evaluating the effects of mergers on the competitive process. These shortcomings 
have been identified following examination of four aspects of merger assessment, 
namely defining the ‘relevant market’, evaluating the unilateral effects of 
horizontal mergers, evaluating the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers, and 
evaluating the countervailing effects on anti-competitive concerns arising in 
relation to horizontal merger. Recommendations for avoiding these shortcomings in 
assessment are made here. 
                                         
1
 The progress of antitrust merger control in China witnessed between 2008 and 2013 is discussed 
by, S Ning et al., Review of Merger Control and Merger Remedies Regime in China: From 2008-2013, 
(August, 2013), available at: http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/08/articles/corporate/antitrust-
competition/review-of-merger-control-and-merger-remedies-regime-in-china-from-2008-2013/ 
(accessed on the 12
th
 November 2013);The Mayer Brown Practices, China Merger Control--Progress 
and Prognostications, (Spring/Summer, 2012), available at: http://www.mayerbrown.com/China-
Merger-ControlProgress-and-Prognostications-05-01-2012/ (accessed on the 12
th
 November 2013);Q 
Wu, China's merger regulation: in search of theories of harm,(2013) Volume 34 Issue 12, E.C.L.R., 
pp.634-641. 
2
 Although the outcome of merger assessment of the same transaction was the same in the EU and 
China, it is hard to draw a line of reasoning for merger decisions in China. A similar opinion also 
expressed in M Furse, Merger control in China: four and a half years of practice and enforcement - a 
critical analysis, (2013) Volume 36 Issue 2, World Competition, pp.285-313. 
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1.1 Improvements to Horizontal Merger Analysis in China 
rendering it Better Able to Predict the Effects of a 
Merger on the Competitive Process 
1.1.1 The Definition of Relevant Market 
Both the EU and China define the relevant market from two aspects, namely the 
relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.3 However, unlike the 
EU, the MOFCOM has here made some mistakes in practice. 
First of all the MOFCOM defines the overlap of merging parties’ products as the 
scope of relevant product market.4 It neglects to assess whether customers could 
shift to purchase other substitutes when the price of overlap products increases. 
This neglect may lead to a narrower product market than the real situation 
indicates, and result in a mistaken condemnatory merger decision.5 
Second, the MOFCOM still relies on some ‘intuitive’ factors in delineating a 
relevant market. These factors include product features, intended use and unique 
function of related industry.6 However, the experience of the EU has shown that 
products with a similar function may not be substituted because of consumer 
behaviour or brand loyalty. By contrast, products having different functions may 
still be taken as close substitutes by customers.7 More factors should be taken into 
account by the MOFCOM in defining ‘relevant market’. 
                                         
3
 Although the EU proposed the third source of competitive constraint, namely potential competition, 
its analysis is only carried out at a subsequent stage if required. Hence the evaluation of potential 
competition is not carried out in chapter 2. See paragraph 24, Commission Notice on the definition of 
relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law[1997] O.J. C372/5. 
4
 SeeAnnouncement MOFCOM [2009] No.28 Mitsubishi Rayon / Lucite; Announcement of MOFCOM 
[2009] No.77, Pfizer / Wyeth. 
5
 See ‘4.2 The Scope of Possible Substitute’ in chapter 2. 
6
 See supra note 117 in chapter 2. 
7
 See the discussion of physical characteristics of the product/services and intended use in point b in 
2.1.1 Demand-side substitution in chapter 2. 
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Thirdly, as under the EU regime, demand-side substitution is primarily considered 
by the MOFCOM in defining the scope of relevant product market. Supply-side 
substitution is considered when it is ‘necessary’. The ‘necessary’ condition has no 
further clarification.8 Neglect of supply-side substitution may result in a narrower 
‘relevant market’ than the real situation indicates. Competitive assessment based 
on a narrower relevant market may lead to false negative errors. 
Fourthly, the scope of geographic market has not been defined in every published 
case in China. In many cases geographic market was delineated as nation-wide 
without giving any reasons. False positive errors may result if anti-competitive 
concerns exist in a specific narrower area of China. On the other hand, false 
negative errors will be caused if the geographic market is broader than China 
because the available imports may be substituted for local products. 
Recommendations are proposed for the MOFCOM to define a more appropriate 
scope of relevant market. Firstly, the MOFCOM should give a general introduction 
about affected products, including their composition and how to classify them 
according to size, use or raw materials. The information on the relevant industry 
can be collected from notifying parties or by consulting related experts or 
organisations.9 The MOFCOM should analyse the substitution among products which 
are on the same level with the affected products.10 This would help to ensure that 
likely alternatives to the affected products can all be included in the substitutive 
test. Affected products might also have sub-categories. A substitutive test should 
                                         
8
 In fact, in certain published cases, there are many disputes on the scope of products which can be 
substituted for each other from the supply-side. InCoca cola/Huiyuan, from the standpoint of supply-
side substitution,milk beverages might have belonged to the relevant product market with juice 
drinks.The possibility was declined by the MOFCOM withoutgiving any illustration in its decision. See 
‘4.2 The Scope of Possible Substitute’ in chapter 2. 
9
 Notifying parties are required to describe the business relationship between merging parties and 
define the relevant markets, providing reasons. See section 7 of MOFCOM’s amended merger 
notification form (Second version). An unofficial English translation of this form is available in the 
Appendix. 
10
 Information on the structure of related products can be collected by consulting related industry 
associations or international organisations. For example, in case Novartis / Alcon the Commission 
refers to the ‘Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical) classification (‘ATC), devised by the European 
Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (‘EpMRA’) and maintained by Eph MRA and 
Intercontinental medical Statistics (‘IMS’). See case COMP/M.5778 Novartis / Alcon [2011] O.J. C20/8. 
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be applied in these sub-categories in order to determine whether the affected 
product market should be further divided. 
The second suggestion to the MOFCOM is to clarify when it is ‘necessary’ to 
consider supply-side substitution in defining ‘relevant market’.11 According to the 
experience of the EU, such ‘necessary’ condition involves considering whether the 
supply-side substitution is as effective and immediate as demand-side substitution, 
especially when companies market a wide range of qualities or grades of one 
product.12 In addition, as the MOFCOM still relies heavily on market shares to 
evaluate competitive effect, supply-side consideration is better considered at the 
‘relevant market’ stage. Especially when demand substitution is weak or low, 
competitive concerns arise because the loss of sales may not be enough to 
countervail the profit of the merged entity’s price increase. 
1.1.2 Horizontal Mergers--Unilateral Effects 
The MOFCOM’s shortcomings in assessing unilateral effects have been stated in 
chapter3.13 
The first problem is that the MOFCOM relies too much on market share to define 
the anti-competitive effects of a merger.14 High market shares of merging parties 
have no anti-competitive effects if there are competitive constraints from 
competitors, buyers or final consumers.15 If competitors are not the closest 
competitors combined high market share will exaggerate their effects on market 
competition.16 On the other hand, a small market share of merged entities post-
                                         
11
 See Article 7, the Guideline on the Definition of Relevant Market. The Guideline was promulgated 
by the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State council on the 24
th
May 2009 and took effect on the 
same day (hereinafter called ‘the Guideline on Relevant Market’). An unofficial English translation is 
available at: http://www.cuplge.com/info_show.asp?news_id=30705 (accessed on the23
rd
 January 
2012). The official translation is not issued in this thesis. 
12
 Paragraph 20, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law (hereinafter Notice on Market Definition) [1997] O.J. C372/5.  
13
 See Chapter 3 Horizontal Mergers – Unilateral Effects, pp. 32-33. 
14
 See ‘3.1 Initial Review of Market Shares and Concentration Ratio’ in chapter 3. 
15
 A market leader which holds a large market share is not dominant in the market. These conditions 
can be seen in note 14 in chapter 3. 
16
 See ‘2.2 Merging Firms Are Close Competitors’ in chapter 3. 
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merger does not mean those mergers are compatible with the competitive 
process.17 Some firms have greater influence on the competitive process than their 
market shares indicate, particularly if the merged entity is coordinating with other 
rivals, innovating, expanding, cutting prices or generally independent as compared 
with the rest of the market. False positive errors might result if the MOFCOM does 
not consider these firms’ influences in other aspects of competition. 
Secondly, the MOFCOM takes the advantage of merging parties in distribution as 
detrimental to competitive process because the merged entity could use its market 
power to hinder the expansion of smaller firms or potential competitors. 
Nevertheless, the strength of the merged entity in controlling the supplier or 
distribution may not be sufficient to restrain market competition. Overestimating 
its effect will lead to false negative errors.18 
Thirdly, although the market share of acquired entity is trivial, the MOFCOM still 
raises anti-competitive concerns because merger eliminates an important potential 
competitor.19 However, the MOFCOM lacks further reasons and evidence to prove 
the effects of losing potential competitor on competitive process. False negative 
errors will result if mergers will not raise significant anti-competitive effects even 
when a potential entrant is acquired. 
1.1.2.1 Recommendations 
Firstly, with increasing experience assessment of anti-competitive concerns of a 
merger should move from reliance on market structure to a more effects-based 
approach. Apart from considering the market shares of remaining players and the 
concentration ratio in the relevant market, the EU considers five other factors in 
                                         
17
 See note 15 in chapter 3. 
18
The MOFCOM should be careful of the transaction which does not raise anti-competitive concerns, 
although merging parties have market power in the procurement market or distribution channel. See 
‘4.2.5Merged Entity Able Hinder Expansion by Competitors’ in chapter 3. 
19
See analysis of Novartis/Alcon in ‘3.1 Initial Review of Market Shares and Concentration Ratio’ in 
chapter 3. Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53 Novartis/Alcon. 
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deciding the unilateral effects of mergers.20 The MOFCOM should also note the 
influence of those five factors on the likelihood of unilateral effects post-merger.  
Secondly, verification of market effects relies on the notifying and third parties.21 
The MOFCOM should improve its communication with them. Links between the ‘SO’ 
and final decision should be established in every case which might be prohibited or 
in which significant commitments are required. In addition, in order to encourage 
the proactive involvement of third parties in its investigations the MOFCOM should 
give a notice on its website declaring whether a merger is being accepted, or 
proceeding into phase II. A non-confidential version of the ‘SO’ should be issued to 
third parties before the hearing in Phase II if they have shown an interest in the 
merger. If notifying parties argue that they are not the closest competitors in the 
relevant market, a merger may be compatible with market competition although 
the combined market share of merging parties is high. The MOFCOM should 
investigate customer preference or purchasing patterns through consumer surveys 
or finding historical evidence. When data are available, a quantitative test can be 
used to see if various methods lead to the same outcome.  
Thirdly, the MOFCOM takes the view that merging parties’ control over distribution 
or supply will hinder the expansion or entry by rival firms because the merged 
entity would raise the costs or decrease the quality of service of its rival with its 
market power. However, a merger may not give the merged entity the ability and 
incentive to do so if, firstly, the merger does not substantially enhance its 
monopsony. A merged entity still lacks ability and/or incentive to procure 
materials exclusively from its own upstream entity and foreclose other upstream 
suppliers from obtaining a sufficient customer base.22 Secondly, the suppliers of 
                                         
20
 Paragraph 28-38, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter Guidelines on 
Horizontal Mergers), [2004] O.J. C31/5. 
21
 If market share exaggerates the anti-competitive concerns of a merger, notifying parties have 
incentives to clarify the false negative errors as they want their transaction to be cleared. If a small 
market share has influence on other aspects of market competition, the related third parties have an 
incentive to point out these false positive errors in order to protect their interests. 
22
 See discussion about Seagate/Samsung in ‘3.4Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by 
Competitors’ in chapter 3. Case COMP/M.6214Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung 
Electronics [2011] O.J. C 165/3. 
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the merged entity might own ‘must-have’ brands; the foreclosure strategy of 
merging parties would not significantly harm suppliers’ business. 
Fourthly, acquiring a potential entrant with a minority market share at present 
may be detrimental to the competitive process.23 However, the MOFCOM needs 
give reasons why a merger with a potential competitor will have significant anti-
competitive effects.24 
Finally, customers might switch to rivals with upgraded products, although the 
merged entity has a relatively high market share at the time of merger review. 
Accordingly, the MOFCOM should investigate the human capital and Intellectual 
Property of the merged entity with which it seeks to hinder the innovation of its 
rivals.25 If the market has enough pipeline products or is characterised as active 
innovation, rivals can realise expansion by developing pipeline products or 
upgrading their products. 
                                         
23
 In Novartis/Alcon the MOFCOM found that the incumbent market share of Alcon in China was over 
60%, while Novartis’ share in relevant market was less than 1%. The MOFCOM still raised anti-
competitive concern, although Novartis notified its decision to withdraw its existing operations in the 
global and Chinese markets for the relevant product. The MOFCOM pointed out that if Novartis’s 
decision of withdrawing from the market strategically was only for this transaction, it still had the 
capability of accessing into the market again after the transaction which would restrict or eliminate 
competition in China. Paragraph 1, Section four, Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53 
Novartis/Alcon. 
24
 In the EU, ‘for a merger with a potential competitor to have significant anti-competitive effects, two 
basic conditions must be fulfilled. First, the potential competitor must already exert a significant 
constraining influence or there must be a significant likelihood that it would grow into an effective 
competitive force. Evidence that a potential competitor has plans to enter a market in a significant way 
could help the Commission to reach such a conclusion. Second, there must not be a sufficient 
number of other potential competitors, which could maintain sufficient competitive pressure after the 
merger.’ See paragraph 60, Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers, note 22supra in this chapter. 
25
 See ‘2.5Merger eliminates an important competitive force’ in chapter 3. 
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1.1.3 Horizontal Mergers--Coordinated Effects 
1.1.3.1 Disadvantages 
Problems of the MOFCOM’s assessment of coordinated effects have been described 
in chapter 4.26 The following is a summary of these problems and recommendations 
for improvement. 
First of all the MOFCOM is still using a check-list in its assessment of coordinated 
effects of mergers. In the reported three merger cases concerning coordinated 
effects the MOFCOM only considered the number of main players in the relevant 
market, the homogeneity of remaining competitors’ products, and the links of 
coordinating competitors in the form of agreement or structure.27 A number of 
necessary factors for proving coordinated effects in the EU have not been 
considered in Chinese published case decisions.28 No rules further clarify whether 
those neglected factors should be taken into consideration. The drawback of a 
‘checklist’ approach is its unpredictability. The outcome is still uncertain in the 
light of both plus- and minus- market characteristics of tacit collusion. That the 
                                         
26
See Chapter 4 Horizontal Merger--Coordinated Effects, pp.37-38. 
27
 See the discussion in ‘3.1 Checklist Period in China’ in chapter 4. 
28
 Inbev/AB was the first merger case cleared by the MOFCOM with restrictive conditions. In this case 
the relevant market was that of beer in China. Apart from the merging parties, there were four main 
competitors in the relevant market including China Resource Snow Breweries, Tsingtao Breweries, 
Beijing Yanjing Breweries and Zhujiang Breweries. Before merger the acquiring firm (Inbev) held a 
28.56% stake in Zhujiang Breweries. The acquired firm (AB) owned a 27% stake in Tsingtao 
Breweries. Remedies were designed to prohibit the merged entity’s holding more stake than its pre-
merger level in the other four main rivals. Such restriction of cross-shareholding was meant to prevent 
a potential monopoly agreement or tacit collusion between the merged company and its rivals. 
Nevertheless, the MOFCOM did not provide any reasoning on the possibility of tacit collusion post-
merger, such as how cross-shareholding between the merged entity and its rivals was conducive to 
tacit collusion and whether entry conditions such as efficient scale of production and brand effect 
would be barriers of entry which will deter potential entrant from counteracting the price increase of 
coordinating group. The following were the conditions imposed on the clearance of the transaction: a. 
AB should not increase its stakes (27%) in Tsingtao Brewery post-merger; b. InBev was obliged to 
notify MOFCOM of any changes in its controlling shareholders; c.InBev should not acquire further 
stakes (28.56%) in Zhujiang Breweries; d. Merged entity should not purchase any stake of the other 
two largest beer producers, China Resources Snow Breweries and Beijing Yanjing Brewery. See 
point 3, Announcement of MOFCOM [2008] No.95, Inbev/Anheuser-Busch. 
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‘pluses’ outweigh the ‘minuses’ in no way implies coordinated effects are to be 
expected.29 
Causal links between the merger and the coordinated effects are absent in the 
MOFCOM’s published decisions. The MOFCOM does not consider the competitive 
situation pre-merger in the market. Merger may not change specific factors which 
restrain coordination successfully pre-merger. Therefore the coordinated concerns 
raised by the MOFCOM post-merger may be false negative errors.30 
The last question is that of finding a proper standard of proof of coordinated 
effects. Currently the MOFCOM raises concerns of coordinated effects only if ‘the 
possibility cannot be ruled out’.31 This low standard of proof has two problems. On 
the one hand, false negative errors will result if tacit collusion is not the most 
likely possibility post-merger. Ineffective judicial review is not able to make good 
remedy of such errors; On the other hand, the standard imposes a too heavy 
burden of proof on the notifying parties. Once coordinated concern is raised by the 
MOFCOM even without sufficient evidence, merging parties have to collect 
evidence for the claim that tacit collusion is unlikely to happen post-merger. 
Especially given that the merging parties do not have any rights to obtain evidence 
from third parties, they are procedurally barred from discharging this burden.32 
                                         
29
 Four drawbacks of the check-list approach have been described in ‘2.1.2 An Evaluation of the 
Checklist Approach’ in chapter 4. 
30
 In Seagate/Samsung the Commission ascertained that ‘Samsung, as the acquired party, was 
neither a particularly strong innovative force nor a particularly strong competitor. Therefore Samsung 
is unlikely uniquely to have constrained suppliers' ability to coordinate or sustain coordination 
premerger in these markets. The effect of Samsung's removal is therefore likely to be limited with 
regard to coordinated effects.’ However, the MOFCOM overestimated the acquired firm’s-Samsung 
role in market competition and indicated that acquisition would lead to coordination post merger. See 
paragraphs 549-550,COMP/M.6214Seagate Technology/the HDD Business of Samsung Electronics 
[2011] O.J. C 165/3. 
31
 Paragraph 3-point 2, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.73 Savio/Penelope. 
32
 The MOFCOM have power to obtain evidence from third parties. Its power of investigation in 
merger reviews regulated in Chapter 6 of the AML 2008,and the MOFCOM announcement [2011] No. 
6 Interim Measures on Investigation into and Handling of Concentrations of Business which was 
promulgated by the MOFCOM on the 30
th
December 2011, and took effect on the 1
st
 February 2012. 
An unofficial English version is available in the appendix. 
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1.1.3.2 Recommendations 
In order to solve the uncertainty of the ‘check-list’ approach, the MOFCOM should 
adopt from the EU an analytical framework within which coordinated effects are 
analysed. The analytical framework is composed by four conditions which are 
necessary to establish and keep the equilibrium of tacit collusion.33 
Secondly, some market characters will affect more than one factor composing the 
analytical framework of coordinated effects.34 Therefore the MOFCOM should learn 
to interpret the effects of a market character on the likelihood of tacit collusion 
from multiple aspects. 
Thirdly, market investigation should compare the market equilibrium before the 
merger with what is expected to emerge following it. If a merger does not change 
those key factors in creating or strengthening a collective dominant position, 
coordinated effects should be deemed unlikely to happen or be strengthened post-
merger. Take Novartis/Alcon for instance. Here the MOFCOM was concerned that 
the Sales and Distribution Agreement between Novartis and Haichang would lead to 
the combined entity and Haichang to coordinate their products post-merger in 
matters of price, quantity, and dividing markets post-merger. However, this 
agreement was in place before the concentration, while there was no coordination 
pre-merger.35 The agreement was not a key factor deterring successful 
coordination pre-merger. According to the requirement of causal links between the 
merger and the coordinated effects, the MOFCOM should prove how those 
deterring factors of coordination will be changed significantly by a merger. For 
                                         
33
 The four conditions are: whether competitors post-merger can easily arrive at a common 
understanding of how the coordination should work, whether there is credible threat of retaliation 
which prevents firms from deviating; whether there is further retaliation that keeps the coordination 
sustainable; whether the reaction of outsiders are able to jeopardise the outcome expected from 
coordination. The MOFCOM did not consider sufficient retaliation to be a necessary condition of 
keeping coordinating firms from deviating. When considering the reaction of outsiders the MOFCOM 
neglected that non-coordinating firms in relevant market as well as countervailing buyer power of 
customers are all able to restrain the outcome expected from coordination apart from potential entry. 
34
 See point five in ‘2.1.1 Reaching Terms of Coordination’ in Chapter 4. 
35
 Novartis/Alcon was notified to the MOFCOM on the 20
th
 April 2010. Novartis signed a Sales and 
Distribution Agreement with Haichang in 2008, which made Haichang the sole distributor of Shanghai 
Shikang in the territory of China. Shanghai Shikang and Haichang had set up a strategic affiliated 
partnership. See Announcement MOFCOM [2010] No.53Novartis / Alcon. 
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example, merger acquires an effective non-coordinating firm which reduces the 
fringe competitive restraint. Thus it permits coordinating firms to coordinate on 
supra-competitive price post-merger.  
Fourthly, the ‘symmetric standard of proof’ in the EU might be too high to be 
enforced by the MOFCOM at present.36 The MOFCOM should firstly establish an 
analytical framework within which likelihood of coordinated effects is assessed. 
Resources and time should be devoted to cases with significant anti-competitive 
concerns because methods of assessing coordinated effects can be explained 
through those cases. In the long term, as the MOFCOM becomes more experienced 
in investigation and balancing various possibilities the standard of proof for 
clearing a merger should be increased to the same level as decisions of significant 
coordinated concern.  
The final recommendation to the MOFCOM is to be cautious of applying the ‘more 
economic approach’ in merger review at present. In the EU, there is criticism that 
the benefits of complex quantitative analysis do not outweigh its cost.37 The 
stronger economics-based approach increases administrative burden,38 diminished 
legal certainty39 while the quality of merger decisions are not guaranteed.40 
                                         
36
 In the light of the MOFCOM’s limited human resource and experience of merger review, the 
standard of proof for assessing a merger which will not raise coordination concern significantly might 
be lower than the standard for assessing a merger which will raise coordination concern at present. 
See ‘4.3.2 Is a ‘Symmetric’ Standard of Proof Suitable for China?’ in chapter 4.  
37
 See A Christiansen, The ‘more economic approach’ in EU merger control: A critical assessment, 
(March, 2006), Research notes working paper series Note 21., pp.1-26. A C Witt, From Airtours to 
Ryanair: is the more economic approach to EU merger law really about more economics?, Common 
Market Law Review, (2012) Volume 49 Issue 1, pp.217-246. 
38
 The burden of proof may be divided into two parts, namely the merging parties’ and the antitrust 
authorities’. In order to use various economic instruments like the HHI test all competitors in the 
market should prepare their status or economic assessment. Accordingly, to the Commission, more 
information provided means more pressure to review. See A Christiansen, The ‘more economic 
approach’ in EU merger control: A critical assessment, (March, 2006), Research notes working paper 
series Note 21.,9. 
39
 Economics is an ‘inexact’ science. There are constant divergences and many approaches in 
economic competition theory whose conclusions may be contradictory. A Christiansen proposed a 
prominent example of the dispute between the ‘Harvard school’ and the ‘Chicago school’ which 
prevailing until (at least) into the late 1980s. These two economic theories are considerably divergent 
not only in their theoretical and empirical foundations but also in their normative objectives. The 
discretion of applying difference models of econometric analysis leads to the uncertainty of merger 
decision. Other kinds of economic model for competitive assessment is available to at ibid, 11. 
40
 Apart from price or output modern economic theory appears difficult to assess the effects of a 
concrete merger on other market parameters, such as a merger’s potential effects on innovation or 
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Therefore, in the EU quantitative evidence has only played an accessory role in the 
Commission’s decision practice to date.41 Since Chinese merger control regime is 
still at an early stage, it may be too early to introduce the ‘more economic 
approach’ in China in order to avoid further legal uncertainty.  
1.1.4 Countervailing Effects: Buyer Power and Market Entry 
1.1.4.1 Countervailing Buyer Power 
The countervailing buyer power is now considered more frequently than before by 
the MOFCOM.42 In most instances insufficient buyer power was one of factors 
leading to the anti-competitive concerns of mergers.43 No legislation mentioned 
the method of analysing countervailing buyer power. In General Motor/Delphi the 
MOFCOM did not consider that a majority of buyers of merging parties would 
switch to alternative suppliers if the combined entity were to increase prices.44 In 
addition, the MOFCOM only considered the incentive of buyers to rebut the price 
increase of merging parties and the roles of small customers in one case separately.  
                                                                                                                               
product quality. In addition, the evidence collected for quantitative analysis presents reliability issues. 
See ‘2.2 Merging Firms Are Close Competitors’ in chapter 3. Political intervention and rent-seeking is 
possible under the shield of complex quantitative analysis. For example, economic model can be 
chosen in favour of clearing a transaction for building ‘champions’ in the global market or providing 
special treatment to certain industries. Firms might lobby the staff in antitrust authority for using 
economic model in their favour. See ibid, pp.18-19. 
41
 Neither the EUMR nor the Commissions’ guidelines require or even refer to the use of quantitative 
analysis by the Commission, and although the latter new periodically carries out econometric studies 
to establish certain facts. The Commission generally refers to quantitative analysis only for supporting 
and complementing the findings of the qualitative analysis. A C Witt, From Airtours to Ryanair: is the 
more economic approach to EU merger law really about more economics?, supra note 37, 244. 
42
 By the 30
th
 June 2013 countervailing buyer power had appeared in five published cases, two were 
the most recent. See Announcement MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilonand Announcement 
MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
43
 For example, in Marubeni/Gavilon, the relevant market was China's import market for soybean, 
corn, bean pulp and dry and course distillers grains. Chinese soybean crushers were downstream 
industries of China’s import market for soybean. Investigation found the level of concentration among 
existing Chinese soybean crushers is low. Most of the Chinese soybean crushers have a relatively 
small production scale, and low bargaining power. The MOFCOM raised anti-competitive concern 
because this concentration of undertakings will further weaken the bargaining power of Chinese 
downstream soybean crushers. See Announcement MOFCOM [2013] No.22 Marubeni/Gavilon. 
44
 See the study of General Motor/Delphiin in ‘2.2.1 The Existence of Viable Alternatives or Credible 
Threats’ in chapter 5. SeeAnnouncement MOFCOM [2009] No.76 General Motors / Delphi; 
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In practice the way of assessing countervailing buyer power adopted by the 
MOFCOM is the same as that of the EU. Three main aspects are considered, namely 
the presence of available alternatives or threats, the incentive of buyer power, 
and protection of all consumers. If there are alternative suppliers, consumer 
investigation like the SSNIP test can be used to determine whether customers 
would switch to other suppliers when the merged entity increases its price post-
merger. Even substitute is available buyers may have no incentive to switch 
suppliers when prices increase. There are two cases in point concerning HDDs 
products.45 The experience of the EU reminds the MOFCOM of three situations in 
which buyers may have an incentive to prevent the price increase from suppliers.46 
Finally, the countervailing buyer power owned by major entities will not be able to 
protect small/medium companies. The MOFCOM has recognised the concern. The 
EU raised an exceptional situation in which price discrimination of small/medium 
consumers will not occur.47The reason for pointing out such exceptional situations 
is that the MOFCOM gets used to judging an anti-competitive concern without 
investigating whether any exceptional situations exist. This may lead to false 
negative errors. 
Finally, if countervailing buyer power is sufficient to eliminate anti-competitive 
concern, a notified transaction will be cleared. The MOFCOM’s assessment of buyer 
power should be revealed in the brief statement of outright clearance. 
1.1.4.2 Market Entry 
The MOFCOM should consider the likelihood, timeliness and sufficiency of potential 
entry.48 Yet no further guidance clarifies the meaning of these three factors. In all 
                                         
45
 Large computer manufacturers have no incentive to constrain the price increase of input, because 
they can pass the increase part of price on to final consumers by increasing the prices of computer 
products. See Part II-6, Announcement MOFCOM [2011] No.90 Seagate / Samsung and 
Announcement MOFCOM [2012] No.09Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies. 
46
 Three situations can be seen in ‘2.3.3 Situation of Price Discrimination’ in chapter 5. 
47
 The study on Enso/Stora is available at ‘2.1.3The Role of Smaller Customers’ in chapter 5. Case 
COMP/M.1225 Enso/Stora, [1999] O.J. L 254/9. 
48
 See also articles 7 and 12 of the Interim Rules: ‘if barriers to access to the relevant market of 
merging parties are low, business operators who do not participate in the concentration are able to 
restrain merging parties to eliminate or restrictive competition post-merger’. Interim Rules on 
Evaluating Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business Operators (hereinafter the Interim 
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published cases barriers to market entry were too high to reduce anti-competitive 
concerns. However, according to the EU’s experience, barriers to entry may be 
temporary or easily broken under certain conditions. A patent is not a barrier if it 
can be avoided by redesigning at low cost. Technical advantage can be broken if 
R&D is fast. For example, in the pharmacy market, pipeline products will enter the 
market when it is ripe.49 Missing these exceptional situations may lead to false 
negative errors. 
The MOFCOM should be provided with more and better explanation of how to 
review the ‘likelihood’, ‘timeliness’ and ‘sufficiency’ of potential entry. In 
practice entry should be considered likely if the benefit of the supra-competitive 
price after entry outweighs the costs of overcoming barriers to entry.50 
1.2 Transparency to the Public 
The importance of transparency of merger analysis has been discussed in chapter 
1.51 The following presents problems which deter the public transparency of 
merger assessment in China. Recommendations are proposed. 
1.2.1 Relevant Market 
1.2.1.1 Disadvantages 
The MOFCOM published a Guideline on Relevant Market one year after the AML2008. 
Both EU and China adopt similar principles and criteria in defining ‘relevant 
market’. However, the MOFCOM did not interpret how those principles and criteria 
were considered in published case decision. 
                                                                                                                               
Rules), (29
th
 August, 2011), MOFCOM Announcement No. 55. The rule has no official English 
translation. An unofficial English translation is available in the appendix. 
49
 Case COMP/M.5476Pfizer / Wyeth[2009] O.J. C 262/1, paragraph 38. 
50
 See ‘3.3.1 When the Entry is more likely’ in chapter 5. 
51
 See ‘1.3 Transparency of Merger Analysis’ in chapter 1. 
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Since the end of 2012 the MOFCOM began regularly to publish decisions of outright 
clearance on its official website regularly.52 Publication is limited to the name of 
the case, name of merging parties and the date of approval. The public is not able 
to scrutinise the enforcement authority’s assessment on these notified transactions. 
In addition, as information on the transaction is revealed to the public after 
approval, third parties are not able to join in the merger assessment and express 
their views if the MOFCOM does not invite them.53  
1.2.1.2 Recommendations 
If the MOFCOM decides to approve notified concentrations unconditionally it should 
publish a brief statement about the time of merger review, the business activities 
of the undertakings concerned, the nature of the transaction and the relevant 
product and geographic market.54 This is to prevent the MOFCOM from clearing 
transactions based on non-competitive considerations, especially since the 
MOFCOM is under the control of the highest organ of state administration.55 The 
MOFCOM should publish more details of reasoning in merger cases which will be 
blocked or cleared with commitments. Firstly, the structure of relevant industry 
involving the affected market should be introduced in the case decision. It is the 
platform for the public to understand the MOFCOM’s subsequent substitute test. 
Secondly, views of the notifying parties should be revealed in the decision. The 
MOFCOM should clarify what views of notifying parties has been confirmed by its 
market investigation. On the other hand, if the notifying parties’ arguments are 
rejected, the MOFCOM should indicate its reasons of rejection with supporting 
evidence collected in investigation. This is to supervise the MOFCOM’s discretion 
and let the public know what information they submit may be accepted by the 
                                         
52
 On the 6
th
 January 2013 the MOFCOM published its outright merger cases during the last quarter of 
2012 for the first time. Since then information of outright cases has been published on the MOFCOM’s 
official website at the end of every quarter. Before 2013 there was no information regarding 
transactions which were cleared outright by the MOFCOM. 
53
 See ‘4.6 Transparency of Case Decisions’ in chapter 2. 
54
 According to the list released by the MOFCOM, it approved about 50 cases every quarter 
unconditionally. It may not be a heavy burden on the authority to reveal more information on each 
case. 
55
 The role of the MOFCOM in implementing non-competitive considerations has been discussed in 
‘4.3.2.2Mission of Implementing Non-competitive Considerations’ in Chapter 1. 
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MOFCOM. Thirdly, in published case decisions, the MOFCOM should also explain 
why competitive concerns would not arise in some effected markets. This is to 
prevent notifying parties from bribing staff in the enforcement authority for 
clearing a transaction like in SEB/Supor.56 If the precise scope of relevant market is 
hard to define, the MOFCOM can leave it open if competitive concerns are not 
substantial even in the smallest market. 
1.2.2 Anti-competitive Assessment of Horizontal Mergers 
Unlike its EU counterpart, anti-competitive assessment of horizontal merger in 
China is not clarified clearly in the legislation. Pursuant to the AML 2008 and the 
Interim Rules, the MOFCOM will take into account a number of factors in merger 
assessment.57 However, there is no further guidance on how the check-list works in 
practice. The Guidance on the assessment of horizontal mergers in the EU contains 
90 articles and 11,628 words, while the Interim Rules in China has only 14 articles 
and 2,319 words. This lack of transparency increases the discretion of the MOFCM 
and reduces the public’s ability to predict. The way of developing guidance in 
China has been pointed out in each chapter.58 In published case decision, views of 
the parties and results of market investigation should be disclosed. Therefore, the 
public are able to know what views of the parties have been accepted, and why 
certain submissions of notifying parties were not agreed by the MOFCOM.  
2 Further Studies 
This thesis does not aim to solve all substantive problems of merger assessment 
under the AML 2008. It only provides solutions to two research questions, namely 
how to make the antitrust horizontal merger assessment in China more effective 
and transparent through learning from the EU. There are still at least two other 
problems awaiting investigation. 
                                         
56
 A controversial case about bribery is SEB/Supor, supra note 188 in chapter 2. 
57
 Article 27 of the AML 2008, and Article 5, the Interim Rules. 
58
 See ‘4.2Recommendations’ in chapter 3. 
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2.1 Anti-competitive Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers 
Two types of non-horizontal merger can be distinguished, vertical and 
conglomerate.59 Non-horizontal mergers are generally less likely significantly to 
impede effective competition than horizontal mergers.60 Unlike horizontal mergers 
vertical or conglomerate mergers do not entail the loss of direct competitor 
between the merging firms in the same relevant market. Therefore the main 
concerns of anti-competitive effect in horizontal merger are not raised in vertical 
or conglomerate mergers. Non-horizontal merger involving producers of 
complementary products can also result in improved specialisation, cost reduction, 
‘internalisation of double mark-ups’, economies of scope and other efficiency 
effects to the manufactures. These efficiencies may give rise to customer benefits 
such as decrease in price, one-stop shopping and so on.61 Thus the effects of non-
horizontal mergers on competitive process differ from those of horizontal mergers. 
Two questions are addressed through comparison of non-horizontal merger 
assessment in the EU and China. Firstly, comparing the EU and China, in which 
jurisdiction the non-horizontal merger analysis better predicts the effects of 
merger on the competitive process. If the EU has more advantages, what can China 
learn in order to improve its method of non-horizontal merger analysis? Secondly, 
which jurisdiction shows greater public transparency of merger assessment? If the 
EU, what can China learn in order to improve such transparency?62 
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2.2 Defence of Efficiency 
According to Article 27 of the AML 2008, in merger review the MOFCOM should 
consider ‘the influence of the concentration on ‘technological progress’ and ‘the 
national economic development’. In addition, Article 28 of the AML2008states that 
‘if the business operators concerned can prove that the concentration will bring 
more positive impact than negative impact on competition, or the concentration is 
pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council 
may decide not to prohibit the concentration.’ These two articles provide a legal 
basis for the efficiency defence. However, comparison with the efficiency defence 
in the EU shows there are a number of problems that impede the predictability of 
efficiency evaluation. 63 
First of all it lacks a framework within which to assess the efficiency brought by 
the concentration; secondly, the AML 2008 does not spell out the welfare standard 
which the evaluation of efficiency should follow. Under consumer welfare, a 
merger is deemed anti-competitive if and only if it hurts consumers in the relevant 
markets. Under the total welfare standard, a merger is deemed anti-competitive if 
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and only if it reduces the sum of consumer and producer welfare.64Thirdly, the 
burden of proof on efficiency defence between the MOFCOM and notifying parties 
is not allocated. Comparison can be applied for solving the above three problems.65 
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Appendix 1 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of 
China 
(Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People''s 
Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 2007)  
Translated by China.org.cn, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm, last 
visited on 15 November 2013. 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic 
conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding 
the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy development of the 
socialist market economy. 
Article 2 This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic activities within the 
People''s Republic of China. 
This Law shall apply to the conducts outside the territory of the People''s Republic of China if 
they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition on the domestic market of the PRC. 
Article 3 For the purposes of this Law, "monopolistic conducts" are defined as the following: 
(1) monopolistic agreements among business operators; 
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by business operators; and 
(3) concentration of business operators that eliminates or restricts competition or might be 
eliminating or restricting competition. 
Article 4 The State constitutes and carries out competition rules which accord with the socialist 
market economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly 
market system. 
Article 5 Business operators may, through fair competition, voluntary alliance，concentrate 
themselves according to law, expand the scope of business operations, and enhance 
competitiveness. 
Article 6 Any business with a dominant position may not abuse that dominant position to 
eliminate, or restrict competition. 
Article 7 With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning 
the lifeline of national economy and national security or the industries implementing exclusive 
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operation and sales according to law, the state protects the lawful business operations 
conducted by the business operators therein. The state also lawfully regulates and controls their 
business operations and the prices of their commodities and services so as to safeguard the 
interests of consumers and promote technical progresses. 
The business operators as mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest and faithful, be 
strictly self-disciplined, accept social supervision, shall not damage the interests of consumers by 
virtue of their dominant or exclusive positions. 
Article 8 No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative powers to eliminate or restrict 
competition. 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish the Anti-monopoly Commission, which is in charge of 
organizing, coordinating, guiding anti-monopoly work, performs the following functions: 
(1) studying and drafting related competition policies; 
(2) organizing the investigation and assessment of overall competition situations in the market, 
and issuing assessment reports; 
(3) constituting and issuing anti-monopoly guidelines; 
(4) coordinating anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement; and 
(5) other functions as assigned by the State Council. 
The State Council shall stipulate composition and working rules of the Anti-monopoly 
Commission. 
Article 10 The anti-monopoly authority designated by the State Council (hereinafter referred to 
as the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) shall be in charge of anti-monopoly law 
enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) may, when needed, authorize the 
corresponding authorities in the people''s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities directly under the Central Government to take charge of anti-monopoly law 
enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
Article 11 A trade association shall intensify industrial self-discipline, guide business operators to 
lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the market. 
Article 12 For the purposes of this Law, 
"business operator" refers to a natural person, legal person, or any other organization that is in 
the engagement of commodities production or operation or service provision, and 
"relevant market" refers to the commodity scope or territorial scope within which the business 
operators compete against each other during a certain period of time for specific commodities or 
services (hereinafter generally referred to as "commodities"). 
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Chapter II Monopoly Agreement 
Article 13 Any of the following monopoly agreements among the competing business operators 
shall be prohibited: 
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities; 
(2) limiting the output or sales of commodities; 
(3) dividing the sales market or the raw material procurement market; 
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the development of new 
technology or new products; 
(5) making boycott transactions; or 
(6) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council. 
For the purposes of this Law, "monopoly agreements" refer to agreements, decisions or other 
concerted actions which eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14 Any of the following agreements among business operators and their trading parties 
are prohibited: 
(1) fixing the price of commodities for resale to a third party; 
(2) restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party; or 
(3) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council. 
Article 15 An agreement among business operators shall be exempted from application of 
articles 13 and 14 if it can be proven to be in any of the following circumstances: 
(1) for the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing new products; 
(2) for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, unifying 
product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor division; 
(3) for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the competitiveness of 
small and medium-sized business operators; 
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving energy, protecting the 
environment and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(5) for the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously excessive 
production during economic recessions; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign trade or foreign 
economic cooperation; or 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
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Where a monopoly agreement is in any of the circumstances stipulated in Items 1 through 5 and 
is exempt from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the business operators must additionally prove 
that the agreement can enable consumers to share the interests derived from the agreement, 
and will not severely restrict the competition in relevant market. 
Article 16 Any trade association may not organize the business operators in its own industry to 
implement the monopolistic conduct as prohibited by this Chapter. 
Chapter III Abuse of Market Dominance 
Article 17 A business operator with a dominant market position shall not abuse its dominant 
market position to conduct following acts: 
(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low prices; 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
(3) refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade exclusively with a designated 
business operator(s) without any justifiable cause; 
(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading without any 
justifiable cause; 
(6) applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties with equal standing; 
(7) other conducts determined as abuse of a dominant position by the Anti-monopoly Authority 
under the State Council 
For the purposes of this Law, "dominant market position" refers to a market position held by a 
business operator having the capacity to control the price, quantity or other trading conditions of 
commodities in relevant market, or to hinder or affect any other business operator to enter the 
relevant market. 
Article 18 The dominant market status shall be determined according to the following factors: 
(1) the market share of a business operator in relevant market, and the competition situation of 
the relevant market; 
(2) the capacity of a business operator to control the sales markets or the raw material 
procurement market; 
(3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator; 
(4) the degree of dependence of other business operators upon of the business operator in 
transactions; 
(5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market; and 
(6) other factors related to determine a dominant market position of the said business operator. 
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Article 19 Where a business operator is under any of the following circumstances, it may be 
assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(1) the relevant market share of a business operator accounts for1/2 or above in the relevant 
market; 
(2) the joint relevant market share of two business operators accounts for 2/3 or above; or 
(3) the joint relevant market share of three business operators accounts for 3/4 or above. 
A business operator with a market share of less than 1/10 shall not be presumed as having a 
dominant market position even if they fall within the scope of second or third item. 
Where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant market position can 
otherwise prove that they do not have a dominant market, it shall not be determined as having a 
dominant market position. 
Chapter IV Concentration of Business operators 
Article 20 A concentration refers to the following circumstances: 
(1) the merger of business operators; 
(2) acquiring control over other business operators by virtue of acquiring their equities or assets; 
or 
(3) acquiring control over other business operators or possibility of exercising decisive influence 
on other business operators by virtue of contact or any other means. 
Article 21 Where a concentration reaches the threshold of declaration stipulated by the State 
Council, a declaration must be lodged in advance with the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council, or otherwise the concentration shall not be implemented. 
Article 22 Where a concentration is under any of the following circumstances, it may not be 
declared to the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council: 
(1) one business operator who is a party to the concentration has the power to exercise more 
than half the voting rights of every other business operator, whether of the equity or the assets; 
or 
(2) one business operator who is not a party to the concentration has the power to exercise more 
than half the voting rights of every business operator concerned, whether of the equity or the 
assets. 
Article 23 A business operator shall, when lodge a concentration declaration with the Anti-
monopoly Authority under the State Council, submit the following documents and materials: 
(1) a declaration paper; 
(2) explanations on the effect of the concentration on the relevant market competition; 
(3) the agreement of concentration; 
224 
 
224 
 
(4) the financial reports and accounting reports of the proceeding accounting year of the 
business operator; and 
(5) other documents and materials as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council. 
Such items shall be embodied in the declaration paper as the name, domicile and business 
scopes of the business operators involved in the concentration as well as the date of the 
scheduled concentration and other items as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council. 
Article 24 Where the documents or materials submitted by a business operator are incomplete, it 
shall submit the rest of the documents and materials within the time limit stipulated by the Anti-
monopoly Authority under the State Council; otherwise, the declaration shall be deemed as not 
filed. 
Article 25 The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall conduct a preliminary 
review of the declared concentration of business operators, make a decision whether to conduct 
further review and notify the business operators in written form within 30 days upon receipt of the 
documents and materials submitted by the business operators pursuant to Article 23 of this Law. 
Before such a decision made by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, the 
concentration may be not implemented. 
Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides not to conduct further review 
or fails to make a decision at expiry of the stipulated period, the concentration may be 
implemented. 
Article 26 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to conduct further 
review, they shall, within 90 days from the date of decision, complete the review, make a 
decision on whether to prohibit the concentration, and notify the business operators concerned of 
the decision in written form. A decision of prohibition shall be attached with reasons therefor. 
Within the review period the concentration may not be implemented. 
Under any of the following circumstances, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council 
may notify the business operators in written form that the time limit as stipulated in the preceding 
paragraph may be extended to no more than 60 days: 
(1) the business operators concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(2) the documents or materials submitted are inaccurate and need further verification; 
(3) things have significantly changed after declaration. 
If the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council fails to make a decision at expiry of the 
period, the concentration may be implemented. 
Article 27 In the case of the examination on the concentration of business operators, it shall 
consider the relevant elements as follows: 
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(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant market and the controlling 
power thereof over that market, 
(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market, 
(3) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the market access and 
technological progress, 
(4) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the consumers and other 
business operators, 
(5) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the national economic 
development, and 
(6) other elements that may have an effect on the market competition and shall be taken into 
account as regarded by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council. 
Article 28 Where a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting competition, 
the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a decision to prohibit the 
concentration. However, if the business operators concerned can prove that the concentration 
will bring more positive impact than negative impact on competition, or the concentration is 
pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council may decide not 
to prohibit the concentration. 
Article 29 Where the concentration is not prohibited, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council may decide to attach restrictive conditions for reducing the negative impact of such 
concentration on competition. 
Article 30 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to prohibit a 
concentration or attaches restrictive conditions on concentration, it shall publicize such decisions 
to the general public in a timely manner. 
Article 31 Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic enterprise or participate in 
concentration by other means, if state security is involved, besides the examination on the 
concentration in accordance with this Law, the examination on national security shall also be 
conducted in accordance with the relevant State provisions. 
Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Article 32 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power, restrict or restrict in 
a disguised form entities and individuals to operate, purchase or use the commodities provided 
by business operators designated by it. 
Article 33 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or an administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may not have any of the following conducts by abusing its 
administrative power to block free circulation of commodities between regions: 
(1) imposing discriminative charge items, discriminative charge standards or discriminative prices 
upon commodities from outside the locality, 
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(2) imposing such technical requirements and inspection standards upon commodities from 
outside the locality as different from those upon local commodities of the same classification, or 
taking such discriminative technical measures as repeated inspections or repeated certifications 
to commodities from outside the locality, so as to restrict them to enter local market, 
(3) exerting administrative licensing specially on commodities from outside the locality so as to 
restrict them to enter local market, 
(4) setting barriers or taking other measures so as to hamper commodities from outside the 
locality from entering the local market or local commodities from moving outside the local region, 
or 
(5) other conducts for the purpose of hampering commodities from free circulation between 
regions. 
Article 34 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power to reject or restrict 
business operators from outside the locality to participate in local tendering and bidding activities 
by such means as imposing discriminative qualification requirements or assessment standards or 
releasing information in an unlawful manner. 
Article 35 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power to reject or restrict 
business operators from outside the locality to invest or set up branches in the locality by 
imposing unequal treatment thereupon compared to that upon local business operators. 
Article 36 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power to force business 
operators to engage in the monopolistic conducts as prescribed in this Law. 
Article 37 Any administrative organ may not abuse its administrative power to set down such 
provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition. 
Chapter VI Investigation into the Suspicious Monopolistic Conducts 
Article 38 The anti-monopoly authority shall make investigations into suspicious monopolistic 
conducts in accordance with law. 
Any entity or individual may report suspicious monopolistic conducts to the anti-monopoly 
authority. The anti-monopoly authority shall keep the informer confidential. 
Where an informer makes the reporting in written form and provides relevant facts and evidences, 
the anti-monopoly authority shall make necessary investigation. 
Article 39 The anti-monopoly authority may take any of the following measures in investigating 
suspicious monopolistic conducts: 
(1) conducting the inspection by getting into the business premises of business operators under 
investigation or by getting into any other relevant place, 
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(2) inquiring of the business operators under investigation, interested parties, or other relevant 
entities or individuals, and requiring them to explain the relevant conditions, 
(3) consulting and duplicating the relevant documents, agreements, account books, business 
correspondences and electronic data, etc. of the business operators under investigation, 
interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals, 
(4) seizing and detaining relevant evidence, and 
(5) inquiring about the business operators'' bank accounts under investigation. 
Before the measures as prescribed in the preceding paragraph are approved, a written report 
shall be submitted to the chief person(s)-in-charge of the anti-monopoly authority. 
Article 40 When inspecting suspicious monopolistic conducts, there shall be at least two law 
enforcers, and they shall show their law enforcement certificates. 
When inquiring about and investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts, law enforcers shall 
make notes thereon, which shall bear the signatures of the persons under inquiry or investigation. 
Article 41 The anti-monopoly authority and functionaries thereof shall be obliged to keep 
confidential the trade secrets they have access to during the course of the law enforcement. 
Article 42 Business operators, interested parties and other relevant entities and individuals 
under investigation shall show cooperation with the anti-monopoly authority in performing its 
functions, and may not reject or hamper the investigation by the anti-monopoly authority. 
Article 43 Business operators, interested parties under investigation have the right to voice their 
opinions. The anti-monopoly authority shall verify the facts, reasons and evidences provided by 
the business operators, interested parties under investigation. 
Article 44 Where the anti-monopoly authority deems that a monopolistic conduct is constituted 
after investigating and verifying a suspicious monopolistic conduct, it shall make a decision on 
how to deal with the monopolistic conduct, and publicize it. 
Article 45 As regards a suspicious monopolistic conduct that the anti-monopoly authority is 
investigating, if the business operators under investigation promise to eliminate the impact of the 
conduct by taking specific measures within the time limit prescribed by the anti-monopoly 
authority, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to suspend the investigation. The decision on 
suspending the investigation shall specify the specific measures as promised by the business 
operators under investigation. 
Where the anti-monopoly authority decides to suspend the investigation, it shall supervise the 
implementation of the promise by the relevant business operators. If the business operators keep 
their promise, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to terminate the investigation. 
However, the anti-monopoly authority shall resume the investigation, where 
(1) the business operators fail to implement the promise, 
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(2) significant changes have taken place to the facts based on which the decision on suspending 
the investigation was made; or 
(3) the decision on suspending the investigation was made based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information provided by the business operators. 
Chapter VII Legal Liabilities 
Article 46 Where business operators reach an monopoly agreement and perform it in violation of 
this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to cease doing so, and shall confiscate the 
illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. Where 
the reached monopoly agreement has not been performed, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall 
be imposed. 
Where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reaching the monopoly 
agreement and provides important evidences to the anti-monopoly authority, it may be imposed a 
mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment as the case may be. 
Where a guild help the achievement of a monopoly agreement by business operators in its own 
industry in violation of this Law, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed thereupon by 
the anti-monopoly authority; in case of serious circumstances, the social group registration 
authority may deregister the guild. 
Article 47 Where any business operator abuses its dominant market status in violation of this 
Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The anti-monopoly authority shall confiscate its illegal 
gains and impose thereupon a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. 
Article 48 Where any business operator implements concentration in violation of this Law, the 
anti-monopoly authority shall order it to cease doing so, to dispose of shares or assets, transfer 
the business or take other necessary measures to restore the market situation before the 
concentration within a time limit, and may impose a fine of less than 500,000 yuan. 
Article 49 The specific amount of the fines as prescribed in Articles 46 through 48 shall be 
determined in consideration of such factors as the nature, extent and duration of the violations. 
Article 50 Where any loss was caused by a business operator''s monopolistic conducts to other 
entities and individuals, the business operator shall assume the civil liabilities. 
Article 51 Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power to eliminate 
or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to make correction and impose 
punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other directly liable persons. The anti-
monopoly authority may put forward suggestions on handling according to law to the relevant 
superior authority. 
Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the handling the 
organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs who 
abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, such provisions shall prevail. 
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Article 52 As regards the inspection and investigation by the anti-monopoly authority, if business 
operators refuse to provide related materials and information, provide fraudulent materials or 
information, conceal, destroy or remove evidence, or refuse or obstruct investigation in other 
ways, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to make rectification, impose a fine of less 
than 20,000 yuan on individuals, and a fine of less than 200,000 yuan on entities; and in case of 
serious circumstances, the anti-monopoly authority may impose a fine of 20,000 yuan up to 
100,000 yuan on individuals, and a fine of 200,000 yuan up to one million yuan on entities; where 
a crime is constituted, the relevant business operators shall assume criminal liabilities. 
Article 53 Where any party concerned objects to the decision made by the anti-monopoly 
authority in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of this Law, it may first apply for an administrative 
reconsideration; if it objects to the reconsideration decision, it may lodge an administrative 
lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Where any party concerned is dissatisfied with any decision made by the anti-monopoly authority 
other than the decisions prescribed in the preceding paragraph, it may lodge an application for 
administrative reconsideration or initiate an administrative lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Article 54 Where any functionary of the anti-monopoly authority abuses his/her power, neglects 
his/her duty, seeks private benefits, or discloses trade secrets he/she has access to during the 
process of law enforcement, and a crime is constituted, he/she shall be subject to the criminal 
liability; where no crime is constituted, he/she shall be imposed upon a disciplinary sanction. 
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions 
Article 55 This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise their 
intellectual property rights under laws and relevant administrative regulations on intellectual 
property rights; however, business operators'' conduct to eliminate or restrict market competition 
by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be governed by this Law. 
Article 56 This Law does not govern the ally or concerted actions of agricultural producers and 
rural economic organizations in the economic activities such as production, processing, sales, 
transportation and storage of agricultural products. 
Article 57 This Law shall enter into force as of August 1, 2008 
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Appendix 2 Interim Provisions on Assessment of Impact of 
Concentration of Business Operators on Competition 
Translated by Linklaters LLP, available at 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/AsiaNews/LinkstoChina/Pages/MOFCOMs-
new-interim-provisions-on-assessment-of-anti-competitive-effects-of-
mergers.aspx, last visited on 15 November 2013. 
Circular of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China No. 55 of 2011  
To standardise the assessment of the impact of concentration of business operators on 
competition in anti-monopoly review and to provide guidance to business operators in respect of 
the proper notification of the concentration of business operators, the Ministry of Commerce has 
formulated the Interim Provisions on Assessment of Impact of Concentration of Business 
Operators On Competition in accordance with the Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, the Measures for Notification of Concentration of Business Operators and the Measures 
for Review of Concentration of Business Operators. These Interim Provisions are hereby 
promulgated for implementation as from 5 September 2011.  
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China  
29 August 2011  
Article 1 These Provisions are formulated in accordance with the Anti-monopoly Law of the 
People’s Republic of China for the purpose of standardising the anti-monopoly review of the 
concentration of business operators and the assessment of the impact of the concentration of 
business operators on competition, as well as providing guidance to business operators in 
respect of the proper notification of the concentration of business operators.  
Article 2 The Ministry of Commerce conducts anti-monopoly review of the concentration of 
business operators in accordance with law.  
Article 3 The following factors must be considered comprehensively based on the particular 
facts and characteristics of each case when reviewing the concentration of business operators:  
(1) The market share accounted for by the business operators participating in the concentration 
in the relevant market and their market control power;  
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(2) The degree of concentration in the relevant market;  
(3) The impact of the concentration of business operators on market entry and technological 
advancement;  
(4) The impact of the concentration of business operators on consumers and other relevant 
business operators;  
(5) The impact of the concentration of business operators on the development of the national 
economy; and  
(6) Other factors having an impact on market competition which should be taken into 
consideration.  
Article 4 When assessing the potential negative impact of the concentration of business 
operators on competition, the first consideration is whether the concentration will give a business 
operator the ability, motive and possibility to independently eliminate or restrict competition or will 
increase such ability, motive and possibility.  
Where there are a small number of business operators in the market to which the concentration 
relates, it must also be considered whether the concentration will give the relevant business 
operators the ability, motive and possibility to jointly eliminate or restrict competition or will 
increase such ability, motive and possibility.  
Where the business operators participating in the concentration are not actual or potential 
competitors in the same relevant market, the review must focus on whether the concentration will 
or might have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the upstream and downstream 
markets or associated markets.  
Article 5 Market share is an important factor in analysing the structure of the relevant market and 
the position of the business operators and their competitors in the relevant market. Market share 
is a direct reflection of the structure of the relevant market and the position of the business 
operators and their competitors in the relevant market.  
The following factors must be considered comprehensively when determining whether the 
business operators participating in the concentration will acquire or increase its market control 
power:  
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(1) The market share accounted for by the business operators participating in the concentration 
in the relevant market and the competition conditions in the relevant market;  
(2) The substitutability of the products or services of the business operators participating in the 
concentration;  
(3) The productivity of those business operators in the relevant market who are not participating 
in the concentration, and the substitutability of their products or services for the products or 
services of the business operators participating in the concentration;  
(4) The ability of the business operators participating in the concentration to control the sales 
market or the raw materials procurement market;  
(5) The ability of the buyers of the goods of the business operators participating in the 
concentration to change their suppliers;  
(6) The financial and technical strengths of the business operators participating in the 
concentration;  
(7) The purchase power of the downstream customers of the business operators participating in 
the concentration;  
(8) Other factors which should be taken into consideration.  
Article 6 Market concentration is a way to describe the structure of the relevant market which 
reflects the degree of concentration of the business operators in the relevant market. Market 
concentration is often measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (or “HHI”, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Herfindahl Index”) and the combined market share of the top N enterprises in 
the industry (or “CRn”, hereinafter referred to as the “n-firm concentration ratio”). The Herfindahl 
Index is the sum of squared market share of each business operator in the relevant market. The 
n-firm concentration ratio is the sum of market share of the top N enterprises in the relevant 
market.  
Market concentration is one of the important factors to be considered when assessing the impact 
of the concentration of business operators on competition. Generally speaking, the more 
concentrated the relevant market is, the greater will be the increase in market concentration 
following the concentration, and more possible it will be for the concentration to have the effect of 
eliminating or restricting competition.  
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Article 7 The concentration of business operators may raise the barriers for entering the relevant 
market. After concentration, the business operators may make use of the market control power 
they acquire or increase through concentration to make it more difficult for other business 
operators to enter the relevant market by controlling the essential factors of production, sales 
channels, technological advantages and key facilities etc..  
When assessing the impact of the concentration of business operators on competition, the 
counterbalance by potential competitors entering the market could be taken into consideration.  
If entry to the relevant market to which the concentration relates is very easy, business operators 
not participating in the concentration will be able to react to and restrain the actions taken by the 
business operators participating in the concentration to eliminate or restrict competition.  
The possibility, timeliness and adequacy of entry must all be taken into consideration when 
determining whether it is easy to enter a market.  
Article 8 Through concentration, business operators can better integrate the resources and 
capacity required for technological research and development. This will have a positive impact on 
technological advancement and offset the negative impact of the concentration on competition. 
The positive impact of technological advancement can also benefit the consumers.  
Concentration may also have a negative impact on technological advancement in the following 
ways: easing the competitive pressure on the business operators participating in the 
concentration, reducing their motivation and input to technological innovation; enabling the 
business operators participating in the concentration to increase their market control through 
concentration and hinder the investment in and the research and development as well as 
utilisation of relevant technologies by other business operators.  
Article 9 As the concentration of business operators can improve economic efficiency, achieve 
the economies of scale and economies of scope, reduce production cost and increase product 
variety, it can be beneficial to consumers.  
Concentration may also increase the market control of the business operators participating in the 
concentration and increase their ability to take actions to eliminate or restrict competition, thus 
making it more likely for them to prejudice the interests of consumers through price increases, 
quality degrading, restricting output and sales, and reducing investment in technological research 
and development etc.  
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Article 10 Concentration of business operators can increase the competitive pressure on 
business operators in the relevant market, thus driving other business operators to improve 
product quality and reduce product prices, thereby benefiting consumers.  
With the market control acquired or increased through concentration, business operators 
participating in the concentration could, by implementing certain operational strategies or 
measures, restrict the business operators not participating in concentration from enlarging their 
operation scale or weaken their competitiveness, so as to reduce competition in the relevant 
market, or eliminate or restrict competition in the upstream and downstream markets or the 
associated markets.  
Article 11 Concentration of business operators will facilitate the expansion of business scale and 
the increase of market competitiveness, thereby increasing economic efficiency and promoting 
the development of the national economy.  
Under certain circumstances, concentration of business operators could also prejudice the 
effective competition in the relevant market and the sound development of the relevant industries, 
thus having an adverse effect on the national economy.  
Article 12 In addition to the factors above, some other factors must also be taken into 
consideration comprehensively when assessing a concentration of business operators. These 
factors include the impact of the concentration on public interests and economic efficiency, 
whether the business operators participating in the concentration are on the verge of bankruptcy, 
and whether there exists any countervailing buyer power.  
Article 13 If the concentration of business operators will or may have the effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition, the Ministry of Commerce must make a decision to prohibit such 
concentration. However, if the business operators can prove that the positive impact of the 
concentration on competition obviously outweighs its negative impact, or that the concentration is 
in the interest of the community or the public, the Ministry of Commerce may decide not to 
prohibit the concentration.  
With regard to any concentration of business operators which is not prohibited, the Ministry of 
Commerce may decide to impose restrictive conditions to reduce the negative impact of the 
concentration on competition.  
Article 14 These Interim Provisions will be implemented as from 5 September 2011. 
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Appendix 3 the Raw Statistics of Mergers Notified to the 
MOFCOM1 
 
Year Notificatio
ns 
Filing 
accepted 
Complete
d reviews 
Withdrawn Cleared 
unconditionall
y  
Cleared 
conditionall
y 
Blocked 
2008   17  16 1 0 
2009   80   4 1 
2010   117   1 0 
2011 203 185 168 5 159 4 0 
2012 201 186 154 6 142 6 0 
1-3/2013     45 0 0 
4-6/2013     56 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
1
 Statistics between 2008 and 2012 is copied from M Furse, Merger Control in China: Four and a Half 
Years of Practice and Enforcement-A Critical Analysis, (2013) Volume 36 Issue 2, World Competition: 
Law and Economics Review, pp. 285-313. 
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Appendix 4 Rules and Guidance Published in Relation to 
Merger Control in China until 30 June 20132 
 
Instrument Date of 
enactment  
Rules of the State Council on notification threshold for concentrations of 
undertakings (‘Notification Threshold’) 
1 August 2008 
Guidance for notification of concentrations of undertakings (‘Notification 
Guidance’) 
7 January 2009 
Guidance for notification documents and materials for concentrations of 
undertakings (‘Notification Documents etc’) 
7 January 2009 
Guidelines on the definition of the relevant market (‘Market Definition 
Guidance’) 
24 May 2009 
Measures on calculation of turnover for notification of concentrations of  
financial institutions (‘Measures on Turnover’) 
15 June 2009 
(Entry into force 
thirty days later) 
Measures on the notification of concentrations of undertakings (‘Notification 
Measures’) 
1 January 2010 
Measures on the review of concentrations of undertakings
3
 (the ‘Review 
Measures’) 
1 January 2010 
Interpretation on measures on the notification of concentrations of 
undertakings and measures on the review of concentrations of undertakings 
(‘Interpretation on Notification and Review Measures’) 
15 January 2010 
Provision measures on the implementation of divestiture of assets or 
businesses imposed on concentrations of undertakings (‘Provisional 
Divestiture Measures’) 
5 July 2010  
 
                                         
2
 The table is copied  from M Furse, ibid, 287 
3
 Replacing the Working guidance on anti-monopoly review of concentrations of undertakings 
published by MOFCOM on 1 January 2009. 
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Circular on establishing the mechanism for national security review of 
mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors 
(‘National Security Review Mechanism’) 
3 February 2011 
 
Provisions of MOFCOM on the implementation of the mechanism for the 
national security review of mergers and acquisition of domestic enterprises 
by foreign investors4 (‘National Security Review Implementation’) 
1 September 
2011 
Interim provision for the assessment of the effects of the concentrations of 
undertakings on competition (‘Competition Assessment’) 
5 September 
2011 
 
Interim measures on the investigation and handling of concentrations of 
undertakings that have failed to notify in accordance with applicable laws 
(‘Failure to Notify Measures’) 
1 February 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
4
 Replacing the Provisional provisions published by MOFCOM on 4 March 2011. 
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Appendix 5 Merger Cases Published in China up to 30 
June 2013 
 
DATE Merging Parties Decision of 
the 
MOFCOM 
Decision of the 
Commission  
Type of 
Concentration 
18/11/2008  Inbev/Anheuser-Busch Conditional 
clearance  
 Horizontal  
18/3/2009 Coca cola/Huiyuan  Blocked   Conglomerate 
24/4/ 2009 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite Conditional 
clearance 
 Horizontal and 
Vertical 
28/9/2009 General Motors/Delphi Conditional 
clearance  
Outright Clearance Vertical 
29/9/2009 Pfizer/Wyeth Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal  
30/10/2009 Panasonic/Sanyo  Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal  
13/8/ 2010 Novartis/Alcon    Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal  
28/6/2011 Uralkali/Silvinit  Conditional 
clearance  
 Horizontal  
31/10/2011 Savio/Penelope Conditional 
clearance  
 Horizontal  
10/11/2011 GE/Shenhua Conditional  joint venture 
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clearance  
12/12/2011 Seagate/Samsung Conditional 
clearance  
Outright clearance Horizontal  
9/2/2012 Henkel HK/Tiande  Conditional 
clearance  
 vertical 
2/2/2012 Western Digital/Viviti 
Technologies 
Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal  
19/5/ 2012 Google/Motorola 
Mobility 
Conditional 
clearance  
Outright Clearance Vertical 
15/6/2012 UTC/Goodrich  Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal 
13/8/2012 Walmart/Yihaodian Conditional 
clearance  
 Horizontal  
6/12/2012 ARM, 
Giesecke&Devrient and 
Gemalto 
Conditional 
clearance  
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Vertical 
16/4/2013 Glencore 
International/Xstrata  
Conditional 
clearance 
Clearance with 
Commitments 
Horizontal 
23/4/2013 Marubeni/Gavilon Conditional 
clearance 
Outright Clearance Horizontal 
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